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This dissertation addresses the problem of the sources of associational life 
and civic engagement. I develop a new theory of the origins of associational life 
by a comparative historical study of popular sector/lower class associations of 
urban and rural populations in a set of Western European countries during the 
period of the 1870s-1970s. The countries under study are Sweden, Norway, 
Austria (strong civil society); Germany, Netherlands, Belgium (medium to high 
associatonal life); Britain (medium associational life); Italy, France, Spain and 
Portugal (weal to very weak associational life). 
Three political and institutional factors have shaped civil society: 1) 
Timing of state building and/or international status in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. The latter the process of state building and/or the lower 
international status in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the stronger will be 
political parties and civil society organizations in the twentieth-century. In states 
that consolidated fully during the mid and late nineteenth-century and/or had 
been secondary states in the international system in the eighteenth-century, the 
pre-modern corporatist structures (e.g. guilds, religious corporate bodies) 
survived up to the early twentieth-century, because the pressures for resource 
extraction from state-builders were weaker. This in turn promoted a stronger 
popular sector organizational life in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  
2) State-capacity: the stronger state capacity, the stronger will be 
voluntary associations. States with high capacity are able to implement policies 
and establish goals autonomously decided by rulers. In the late nineteenth-
century, one of the main functions of the state became the promotion of economic 
development and nationalist mobilization. For this purpose states have 
established partnerships with associations. This has empowered associations, 
through two mechanisms. First, associations have received resources, legitimacy 
and public status from the State, being thus able to recruit more members through 
the distribution of selective benefits (welfare, pensions). Second, since high 
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capacity states are more able to impose a uniform jurisdiction and control over a 
territory, this will make easier for associations to expand through the whole 
national territory, to connect different geographical areas and more easily develop 
encompassing peak associations.  
3) Democratization: the stronger the degree of democratization of the 
regime between the 1880s and the 1930s, the stronger associational life. 
Democratization is measured by two dimensions: 3.1) the extension of rights of 
participation, debate, and assembly; 3.2) the degree of parliamentarization of the 
regime. This refers to the control by representative bodies of the formation, 
decisions, personnel and policies of the executive. The stronger the parliament, 
the more associational leaders will seek to influence and establish links with MPs 
and political parties and build their own agenda according to parliamentary 
cycles. Since strong parliaments represent the whole nation, associations will 
tend to become national in scope, and as such more coordinated through the 
territory, with associational leaders creating links and alliances that run through 
several regions of the country. Moreover, in a strongly parliamentarized system 
parties will be also more interested in creating permanent and not episodic links 
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Introduction: The Research Question 
 
In the political development of Western Europe, since the late eighteenth 
century collective action started to be organized through voluntary associations. 
As Philippe Schmitter argued, «the propensity of actors for forming, joining, or 
participating in permanently administered secondary groups» increasingly 
became the main form for Europeans to «advance or defend a specific set of 
interests that explicitly advance or defend a specific set of interests».1 Collective 
action in previous eras had taken the form of social networks and organizations 
such as clans, families, villages, communities, royal families, ethnic diasporas or 
churches. Although they were never dominant, forms of proto-associations 
existed. For instance, one thinks of  the professional associations and craft guilds 
during the Renaissance or the organizational forms of the Protestant sects during 
the Reformation. Yet, it was only after the French revolution that collective 
action became increasingly associational.2 
This new situation was brought about by profound societal and political 
changes. Societal transformations included the emergence of capitalism and the 
processes of industrialisation and urbanisation, which stimulated the appearance 
of new social groups, like the bourgeoisie and later the proletariat, and of new 
professional categories and economic sectors. Politically, state-building processes 
(e.g. the extension of administrative and coercive capacities of the state over 
populations) led to growing pressures from elites for the extraction of resources 
from subject populations which in turn stimulated organized democratization 
pressures from below. The growth of the national state implied the establishment 
of ties to a large-scale political unit, which by itself pushed for the rebuilding or 
dissolution of for example such primordial social identities as the community or 
the family. Moreover, political transformations, like the French revolution, 
created mass-based ideological left-right cleavages and paved the way for the 
development of struggles over the definition of rights and obligations between the 
rulers and the ruled, namely of the meaning of citizenship.  
                                                 
1 Schmitter, 1971, p. 6. 
2 Tilly, 1976, p. 7. 
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As a consequence of the emergence of new social groups and political 
identities, the traditional estate-based organisation typical of the Ancien Regime 
was unable to continue to be the institutional site for the resolution of such 
conflicts as for instance those pitting labourers against owners and employers or 
those over the definition of political issues like the extension of suffrage or the 
rights of assembly. Although there were variations within Western Europe with 
respect to the survival of premodern institutions like corporations, the self-
organisation of new political and social forces through formal voluntary 
associations was a much more efficient organisational device.3 
Nevertheless, from the very onset of modernisation, we can note 
differences between European societies with respect to the way the modern 
organisation of the voluntary association established itself, its political role, 
national levels of membership or coverage, and variations in the types of 
associations. For instance, as Reinhard Bendix stressed, in countries like France, 
social movements were mainly based on networks of informal solidarity, whereas 
in England they were mainly constituted through networks of formal associations. 
Also, the right to form associations varied immensely in the nineteenth century 
Western Europe. While England and the German states had very restrictive laws 
about associational life, although they were directed mainly against working class 
organisations, France’s Loi Le Chapelier set a pattern of state repression and 
harassment of voluntary associations. In turn, the Scandinavian states and 
Switzerland (although here with cantonal variations) were more tolerant and 
allowed more freedom of association.4  
After the 1930s/1940s until very recently these differences tended to 
stabilize, thus creating varying institutionalized patterns. For instance, 
contemporary levels of citizens’ membership in voluntary associations in 
Western European countries show great variations between 1945 and 2000. 
European countries tend to form clusters, with rankings stable over time. The first 
cluster is formed by countries like Iceland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Denmark, and Finland, where between 60% to 80% of the population is affiliated 
                                                 
3 Gouldner, 1980, pp. 355-373. 
4 Bendix, 1988. 
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with associations; West Germany, Belgium, Great Britain, and Austria, with a 
percentage between 50% and 60%, form the second cluster; Ireland and 
Switzerland, with an approximate percentage of 40%, constitute the third cluster; 
and lastly, Italy, France, and Portugal share an approximate percentage of 30%, 
while only 20% of Spain’s population is affiliated with associations.5 Voluntary 
associations in Western European democracies also vary in many other 
dimensions, like the degree to which they are integrated into peak associations 
(federations and confederations), influence the design and implementation of 
public policy, the degree to which they form parts of networks of policy 
implementation, or are favored partners of a state.6 
This dissertation proposes to develop an explanation of variations of 
associational life in Western European democracies, applicable to a set countries 
composed of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Great Britain, Italy, France, Portugal, and Spain. I discern a combination of 
factors that lie in the genesis and spread of the voluntary associations and that 
account for national variations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I make 
three types of comparisons. First, between the above mentioned of countries from 
the nineteenth century to the 1970s. I argue that national patterns of associational 
life became established and stable during the period starting from the turn of the 
1940s and lasting until the late twentieth century. In looking for an explanation, 
one should study the antecedent period of interwar Europe, namely how the push 
for mobilization and associational expansion of the interwar years interacted with 
institutional legacies, processes of state building, and previous patterns of 
associational life inherited from the past (since at least the eighteenth century) to 
produce the patterns that stabilized after 1945. 
In this respect, I make a contribution to the contemporary debate on the 
supposed decline and/or transformation of associational life. Many argue that 
traditional forms of participation and civic engagement are in decline, one 
                                                 
5  Wilensky, 2002, p. 142; for the years 1977-1998 see Eurobarometer; 1999 and 2002 see 
Ulzurrum, 2001, p. 425. 
6 Schmitter, 1999; Wessels, 1997, p. 201. 
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protagonist being Robert D. Putnam with his Bowling Alone.7  More recently, 
Philippe Schmitter and Alexander Treschel have contributed to this debate with 
an analysis of the countries of the Council of Europe, putting forward many 
hypotheses that could explain variations in levels of associational life, from more 
cultural and societal transformations like globalization, immigration, 
individuation, and mediatization to political causes like European integration and 
changes in state capacity. Moreover, as their study demonstrates, Putnam’s 
conclusions on the decline of associational life are typical only in the United 
States. In many European countries, there are varying trends, even with the rise 
of participation in voluntary associations in many countries. Rates of affiliation 
with voluntary ssociations by the national adult populations are not declining and 
show even a predicted rise. Union density has declined in Western Europe, but 
only slightly, while there has been a major decline in the United States.8 
Yet, the contemporary debate suffers from gaps. To understand the causes 
of the supposed decline/rise/stability of associational life, we must understand 
first the causes of the emergence of associational life and the mechanisms that 
consolidated it in various national patterns. Only after establishing a historical 
theory of the origins of associational life in Western Europe, we can explain the 
more recent transformations. The same set of factors that contributed to the 
varying patterns established in the so-called historical era, or the mass age of 
associational life (1870s-1970s), should be taken into account before embarking 
in explanations of contemporary changes. 
Second, I compare Portugal and Spain between the 1970s and 2000. Here, 
I use the two Iberian democracies to debate contemporary theories of post-
authoritarian civil societies. Portugal and Spain have the weakest and least 
developed associational life in terms of rates of affiliation, organizational 
development, and federative structures. This is a legacy of the long period of 
authoritarianism, which itself was the product of the conflicts of the interwar age 
and the mass age period. The push for associational development in the 1920s 
                                                 
7 Putnam, 2000. 
8 Union density in the USA fell from 45% in 1970 to 18% to 1995. Schmitter, Trechsel, 2004, pp. 
40-45. 
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and the 1930s interacted with previous patterns of state and institutional building 
that produced by the late 1930s a pattern of associational life stabilization by 
state-corporatist authoritarian regimes that left a legacy of localistic, 
individualistic, passive, and uncoordinated voluntary associations that have lasted 
until the present day. In this sense, civil societies that develop in democracies 
after authoritarian regimes, as opposed to some other form of previous regime 
(e.g. oligarchic-competitive liberalism or mobilizing dictatorships) will be 
weakly developed. Yet, not all post-authoritarian civil societies are condemned to 
be weak, and there are significant differences between post-authoritarian 
democracies. In this sense, I compare Portugal and Spain in order to isolate the 
factors that could explain varying patterns of associational life in post-
authoritarian democracies. This is a significant contribution, since many argue 
that third wave democracies have more difficulties, because of the experience of 
authoritarianism, to develop a democratic and participatory citizenry. Thus, to 
know when this kind of civic engagement emergesit is a fruitful contribution to 
the debates on the quality of recent democracies. 
Finally, I make a third comparison between early and late democratizers. 
By comparing two periods of historical development (from the late nineteenth 
century until the 1930s and from the 1970s until 2000), I propose a general theory 
of associational life, valid for modernity, and having the Western European 
continent as units of comparison.9 
In the first part of this dissertation I theorize about associational life in 
order to distinguish its component properties and dimensions. I argue that 
national patterns of associational life vary in their degree of density (the 
propensity of individuals to affiliate in voluntary associations) and coordination 
(the degree to which associations tend to form peak associations). Variation 
between Western European democracies is then established according to these 
dimensions in order to establish types of associational life in the post-1930s-
1940s period. These patterns of associational life constitute the variation to be 
explained. I examine critically existing theories that account for varying patterns 
                                                 
9 Similar approcahes have been attempted for issues like democratization. See Collier, 1999. 
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of associational life and propose my own theory. I argue that patterns of 
associational life are the result of the varying combination of three factors: 1) the 
degree to which by the late nineteenth century in Western European pre-modern 
corporate forms of associational life in the economy and in politics (e.g. guilds in 
government) still existed (which itself was the result of state-church relationships 
established after the peace of Westphalia, in 1648, timing of state building, and 
international status of the country by the late eighteenth century); 2) the degree of 
democratization of the regime between the mid-nineteenth century until 1918, 
especially the role and strength of the parliament; 3) the degree of state capacity. 
The higher a country is ranked in each of these items, the stronger (denser and 
more coordinated) would be voluntary associations within that country. Varying 
mixes of these factors contributed to different types of associational life in the 
period from the 1930s until 2000.  
To some degree, the theory developed here should be seen as a 
contribution to theories of neo-corporatism, more specifically as a historical 
explanation of the origins of state and societal corporatisms in Western Europe. I 
argue that there is no unified theory on this topic. The major theorists of neo-
corporatism (Schmitter, Streeck, and Lembruch) have focused mainly on the 
properties and effects of neo-corporatism but much less on its origins. I build on 
their suggestions, combining them with the ideas of other schools that have also 
analyzed voluntary associations (welfare state theories and historical-
institutionalism), in order to provide a historical comparative approach that looks 
for causal configurations and combinations of causes that interact to produce 
these varying patterns of associational life. This will be the subject of parts II and 
III of this dissertation, where my theory is demonstrated with the help of  a 
historical analytical narrative of the group of Western European countries 
mentioned above. Finally, in part IV I explain variations between contemporary 
Portugal and Spain. I argue that differences in associational life between these 
two neo-democracies are the result of three factors: 1) legacies of state-
corporatism inherited from the authoritarian period, in particular the form the 
dynamics of liberalization of the dictatorships (mid-1960s until mid-1970s); 2) 
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processes of regime-building, in particular during the process of transition from 
authoritarianism (mode of transition) (mid-1970s until early 1980s); 3) 
institutional configurations of the new democracy, namely the degree to which 
welfare state institutions have been set up as well as the degree that political 
parties and associations have created links with each other. 
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Part I: Patterns of Associational life in Western Europe, 1800-2000 
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Chapter 1: Conceptualization: Associational life in Western Europe, 1800-2000 
 
1.1. Collective Action, Associational life, and Voluntary Association 
 
The representation and intermediation of societal interests by voluntary 
associations is something new of modern societies. Before the modern age 
societal groups were mainly represented by other institutions and organizations 
like churches, corporate groups, or kinship networks. In the course of 
modernization, which implied the building of states and markets at the national 
level, they were progressively replaced by formal organizations that aggregated 
preferences at the territorial (political parties) and functional (associations or 
interest groups) levels.10 
In this sense, voluntary associations are one of many forms for «people [to] 
act together in pursuit of shared interests».11 It is a form of collective action; to 
participate, affiliate, obey, support, or found a voluntary association is a matter of 
collective action, the ability of groups of individuals to agree to pursue courses of 
action on the basis of a perception and construction of common interests.12 At 
this level of abstraction, the dilemmas and constraints that individuals face when 
deciding to participate in a voluntary association are generically conceptualized 
under conditions of collective action. 
Mancur Olson was the main contemporary theorist linking the issue of 
collective action with the general theme of the formation and affiliation in 
voluntary associations. Olson argued that associational life does not come 
naturally out of rational action. Individuals pursuing their self-interest will not 
necessarily form or engage in associations. This varied inversely with the 
probable number and dispersion of participants. For instance, the higher the pool 
of prospective members of association, the less impact the effort of one particular 
individual will have on the participation’s outcome, and thus, it is rational to free 
ride. According to Olson, only when groups are small and/or compact, and as a 
                                                 
10 Rokkan, 1966. 
11 Tilly, 1978, p. 5. 
12 Olson, 2000. 
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consequence the effort of one individual will actually make a difference in the 
outcome of participation, people will voluntarily participate in associations. In 
contrast, people would participate in bigger groups only if coerced to the 
association (either by the state, e.g. legal rules that specify that a individual must 
be affiliated in a union if he wants to enter a certain profession, or by strong 
moral pressures from the community, usually the situation in small compact 
groups), or if selective benefits were presented by the association itself (e.g. 
insurance schemes or travel prizes provided by a union so as to attract 
membership).13 
Olson’s perspective was an improvement in relation to previous theories 
which predicted that whenever there was a perceived common interest or a 
context of social disturbance, a decision to be involved or to found a voluntary 
association would follow rather automatically.14 According to traditional pluralist 
thinking, people join groups naturally, in order to support common goals. The 
process of evolution from social interests to self-organization through 
associations is unproblematic. Individuals who have common interests would 
form formal groups which then transmit these interests to the political system. 
Voluntary associations are considered to emerge naturally from the simple 
existence of different groups or aggregates of individuals with potential and real 
differences of interest. 
Olson’s theory, however, is unable to account for certain aspects of voluntary 
associations. Several theorists have revised Olson’s theory with new assumptions 
about the criteria that structure individual choice in participating in associations. 
For example, Terry Moe has argued that when an individual calculates her costs 
and benefits she may think that her contribution will make a difference. In this 
sense, she may have a «perception of efficacy». These motivations are not 
necessarily economic; instead, they are a «purposive sense of satisfaction from 
the act of contributing itself». In fact, there are several types of motivations for 
individuals to participate that are not accounted for by the exclusively rationalist 
line of thinking in Olson’s contribution. Some of these are motives of solidarity, 
                                                 
13 Olson, 2000, pp. 5-65. See also Walker, 1991, pp. 45-46 and Wilson, 1973, p. 20. 
14 As argued by Truman, 1971. 
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like the ones arising out of friendship, feelings, social status identification, or the 
need of social acceptance. Others are purposive, more related to ideological, 
moral, and religious principles. These motivations constitute in many historical 
contexts the main basis for joining and forming associations.15 
Moreover, James Q. Wilson developed further Moe’s theory of incentives. 
The first type of motivation/incentives, Wilson argued, was the material 
incentives that push individuals to participate. Money rewards, like the possibility 
of getting a wage raise or a job, would be higher when entering an association 
that somehow controls the distribution of these resources (e.g. trade unions with 
closed agreements). Similar to Moe, Wilson considered also solidarity incentives. 
These can be specific, in the sense that the rewards are endogenous in the act of 
participation and given to particular individuals, like offices, honors, and 
deference, or they can be exogenous, namely that the satisfaction derives from 
doing things collectively. In the latter case, participation is an end in itself, and 
the more people participate, the more each individual will benefit. Many 
associations are of this latter type; consider for example the various status clubs 
and fraternal organizations. Finally, purposive incentives derive from «the sense 
of satisfaction of having contributed to the attainment of a worthwhile cause». In 
many historical contexts, the motivation to associate was ideological, even 
altruistic, in the sense that nonmembers could also benefit from the fulfillment of 
the association’s goals. For instance, ideological conceptions of justice are a case 
in point. Here an individual’s participation depends on the others’ participation. 
Ideological bonds that foster strong solidary and common cooperation are created 
(e.g. specific goals like pro- and anti-abortion movements or ideological goals 
like parties and religious sects).16 
A second aspect that Olson ignored was the role of leaders and founders of 
associations. Moe already touched on that subject when he argued that leaders 
must be sensitive to a group’s preferences or risk becoming isolated. This hinted 
at the partial autonomy of the leaders of a particular association in the sense that 
they are not the mere representatives of the members’ interests. Firstand in a very 
                                                 
15 Moe, 1981, pp. 536-537. 
16 Wilson, 1973, pp. 18-25. 
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material sense, leaders invest the resources they have or are able to gather in the 
initial founding of an association. Second, leaders have also margins of action 
that allow them to shape the inducements for collective action. Robert Salisbury 
pushed this point further when he argued that the associational entrepreneur 
pursues first and foremost his private interests and does not necessarily always 
take into account the views of the other members in his actions. Members’ views 
are only considered up to the point where they do not compromise the viability of 
the association as founded by its leader. 17  Moreover, as Wilson argued, as 
organizations grow in membership, there is usually the need for the existence of a 
staff to coordinate joint actions, which gradually becomes a group with its own 
interest in maintaining its position within the association. In turn, associations 
tend to develop distinctions between administrative and leadership positions and 
the rank and file members.18 In this sense, associational leaders, founders, and 
staff are mobilizers and demobilizers, meaning that they are the very agents who 
define the collective interest of a given social group. In a sense, group interests 
do not exist before somebody, usually an associational entrepreneur and founder, 
articulates them. As Salisbury argued, it is the entrepreneur that sets in motion the 
demand, and before he offers his benefits for the association, we cannot really 
speak of interests. 
Yet, these theories are incomplete in many respects. First, there is an 
excessive focus on individual motivations. Instead, we should move beyond the 
individual in the core analysis and complement it with an attention to the social 
and political contexts. Although it is true that individuals are rational, they do not 
live in a societal void. Groups exist in historical settings and they are shaped not 
only by their internal dynamics but also by inherited traditions of collective 
action and previous patterns of associational life as well as by cross-cutting social 
and political processes intersecting with the groups’ dynamics. Second, 
organisational persistence is not explained by these theories. One is left with the 
impression that organisations tend to lose membership and hence cease to exist if 
they base their appeals exclusively on “erroneous” definitions of individual 
                                                 
17 Salisbury, 1969, p. 26. 
18 Moe, 1981, pp. 536-537. 
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interest. But what makes individuals to be responsive to solidarity and purposive 
goods? Moreover, what makes these organizations persist over time, when 
frequently the intensity of mobilization based in solidarity or purposive 
incentives has faded away? Associational persistence is determined to a large 
degree by the historical origins of an association and specifically by the way an 
association could become embedded in the social and political structures.19 In 
sum, earlier theories are too general, ahistorical, and oblivious of context. 
To go beyond these the existing approaches, it is necessary to develop an 
institutional and historical theory that locates associational formation, 
persistence, and transformations in socio-political contexts, and that is attentive 
to historical variations.20 Societies differ in their so-called degree of associational 
life: the extent to which the expression of interests will take the form of voluntary 
association, the social movement and the party or will take any other form that is 
non-associative. Thus, to understand the particular role of associational life in a 
given society, it is necessary to compare the organisation of associational life 
with other institutions concerning the expression of interests. This is what 
Tocqueville meant when he wrote that «wherever at the head of some new 
undertaking you see the government in France, or a man of rank in England, in 
the United States you will be sure to find an association».21  Alternatively in 
Philippe Schmitter’s words, «associational life never completely monopolises the 
interactions between the state and the individuals, firms and clans, but operates 
alongside these interactions in differing mixes of efforts to influence the course 
of public policy».22 
In this enterprise, the first task is to situate collective action through voluntary 
associations within the overall patterns and diversity of forms of collective 
action. First, one needs to specify and understand the different modes of 
collective action, so as to be able to situate the voluntary association within the 
universe of forms of collective action. Moreover, one must define the dimensions 
                                                 
19 Wilson, 1973, pp. 22-23. 
20 McAdam, McCarthy, Zald, 1996, p. 5; Wessels, 1997, p. 202; for a review see Walker, 1991, 
pp. 41-49, 51. 
21 Tocqueville, 1994, p. 106.  
22 Schmitter, 1997, p. 240.  
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under which collective action varies. It is my argument that collective action 
should be discussed in two important aspects. The first aspect to discuss is the 
nature of those ties that connect an individual to the course of action, and they 
can be formal or informal. The second aspect is the degree of exit from those ties, 
varying between high and low. 
Collective action can be organised under formal or informal ties. It can take 
the form of organised and formalised organisations, involving some kind of 
organisational creation and degree of bureaucratisation, or subsist over already 
established social networks and relationships and be based on non-written shared 
understandings and rules. Informal collective action can take the form of protest 
actions bringing together disparate groups and communities, like in strikes or in 
riots; or it can be the expression of interests through such institutions as the 
church, primary social groups (the community or family), personal followings, 
plain gatherings of people, networks like bureaucratic factions, diplomatic and 
civil service cercles, clientelas, gangs of criminal entrepreneurs like the Mafia, 
followings under warlords, social banditry, or communal chiefdoms.23 Informal 
collective action is always based on personal ties of trust, it has a tendency to be 
local and territorial, and in its simplest forms (e.g. street gangs) it arises out of the 
«habitual association of the members over a long period of time».24 Formal ties 
are typical of modern voluntary associations but also of other modern institutions 
like the state. They vary in the degree of freedom that partners have to disengage 
from these relationships, but at the core there is a written definition and 
specification of rights and duties of the actors engaging in collective action, like 
the definitions of the role of the member of an association or a political party 
specified in the statutes of these organizations, or the definition of rights and 
obligations of citizens vis-à-vis the state, in laws, constitutions, and so on. 
This distinction was first formulated by Ferdinand Tönnies in his 
conceptualisation of forms of social life. Tönnies distinguished between two ideal 
types of society. The first, Gemeinschaft, is equated with community life and 
involves all kinds of social co-existence that are «familiar, conformable and 
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exclusive». It manifested itself in what Tönnies called communities of blood, 
social relationships between mother and child, man and woman, brothers and 
sisters, but also in communities of place (the neighbourhood, and the village) and 
communities of faith (religion). These are durable relationships that are based on 
people having lived long together and/or having possessed goods in common 
(like land), which produce as a consequence strong bonds of friendship and 
loyalties. In its purest form, it implies common friends and common enemies. 
The other ideal type of society is Gesellschaft, which is a characteristic of 
modern urban and industrial society. Individuals establish contractual 
relationships and voluntary agreements between free-willing agents that are 
neither determined nor previously established by the habit of living together in 
the same village or by being a member of the same family. Here, individuals do 
not possess previous bonds but rather, they establish contractual bonds that are 
meant to serve mutual advantages.25 
Although I was inspired by this conceptualisation, I depart from it because 
these ideal types are identified with types of society, with whole societies, 
whereas I restrict the level generalisation to types of social relationships, to a 
specific dimension of social life which I consider relevant to the problem at hand. 
The second dimension is the facility of exit from those ties. Once within a 
network of collective action, individuals face varying degrees of freedom in 
leaving the network, if they feel that are not receiving the expected benefits.26 In 
other words, this dimension refers to the degree of control that a network and its 
leaders have on members’ actions. Several means can be employed by them, like 
having the power to distribute valuable goods for the members that cannot be 
found anywhere else (monopolistic access to valuable goods) or through 
sanctions, whether psychological (e.g. excommunication in the church) or 
physical (coercion, threat to physical integrity and even life).27 This means that 
networks of collective action, associational or not, are providers of goods and 
enforcers of compliance that urge a cost/benefit calculation on members who 
                                                 
25 Tönnies, 2001, pp. 18, 22-23, 27-29, 36, 56, 63, 65.  
26 Hirschman, 1970, pp. 15-17, 22-25. 
27 Hirschman, 1970, pp. 93, 96. 
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contemplate whether to stay in or leave a network. Both formal and informal 
networks of collective action do this. They refer to «mechanisms whereby 
pertinent individuals are induced to join, and stay involved» in these collective 
action networks.28  
Extreme cases of very high costs of leaving are totalitarian parties criminal 
groups that eliminate their dissidents or states that control vehemently their 
borders. According to Hirschman, organisations like the church, the family, the 
tribe, and the state are cases where the exit option is very costly.29  Informal 
associations like the family give access of emotional and material support 
benefits; communities of territory give self-identification and public recognition 
of status; criminal networks, through high risk (physical) adventures give access 
to fast and vast material goods; political parties give members the benefits of 
purposive benefits, of the sense of fulfilment of the civic duty of participation 
under a common ideology and access to resources of the state; and voluntary 
associations give members identification benefits and access to selective goods 
(e.g. welfare benefits channelled through professional associations to the 
individuals in a certain productive sector). In many contexts there is also some 
degree of coercion involved. Leaders and officials of a voluntary association have 
an interest to coerce members to stay in the association, for example by raising 
the costs of access to certain goods making it harder for people to leave the 
association. In these situations, we can talk of non-voluntary membership or 
participation.30 
 
The dimensions of collective action can be formed into a typology of 





                                                 
28 Kaufman, 2002, pp. 66-67. 
29 Hirschman, 1970, pp. 33, 76, 96. 
30 The notion of non-voluntary associational life is central in Streeck and Schmitter, 1985. 
 23
  Table 1- Forms of Collective Action 
 
 High Bus Line   
Associational 
Life 
   Gathering/Crowd    
Exit   Church      
 Low Family 
 
Community  
  State 
        Informal          Formal 




The upper left quadrant refers to those forms of collective action that are 
informal and with high degree of exit. A pure form is the occasional meeting 
between two strangers that engage in short-term collective action for some 
immediate purpose with their interaction finishing rapidly after both or one of 
them considers that her aims have been achieved (e.g. helping someone change a 
tire on a country road). Cases a bit more coherent are the common phenomena of 
gatherings and crowds, when people that accidentally or by some predetermined 
routine are put together in the same context and because of an external stimulus 
and based in implicit codes of behaviour pursue local and short term common 
action (e.g. bus line). Other cases are short-term peasant rebellions that mobilize 
many people but end soon, and that are unable to sustain themselves for a long 
time period because individual defection happens very soon.31 
The lower left quadrant refers to forms of collective action whose ties are 
informal and the exit possibility is low. In most human societies, the family is the 
typical form here; it is based on affective feelings of belonging that are not 
written but whose costs of leaving are very high, both materially (especially in 
the first two formative decades of the individual in modern societies) and 
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emotionally (it is possible to break with one’s family completely but at cost of 
running into high emotional loss). 
The lower right quadrant refers to those collective action forms where exit is 
low and ties are formal. Historically, the state has provided a clear example. It is 
a formal organization that attributes differentiating tatus to the individuals within 
its territory according to legal and predefined criteria (e.g. tax-payer categories, 
citizenship statutes, or nationality attribution), and that determines this formal 
attribution of status from an individual’s birth to his death. Moreover, it is 
coercive, and in this sense it is a high-exit organization. It has a panoply of 
instruments (police, army, and officials) to coerce individuals to give it their 
resources (e.g. taxes), time (e.g. civil service) and even their life (e.g. military 
conscription in periods of war).32 
The upper right side of the typology refers to the high exit and formal ties 
forms of collective action. Several forms of modern voluntary associations fall in 
this quadrant: political parties, associations, and movements. They are formal in 
being groups that are set up specifically to define and promote sets of interests, 
but whose apprehension does not derive from the patterns of relationship 
transmitted by tradition and by almost self-evident and spontaneous associations 
of individuals, like in the family or in the community. On the contrary, these are 
forms of collective action set up with the purpose of promoting and defining 
interests that are non-ascriptive, somehow “artificial”, connected by ideology, 
shared by a profession or a class, and that bring together individuals of otherwise 
different backgrounds. As Otto von Gierke argued, the emergence of the modern 
voluntary association is a hallmark of modernity, what he called the «spirit of 
association». These were forms of collective action that in his opinion were 
formed for single purposes (whereas the family, the community or medieval 
corporations absorbed the whole person). In other words, they were specialized 
formal organizations. Moreover, according to Gierke, they are also based on the 
free choice of individuals, thus imposing low exit costs on the members. The 
same individual can belong to a plurality of associations of different purposes 
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(charity, political, and professional) and many combinations are possible for each 
individual. 33  More recently, Pizzorno argued in a similar vein: a voluntary 
association is a formal group «created through the free choice of their members, 
who can leave whenever they desire, and which pursues specific, declared goals 
by means of collective action».34 
We call this the sphere of Associational life. Still, there are variations to 
consider in this form of collective action. First, one should not assume that the 
degree of exit is the same in every association or during each historical period. 
Associations and their leaders raise the costs of exit when they are able to possess 
a monopolistic control over the access to certain goods, especially when they 
have been able to secure a privileged representative role in their constituencies 
vis-a-vis the authorities and the state. In these contexts, associations frequently 
become vehicles of state policy. In fact, historically it has been common that the 
state legislates mandatory or quasi-mandatory membership in certain 
associations. This is especially true of a subset of democratic countries after the 
1930s-1940s: the northern European neo-corporatist civil societies (the 
Scandinavian countries, Austria, and the Netherlands are examples of this). 
Second, one should also consider the political party as a modern form of 
associational life. The difference with other forms of associational life is that 
voluntary associations formulate and express interests based on class, sectoral, 
and professional interests, while political parties are associations devoted to 
conquering and ruling the state apparatus. The former is functional, the latter is 
territorial. A voluntary association is a self-organised intermediary group that is 
relatively independent of authorities and of informal groups of collective 
action,35 and it has «a clearly definable membership»,36 a «consciously adopted 
name»,37 and it is «capable of deliberating about and taking collective actions in 
defence or promotion of their interests or passions». 38  On the other hand, a 
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36 Wilson, 1973, p. 31.  
37 Wilson, 1995, p. 31. 
38 Schmitter, 1997, p. 240. 
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political party is a «political association whose principal objective is to control 
the recruitment» to the state, and whose political objectives are less specific than 
those of associations.39 Parties are mainly oriented to competition in elections for 
the occupation of political office and the formation of governing elites.40 Civic 
groups, unions, trade associations, NGO’s, and neighborhood commissions are all 
examples of voluntary associations. 
As will become evident later, the relation between party and voluntary 
association can be also cumulative. It is interesting to explain the variations 
between and within societies given the relative importance of voluntary 
associations and parties. In some societies parties dominate all the associative 
landscape; in others, affiliation and participation in events organised by voluntary 
associations (broadly defined as social movements) monopolise associational life 
outside the party arena. A good example is provided by democratising Poland, 
where democratic consolidation was achieved through loose networks of 
associations in the form of social movements, which acquired some degree of 
institutionalisation but had very weak links with parties. 41  In some societies 
voluntary associations have strong mobilising capabilities, and they are numerous 
and perform various activities, while in others none of this happens. Moreover, 
the associational dynamics between a party and a voluntary association can be in 
some contexts mutually reinforcing, whereas in others they can be conflictual.42 
These sometimes contradictory, sometimes compatible paths between parties and 
voluntary associations should be related to the changing nature and types of 
parties and associations during the twentieth century. 
Obviously, the borders between these types of collective action are neither 
fixed nor clear-cut, and I keep distinctions for analytical purposes. Some 
associations have evolved and prospered using resources from these previous 
informal types (e.g. a sports club based on a local community) or a formal 
organisation may evolve into informal collective action (terrorist groups that 
                                                 
39 Schmitter, 1971, p. 9.  
40 Rucht, 1996, pp. 186-187.  
41 Ekiert, Kubik, 1999, p. 197.  
42  We would advance the observation that early twentieth century processes of European 
democratization fit the first situation, while late twentieth century democratization the second.  
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originated in political organisations). 43  Examples abound. In the nineteenth 
century France, the mode of organisation of unions and the preferred modes of 
collective action (strikes and collective violence) were highly correlated. In this 
respect, a major causal factor was the legislation on strikes.44 In situations where 
there was restriction on the freedom of association, collective action tended to 
assume non-formal and non-legal forms, like secret societies (e.g. masonry), and 
to occupy the informal spaces of sociability (e.g. religious ceremonies, funerals 
as well as theatrical events). Another example is the Solidarity union in 
Communist Poland that was simultaneously a trade union and a citizens’ 
committee, and that during the phase of democratisation originated from both 
parties and associations.45 
From this typology, and in order to develop a theory of associational life, two 
crucial implications follow. First, the forces that push for the development of 
associational life, that is formal easy-exit units of collective action, are the ones 
that undermine informal collective action. In societies where parties, interest 
groups, and voluntary associations are weak, we should expect the state, 
communities, political networks, gangs, families, and gatherings to be the more 
common venues of collective action. This is a way to conceptualise the need that 
a theory of associational life formation must also require a theory of non-
associational life formation, to see which institutions in society perform the roles 
of aggregating preferences and identity formation that we would expect parties 
and associations to perform. Moreover, most societies are a mix of the above 
mentioned forms of collective action, and their internal dynamics are processes of 
tension andadaptation between these forms. Societies are composed of different 
mixes of formal and informal collective action, and with differing degrees of 
integration within the state. Some societies have a higher role for informal 
collective action, while others are more formalized with such an encompassing 
role for associations that they become one of the main pillars of social order.46 In 
sum, the tensions and agreements between these clusters of collective action 
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shape a society. With this conceptualisation I go beyond the usual division 
between modern and traditional societies and avoid the teleological reasoning 
that implies that modernisation necessarily evolves in the direction of 
associational life. Moreover, I argue that modernisation dynamics in one society 
may even strengthen informal collective action, while in another society they 
may produce formal collective action. The difference arises from the ways in 
which social dynamics interact with historical and institutional legacies.47 
Second, what explains variations in the strength and the role of voluntary 
associations in societies? Assuming a common tendency towards the 
development of voluntary associations in modern societies since the eighteenth 
century, which is usually called the associational life sector, what explains its 
different levels across countries? In order to answer this, one must narrow the 
level of abstraction and find dimensions to compare and classify national civil 
societies. This is the topic of the next section. 
 
1.2. Patterns of Associational life, 1930s/1940s-2000 
 
Descriptively speaking, associational life is constituted by the number of, and 
the interactive dynamics between, voluntary associations that exist in a particular 
setting. It is a «set or system of self-organized intermediary groups that» 
deliberate and promote their interests, ideologies and conceptions of individual 
and/or collective interesst through collective action. 48  It is «organized social 
activity that occurs in groups that are formed outside the State, the market, and 
the family».49 But it is composed of that part of associational life which is not 
political parties. 
Associational life is a difficult concept to operationalize and to identify. First, 
it does not have one specific institutional setting but several, depending on the 
associational arena in question (e.g. religion, human rights, neighbourhood 
committees, or trade unions). In this sense associational life is «internally 
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48 Schmitter, 1997; see also Ekiert, 2001, p. 83 and Rueschemeyer, 1998, p. 12. 
49 Pharr, 2003, p. xiii. 
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diversified and composed of various sectors, which are characterized by great 
fluidity».50 Associational life has heterogeneous and possibly different operating 
logics at regional or sectoral/policy levels. As a consequence, not all associations 
are related to each other.51 Ekiert considers at least seven sectors in contemporary 
civil societies: labor organizations, NGO’s, social movements, youth 
organizations, religious ethnic associations, and neighborhood/recreational 
associations. Other authors have listed even more sectors or types of associations. 
The diversity of associations can be classified according to many criteria (e.g. 
types of interest pursued or self-declared classification). Major classifications 
have been based on direct imputations of the interests and identities that 
associations declare to pursue. Accordingly, associations are classified as 
organizations representing social identities (race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or 
class), special-interest groups (mercantile and commercial associations, 
manufacturers, employers, boards of trade, or chambers of commerce), elite 
social clubs, professional associations (teachers, lawyers’ guilds, or doctors), 
neighborhood associations, civic clubs, citizens’ groups, and labor organizations. 
Another classification is the one opposing traditional and old organizations 
(unions and professional) and new associations (peace, environmental, or animal 
rights). 52  Yet another classification distinguishes associations from social 
movements by the degree they defend public or private interests, 53  whether 
groups are open to everybody or impose restrictions on membership. Offe and 
Fuchs have recently proposed a typology, but it suffers from such generality and 
includes so many lines of classification that it is simultaneously about everything 
and nothing.54 
Second, each sector’s size and relative importance in the national polity, 
density, mobilizational capacity, relations between associations (competition or 
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cooperation), and institutionalization vary to a good degree. Erik Olin Wright has 
argued that class is the major issue around which associations are formed, so that 
the most important associations are capital and labor organizations. As Schmitter 
argues, although «the emergence of associational life can assume a wide variety 
of organizational configurations», the «range that is viable in any given polity is 
likely to be considerably more restricted».55 But there is still the need to explain 
associational diversity.56 For instance, many of the functions that are done by 
unions in some settings are done by religious associations in other settings.57 
One way to bypass these difficulties has been to equate associational life with 
civility. For Edward Shils, the organizations that constituted associational life 
serve the function of spreading refined manners in the citizenry: they are a civil 
society.58 Almond and Verba take this argument even further, because a “civil” 
associational life is a necessary condition for a democratic regime; one could 
even say that these authors equate civility with liberal democracy. 59  More 
recently, social capital theories have reiterated this argument by claiming that the 
more developed an associational landscape, the more citizens learn to cooperate 
with each other, develop trust relationships, and this by itself spills over into 
government.60 Democracy is seen as a consequence and as determined by inter-
individual relationships that breed trust. It is not always clear whether it is the 
levels of trust that exist in a society that determine the level of associational 
development of that society or vice versa. Furthermore, there is some circularity 
in this argument, since the causes are confused with the effects of civility. Be that 
as it may, these theories are too psychological. Associational life is the result of 
socialization processes and cultural attitudes. Methodologically, these approaches 
tend to focus on individual characteristics of the citizenry as gathered from public 
opinion surveys and by drawing from them direct assumptions about the 
character, density, and quality of associational life and democracy. The level of 
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analysis remains at the individual motivations of the citizenry, and in this sense 
individual psychological traits are thought to pre-exist and determine the 
formation of the associations themselves: the expression of interests is always 
prior to the associational institutionalization of those interests.61 
These approaches have also other problems. First, associational life is 
perceived as a purely social phenomenon and as separate from politics, public 
institutions, and the state. Second, conflict and competition are absent; it is as if 
associational life is the realm of only peaceful interactions. This may be true for 
some historical periods (e.g. the neo-corporatist institutionalized partnerships and 
negotiations between capital and labor in 1960s in Austria) or types of 
associations (e..g. tea clubs). Even if one admits that there are few power 
struggles in the more peaceful and institutionalized trust networks involving 
associations (and even that it is not so clear, since for instance small-town elite 
clubs may be internally divided by factional fights), these theories forget that 
these exchanges were the result of power struggles between organized social 
groups in a society. Associational life is an arena where struggles for power 
develop. As Gramsci argued, «class struggle is organized on the terrain of active 
society or civil society».62 Associational life is an arena through which groups 
and classes compete for resources and power. In this sense, its character is 
political. 
Furthermore, these approaches do not account for political realities and 
historical variations. They tend to idealize Anglo-Saxon civil societies, namely 
Great Britain, with its supposed history of aristocratic-bourgeois compromise and 
gradual integration of pressures from below,63 whereas countries with a weaker 
sense of trust and lower levels of associational membership are regarded as 
having weaker, less civic political cultures (e.g. France or Italy). Temporal 
variations are poorly explained. For instance, the recent debate about the decline 
of social capital since it focus on attitudes tends to extrapolate from it 
interpretations of decline almost automatically, romantisize the past, and see the 
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future as bleak without considering that the historical meaning of the supposed 
decline of civic engagement may be very different.64 
In this sense, a historical approach is required. Associational life is neither 
good nor bad in itself; this is to be determined by historical research.65 For the 
present purposes, associational life is a historical concept, it should reflect 
historical realities, and it should capture paths of organizational and institutional 
development. For instance, associational life can be dominated by democratic or 
anti-democratic organizations, but usually it is portrayed as always acting «within 
pre-established rules of a "civil," i.e. mutually respectful, nature».66 In fact, a 
major drawback in associational life theories is their a-historical character. 
Consequently, no distinction is provided between a theory of the origins and 
types of voluntary associational life and a theory of the effects of associational 
life, namely its contribution to democracy. In such approaches, associations are 
usually portrayed as always concerned with public rather than with private ends, 
as never performing political functions (which implies that they can never have 
some form of integration within the State), and they are given functions that lack 
empirical support (e.g. to monitor and restrain the state in democracies and to 
democratise authoritarian regimes). Other definitions equate voluntary 
associations with the rule of law. 
Existing approaches, since they usually rely on culturalist assumptions, fail to 
put the organizations themselves at the locus of analysis. Since it is assumed that 
interests exist before the development of associations, there is little need to study 
associations as such, since they are only an outgrowth of attitudes. Yet, as I have 
argued, it is the very process of historical associational formation that creates 
identities, formulations of collective as well as group and individual interest that 
frequently contrast other associations and groups. One needs to explain why the 
definition of interest formulation is in some contexts (both between societies and 
between groups in the same society) almost a monopoly of voluntary associations 
and in other contexts stays in the hands of other agencies (e.g. the family or the 
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state).67 From this perspective, it seems clear that analysts should move from 
attitudes and surveys to other dimensions and aspects in their studies. 
In order to explain variations between modern democracies in their degree of 
associational life, two tasks are necessary. First, one should excavate dimensions 
of variation in order to compare civil societies at the national level. This serves to 
identify national patterns of associational life. Second, the concept of 
associational life should be disaggregated and a specific set of associations 
should be chosen for the study. In turn, their path of development should be 
followed while explaining their varying degrees in representing, recruiting, and 
mobilizing their constituencies. One should ask which groups are organized and 
how they became to be organized as well as which associations are more 
successful and why in mobilizing their constituencies.68 
Of particular interest are associations that in the historical development of 
modern societies based their appeals on vast constituencies and tried to have 
influence at the national level through the creation and organization of big and 
broad categories of individuals. In this context I argue that three types of mass 
associations were central in modern societies: unions, agrarian, and religious 
(sometimes also ethnic based) associations. The urban and rural mobilization of 
the popular classes, with appeals to class, sector of production, and religious 
attachment, have been rival strategies of mobilization in the era of mass politics, 
especially after the 1870s. The first type refers to wage earners, people in a 
common situation of deriving income from the sale of their labor. They have 
existed in many historical times, but as a mass of people they are a modern 
phenomenon, the result of the marketization of societies and technical 
specialization. The second type, or agrarian associations, has been a similar 
movement to the industrial workers unions, fighting for improvements in the 
status of farmers, tenants, and the rural proletariat in the modern conditions of 
market agriculture. In addition, religion has been one form of resisting the spread 
of modern liberal market societies. Here the important associations are lay 
associations, formed by religious lay people that chose to defend and promote the 
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interests of a particular religion by setting up a voluntary association. These 
associations should be distinguished from many other religious associations 
which are not voluntary but are an intrinsic part of a commitment that is accepted 
and not (usually) chosen. Therefore, one must look for variations in these 
attachments across different national polities in order to explain variations in 
associational life.69 
Regarding the first aspect, it is necessary to establish dimensions with which 
on can compare across national countries. Despite the difficulties discussed 
above, it is possible to conceptualize civil societies at the national level, as is 
supported by some of the literature. As a first cut, there are regularities in 
associational membership levels of adult populations that are stable over time. 
These point to structural factors and invariants behind individual decisions to 
become a member of associations. Moreover, associations tend to appear in 
waves. Earlier research shows that there are periods of high associational growth 
and periods of consolidation of previous patterns. 70  Furthermore and more 
importantly, one should examine the core of what constitutes a voluntary 
association and extract properties that are invariant among all voluntary 
associations. In this respect and following Schmitter and Streeck, I argue that 
associations are caught between two logics: the logic of membership and the 
logic of influence. Associations are created by entrepreneurs, but in order for 
them to survive they must be able to recruit a clear membership and adapt to the 
institutional environment they face, including relations with other associations. 
Associations are «producers of group interests» and not just «the passive 
recipients of preferences put forward by their constituents and clients». «Interests 
are not given but emerge as result of multifaceted interaction between social and 
organizational structure». To a large extent, the leadership and the staff of an 
organization determine interest formation and definition, as well as the properties 
of the association.71 As Gierke noted in the 1860s with reference to unions, the 
stronger unions were the ones that were able inbue the masses with a unified 
                                                 
69 On unions and farmers associations see Boulding, 1968, pp. 89-92, 109-116. On religion see 
Gould, 1999; Kalyvas, 1996; and Warner, 2000. 
70 Stinchcombe, 1986. 
71 Streeck and Schmitter, 1985, p. 130. 
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will.72 Thus, associations are not reducible to members’ interests, and they both 
respond to members and the dynamics within the association and are shaped by 
their social environment. As James Q. Wilson has argued, «the behavior of 
persons who lead or speak for an organization can best be understood in terms of 
their efforts to maintain and enhance the organization and their position within 
it».73 Hence, organisations seek survival by «securing essential contributions of 
effort and resources from members» and some form of equilibrium with the 
environment.74 One of the more important aspects of the environment are the 
other associations: their number, their operating logic, their reciprocal interaction, 
and specifically the «existence of networks» between associations and the degree 
to which these networks facilitate co-operation among them.75 
From this definition of association it follows that the two major aspects that 
structure an association’s life are: 1) the need for a supply of membership, and 2) 
the relationships with other associations. This is similar to what Philippe 
Schmitter has defined as coverage: the degree to which social groups «have 
available for their interests’ defense the existence of formal organizations». As 
the dimentions of the concept, Schmitter includes the number of associations, 
their geographic scope, the degree to which associations form federations, and 
their functional scope (the diversity of interests that are mobilized and aggregated 
by the associations).76 
Yet, Schmitter’s definition suffers from too many dimensions. It is preferable 
to focus on a smaller number of dimensions while considering the rest as possible 
independent variables. For instance, what Schmitter calls functional scope of 
associational life can be subsumed under the idea that associations representing 
diverse societal interests form coalitions and that some of these coalitions are 
promoted by political parties. This means that parties should be taken into 
consideration, not as a part of the outcome to be explained but more as a part of a 
causal theory, or as an independent variable. 
                                                 
72 Gierke, 1990, pp. 218-219. 
73 Wilson, 1995, p. 9. 
74 Wilson, 1995, p. 30. 
75 Heinrich, 2005, p. 218. 
76 Schmitter, 1971, p. 11. 
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I focus on two aspects, namely density and inter-organizational dynamics. 
These two dimensions capture associational life at national level. They capture 
the encompassigness of associations and their presence in shaping people’s lives 
(the degree to which an association encompasses its potential members) as well 
as their role as independent bodies with partial autonomy from their members and 
constituencies interests: forming cohesive links with other associations, and 
promoting mutual consultation for common actions and policy implementation. 
The concept “density” refers to the degree to which associations have the 
capacity to recruit individuals from the groups they seek to represent (from a total 
failure to situations of an almost monopoly of representation). It is usually 
measured by membership of the adult population in voluntary associations, or in 
specific sub-sectors (e.g. union density), the proportion of that category that is 
member of the association(s) claiming to represent it. Membership (like 
subsidies, fees, grants, and sales) is an association’s resource and an indicator of 
the degree to which associations shape individual’s life in such areas as politics, 
work, or leisure. 
A focus on membership is important also for other reasons. In the history of 
modern voluntary associations, it has been object of struggle for long periods, 
with sometimes violent clashes between rulers and ruled over the right of forming 
voluntary mass associations. As a political right it was not easily acquired or 
granted, and it linked to struggles over the role of the ruled and the rulers in a 
polity.77 Early pluralist thinkers, although overly optimistic of the potential of 
associational life in democracy, captured this link between integration in national 
polities and membership associations. According to Almond and Verba, «the 
member, in contrast with the nonmember», appears to approximate more closely 
what we have called the democratic citizen. The member is competent, active and 
open with his opinions»78. Even passive membership was related to some sense 
of political competence.79 
                                                 
77 Howard, 2005, p. 231. 
78 Almond and Verba, 1963, p. 310; see also Hall, 2002, p. 22. 
79 Almond and Verba, 1963, p. 318. 
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In the contemporary debate on the significance of membership, it has been 
suggested that formal membership is no longer central, and that it is being 
replaced by informal and fluid forms of identification, especially within social 
movements. Allegedly, there has been a decline of traditional formal and large 
associations with socioeconomic, class, and sectoral interests, which are being 
replaced by social movement activity and loosely organized groups. In Melucci’s 
terms, since the 1980s civic engagement is characterized by “movement areas”, 
networks composed of a multiplicity of groups that are dispersed and fragmented. 
They mobilize people periodically, according to the emergence of new issues. 
Memberships tend to be temporary and disrespectful of the logic of discipline 
familiar in older mass associations.80 Yet, this seems like an exaggeration both 
empirically and theoretically. 
Regarding the theoretical concern, even if we assume that there is a decline of 
membership in the traditional associations within contemporary societies, 
especially since the 1970s, and even if it is being replaced by other forms of 
associational life, we would still need a theory that explains variations in 
membership that would use the standard of membership as the criteria for 
comparisons. This is particularly important for the period where formal 
membership was one of the main objects of claim-making (together with suffrage 
extension and welfare benefits) of the popular classes (notably during the 
nineteenth and the early twentieth century) and when affiliation became a routine 
form of civic engagement (1930s/1940s-1970s). But this has not yet been 
attempted. We still lack a general theory of associational membership for 
Western Europe. Only after this theory has been developed, we can develop a 
hypothesis on the supposed decline of membership and its replacement by other 
forms of civic engagement. As Dahl noted in 1982 (although he did not provide 
an explanation for it), between the 1940s and the 1980s variations «in 
organizational membership are great … in the advanced industrial countries».81 
In the early stages of associational life there was already much variation. Many 
contributors noted that already in the nineteenth century, when the modern 
                                                 
80 Melucci, 1989, pp. 73-74. 
81 Dahl, 1982, p. 67. 
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voluntary association appeared, there was wide variation, which became even 
higher during the interwar years, with Germany and Sweden in the path of 
becoming full associational societies and France being a case of low membership 
and where citizens preferred informal identifications. Recent research on 
American associational life by Theda Skocpol, especially on large federated 
associations, concludes that associations were for the most part of their history 
avenues of upward social mobility, places to find jobs, a husband or a wife, and 
providers of social welfare for members.82 
Moreover, since it is such an important good, associations have sought to 
create situations, usually with the help of the state, where membership becomes 
almost mandatory, thus creating situations of semi-voluntary membership. As 
Schmitter has argued, «organized interests in the political life of Western 
democracies» have as well been characterized by «monopolies of interest 
representation». «Membership in associations is not always voluntary and a wide 
range of de facto as well as de jure arrangements exist both to bind members to 
their associations and to prevent the emergence of competing ones». 83  
Membership is still the best measure of density of associational life, or of 
penetration in a society by voluntary associations, and of their capacity to even 
indirectly socialize publics by the distribution of goods.84 It can also be seen as a 
measure of organizational consolidation. As Collier argues, the higher the levels 
of membership in associations the more able are associations to organize 
sustained mobilization and to develop strategies.85 In this respect, membership is 
an important resource of associations and its leaders will try use a variety of 
inducements to co-opt people, with selective incentives that make the distribution 
of certain goods cherished by the public only available through membership of 
the organization. 
In addition, there is little empirical evidence supporting claims of a 
membership decline in associations. As shown in Tables 2 and 3, with the 
exception of Spain, all Western European countries show a rise in affiliation. 
                                                 
82 Skocpol, 2003, pp. 79-85. 
83 Schmitter, 1971, pp. 161-163. 
84 Howard, 2005, pp. 231-232; see also Ebbinghaus, Visser, 1999, p. 136. 
85 Collier, 2006, p. 133. 
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Interestingly, the rise after the 1980s has been higher in the countries which 
already had the higher rates of membership in the previous decades, just very 
small in the countries which had a medium level of membership, and there is a 
decline in the countries that were actually the weakest in terms of density before 
the 1980s. For instance in Denmark and in the Netherlands, which had some of 
the highest rates of membership in the 1968-1983 period (70.3% and 69.3% 
respectively), during the 1990-2002 period membership rose to 86.5% and 82.5% 
respectively. Italy and the United Kingdom, which in the first period had average 
rates of membership in European terms, maintain that position in the post-1980 
period with only a small increase (37.3% and 53.3% respectively), thus lessening 
the gap with the countries on the top of the table. Finally, the countries with the 
lowest rates until the 1980s saw their lower position evolve even more to the 
bottom during the following decades. Spain declined from 33.5% to 30.5% and 
France from 43% to 40%. Evidently, something must have happened in the mid-
1970s and the early 1980s that contributed to the widening of the gap between the 
Western European countries. The ranking of the countries is the same as in the 
decades before, after the 1980s there are growing differences between low, 
medium and high ranking countries. To explain this would be a fascinating topic, 
yet beyond the scope of this dissertation, and despite some studies have dealt 











                                                 
86 Schmitter, Trechsel, 2004; for the USA trends since the 1970s see Pierson and Skocpol, 2007. 
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Table 2: Membership in Voluntary Associations (% adult population affiliated) 
(Sources: 1968: based on cross-sectional national samples, 1959-1972, the median year being 
1968, Wilensky, 2002, p. 142; 1977-1998: Eurobarometer; 1999 and 2002: Ulzurrum, 2001, p. 
425) 





Austria  51 - 60 52 53 67 75 59.6 55.5 61.7
Belgium  29 71 45 58 48 68 71 55.7 48.3 61.2
Denmark  71 75 65 86 84 84 92 79.5 70.3 86.5
Finland  62 - - 86 72 80 76 75.2 62 78.5
France  29 56 44 42 40 38 - 41.5 43 40
Germany  44 56 61 57 56 51 70 56.4 53.6 58.5
Ireland  29 54 55 57 51 57 68 53 46 58.2
Italy  29 47 36 39 34 42 35 37.4 37.3 40
Netherlands  51 80 77 75 79 92 84 76.8 69.3 82.5
Norway  70 - 61 77 75 - 84 73.4 65.5 78.6
Portugal  - - - 24 26 24 29 25.7 - 25.7
Spain  - 36 31 27 28 31 36 31.5 33.5 30.5
Sweden  75 - 67 85 85 96 90 83 75.6 89
Switzerland  29 - - 43 49 - - 40.3 29 46
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The supposed decline in membership seems to be restricted to the United 
States since the 1970s.87 In a recent study, Dekker and Broek concluded that 
between 1980 and 2000 in a selected group of countries there was no evidence 
supporting a decline in levels of membership in associations, although there is an 
even deeper variation in paths. They observed a small decline in membership in 
countries like France, Spain, and Germany and growth in the rest of western 
European countries. My data challenges such conclusion, because there is 
growth, although at different rates, in all western European countries. Moreover, 
the general tendency is for a growing distance between existing patterns, with the 
countries which had a high associational life until the 1980s now showing even 
more growth, whereas the countries with lowest score before 1980s stabilizing or 
having very low growth rates. This becomes evident from the two ways in which 
                                                 
87 Rueschemeyer, Rueschemeyer, Wittrock, 1998, p. 271. 
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the authors counted membership. First, they considered membership in all types 
of associations with the exception of religious groups and parties. Here there was 
growth in Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy, and decline in 
Ireland, (West) Germany, France and Spain. When parties and religious 
associations were included, the patterns of growth and decline were similar.88 
For the most part, the existing data does not show also that individualised 
and expressive forms of participation are replacing forms of involvement in 
traditional associations.89 There has been some rise in membership in social civic 
associations and some decline in political forms of associational life, but this does 
not mean that social associations are on their way to become the sole type of 
organizations of Western citizenry or that political associations are on the road to 
extinction. The contemporary situation is better described as one where political 
and social organizations share space in the polity, which before was mainly a 
monopoly of political associations. As Schmitter and Trechsel argue, «the 
universe of associations is becoming increasingly specialised. More and more 
associations, movements and foundations are chasing after members and funds to 
support ever more specific definitions of collective interest and passion».90 
As can be seen from Table 4, the picture is more complex. Since the 
1970s, there has been a rise of both political and social organizations in some 
countrieswith clear cases being Denmark, Finland, and Sweden. In the case of 
Denmark, between 1977 and 1998 membership in political organizations rose 
from 73% to 90% and in social organizations from 59% to 89%. Other countries 
show a decline in membership in both types of associations. This is the case in 
Belgium and particularly in France, where membership in political associations 
declined from 64% to 15% and in social organizations from 64% to 43%. In the 
remaining countries (Austria, Germany, and Great Britain), there is a decline in 
political organizations and a rise in social organizations, although in these 
countries the rise of political associations is not too deep and the rise in social 
organizations is not much higher from previous levels. For instance, in Germany 
                                                 
88 Dekker, Broek, 2005, p. 49. 
89 Rueschemeyer, Rueschemeyer, Wittrock, 1998, p. 272. 
90 Schmitter, Trechsel, 2004, p. 45. 
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political membership declined from 38% to 23% and levels of membership in 
social organizations have maintained the level of 52%. It is in Italy where one 
notices marked differences between the two types of associations, with a fast 
decline in political organizations (from 54% in 1977 to 18% in 1998) and a 
substantial rise in social associations membership (from 19% to 34%). Finally, in 
the two southern European countries, Portugal and Spain, social associations 
have higher membership rates than political associations, but both at very low 
levels and showing a pattern of relative stability between 1990 and 1998. 
Portugal has rates of 9% in political membership and Spain from 9% to 10%. In 
social membership, Portugal has rates of 26% and 25% between 1990 and 1998 
and Spain of 23% and 26% during the same period. 
 
 
Table 4: Membership in Type of Association: Political and Social 
 1977 1983 1990 1998 
Country 




     
political
    
social  
     
political 
     
social  
     
political 
    
social  
Austria             37 39 33 54 
Belgium         89 64 33 36 47 56 22 51 
Denmark       73 59 68 41 96 87 90 89 
Finland        54 59 57 68 
France           64 64 32 36 25 41 15 43 
Germany       38 52 59 54 38 57 23 52 
Greece    27 19 16 16 8 24 
G. Britain      46 54 48 50 52 61 30 60 
Ireland  35 64 41 55 28 63 18 67 
Italy  54 19 22 28 29 30 18 34 
Netherlands 122 90 79 87 60 80 78 91 
Norway     75 64   
Portugal     9 26 9 25 
Spain     10 23 9 26 
Sweden      69 60      112 87 
Switzerland      29 24   
(sources: Eurobarometer: 1977-nº 8, 1983,-nº19, 1990-nº34.0, 1998-nº50.1; social associations: 
groups that provide social welfare, personal health, education, art, music and culture, youth, 
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sports, recreation and entertainment; political associations: unions, professional associations, local 
community groups, political parties, movements for human rights, peace, Third World 
development, resource conservation, environmental protection, gender equality) 
 
Finally from the data on union density (Table 5), one notices varying 
evolutionary patterns. Between 1970 and 1997 there has been a decline of union 
density in countries like Austria (from 57% to 39%), France (20% to 10%), 
Germany (32% to 27%), the Netherlands (37% to 23%), Great Britain (50% to 
43%), Spain (26% to 17%), and Portugal (from 52% to 26%). Moreover, this 
decline has been big in some countries. Austria, France, the Netherlands, and 
Portugal have all more than a 10 point fall. In other countries the decline has been 
less dramatic (Great Britain and Germany). At the same time, there has been a 
rise in union density in other countries. Some of them are Belgium (42% to 50%), 
Denmark (62% to 76%), Norway (50% to 55%), and Sweden (67% to 86%). Italy 
has maintained an average of 41% during this period (37%). 
 
Table 5: Net Union Density (% of active labor force) 
 1970 1975 1980 1990 1997 
Austria  57 - 52 47 39 
Belgium  42 - 53 50 - 
Denmark  62 - 79 75 76 
Finland  - - - 72 78 
France  20 - 22 14 10 
Germany  32 - 35 32 27 
Netherlands  37 - 35 24 23 
Norway  50 - 55 56 55 
Ireland  60 - 64 59 - 
Italy  37 - 50 39 37 
Spain  - - 26 15 17 
Portugal  - 52 - 32 26 
Sweden  67 - 78 82 86 
Switzerland  30 - 31 27 23 
U.Kingdom 50 - 56 43 - 
(Sources: Ebbinghaus, Visser, 1999, p. 147; Ebbinghaus, Visser, 2000, p. 63; Spain and Portugal 
until 1997 Gunther and Montero, 2001, p. 109; note: Spain in 1980 refers to 1978 and in 1997 
refers to 1994; Portugal in 1997 refers to 1995) 
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In sum, from the analysed data, one can draw the conclusion that 
affiliation or membership is still a decisive aspect of associational life, in spite of 
its recent transformations. Since the objective here is not so much to explain 
recent transformations but instead to explain the variations for the whole post 
1930s/1945 period, I will suggest rankings between western European societies. 
As an indicator, I use the levels of membership of the adult population in 
voluntary associations. By using Table 2, I examine the degree to which Western 
European countries tend to co-vary and form clusters. Although a crude measure, 
it constitutes a starting point in order to classify countries. This indicator 
measures the degree to which associational life encapsulates the population of a 
given polity. 
Several clusters of countries emerge when comparing levels of 
membership of the adult population of Western European countries for the period 
1968-2002. First, high density countries that show levels of membership 
consistently above 66% are Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands. 
The lowest density group (below 33%) is composed of Spain and Portugal. A 
third group, of medium density (between 33% and 66%), is more heterogeneous. 
Nevertheless, it is composed of two subgroups. One is closer to the lowest 
density group. It has percentages always below 50%, and it is composed of 
France, Italy, and Switzerland. The other group is closer to the higher group 
(percentages between 50% and 66%) and is composed of Austria, Germany, 
Belgium, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Using these measures, I have 



















Sweden  1 1 1
Denmark  2 2 2
Netherlands  3 3 3
Norway  4 4 4
      
Austria  5 5 5
Germany  6 6 7
Belgium  7 8 6
U. Kingdom 8 7 9
Ireland  9 9 8
      
France  10 10 11
Switzerland  11 13 10
Italy  12 11 12
Portugal  14 - 14
Spain  13 12 13
 
 
The second dimension of associational life refers to the main type of 
interaction between voluntary associations. The pluralist theoretical tradition has 
emphasized this aspect. In particular, it has been emphasized that associations, 
almost by definition, compete with each other in each particular arena of interest. 
Max Weber noted this when he argued that religious sects in the United States 
were more competitive and that this spurted a process of organizational diffusion. 
To Weber this process stimulated the growth of associations because sects, 
contrary to churches, are voluntary associations of «those who, according to the 
principle, are religiously and morally qualified. If one finds voluntary reception 
of his membership, by virtue of religious probation, he joins the sect 
voluntarily». 91  Moreover, as James Q. Wilson argued, «all voluntary 
associations, like all retail firms, compete with each other – they struggle to 
                                                 
91 Weber, 1970, pp. 305-306. 
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obtain scarce resources from a population of prospective contributors (or 
customers) who in a sense are allocating their money, time, and value of their 
names between associational and non-associational uses and, within the former 
ones, among a variety of alternative associations».92 This is especially true in 
organizations that have similar objectives or belong to the same ideological area. 
Associations compete with each other more intensely especially if they are in the 
same functional, sectoral, geographical, or ethnic arena, because the pool of 
resources and members is the same and less between associations that oppose 
each other (e.g. labour unions versus employers).93 
cess.97 
                                                
Still, competition between associations is more a question of degree. 
Associations are not competing all the time, and sometimes they even restrict 
competition and cooperate with each other. Empirically this is demonstrated by 
the fact that competition is especially intense in the formative and early years of 
an association, when the organization doesnot yet have a defined jurisdiction and 
arena of intervention. When associations achieve these, they tend to compete 
less.94 Weber, although noting that in America there was the «proselytizing of 
souls by competing sects», also observed that the same sects sometimes formed 
«cartels for the restriction of proselytizing».95  In neo-democracies it has also 
been noted that after the period of transition from authoritarianism, where a 
plurality of associations with competing aims emerges, competition is replaced 
gradually by the question of «collective action among or across organizations 
with compatible interests and agendas».96 Oxhorn demonstrated the validity of 
this argument when he studied Chilean neighborhood movements and showed 
how these associations had to coalesce in a broader and novel social movement in 
order to achieve leverage and suc
One also encounters arguments that associations seek mainly to develop a 
specific area of intervention and competence, have a regular clientele, and an 
 
92 Wilson, 1973, p. 261. 
93 Walker, 1991, p. 28. 
94 Wilson, 1995, pp. 264-266. 
95 For instance, in order to restrict remarriages. Weber, 1970, p. 306. 
96 Collier, 2006, p. 130. 
97 Oxhorn, p. 288. 
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«undisputed jurisdiction over a function, service, goal or cause».98 To James Q. 
Wilson, competition is subordinate to these aims. Associations will compete only 
to the extent that it ensures their survival.99 Sometimes associations, especially 
the associational leaders and staff, will seek an accommodation and even 
declared alliances with other associations.100 In this sense it is necessary to look 
at the horizontal relations of organizations with each other.101 An important form 
of institutionalization of associational cooperation is the construction of 
confederation structures (especially at the national level). Gierke was one of the 
first to note that early nineteenth century associations evolved from small-scale 
and localistic organizations dedicated to the defense of a small portion of the 
working classes (brotherhoods, burial, and self-help societies) to large-scale and 
nationwide organizations that linked these associations to one another. These 
confederations were able to amass fees to establish union funds, structured interal 
institutions for the coordination of collective action (e.g. organization of strikes) 
like central committees and national congresses.102 Also Simmel argued that in 
some circumstances associations promote the creation of federations, which are 
associations of associations, or in his words «coalitions of coalitions».103 Even 
more, this trend for the creation of confederal structures is the central dynamic of 
contemporary association building of groups like the industrial workers, the 
mercantile class, and women. According to Simmel, the particularistic divisions 
within each societal group, like the divisions in the merchant class or between 
workers of different branches of industry, was something of the past. Groups now 
sought to consolidate alliances and build cohesive groups. For instance, Simmel 
considered general strike as an example of how workers from different arenas 
considered themselves as members of the same class.104 
More recently, Philippe Schmitter’s work on neo-corporatism has 
emphasized this aspect. According to Schmitter, in many western European 
                                                 
98 Wilson, 1995, p. 224. 
99 Wilson, 1995, p. 262. 
100 Schmitter, 1981, p. 295. 
101 Stepan, 2001, p. 103. 
102 Gierke, 1990, p. 219; see also Tilly, 1976 and 2004. 
103 Simmel, 1964, p. 175. 
104 Simmel, 1964, pp. 174-185. 
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countries the associational landscape is composed mainly of «singular, 
concentrated, differentiated and hierarchical associations» and not of «multiple, 
dispersed, non-hierarchical» ones. 105  Even more importantly, Schmitter 
suggested that these aspects of centralization (themselves deriving from 
monopolies of representation by the associations), have historically emerged 
before acquiring high levels of membership.106  The same argument has been 
applied to political parties. Lipset and Rokkan argued that Western European 
political parties during the period from the 1920s until the 1970s consolidated 
themselves first as organizations in the 1920s and only later, after the 1930s and 
1940s, started recruiting members on a mass scale.107 
                                                
Following these insights, I argue that societies vary to the extent that 
associations are concentrated in peak associations, unified under a single 
leadership who is responsible for negotiating in the name of the several 
associations within the network. 108  I call this dimension the degree of 
coordination of associational life and use data from national union movements as 
an indicator to assess the degree of coordination of associational life. It is 
constituted by two sub-dimensions: monopoly and centralisation. Regarding 
monopoly, this sub-dimension captures the degree of concentration in a single 
peak organization of the multiple associations that compose a sector (unions, 
capital, a sector, an industry, a class, a region, and a state).109 I use as an indicator 
of the degree of monopoly of associational life the monopoly of the main union 
confederation, measured by the known percentage of unions affiliated to the main 
confederation.110 In theory, monopoly makes coordination easier by replacing 
competition between associations with inter-organisational dialogue and pact-
making. Still, this is not necessarily so, and so it is necessary to look at the 
second dimension, centralisation. Centralisation measures the degree of control 
 
105 Schmitter, 1974, pp. 93-94, 96; see also Schmitter, 1982, pp. 263-264. 
106 Schmitter, 1982, p. 264. 
107 Lipset and Rokkan, 1985, p. 238. 
108 Dahl, 1982, p. 68; Schmitter, 1999, pp. 437, 439; Schmitter and Streeck, 1985. 
109 Schmitter, 1999, p. 438; Katzenstein calls it concentration, but its meaning is the same as 
monopoly, the proportion of a certain category (farmers, workers etc) that is organized by the 
confederations organizations. Katzenstein, 1985, pp. 32-33, 89. 
110 Crouch, 1993, p. 74. 
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and capacity for coordination of the peak association over its members. Although 
there are many monopolistic associations, some have low capacity to make 
members comply with a peak level decision; sometimes members have large 
degrees of autonomy of action, including financial autonomy.111 
To use the degree of the union movement’s monopoly and centralization 
as the measure of coordination of associational life could be stretching the 
indicator too far by wanting it to mean something that it is unable to reveal, 
namely the coordination level of other arenas of associational life. As mentioned 
before, associational life is composed of many sub-arenas, and it is plausible that 
they have different logics and hence different coordination levels. Still, as a first 
step to assess the level of coordination of associational life it is a useful indicator 
for at least two reasons. First, because workers’ movements have been identified 
with the history of associational life as such and historically has occupied the 
central role in associational life.112 Second, several researchers have observed a 
process of institutional homology between associations. In the countries with 
high union centralisation other associations will tend to acquire that form. 
According to Schmitter, «where workers’ associations are highly centralized and 
monopolistic, other interests will be correspondingly organized».113 And as Peter 
Katzenstein argues that «trans-sectoral coordination» in unions extends to other 
groups in a society. This happens because monopolistic and centralized union 
confederations have been the result of full integration of these union 
confederations in the formulation and implementation of public policy (issues 
like full employment, economic growth), and this makes them have an impact on 
other interests that accordingly will try to imitate this organizational format.114 
In  Table 7, I have condensed information relative to the degrees of 
coordination of associational life in Western European democracies for the period 
1950-1990. I have gathered data on the degree of monopoly of the main union 
confederation in each country and the percentage of unions that are affiliated in 
                                                 
111 Crouch, 1993, pp. 74-75; Schmitter, 1999, p. 438; Schmitter and Lanzalaco, 1989, p. 205; 
Katzenstein, 1985, pp. 32-33, 89. 
112 Katznelson and Zolberg, 1986. 
113 Schmitter, 1981, p. 293. 
114 Katzenstein, 1985, p. 92. 
 51
the main confederation. I have relied on the classification of Colin Crouch on the 
degree of centralization of main confederation, the degree to which it has the 
power in relation to its affiliates in terms of control of strike funds, strike calls 
and wage demands, and classified the countries in terms of high (H), medium 
(M), or low (L) centralization. 
 
Table 7: Western Europe: Coordination of Labor Unions, 1950-1990 
 1950 1963 1975 1990 
 Mon. Cent. Mon. Cent. Mon. Cent. Mon. Cent. 
UK  84 L 83 L 92 L 89 L
Denmark 85 H 80 H 72 M/H 70 M/H
Germany 92 M/H 81 M/H 82 M/H 82 M/H
Norway 90 H 82 H 75 H 67 M/H
Sweden 80 M/H 73 M/H 63 H 60 M/H
Netherlands 33 M/H 36 M/H 75 M/H 59 M/H
Belgium 45 M 46 M/H 51 H 53 H
Switzerland 59 M 56 M/H 51 M/H 51 M/H
Austria  100 H 100 H 100 H 100 H
Ireland  53 M - L 98 L 90 M
Italy  79 L 61 L 51 M 52 M
France  76 L 51 L 44 L 31 L
Portugal - - - - - L 55* L
Spain   - - - - - L 44* L
(Mon: monopoly; Cent: centralization; *% of the universe of affiliated labor force that belongs to 
the main confederation; Sources: Crouch, 1993, pp. 177-283; Schmitter, 1995, p. 294) 
 
 As is evident from the last table, for the most part of second half of the 
twentieth century, between 1950 and 1990, Western European countries exhibited 
wide variations in monopoly and centralization, the two dimensions of 
coordination. Some countries have high monopoly and centralization. Here union 
confederations include most of the existing unions in the polity (usually above 
70%) and have the capacity to coordinate their actions. Denmark, Norway, and 
Austria are the clearest examples. Sweden and Germany are very close, although 
with less centralization. Then a second Medium to high monopoly (marks 
between 40 and 70%) and centralization are the cases of Belgium and the 
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Netherlandsfollowed by a category of high monopoly (above 70%) and low 
centralization, represented by the Great Britain and Ireland. Finally, there is a 
group of cases that rank low in both dimensions: France, Portugal, and Spain. 
Their levels of monopoly are usually below 50%. Italy is a borderline case where 
centralization and the degree of monopoly (around 50-60%) is higher than in the 
other southern European cases. 
In Table 8, I have ranked the countries in these two dimensions and 
aggregated them in order to arrive at a general ranking of coordination of 
associational life. For each year between 1950 and 1990, the composite rank 
order for monopoly is the following: 0-50% equals 3, 50-75% equals 2, and 75-
100% equals 1. For centralization, L equals 4, M equals 3, M/H equals 2, and H 
equals 1. As can be seen from the table, Austria, Germany, Denmark, and 
Norway rank between first and third in the level of coordination. I hypothesise 
that most voluntary associations belong to federations/confederations, and that 
these peak organizations are able to speak and act in the name of its associates. 
Countries with medium to high levels of coordination are Sweden, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland. Medium to low levels include Italy, Ireland, and 
















Table 8: Coordination of Associational life, 1950-1990. Ranking Order. 
 1950 1963 1975 1990 
 Mon. Cent. Mon. Cent. Mon. Cent. Mon. Cent. 
Total Rank
UK  1 4 1 4 1 4 1 4 20 9 
Denmark  1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 12 3 
Germany  1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 12 3 
Norway  1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 10 2 
Sweden  1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 14 5 
Netherlands  3 2 3 2 1 2 2 2 17 6 
Belgium  3 3 3 2 2 1 2 1 17 6 
Switzerland  2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 17 6 
Austria  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 1 
Ireland  2 3 -2 4 1 4 1 3 20 9 
Italy  1 4 2 4 2 3 2 3 20 9 
France  1 4 2 4 3 4 3 4 25 12 
Portugal  - - - - - - 2 4 6* 13* 
Spain  - - - - - - 3 4 7* 14* 
(Note: ranks in parenthesis means that data was not available. It was given the same value of the 
year before; *since Portugal and Spain are only democratic since the early-mid 1980s, there was 
not available data for the previous decades. The ranking of these two countries was thus 
calculated within a comparison with the other countries just for the year 1990; Sources: Crouch, 
1993, pp. 177-283; Schmitter, 1995, p. 294) 
 
 Moreover, as can be seen from Table 9, in Western European countries 
the levels of coordination and density of voluntary associations are clearly 
positively related. The denser a country’s associational life, the more it will be 
coordinated, and vice versa. As the table shows, the countries with the highest 
rankings of coordination (between 1 and 7) have also similar rankings for the 
levels of density. Sweden, Norway, Austria, Denmark, Belgium, Germany, and 
the Netherlands are all in this pattern. Next, there is a middle level of density and 
coordination: the United Kingdom and Ireland. Italy is again a borderline case, 
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marking the frontier between this group and the cases where density and 
coordination are both low (France) and very low (Spain and Portugal). 
 Contemporary Switzerland is the only case where a medium level of 
coordination is related to low levels of density. This is the most interesting 
finding for two reasons. First, it indicates that the two dimensions need not to co-
vary in the same direction. In fact, this relationship is only valid for the post-1945 
period. As will be demonstrated in chapter 6, the interwar period was much more 
varied in the combinations of these two dimensions. Table 27 (p. 165) shows that 
in the interwar period there were countries with high levels of coordination and 
density (Austria, Denmark, and Sweden) As well as countries with high levels of 
coordination and low levels of density (Norway and France). Moreover, Italy and 
Belgium were countries with high density and low coordination, while Portugal 
and Spain were countries with low scores on both dimensions. 
 Second, what comes first, density or coordination? There are several 
theories that attempt to answer this question, and I will analyse them in chapters 2 
to 5. Bottom-up theories would argue that density comes first, since people start 
forming and join associations first and later, if they so agree, form peak 
associations in order to coordinate common actions thereby restricting 
competition. Top-down approaches argue counter-intuitively that associations 
establish relationships with each other (of cooperation or competition) whose 
outcomes (mergers, pacts, and so on) are not determined by members’ 
expectations, or even by their interests, and that frequently they have been led to 
create large and encompassing networks that only recruit large memberships. 
This is most frequent in contexts where associations are forced to moderate their 
competitive drive and rationalise their structures within larger associational 
wholes by pressure of external agents, usually the state, that in exchange 
guarantees the association’s monopolies of representation. 115  The validity of 
these competing claims will be analysed in chapters 2 to 5. 
 
                                                 
115 On this debate see Schmitter, 1982. 
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The two constitutive dimensions of associational life, density and 
coordination, can be combined in order to generate a general ranking of 
associational life for the period 1945-2000. Although theoretically both 
dimensions could be seen as independent of each other, their juxtaposition is 
justified in order to arrive at a denser measure of associational life organization. 
In the next chapters, I demonstrate this and argue that the degree of coordination 
of associations and the creation of federative structures were first set up (often in 
coordination and facilitated by the state) and only afterwards associations started 
recruiting members. Before doing this, it is sufficient at this stage to constructa 
global ranking of civil societies that is attentive to variations and that measures 
the degree of associational life in each society. This ranking can be grouped in 





Table 10: Patterns of Associational Life, Western Europe 1950-2002 
 Coordination Density Total    Global Rank 
Denmark 3 2 5 1 
Norway 2 4 6 2 
Sweden 5 1 6 2 
Austria 1 5 6 2 
Germany 3 6 9 5 
Netherlands 6 3 9 5 
Belgium 6 7 13 7 
UK 9 8 17 8 
Switzerland 6 11 17 8 
Ireland 9 9 18 10 
Italy 9 12 21 11 
France 12 10 22 12 
Portugal 13 14 27 13 
Spain 14 13 27 13 
 
 
 By aggregating the two dimensions of associational life, one arrives at a 
conceptualization that captures their characteristics at the national level. I propose 
four types of associational life. The denominations proposed capture the 
simultaneous intertwining of embededdness and recruitment by associations of 
the population, the degree to which they saturate their potential publics, and also 
the degree to which associations are linked to each other. The ideal types are the 
following: 1) Hegemonic (very high recruitment of the population and strong 
inter-organisational links); 2) Dominant (high in both recruitment and inter-
organizational links); 3) Divided (medium in both: there is a division in both the 
sense that a part of the population is inside the associational networks but a 
substancial part is outside, and at the same time associations compete with each 
other and have weaker links); 4) Disjointed (a very small part of the population, 
usually middle and upper classes, is included in associations, and there is a big 
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mass of non-members, levels of coordination between associations are episodic 
or almost non-existent). 
 The first set of countries, where associational life is highly dense and 
coordinated, is composed of the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, and 
Denmark) and Austria. In these countries, the organizational field is very dense, 
the population is very much engaged in associations and its activities, and groups 
in society mainly define their self-interest through associational representatives. 
There are strong opportunities, incentives and resources to participate, which in 
turn lead to high membership rates, probably high volunteering and participation 
within associations, strong autonomy and independence of associations. In 
Sweden, for instance, there is an indistinction between the terms “association” 
and “society” in the popular vocabulary. Moreover, associational leaders or elites 
accept to cooperate with each other, have a culture of mutual respect and 
agreement which is the result of institutionalized cooperation within the 
framework of peak associations. Associational leaders exchange information, 
have regular contacts and agreements, and have the power to talk in the name of a 
number of secondary associations. Moreover, at the inter-organizational level 
there is a junction between national and local associational life. Relevant here is 
that associational life absorbs to a large extent the interactions and exchanges 
between individuals and other collective actors, and that associational leaders 
have a leading role in the direction and definition of interests and in the 
maintenance of social and political order. In this sense organizations and their 
leaders are hegemons. This has resulted in voluntary and informal co-ordination 
of conflicting objectives through continuous political bargaining between interest 
groups.116 
 The cases of medium-high levels of encompassigness of associational life 
are Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium.These cases can be called Dominant. 
Here, associations are highly institutionalized, frequently developing networks 
that expand through the whole territory, but not as extensive and powerful as in 
Scandinavia. Also, density is not as strong in these countries. Still, associations 
                                                 
116 Katzenstein, 1984, pp. 32-33. 
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constitute basic pillars and motors of society and shape much of citizens’ 
preferences, life, and identity. Yet, contrary to the hegemonic cases people are 
less engaged in associations and these are less monopolistic and centralized. In 
other words, although associations still achieve a high degree of density and 
coordination, there are some divisions between them that inhibit a full 
coordination at the national level. These divisions may be related to ethnicity, 
religion, an urban-rural cleavage, or socioeconomic issues, but in any case they 
have prevented the development of fully encompassing and monopolistic 
associations. On the other hand, associations still perform a main role in citizens’ 
lives, more so than communities, the state, or the family, and they are strongly 
coordinated with each other. Although networks of associations are not as 
nationally encompassing as in Scandinavia and Austria, there is still the 
formation and decisive role of peak associations working as associational private 
governments, with associational elites having power over members’ preferences. 
The cultural concept here is more around the notion of subsidiarity than of a 
fusion between society and association. 
 In the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Ireland there are medium levels 
of encompassigness. I call this the divided pattern of associational life. The levels 
of density and coordination of associational life are around the European average. 
No more than half of the adult population is affiliated in associations, 
associations are highly autonomous from peak associations, and the associational 
landscape is characterized by single purpose associations who act autonomously, 
and as a consequence more competitively, from similar associations belonging to 
the same sectoral domain. Existing peak confederations have weak monopoly and 
concentration over members’ units, and a low capacity to make members comply 
by their directives. Associations do not shape much of individual’s lives. 
 Finally, in countries like France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal associational 
life has reached low and very low levels of encompassigness. These are 
disjointed associational lives. There is a combination of low density and weak 
vertical links between organizations. Associations are few, and most of the 
population is unaffiliated with associations and not engaged in their activities. 
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Associational entrepreneurs found associations, define and redefine interests 
(even in the name of the general population or of specific sub-sectors of the 
population), but these organzations exist for themselves to a large degree. The 
identities and the interests of the population are defined outside the associational 
field. Although there are internal variations (Italy is a borderline case, where as I 
argue the levels of membership and coordination are stronger than in the other 
three cases), associations in general reveal an inability to engage in common 
tasks of coordination due to their ideologies and activities.117  In this pattern, 
associational life tends to be fractionalized, localistic, and selectivist in the sense 
that the state develops partnerships only with selected single associations based 
on ad hoc and particularistic criteria. In Italy, for instance, the so-called third 
sector, the network of associations providing health, educational, and poverty 
eradication programs are low. Only 12% of the population is affected by it and 
70% of its volunteers are organized by a single organization. 118  People’s 
identities and interests are mainly defined and intermediated by institutions like 
the family, the church, informal networks of compadrio and neighborliness, or 
directly interpreted by the state. There are, still, subgroups to consider. In France 
and Italy the density and coordination of associational life is higher than in the 
Iberian countries. 
 Having outlined the prevalent patters, I analyse next I discuss several 
theories that have attempted to explain variations in associational life within the 
process of political development of Western Europe. The aim is to develop a 
theory that explains these outcomes, the stable patterns of associational life in 
Western Europe between the 1940s and the 1980s, a period that could be called 
the golden age of European associational life. 
                                                 
117 On modes of collective action of Portuguese capitalists and industrialists see Schmitter, 1995, 
p. 311. 
118 Ranci, 2001, pp. 74-75. 
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Chapter 2: Competing Theories of Associational life I 
 
 One set of theories on the origins of associational life is based on the idea 
that societal dynamics shape the propensity of individuals to affiliate and 
participate in associations, in organizational development, and in interactions 
between associations. Societal theories have in common a bottom-up focus, in the 
sense that it is society that shapes politics by making more available and 
widespread sets of resources and/or cultural attitudes that allow for an easier 
formation of associations. These theories are of three types. The first, 
socioeconomic modernisation, argues that the more economically developed a 
society is, by improving the economic condition of individuals and groups, the 
more associational life will expand. The second and third sets of theories are 
more cultural in the sense that they argue that particular attitudes (e.g. levels of 
inter-personal trust) and religious beliefs (e.g. Catholicism or Protestantism in the 
European context) predispose individuals in varying ways towards civic 
engagement. I analyse each of these theories next. 
 
 2.1. Socioeconomic Modernisation 
 
 The spread of capitalism, industrialisation, and urbanisation during the 
nineteenth century Europe propeled, in the terms of Tönnies, the transition from 
Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft: the interactions in a society went beyond the level 
of the community as the economy changed from household to trading.119 This 
structural transformation of European societies had two consequences. First, it 
made new groups appear and contest the established elites: capitalists and the 
middle-class versus the land-owning nobility, and later the labouring classes 
opposing capitalists and the middle–class.120 Second, this transformation, in the 
words of Karl Polanyi, originated a «catastrophic dislocation of the lives of the 
common people» in the sense that the expansion of commerce and markets 
                                                 
119 Bendix 1988b pp. 210-211; Bermeo and Nord, 2000; Rokkan, 1970, pp. 57-60; Tönnies, 2001, 
p. 66. 
120 Tilly, 1986, pp. 5-7. 
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undermined the social bases of power and status of traditional classes, because 
money and expertise, instead of tradition or land, became the new basis of status 
and power.121 Proletarisation of work implied the declining control of households 
over their own means of production and the increasing dependency of workers on 
the sale of their labour power.122 
 This rise of new groups and professions, new definitions of interests, and 
new social division of labour produced social and political mobilisation. It 
increased the self-awareness of groups and intensified existing social problems 
that eventually became the sources of organisation and associational 
development.123 This process was observed in many geographical settings, since 
the evolution from a closed and static economy to a dynamic market economy 
stimulated associational life. An example is the growth of rotating credit 
associations in many countries facing development in Africa and Asia.124 
 Inversely, low levels of economic development have been associated with 
weak associational life.125 At the level of individuals’ traits, some data seem to 
corroborate this hypothesis. The more economic resources one has, the more one 
tends to participate and join associations: high-income individuals tend to 
participate more in voluntary associations than low-income individuals.126 
 But once we look at the origins, timing, and changes of specific types of 
organizations, study patterns of the development of associational life over long 
periods of time, or focus on the differences between Western European 
industrialized countries, the socioeconomic argument becomes less compelling. 
There are numerous deviant cases that are unaccounted by this theory. Country 
variation in levels of unionisation in Europe since World War Two is not 
explained by the development of the economy. There are huge variations between 
countries with similar extent of economic growth: the Swedish working class is 
six times more unionised that the French, much more than their economic 
                                                 
121 Polanyi, 1944, p. 33; see also Tilly, 1997a, pp. 62-74. 
122 Bartolini, 2000, p. 14. 
123 Alexander, 1998, pp. 8-10; Bartolini, 2000, p. 554; Durkheim, 1964; Nelson, 1994, pp. 107-
109; Schmitter, 1971, p. 21. 
124 Kerri, 1976, pp. 32-33. 
125 Reis, 1998, p. 33. 
126 Burns, 2002, pp. 479-480; Wilson, 1973, pp. 58-59. 
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differences would predict. 127  Urbanisation levels are not a better explanation 
either. In 1859, Portugal, with a weak associational domain, had the same 
urbanisation level as the Netherlands and Belgium.128 In China, associations are 
stronger in the countryside than in cities.129 In late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century United States, the fastest growth rate of associations was in rural and 
small town areas, not in urban places.130 Although one could argue that levels of 
economic development make their impact through threshold effects, it is unable 
to explain types of associational configurations and the degree of coordination of 
associational networks. Also for the period between the 1880s and the 1920s, the 
extent of economic development does not correlate positively with types of 
associational life. 
 Individual-level data has shown that the lower the social class and the 
income of an individual, the lower will be the level of participation. Nevertheless, 
working class people do in fact affiliate. The relation of income and political 
membership, for instance, is not linear. For instance, in West Germany income 
level is not significant, while in Sweden it is the opposite with individuals with 
extreme income (both the very rich and the very poor) more willing to join 
organizations than the middle-income people. The correlation of social class to 
participation is high in Southern European and Anglo-Saxon countries and almost 









                                                 
127 Rothstein, 1998, p. 33. 
128 Bermeo and Nord, 2000. 
129 Schmitter, 1997. 
130 Skocpol, 2002, p. 123. 
131 Ulzurrum, 2004, pp. 176-181. 
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Denmark  L 3.4 Hegemonic 
Norway  L 4.4 Hegemonic 
Sweden  M 3.3 Hegemonic 
Austria  L 4.2 Dominant 
Germany  H 3.7 Dominant 
Netherlands  M 4.0 Dominant 
Belgium  H 4.1 Dominant 
UK  H 2.3 Divided 
Italy  L - Disjointed 
France  H 4.6 Disjointed 
Portugal  L 2.5 Disjointed 
Spain L 2.3 Disjointed 
(sources: industrialization: adapted from Janoski, 1998, p. 194; L: Low, M: Medium, H: 
economic growth: High; economic growth: annual increase in real gross domestic  product, 
source: Katzenstein, 1985, p. 195; Spain and Portugal’s economic growth refers to 1973-1994, see 
Lopes, 1997, p. 248; for Spanish and Portuguese industrialization, see Malefakis, 1993, p. 41) 
 
 As Table 11 shows, socio-economic variables are not good at predicting 
the development of associational life. Levels of industrialisation vary immensely 
within and between patterns of associational life. Both hegemonic and disjointed 
civil societies, the most developed and the least developed (in terms of density 
and coordination), have had historically low levels of industrialization, with the 
exception of the medium levels of industrialization in Sweden. Germany and 
France, the first a case of dominant associational life and the second a case of 
weakly dense and coordinated associational life, have similar rates of 
industrialization. For instance, in 1930 the percentages of population engaged in 
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agriculture were quite close (20.1% and 28.8% respectively). 132  Within the 
dominant pattern of associational life there are cases of high (Germany) and 
medium industrialization (the Netherlands). 
 The socio-economic hypothesis is also unclear about which specific type 
of collective action is the outcome of social change. In some contexts, 
urbanisation, capitalism, literacy, and industrialisation are associated with 
informal collective action and not with formal associational life. If it is true that 
backward societies are less mobilised, in some of these societies socio-economic 
modernisation strengthened clientelistic relations, namely when local caciques 
were integrated within national parties. As a consequence, machine politics grew 
with socio-economic growth. In Latin America and Africa, formal and informal 
organisations have grown together. 133  Finally, clientelistic practices are not a 
common phenomenon in all economically underdeveloped societies, while they 
can also be found in prosperous ones: «Examining societies where clientelism is 
practiced, one finds that the poorest are not the most common practitioners».134 
In fact, authors stress that «clientelism is more of a social and political 
phenomenon than an economic or cultural one and the Greek experience suggests 
that it does not automatically disappear with economic development».135 
                                                
 Moreover, the socio-economic hypothesis is unclear about the public 
status of parties and associations. One would expect associations, in the sense 
that they are not an outcome of political changes, not to have any public status. 
But developed countries have great variations in this aspect, ranging from 
contexts where associations are strongly integrated in the national bureaucracy, 
corporatism, to others where pluralism is the norm. 136  This theory does not 
predict all types of associations; only associations that are directly related to the 
economic sphere and the division of labour (like unions, interest groups, and 
professional groups) are logical outcomes of this hypothesis.137 
 
132 Malefakis, 1995, p. 41. 
133 Nelson, 1994, p. 119. 
134 Pizanias, 1993. 
135 Papakostas, 2000, p. 6. 
136 Schmitter, 1981. 
137 Wessels, 1997, p. 203. 
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 It has been argued also that the roots of new social movement 
associational life that appeared in Western democracies in the 1960s are in 
changes in the economy. Specifically, the transition to an economy based on the 
service sector led to the emergence of a new style of politics in Western 
democracies that was based less on large-scale membership organizations and 
more on informal networks, protest actions, direct action activism, and the 
domination of new single issue associations (the environmentalist, women’s 
issues, and so on).138 Nevertheless, these changes in associational life were not 
gradual but sudden, appearing mainly in specific periods during the 1960s and the 
1970s, whereas the socioeconomic trends were gradual. Many argue that the 
explanation lies in the institutions of Western democracies, namely how the links 
between the state and associations have been affected by changes in the nature of 
the political system, like the changing nature of catch all parties, or of the welfare 
state.139 
 In order to go beyond these shortcomings, one possible strategy is to 
conceptualise different types of capitalist development.140 Countries like France, 
Italy, or Switzerland, where traditional family-based small business is still a 
central part of the economy, have maintained a type of worker-employer 
relationship which is direct and informal, with labour being frequently recruited 
in the family or from the immediate communal networks of the employer. As a 
consequence, personal and informal attachments tend to prevail over formal-
professional ones. The family as a form of collective action is favoured over 
other types of collective action, like voluntary associations. Also, horizontal links 
between the people of the same professional category are more difficult to create. 
Since this type of industrialization is based on the maintenance of particularistic 
and localistic producing systems, it tends to reinforce a strong separation of urban 
and rural society, each with its own logic, living as if in two separate worlds. 
Several consequences follow. Rural and urban elites feel no need to develop 
                                                 
138 Norris, 2002, pp. 19, 22. 
139 Berman, 1997a; Kriesi, 1999. 
140 Wolf, 1982, pp. 302-309; for the varieties of capitalist systems in the second half of the 
twentieth-century see Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997 and Kitschelt, Lange, Marks and Stephens, 
1999. 
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common ventures of organisational mobilisation. 141  Popular groups’ class-
conscience is inhibited, and attempts at broad associational networks face strong 
barriers. 142  Even though this hypothesis does not explain variations between 
countries that experienced this type of capitalist development, like France, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain, it is a strong predictor of the differences between this cluster 
of countries and other clusters at the level of citizen affiliation. 
 One should also consider the timing of urbanisation relative to 
industrialisation: The earlier urbanisation (before industrialisation), the more the 
growth of cities will be the result of large internal migrations and function as a 
safe valve for the pressures from rural exodus. This inhibits associational life and 
the development of voluntary associations because when industrialisation arrives 
it faces already well-established elites that have the control of organisations of 
mass mobilisation that were generated in the previous process of urbanization, 
and that tend to be representative of only the urban classes. 143  Yet, this 
hypothesis does not predict variation within early urbanisers in Europe. In the 
famous European city-belt, the urban world of the thirteenth to the fifteenth 
centuries, we find many variations in today’s forms of associational life, namely 
in national levels of citizen’s affiliation. There are strong differences between 
(central and northern) Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands, although all of these 
countries belong to the early urbanisation category. I will return to this topic later 
in the following chapters when I analyse the legacies of pre-modern city 
corporations and guilds. 
                                                
 Another hypothesis is the timing of industrialisation. The later a country 
enters the development race, the less autonomous is the development of 
economic entrepreneurs and more likely a state initiative. Late developers have 
shaped their development strategies by comparing themselves with early 
developers, and as a consequence they tend to have a stronger political 
conscience of their “underdevelopment”. The whole process of economic 
development tends to be state induced, so there is a much smaller margin for 
 
141 Schmitter, 1971, pp. 369-375 
142 Bartolini, 2000, p. 125. 
143 Mouzelis, 1996, pp. 229; Schmitter, 1971, pp. 369-375. 
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private initiative to take place. As a consequence, there is a smaller impetus and 
less room to the formation of autonomous voluntary associations, since political 
space is already occupied by the state.144 Yet, this hypothesis is unable to explain 
empirical variation. For instance, some late developers and industrialisers like 
Norway or Finland that have approached the level of the first developers have 
high membership and participation rates. Evidently, a successful agricultural 
modernisation was crucial in this regard. There was the creation of a decisive 
internal market for industrial goods, which by its turn stimulated strong linkages 
the between primary and secondary sectors. Moreover, the interventionist state 
coordinated the joint modernisation of agriculture and industry.145 This indicates 
that we should examine also the nature of the rural society in each society and its 
reciprocal links with the State. 
 Many theories argue that peasants and farmers are more difficult to 
organise for collective action than are industrial workers, because of their 
isolation, dispersion, and reliance on family labour.146 One should expect rural 
European society to show differences in their potential for collective action 
through the formation of associations. Here, one should look at differences in 
land tenure and rural stratification. Societies with great inequalities in the 
distribution of the land usually rely on cheap labour, frequently supplied by semi 
or fully coercive means (e.g. the late nineteenth century patterns of land work in 
the southern Iberian latifundia, servitude in the big estates of Prussia, and 
slavery), and this inhibits the development of voluntary associations in the 
countryside, thus making the industrial organizations the only ones possible in 
the whole polity. Industrialisation in societies with more equal land possession 
patterns should facilitate associational ventures. Dahl has classified the former 
peasant society, the later farmer society.147 Some historical patterns confirm this 
hypothesis. In the history of suffrage extension in large estates, the popular vote 
tended to reflect the semi-imposed influence of landowners (consider for instance 
the nineteenth century England and France). In other cases patterns of elite-mass 
                                                 
144 Schmitter, 1971, pp. 369-375. 
145 Mouzelis, 1996, pp. 227-228. 
146 Marx, 1955, p. 219; see also Finegold and Skocpol, 1995, pp. 33-35. 
147 Dahl, 1971, pp. 82-104. 
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clientelistic exchanges determined high rates of participation of rural popular 
classes, but that contributed to maintaining hostility to broad class peasant 
associations (e.g. Portugal, Russia, and Italy in the early twentieth 
century). 148 Inversely, in the early twentieth century Scandinavia, an area 
characterised by an equalitarian farmer society, there was a strong associational 
mobilisation of the free peasantry against state centralisation and the dominance 
of urban elites.149 
 Nevertheless, this hypothesis leaves some aspects of the voluntary 
association domain unclear. First, it does not account for variation both within the 
peasant society group (Portugal, Spain, and Italy) and the farmer society group 
(Austria, Scandinavia, and Switzerland). Second, the type of associations is left 
unspecified. How should we explain the emergence of industrial, ethnic or 
religious associations? 
 Finally, this implies that we should focus not on such patterns as land 
property or of distribution but on communal and representative institutions in the 
countryside that may have fostered association building. Traditional community 
structures and patterns of land possession must be placed in interaction with other 
variables so as to produce the emergence of the voluntary association. Even 
more, we must see how local and national politics interact. National elites can 
mobilise people through parties and associations, and national political 
institutions can provide opportunities for participation in associations. In this 
respect, a good example is India’s caste associations. 150  Because of India’s 
context of competition for power in the aftermath of the democratisation process, 
they served as vehicles of political organisation of traditional groups and in the 
process became integrated actors in the struggles for power in the polity. One 
should look at political factors, especially when studying late industrializers. 
 
2.2. Political Culture and Values 
 
                                                 
148 Bermeo and Nord, 2000. 
149 Rokkan, 1966, p. 262. 
150 Rudolph and Rudolph, 1960. 
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 The hypothesis relating political culture to the development of voluntary 
associations was first formulated by Tocqueville when he suggested that “mores”, 
«the manners and customs of the people» or «the whole moral and intellectual 
condition of a people», were the key to associational life.151 Almond and Verba 
in the 1960s and more recently Robert D. Putnam have reiterated this hypothesis 
when arguing that the value system of a population, especially its degree of trust 
(however defined), determines levels of associational life and in particular 
associational membership.152 
 Countries with low levels of interpersonal trust, where trust is restricted to 
the near family and with high levels of distrust of others in general, are 
considered a poor context for associational life. Inversely, high trust fosters 
associational life. Banfield classified the situation of low trust as “amoral 
familism”.153 People who are amoral familists have a sense of solidarity only 
with the very immediate family, and they consider others as instruments and 
resources to be exploited according to the interests of the family. In this sense, 
there is no possibility of creating broader, impersonal and ideological ties of 
solidarity which are essential for associational ventures to succeed.154 Southern 
Europeans, namely the Italians, the Portuguese and the Spanish, were thought to 
maximize the material and short-run advantages of the nuclear family at the 
expense of any other definition of interest.155 According to the anthropologist 
Julio Caro Baroja, the Spanish had «deeply personalist attitudes» who saw «each 
person as isolated (beginning with himself) with a series of distinct characteristics 
and has no scruples about abusing some and favoring others, since he sees them 
all inherently different, some of them sympathetic and attractive to him, and 
others not».156 Inversely, high levels of trust in others in general will enable the 
emergence of voluntary associations. 
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Portugal  -  76 Disjointed 
France  71  72 Disjointed 
Italy  72  62 Disjointed 
Spain  61  62 Disjointed 
GB  54  55 Divided 
Belgium  63  61 Dominant 
Germany   58  51 Dominant 
Netherlands  49  44 Dominant 
Denmark  44  40 Hegemonic 
(source: Torcal and Montero, 1999, p. 174, based on European Values Survey 1981 and World 
Values Survey 1990; % of the population who say they do not trust other people) 
  
There is some correspondence between trust and types of associational 
life. As is evident in Table 12, people from disjointed civil societies tend to have 
higher levels of mistrust, between 62% and 76%. One case of Hegemonic 
associational life, Denmark, has the lowest score on interpersonal distrust. Still, 
not all variation is explained. Belgium, with a denser associational life than 
England, has higher rates of mistrust (in 1991, 63% and 54% respectively). And 
the variation, for instance, within the type of dominant associational life is too 
big, between the Netherlands, whose values never surpassed the 40s%, and 
Belgium, above 60%. 
 The problem with this line of argument is that it is unable to explain 
interregional variations in southern European countries, differences between 
southern European countries and temporal variations. There were periods when in 
Southern Europe voluntary associations did develop, in waves as strong as in any 
other country (e.g. the late nineteenth century or during the 1970s in Spain). The 
only difference is that these associations were, for some reason, unable to become 
institutionalized and often had a short life (although trust levels and political 
culture remained constant). Italian and Spanish labour movements, for instance, 
tended to be volatile with abrupt shifts from revolutionary aims to reformism and 
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in levels of membership. 157  In fact also other countries, like contemporary 
Poland, with high levels of distrust have had high levels of collective action 
through voluntary associations.158 By implication, mass attitudes and individual 
behaviour are not a sufficient the explanation, since these changes happened too 
abruptly. Even more, scholars have argued that distrust, not trust, grows with 
associational life. If voluntary associations are organisational weapons to advance 
subordinate interests, the more groups push for their interests, the more distrust 
will increase. In this sense trust may be considered more a symptom of passivity, 
the inability to act collectively. 
 Second, it does not discriminate among types of trust and varying 
dimensions of political culture. Which type of trust is best for the emergence of 
voluntary associations, interpersonal or political trust? The latter could be good 
for associational activity, while the former bad because it inhibits co-operation 
between individuals. Also, certain aspects of political culture, like interest in 
politics, are not related to political membership in some countries (Belgium); 
whereas in others only people with interest in politics are members of political 
associations (in Southern European countries). In fact, people who are members 
of political associations in Southern Europe tend to discuss politics more than in 
Scandinavia. Finally, individuals with post-materialist values in Western 
European countries tend to be members of all types of associations.159 
 Third, even assuming that this proposition is true, it would still be difficult 
to apply it to all the dimensions of voluntary associations. It could be useful for 
explaining levels of membership and participation density either in individual 
associations and at national levels, eventually the number of associations in a 
given society, but it is unclear about membership in different type of associations, 
social or political. We would only expect associations that favour high 
membership and participation, and that offer strong solidarity goods, because 
these promote more interpersonal interaction and so develop the emotional and 
personal attachments necessary for trust. But the role of associations that rely 
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primarily on the distribution of material incentives is less predicted by this 
hypothesis. Also, trust theory, at least in its recent formulation, argues that non-
political associations are the more important form of associational life.160 Yet, 
some recent work has contradicted this argument and advanced the thesis that 
non-political associations are usually less supportive of democracy, despite 
higher levels of trust between members and better organisational skills.161 
 Fourth, this theory mistakes correlation for causation, and it is not able to 
specifiy the causal direction. Is it trust that causes associational development or 
the inverse? For instance, Verba and Almond’s work on civic culture,162 whose 
findings were based on surveys of attitudes and opinions, never addressed this 
question.163 I argue that values and trust are an integral part of what should be 
explained, and less of a prior and external factor to inducing participation in 
voluntary associations. Individual attitudes do not pre-exist the formation of 
associations, that is, the expression and institutionalization of interests. Mores, 
culture, and ideas are not decisive, but they need to be grounded in organizations 
that inculcate interests. 164  In contemporary advanced democracies, a major 
variable between individual attitudes and voluntary associations is the atate, 
specifically due to the way it regulates and institutionalises the spheres of work, 
welfare and family,165 all of which are the crucial areas that shape individuals’ 
perceptions of society and other people.166 Certainly, parties and governments 
should also be taken into account. 167  A major shortcoming of the culturalist 
approach is that it establishes direct connections between individual attributes 
and associational activity without paying attention to history, political context, 
and intervening variables.168 Almond and Verba do not provide any information 
about the real life agents and organisations that embody the different political 
culture of the countries under scrutiny. 
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The political culture argument implies also a consensual model of society, 
with more attention given to attitudes than to temporal variations or to specific 
and sometimes decisive events and interaction between social groups.169 For this 
reason, this theory is unable to understand for example why, although being 
classified as a highly passive political culture, Italians since the nineteenth 
century tended to be active in particular forms of collective action like land 
occupations, strikes, or revolts, all of which do not necessary imply membership 
in associations, and at the same time showing levels of associational membership 




 Religion may be related to voluntary associational life, either by 
promoting or inhibiting it. First, the very values of each religious doctrine may 
facilitate or inhibit associational life. In this respect and within the European 
context, the more important division is the one between Catholicism and 
Protestantism. Second, the institutional organisation of the churches themselves 
may pose varying stimulus or obstacles to the formation of associations. 
 Some theories have argued that the values advanced by a particular 
religion have a direct relation to voluntary associations. Specifically, this 
argument claims that Catholicism inhibits the emergence and participation in 
voluntary associations, and that Protestantism promotes it. 171  As Tocqueville 
argued, Puritanism was «not merely a religious doctrine but corresponded in 
many points with the most absolute democratic and republican theories». 172  
Furthermore, according to Max Weber’s definition, in Protestantism the strong 
conflict between «two structural principles – of the church as a compulsory 
association for the administration of grace, and of the sect as a voluntary 
association of religiously qualified persons» served as a stimulus for the creation 
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of voluntary associations.173  The dissident sects tended to be forms of proto-
associations, mobilizing the faithful through national territories in order to change 
the principles and practices of the established national church. 
 Although Protestantism did not always promote democracy,174 and there 
are differences between Lutheranism, Calvinism and the non-conformist sects, 
the fact remains that Protestantism introduced a new organisational form.175 The 
modern religious leaders of Protestantism secured a following through societies 
of correspondents and religious brotherhoods solidified by secret codes and 
rituals.176  These were in fact the earlier forms of voluntary association. This 
promoted a more participatory ethos. As Ernest Gellner has argued, Protestantism 
is based on the observance of rules (dictated by God) and not on a loyalty to 
intermediate agents, like priests but also the family, the employer, or the state. 
Consequently this is a favourable ideology for the «participatory self-
administration of the sect».177 Catholicism, instead, with its acceptance of the 
authority of the Pope and the priests as agents of intermediation between God and 
the faithful, inhibits the development of voluntary associations. 
 As the table below shows, this argument does not explain variation and 
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Table 13: Religion and Patterns of Associational life 
 Religion 
Pattern of Associational 
Life 












(Source: Flora, Kuhnle, Urwin, 1999, p. 56; P: Protestant; M: mixed; C: Catholic) 
 
 First, there are unexplained variations between Protestant European 
societies. Scandinavian countries and England are all Protestant societies but in 
England the levels of density and coordination of associational life are much 
lower. This suggests that Protestantism per se is insufficient to promote the 
development of voluntary associations, but that it needs to operate alongside 
other causal factors. For instance, Tocqueville argued that for the United States, it 
is Protestantism plus a colonial society without a feudal past plus a decentralised 
administration that produced the spread of voluntary associations. 
 Moreover, Catholic Austria belongs to the type which was defined as 
hegemonic, whereas many of other Catholic countries are in the Disjointed type 
(Spain, Portugal, and France) and in the Hegemonic type (Belgium). In fact, 
variation within the Catholic subgroup is even wider. Moreover, at the level of 
values they espouse, Catholicism in the nineteenth century Belgium promoted a 
democratic Catholic associational life, (although it was initially anti-democratic) 
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and accepted parliamentarianism whereas in Italy, as authors argue, it performed 
a heterogeneous role, aligning not only with the most conservative forces but also 
with syndicalists who defended equality against rural landlords. On the contrary, 
twentieth century Latin America Protestantism has been related to 
authoritarianism and Catholicism to liberalism and associational life, especially 
in the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council of the 1960s.178 
 Another argument states that the greater the religious pluralism, and 
consequently religious competition in a given society, the denser associational 
life will be. This argument claims that where religion arrives at an 
accommodation with the state through a guarantee of a monopoly of religious 
representation it will produce a weak associational life, because there is no 
competition between rival denominations, and hence no need to organise 
followers within organisations. It suffices to rely on the coercive mechanisms of 
the state, especially for mandatory religious education, for the established church 
to have a supply of members. An established church will claim easily a monopoly 
on associational life and establish alliances with the state in order to prevent the 
emergence of competing religious organisations. This pattern can be observed in 
such Catholic countries like Portugal and Spain but also in Italy and to a lesser 
extent in France. In fact, these countries form a cluster of low density of 
associational life. Inversely, the more pluralist the religious arena, in which 
religious organisations compete with each other for members and resources (e.g. 
the Netherlands), there should be a stimulus for the development of voluntary 
associations.179 Each religious denomination will develop its own associational 
network for that purpose, and consequently a process of organisational emulation 
will take place.180  
 Yet, the data does not support this hypothesis. Countries like Norway and 
Portugal, the former with one of the most dense civil societies in Western Europe 
and the latter with one of the least dense, are both religiously unitary. Germany 
and Austria have similar levels of associational life density, but one is religiously 
                                                 
178 Dominguez, 1994, p. 87. 
179 Grew, 1977, p. 22; Rokkan, 1970, pp. 57-60; Wuthnow, 1991a, pp. 20-21. 
180 Wuthnow, 1991a, pp. 20-21. 
 77
diverse (Germany) while the other is homogeneous (Austria). Also, the 
hypothesis fails to explain variations both within the group of Catholic countries 
and within religiously pluralist countries, where between 43% and 60% of the 
adult population has been affiliated in voluntary associations (Table 2). 
Moreover, the competition hypothesis may be good for predicting the number of 
associations (should be comparatively high), but it restricts the topology of 
associations to religion. Finally, at the individual level, research has shown that 
religion has varying effects. If we look at membership in religious associations in 
Protestant countries, their members tend to belong also to political associations 
(the exceptions are Norway, Sweden, and Denmark) unlike in Catholic 
countries.181 
 I have argued against using directly indicators of individual attitudes and 
culture to social and political outcomes. As in political culture and trust theories, 
there are neither agents nor history in these theories, and direct assumptions are 
made from values to actions. But as is evident in the case of Catholicism, 
majority identification with a religion in a country does not result automatically 
in more religious organisations. The example of Christian democracy is a case. 
France, with a majority of Catholics, does not have mass religious parties, 
whereas Germany, with a much smaller Catholic population, has the Christian 
democratic party.182 
 A third type of arguments looks at the church’s institutional structure, 
since much of pre-modern European associational life was in fact religious life. 
In this dimension, since the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries there are already established organizational and institutional differences 
between Catholic and Protestant Europe. Protestant societies were inclined 
toward higher organizational development. Calvinist groups were formed on the 
principle of voluntary association, beyond the family and local or regional 
community, and they tended to produce leagues of the faithful, congregations, 
and conferences that spread through national or regional territories.183 This was 
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favored not because of its ideological principles but because of organizational 
developments. The structure of the Calvinist church was «an inclusive 
organization of professing Christians, saints and hypocrites alike, governed by a 
select committee of ministers and laymen», who relied on recruiting laymen for 
the development of church tasks. As a consequence, the form of church 
government was based on bonds of fellowship between laymen, between laymen 
and priests, and between the assembly of ministers and elders.184 
 In Catholicism, by contrast, blood ties and feudal principles were still 
dominant.185 Social control was more in the hands of the clergy hierarchy than in 
the hands of laymen. Moreover, in each national setting, the Catholic Church is 
divided by dioceses which are based on medieval boundaries and strongly 
dependent on patrons, the bishops nominated from Rome, thus making 
coordination between parishes difficult. Diocese life tends to be self-secluded, 
contributing thus to the stronger localism of Catholic countries’ civil societies, all 
other factors being constant (dense civil societies can emerge in Catholic 
countries and counteract the effects of the structure of the national church if other 
factors are present, as I show later).186 
 Since in Protestantism inter-territoral coordination is easier, each new 
wave of religious dissent within the Protestant church tends to spread easily in the 
national territory. In fact, in Protestant countries since the sixteenth century the 
church became a state church, or it was directly supported by state authorities to a 
much larger extent than in Catholic countries. This promoted the conditions for a 
pattern of state-society relations where future mass movements of religious 
reform from below directed themselves at reforming the state as well. Ideologies 
of religious mobilization became more easily also political ideologies. Moreover, 
once these movements were able to secure political gains, they developed and 
expanded partnerships of social welfare institutions, like in the Netherlands after 
their revolution against Spain.187 
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 The missing link here is the institutional interaction behind support for 
religious values. The struggles between the churches for the defence of their 
corporate rights and the claims of the nation-building elites between the sixteenth 
and the nineteenth centuries shaped future associational life. Historically, 
chucrches have had a monopoly or a high level of control of education of the 
population and of representation of local communities, in both Catholic and 
Protestant countries. It is not religion per se, or their degree of pluralism in a 
specific setting that explains the associational domain, but how they are related to 
processes of national unification. When state-church relations have promoted the 
development of cross-local and cross-sectional functional divisions (instead of 
territorial divisions), associational life has tended to increase. The contrary would 
inhibit the development of the voluntary association.  
This implies an analysis of both the institutional organisation of the 
church and the relations between churches in their diverse state settings. The 
historical patterns of conflict/accommodation between a state and a church 
shaped voluntarism or contributed to involuntarism. During the early modern 
period, leaders of dissenting churches attempted to impose limits on the state and 
on monarchs’ power, and this promoted the growth of associations. In the 
eighteenth century, the scientific academies and associations for knowledge 
where made against the church, as the republican and social-democratic 
upheavals in the nineteenth century Europe were also partly based on conflicts 
over religion. 
 Two patterns have emerged in Europe: either the church identified with 
the project of nation- and state-building (e.g. Belgium and Ireland) or it was 
against this project (e. g. France and Spain). After the reformation, in countries 
where Protestant reform produced the early nationalisation of the territorial 
culture, this favoured the process of mobilisation from below. Moreover, the 
close relation between the state and the church and the incorporation of the 
church in the state diminished the potential for future state-church conflicts. In 
turn, this helped a clearer definition and identification of the centre against which 
the opposition of outsiders could be directed. In most Catholic countries, the 
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supranational character of the church tended to favour a mobilisation from above 
by Catholic hierarchies and the late increase in levels of literacy, thus making it 
more difficult to mobilise the lower classes. These conflicts were mainly over the 
educational system but also involved the gathering of data, such as the number of 
births and deaths of the population at the parish levels, the dispensation of 
welfare services and so on.188 Only where some form of national unification is 
achieved do we find religion producing a stronger push for associations. In 
Lutheran countries this was possible because churches had become national 
churches and agents of the state in the educational and welfare initiatives. This 
shaped future religious movements that would emerge in the nineteenth century 
for the reform of the church: since the church was part of the state apparatus, 
mobilization for the reform of the church was also mobilization for change of the 
state and it implied political discourse. 
 Moreover, this institutional structure of an alliance, almost fusion of the 
state and the church, made it easier to create alliances of religious reform 
movements with secular political movements, like for example with liberals or 
with socialists, in some cases in the mid and late nineteenth century. The Left 
movements, like the socialists, were able to form alliances with church dissenters 
and nonconformist groups and sects. In other words, religion would not be a 
cause of division between the lower classes fighting for inclusion and suffrage in 
the national polity. In Catholic Europe, the Counter Reformation had made the 
Catholic Church strong and at the same time autonomous from the state, in the 
sense that national Catholic churches owed their loyalty mainly to the Holy See. 
This left these countries, all other conditions being equal, with a high degree of 
localism, either in the form of nationality or region, because the church put a 
strong barrier to state expansion. This localism would promote higher barriers to 
the establishment of alliances between religious and secular movements. 
 In this sense, I argue that it is necessary to look at how centre-periphery 
relations are established in particular settings. By implication, one should 
consider the state apparatus and the institutions of the regime. Where nation-
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building was able to include the church, it was easier to mobilize religion on an 
associational and political way and so associational life tended to become 
stronger and easily institutionalised. Inversely, countries where the church and 
the state opposed each other were instead characterized by an alternation of 
periods of high mobilization and periods of quiescence. Especially in the 
southern European countries, the strong opposition of the church agents against 
compulsory liberal-secular education by the state and commercialisation of its 
land provoked reactions from the church as a defensive localistic corporate body, 
but not as an associational body, resisting the expansion of the state and rejecting 
its legitimacy and thereby delaying associational formation. 
 Still, there was variation between Catholic countries. Later on, between 
the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, the church tended to sponsor 
parties and associations of religious defence and mass movements and gain 
loyalty among the working classes. This process included the creation of 
associational Catholic subcultures based on educational societies and schools, 
youth movements, sports clubs, and so on. 189  In some contexts (Germany, 
Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy), this was successful whereas in 
others less so (France, Spain, and Portugal). In these later places the strength of 
anti-clericalism and the state-church conflict were so endemic since the early 
nineteenth century that the church refused to participate in the national polity 
through associations and party building. In the former cases the pattern of state 
and regime building allowed for inclusion of religious identities and actors. In 
Belgium, for instance, Catholicism identified with the new state because that 
implied independence from the Dutch Protestant rule in the 1830s.190 
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Chapter 3: Regimes, States, and the Political Origins of Associational life 
 
3.1. The State 
 
One of the major advances in the social sciences since the 1970s, in particular 
in the study of associational life, was the change of focus from socioeconomic to 
political and institutional factors, a change which highlighted the role of the state. 
To be fair, the pluralist school had some insights as well, and the importance of 
the state was recognized by some studies in this tradition when they analyzed the 
processes of consultation between state agencies and interest groups. In the case 
of Italy, Lapalombara called this processes clientela and parentela.191 Still, these 
patterns never led to changes in the basic assumptions of the pluralistic theory. 
The process that drove the formation of associations was still economic and 
societal modernization, and the cases where the state was seen as shaping 
associational life as much as the market forces, were seen more as anomalies and 
exceptions, denominated simply as processes of capture of a state agency by a 
particular association or in the more neutral designation of occasional delegation 
on the association of some public tasks.192 In the American case, Lowi called it 
the end of liberalism; and Beer for the case of England denominated it the 
collectivist age.193 
The neo-corporatist school that appeared in the 1970s was the first line of 
thinking in contemporary political science to put the state as a central theme in 
theories of associational life. The state’s role in promoting or inhibiting 
associational life was much more than just the passive pattern of being captured 
by associations or through neutral sectoral partnerships, but now it was the main 
factor shaping the dimension of civic engagement and the pattern of associational 
life. In the words of Philippe Schmitter, the state is not only «an arena for which 
interests contend or another interest group with which they must compete, but a 
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constitutive element engaged in defining, distorting, encouraging, regulating, 
licensing and/or repressing the activities of the associations».194 
Many aspects were considered by this school that had been previously left 
untouched. The state not only licensed and legally recognized associations, but it 
also created associations and promoted particular interests by giving associations 
monopolies of representation of such social groups like the working class or 
producers like middle-sized farmers. This affected the density of associational 
life in the sense that the more the state granted a role for policy for associations, 
the more they became representational monopolies and as a consequence they 
were able to attract more members; in fact, in many contexts the state made 
contributions quasi-compulsory, thus promoting membership in associations. 
Moreover, the state also affected the coordination level of associational life. 
States promoted links between societal associational actors, in order to improve 
the quality and accountability of the policy-making process. This tended to 
generate encompassing and hierarchical associational structures in the form of 
national level peak associations. Schmitter and Lehmbruch emphasized this 
aspect when they examined the role of associations in policy-making. For 
Lehmbruch, in order to achieve a role in policy-making (e.g. shaping and 
implementing policies of employment, monetary stability, balance of trade and 
income etc), associations must be strongly empowered by the state by being 
granted a place, decision capabilities and veto power through specific institutions 
like tripartite councils, economic and social councils (e.g. the Netherlands), 
chambers of representation (Austria), advisory committees, or consultation 
procedures.195 This tends to facilitate the coordination activities of associations 
between themselves, since participation in these bodies is frequently conditional 
on the fusion of previously competing associations and through the devolution of 
power to peak organizations.196 
Curiously enough, when it came to developing a theory of the origins of 
associational life in the neo-corporatist school, the state was absent as an 
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independent variable. The state was only seen as an important factor when 
scholars in the neo-corporatist school were describing the traits and the 
facilitating conditions of modern associational life. This resulted from the debate 
on corporatism that it has been more interested in the consequences of the 
different systems of interest intermediation (on employment, welfare, salaries, 
protest) than on its origins.197 But when a dynamic (or historical) analysis of 
modern associational life was attempted in order to assess the causal factors 
behind corporatist systems, the state receded back and societal and economic 
factors were given primacy. According to Schmitter, the spread of corporatism 
was  
 
«related to certain basic imperatives or needs of capitalism to reproduce the 
conditions for its existence and continually to accumulate further resources. Differences 
in the specific nature of these imperatives or needs at different states in the institutional 
development or needs at different stages in the institutional development and 
international context of capitalism, especially as they affect the pattern of conflicting 
class interests, account for the difference in origins between the societal and state forms 
of corporatism».198 
 
In the same vein, Lehmbruch argued that corporatism was «related to 
problems of economic policy-making which arise in a rather advanced stage of 
capitalist development», it «appears to serve such imperatives (of capitalism) by 
regulating the conflict of social classes in the distribution of national income and 
in the structure of industrial relations».199 
Admittedly, Schmitter also mentiones the role of political factors in the 
emergence of modern associational life. He includes factors like the growing 
bureaucratisation and oligarchisation of the modern state since the late nineteenth 
century state to World War I in establishing state-society partnerships and 
fostering a concomitant impact in interest associations, thus making them 
centralized and oligarchic; prior party-interest group linkages; the international 
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context, especially wars; traditions of civil service and public administration; a 
liberal-pluralist past in the sense that prior to the interwar years the countries 
where corporatism developed had a competitive party-system, a parliament where 
grievances could be addressed and a history of autonomous associations200. But 
these factors were considered mainly in an ad hoc manner and they were external 
to his theory of corporatism. 
Nevertheless, I will follow these leads and argue that some of these factors 
are very important and may constitute the starting point for a unified theory of the 
origins of associational life. This is developed in the next chapters. A historical 
perspective on the state is needed, and it should be attentive to the extended 
process of state development and how this, in turn, has shaped associational life 
both directly and indirectly. 
Since the peace of Westphalia, European polities became organized mainly 
around national sates.201 According to Tilly, state makers were initially sets of 
noble families that since the end of the Roman Empire competed militarily with 
other noble families and polities (cities, the church, and tribes) for the control of a 
territory and the population within it. 202  After the seventeenth century an 
international political system developed in Europe with the state being the main 
organization in international affairs with claims of control, legitimacy, and 
resource extraction from populations and territories. Other organizations that 
have long rivalled with states (city-state leagues, churches, communal bodies, 
principalities, feudal structures, and empires) lost much power to them.203  
In sum, the state is an organization that controls a well-defined territory and 
population through the monopoly of coercion.204 States make claims on resources 
and people on a certain territory and use force to constrain, educate, and extract 
resources from these populations. In this sense, although with variations, the state 
is an autonomous bureaucratic organisation not reducible to the interests of 
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economic and social groups, namely the dominant groups/classes in the capitalist 
process.205 
The process of state formation shaped collective action, organized interests, 
and movements of protest. State-building processes generated more self-
conscience and stressed primordial ties of the primary groups that got involved in 
conflict with the state.206 The first functions of the state were the extraction of 
taxes, the confiscation of grain and other agricultural products to feed armies, and 
the forced conscription of peasants in national armies. Initially, this led to 
widespread revolts and rebellions, which were common in Europe until the late 
nineteenth century (e. g. Carlist wars in Spain in the 1870s).207 Initially these 
were just social revolts directed against the state and assumed a simple reactive 
character, a rejection of what was considered imposition and unfair resource 
extraction from above.  
Gradually, however, as states became consolidated and took over the full 
control of the territory, the character of collective action also changed. Claims by 
the population evolved from being just sheer localistic resistance to actions meant 
to influence the decisions of state makers. Moreover, different groups started to 
establish links and alliances for this purpose, cross-cutting different geographical 
areas and sometimes achieving organization and mobilization that was national in 
scope.208 As the tasks of government became more complex, reached more strata 
of the population, and the state became the single coordinating military agency in 
a territory, the more the individual lives were affected by it and as a consequence 
organized in a way to influence its policies. 209  As the state became more 
centralised and with a higher control over a territory, groups evolved from a 
localist and reactive resistance and conflict pattern of collective action, and used 
the voluntary association for the purpose of fighting the state.210 
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In this sense, all other things being equal, a strong state fosters the 
development of associational life. Recently, Skocpol has argued that in the 
United States the periods of major associational boom were periods of expansion 
of state power, not the inverse (periods of war or of the expansion of welfare state 
initiatives).211 Yet, the context of war has been decisive in fostering associational 
life as becomes evident if considering the interwar period in Western Europe. The 
need of governments to rely on the citizenry for the war effort, either by military 
conscription, by the mobilization of organized labour for production directed for 
war, and by the simple necessity of keeping labour unrest at low levels in order 
not to disrupt the productive process, led to the development of state-
associational partnerships that resulted in the empowerment of voluntary 
associations. Initiatives like the authority given to the ministries of munitions to 
negotiate war contracts spread to other spheres: grievance committees for 
workers or factory committees were institutionalised in France, Italy, and 
Germany in 1918-1919; the state fostered agreements between labour and capital 
to regulate the labour market (e.g. Sweden in 1938).212 In sum, as Charles Maier 
has argued, «after the mass political mobilization that followed … the world war, 
authoritarian and democratic national political economies alike perceived the 
imperative for dealing with collective interests in the market place as well as in 
government agencies … Modernization was a corporate task and no longer an 
individualist possibility».213 World War II pushed this trend even further. 
States promote associational life when certain conditions exist. First, patterns 
of war-making that do not lead to collapse and breakdown, or when the territorial 
borders of the state are not questioned, favor associational life because it is easier 
to connect groups with claims to the centre of political life and elites are more 
successful at mobilizing the citizenry for war-making tasks.214 Moreover, when 
individuals and groups begin to be connected to the centre (because of job 
opportunities, same educational programs, and being together a part of the 
military machine), the resolution of local issues begins to be a question of getting 
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resources from and by influencing the centre. For instance, associations find it 
easier to spread through the territory using state resources (roads, tax policies, 
postal systems, and so on).215 
Second, strong states make for the nationalisation of politics, that is, for the 
absorption of peripheral regions under the same centralised authority. This fosters 
national alliances. Strong states are able to pursue and implement their declared 
goals. States with high capacity have at their disposal an organisational and 
bureaucratic apparatus that allows them to implement policies and establish goals 
autonomously decided by the government in spite of resistance from actors in 
society. In this sense a high capacity state has a body of functionaries or state 
officials, managers whose goals and interests are independent from societal 
forces.216 
Strong states encourage the nationalisation of conflict, because they increase 
the importance of national institutions and national conflicts and so make for 
higher relevance of associational organisations and to a bigger push to draw these 
organisations to the political debates and conflicts. 217  Groups will use the 
resources of the state to foster their associations: railroads, mail offices and 
services, and schools which tend to imitate the internal structure of the state. The 
voluntary association can thus transcend the locality and to organise collective 
action on a vaster scale (national). Tarrow locates the origins of this process in 
the eighteenth century England, where the first associations were promoted by 
the resistance to indirect taxes.218 
Third, since a strong state has the instruments and resources to deliver goods 
sought by groups (e.g. through public polices), the more eco-functional conflicts 
tend to prevail over other divisions like territorial ones, and this tends to stimulate 
associational life. 219  States that are weak, unwilling, or unable to extract 
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resources from the population do not need to develop bargaining with populations 
and tend to repress associational life development.220 
In weak states associational life tends to be less active because it is mainly 
local. For instance, Nancy Bermeo concluded that in the early twentieth century 
patterns of state-building that had high asymmetry between national and local 
politics (Italy, Portugal, and Russia) state legitimacy was weaker and so it eroded 
connectedness between institutions and citizens.221 Philip Nord has argued that 
the failed integration of the countryside (or periphery) in the civic life of a nation 
inhibited associational life. According to Nord, in France this was achieved in the 
Third Republic in 1882 (when the regime was able to rally small town 
constituencies) and in Great Britain by the late eighteenth century, but not in 
Portugal, Russia, or Italy. Consequently, the political behaviour of the peasantry 
in the periphery was unknown and so political forces refrained from mobilizing 
it. 222  Other examples are found in Latin America, where sometimes the 
“profound crisis of the State” in countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Peru, 
according to Guillermo O’Donnell, have not produced popular mobilisation and 
association-building but rather the increasing consolidation of non-democratic, 
autonomous, clientelistic, and semi-authoritarian territories, which he labels 
“br
                                                
own areas”.223 
Moreover, a weak state makes it easier for clientelistic elites to become the 
main power figures and for the links with the masses to be established through 
corrupt exchanges. In weak states, the flow of resources is more easily 
appropriated by private agents (e.g. cliques, political machines, bureaucratic 
clienteles, and feuds). Consequently, it is harder to consolidate other networks 
and forms of collective action or to allow only for the emergence of a narrow and 
selected set of privileged associations rather than widespread networks of 
associations. In some countries, namely in Portugal and Spain, a solution has 
been the establishment of state-corporatist systems, but even here associations 
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tended to rely more on patronage goods and less on collective goods to mobilize 
constituents.224 Responsible and collective goods oriented associations, as well as 
parties, should be able to produce long and sustained civic participation through 
time unlike parties that rely on patronage. In fact, countries with low (France or 
Italy) and very low (Portugal, Spain, and Italy) density of associational life have 
historically had patronage oriented parties. On the other hand, countries with 
medium to high density levels of associational life (Great Britain, Germany, and 
Sweden) have had collective goods oriented parties.225 Would-be and potentially 
mobilizing political and social elites and coalitions when faced with an inefficient 
state will face more obstacles in adopting public policies that promote 
associational life (e.g. partnerships government-associations for the distribution 
of social welfare resources, or the attribution of public status and funds to 
ass
                                                
ociations). 
Finally, weak states are prone to situations of collapse and crisis and in these 
situations associational activity expands sometimes, but it tends to be short-lived. 
It expands only in periods of administrative collapse, creating in this process both 
the opportunities for the emergence of associations and new claimants and the 
impetus for new ruling elites to mobilize the citizenry in support of a new 
political order. Scholarship on revolutions has stressed this aspect.226  In fact, 
there is a strong relation between a weak state, or a “coup prone” state, and a 
weak associational life. On the basis of Belkin and Schofer’s analysis of 108 
countries between 1948 and 1967, «weakly institutionalized societies are far 
more likely than those with highly developed institutions to suffer (…) political 
interventions by the military».227  Moreover, these cycles of mobilization and 
association building after a state collapse tend to be short-lived, and voluntary 
associations find in the short -term many barriers to their institutionalisation, 
while individuals have few incentives to join associations. These civil societies 
oscillate between explosions of participation and periods of apathy. As Harry 
Eckstein has argued, this happens because what is at stake and in conflict is the 
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very definition of central power in a society, the «very location of formal power 
and consequently civil society becomes the center of all concern or of no concern 
at all». 228  In sum, the more developed a strong state is, the stronger its 
ass
tive infrastructure was bigger in absolute 
and
                                                
ociational life. 
State strength seems to be a fair predictor of the density of associational life 
over time. For instance, dense civil societies exist in the strong welfare states of 
Scandinavia, the Netherlands and Finland, and the lowest density in the weakest 
social welfare states of Portugal, Spain, Italy, and France. Thus, associational life 
seems to vary positively with states with strong redistributive and extractive 
capacity. Also, societies with a history of rational and efficient state bureaucracy 
have the densest civil societies. Comparative historians and sociologists have 
identified the Scandinavian countries, Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium, 
and Great Britain as bureaucratic since the late eighteenth century, whereas the 
pattern of state development and type of bureaucracy that developed in Iberia, 
France (until the 1950s at least), and Italy has been defined by comparative 
sociologists as patrimonial. 229  The case of England has been revised lately. 
Altough in England in the eighteenth century the state was much still a 
proprietary state where officials had property rights of their offices, recent 
research has shown that England developed modern and rational forms of state 
administration much earlier th it was thought. Thomas Ertman, for instance, has 
argued that in England already in the eighteenth century existed a rational-legal 
state apparatus. It’s fiscal and administra
 relative terms than Prussia230.  
Especially in Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and Belgium the state maintained 
its autonomy and cohesion, which made for a smoother mode of transition from 
pre-modern to the modern period. In Scandinavia it allowed the pre-modern 
corporations to be transformed into modern institutions, and in Belgium and in 
the Netherlands the liberal regime had the ability to sustain and integrate 
pressures from below in the form of religious, ethnic and socioeconomic 
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mobilizations. Inversely, countries with a weak state have the least dense civil 
societies: Portugal, Spain, Greece, Italy, and, partially, France. What is crucial 
here is that the state be strong and somehow united around a national centre 
(independently of a centralized or decentralized regime structure, e.g. being 
fed
e within the 
Disjointed cases and even slightly ahead of Germany and England. 
Table 14: State Strength, 1965-1985 
 
Taxes as % of 
GNP Assoc
eral or unitary). 
By using taxes as percentage of Gross National Product as an indicator of 
state strength, one can see a homology, although imperfect, between state 
strength and associational life development. Countries of hegemonic civil 
societies have the highest rates of taxation, all between 38% and 43.7% (Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark, and Austria). Also, countries in the Dominant associational 
life pattern have high rates of taxation: Germany (35%), Belgium (39.7%), and 
the Netherlands (41%). England, the case of Divided associational life is 
immediately below, although at the same level as Germany (35.3%). In the case 
of Disjointed associational life, taxation levels are lower (Spain, 29.9% and Italy 
32.3%), but there are two cases that stand out. France, with a level of 39.3%, has 
levels higher than Germany and Austria for instance. Furthermore, Portugal is 

















(taxes: average of 1965, 1975, 1985; sources: 1982; Janoski, 1998, pp. 130-131; Spain refers to 
e average of years 1982-2000, source: Gunther, Montero, Botella, 2004, p. 338) 
 in voluntary associations that evolved from 40% to 
                                                
th
 
 Although important, the state strength hypothesis, however, is insufficient 
to explain all the variation between western European civil societies, both in 
understanding situations where strong states are associated with associational life 
and where weak states have fostered weak civil societies. In fact, very strong 
states can also lead to the development of totalitarian regimes and not to 
democratic citizenship and participation. Strong and autonomous states, 
especially with a high coercive apparatus, may use this strength to repress 
autonomous associational life or to mobilise it through single and regime 
sponsored associations (e.g. Fascist Italy), as is confirmed by many highly 
institutionalized authoritarian regimes.231 Also, this predictor is not able to fully 
explain existing variations. It does not account for variations within the groups of 
dense and weak associational life. Countries like Belgium, Ireland, Austria, and 
West Germany, all with medium to highly dense civil societies, have nevertheless 
major differences. The same applies to Italy and Portugal, both countries with a 
less dense associational life in comparison with the previous group, but also with 
different degrees of encompassigness of associational life. Second, temporal 
variation is also left unexplained. A case in point is Finland with an affiliation 
rate of the adult population
86% in a very short period. 
 In fact, the relation of states to associational life seems ambiguous. On the 
one hand, high repressive capacity has historically inhibited formal collective 
action and channelled it through informal paths. In contexts of high restriction of 
freedom of association, collective action tended to assume informal dynamic 
either through secret societies (e.g. the masonry in certain countries  like France), 
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or to be based mainly on informal sociability (e.g. churches, funerals, theatrical 
performances, and local personal networks). Moreover, the higher the state 
repression, the more associational life organizations preferred radical and violent 
forms of action like, for instance, in Spanish Andalusian anarchism.232 On the 
other hand, the fact that a state is strong in coercive capacity does not mean that 
coercion will be used against associations. The ideal states are the ones that have 
«the strength and capacity to deliver policies sought by social interests and that 
are at the same time neither so strongly beholden to social forces with vested 
e duty of 
e population to serve in national armies. This idea of citizen-soldier emerged 
ch revolution and it spread soon to other countries.235 
                                                
interests in the status quo nor so autonomous from society at large that they can 
and will ignore broad-based demands».233 
 Beside the character of the state, also other factors shape associatonal life. 
Recent research has pointed out the need to consider the regime’s institutions. We 
should look also at institutions, patterns of institutional development and change, 
and institutional legacies. State builders have always tried to go beyond the use of 
sheer repression and become accepted by the population, that is, they have 
developed claims of legitimacy which foresaw rights and duties of populations 
over which they clamed to rule. In some circumstances this has led to 
mobilisation strategies by elites and the creation of links of some sort between 
state builders and the population. In the process of state building elites also 
needed more than just the compliance of the population, and they pushed for 
participation, so that it could be organised for special tasks and to provide the 
state’s leaders with political support. 234  Since state rulers also need the 
acquiescence and even the support of populations, they have tended to negotiate 
with them regarding general rights and duties within the national polity. An 
important and probably the first issue over which there were these negotiations 
was military service. State builders exchanged rights and services for th
th
first after the Fren
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ities and consequently they 
pro
mark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, 
Gre
                                                
. The Regime 
 
A political regime refers to the formal and informal rules regulating «the 
organization of the center of political power», «its relations with the broader 
society», the agents’ ability to «access political power, and how those who are in 
power deal with those who are not».236 According to Ekiert and Kubik, the size 
of civil societies and its internal diversity «may decrease or diminish according to 
the independence they are accorded within the legal framework of the regime».237 
National political institutions and their changing configuration determine an
uences ways people perceive their experience and «affect the capabilities of 
various groups to achieve self-consciousness, organize, and make alliances».238 
In this section, I analyse the degree to which different institutional 
configurations that regulate access and distribution of power in polities is related 
to associational life. Federalism, a political system based on the division of power 
between central and regional governments has long been associated with strong 
and dense civil societies. This argument, initially developed by Tocqueville and 
based on the American case, argues that federal systems provide more 
opportunities for autonomous self-rule by commun
mote organization-building and mobilization.239 In contrast, it is often argued 
that unitary states do not provide such opportunities. 
The data, however, show no direct relation between federalism and 
associational life. Although true that in federal countries like Germany, Belgium 
after 1993 and Austria, and with the exception of Switzerland, associational life 
tends to be medium to high in terms of density, in the semi-federal countries we 
find Spain (weak associational life) and the Netherlands (very dense associational 
life). Moreover, the unitary countries (Den
ece, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy) show 
many variations in terms of associational life. 
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The division power between central and local government may also be a 
causal factor that shapes associational life. The degree of political 
decentralization of the regime has usually been advanced as a major cause of 
density of associational life. This hypothesis argues that the degree of political 
centralisation – the way relevant decisions are structured from local to national 
powers – shapes the character of collective action.240 This is an argument that 
goes back to Tocqueville. The more decentralised a state, the more there is a 
stimulus to the development of local voluntary associations. There is a positive 
correlation between the number of associations – the stronger and «more 
numerous» «local powers» – and the level of decentralisation of the 
administration. Tocqueville developed this idea in order to explain the extreme 
proliferation of newspapers in America, but it could be applied to associations as 
well. As Tocqueville wrote, «the extraordinary subdivision of administrative 
pow
On
                                                
er has much more to do with the enormous number of American newspapers 
than the great political freedom of the country and the absolute liberty of the 
press».241 Inversely, a more centralised state inhibits associational life. 
Nevertheless, the data shows that there is no correlation between the level of 
centralisation and associational density. High density Austria is as centralised as 
low affiliation Portugal and France. Similarly, decentralised Sweden has much 
higher levels of affiliation than decentralised Germany.242 Countries with denser 
associational life, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, are decentralised but the 
Netherlands is centralised. In the group of medium-high associational life, 
Belgium (after 1993) and Germany are decentralised, but Austria is centralised. 
 the other hand, all cases of medium and low associational life are centralised: 
the medium cases (Great Britain and Ireland), the low density cases (France and 
Italy) and the very low cases (Portugal, Spain, and Greece).243 
The electoral system, whether proportional or majoritarian, has also been 
connected to associational life. Many have argued that proportional systems 
promote a high density of associational life because it leads to an egalitarian 
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representation of all political identities and currents existing in society, thus 
giving minorities equal rights of representation and opportunities of access to 
power. Proportional representation makes for encompassing government 
coa
een societies with similar 
elec
er has a medium dense and the latter a weakly dense 
ssociational life. Also, Portugal and Sweden have similar levels of multipartism, 
ut the latter has one of the densest civil societies in Europe, while the former has 
ne of the least dense.246 
                                                
litions and so for a broader associational development. Conversely, 
majoritarian systems favor a winner take all situation and so to generate very few 
political winners.244 
Nevertheless, the electoral system is not directly related to associational life 
development, because there are many variations betw
toral systems. For instance, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Ireland have all 
proportional systems, though the first country has low density, the second has 
high, and third has medium dense associational life.245 
Note also that the degree of multipartism, namely the effective number of 
parties in a given polity, is not related to the degree of density of associational 
life. On the one hand, the more parties exist, there are more political identities 
and agents for mobilization, and so associational life is expected to be denser. On 
the other hand, bipartism may also be related to denser civil societies, because it 
offers clear cut political alternatives, a clearer delimitation of ideological and 
policy alternatives and promotes stronger political competition. But there are 
many empirical variations, so this variable must operate together with other 
causes. Both the United Kingdom and Greece have a very low degree of 
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Sweden Hegemonic P        U D H M 
Norway Hegemonic P        U D H M 
Denmark Hegemonic P        U D H M 
Austria Hegemonic P        F C H B 
Netherlands nt  Domina P        U/F C/D L M 
Germany Dominant P        F D L B 
Belgium  Dominant P        U/F C/D L M 
U. K. Plural M        U C H B 
Italy Disjointed P        U C H M 
France Disjointed M         U C H M 
Portugal Disjointed P         U C M M 
Spain  Disjointed P         F C H B 
(Not : Portugal and Spain refer to the period 1981-2000; electoral system: P refers to proportional 
representation, M to majoritarian; Socialist rule after 1945: H: high, M: Medium or L: low 
ortuga
e
(P l and Spain refer to the period 1981/82-2000; Party system: M refers to Multiparty, B to 
biparty; source: Lijphart, 1999) 
 
 A democratic regime will foster the development of associational life 
when its institutions promote and give strong incentives for citizens’ participation 
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in the electoral arena. This is for instance when they foster broad and equal 
citizenship (extensive rights in the social and economic arena), and rely on 
mechanisms of permanent consultation between the government and citizens for 
public policies, public forums of state-society co-decision.247 I argue that these 
 by 
                                                
functions of democratic regimes should be looked for in the following arenas: 1) 
national level corporatist structures of policy making, 2) mass political parties, 
and 3) welfare state types. 
 Associational life is impacted greatly by the type of system of interest 
intermediation institutionalized in a democratic regime. Democratic systems of 
interest intermediation in Western Europe can be corporatist or pluralist. In a 
corporatist system of interest intermediation the state encourages directly and 
indirectly associations in order to have interlocutors with whom to discuss and 
implement social policies and to achieve social peace by making conflict interests 
develop an interest in permanent consultation. The state gives public authority to 
associations.248 Corporatist structures appeared historically first as sites for wage 
settlements or bargaining between workers and employers. They were a 
qualitative change from previous historical experiences where wages were 
determined after the defeat of one part (usually the workers) or by direct state 
determination. Gradually these negotiations spread to other sectors of the 
workforce, especially during World War I because of the need for cooperation
all sectors in the war economy, and they were vastly experimented between the 
wars and solidified in many countries after 1945, in particular in Austria’s system 
of social partnership, and in Sweden, West Germany, and the Netherlands.249 
 This facilitated the development of both density and coordination of 
associational life. Corporatist institutions lead to higher associational density 
because the state granted associations a «deliberate representational monopoly 
within their respective categories».250 By doing so, they were able to raise their 
capacity to recruit members. Furthermore, coordination was facilitated because 
the state, by wanting the participation and inclusion of associations in policy, 
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made them reduce their competition and find common programmatic grounds, 
which in turn made them have a single voice. In interest group corporatism, there 
are regular meetings between the government, unions, and employer 
organizations in order to foster agreement on socioeconomic policies. This is 
usually referred to as concertation or tripartite pacts. In this sense they become 
under the leadership of a hierarchical peak association, since that facilitates 
negotiation. In a pluralist system the state does not foster or call associations for 
partnerships in the implementation of economic and social policies. Associations 
are not integrated into policy-making procedures, and as a consequence they have 
a smaller capacity at coordination and at recruitment of possible members, or in 
here states and regimes are strong, 
evelop inclusive institutions, and recognise public status to associations, 
ssociational life will tend to grow, encompass a higher proportion of the 
opulation and consequently to be denser. 
                                                
other words a lower density. Instead, associations compete with each other for 
resources and members.251 Examples of this are Britain, France, and Italy where, 
for instance, wage bargaining procedures are more conflictual.252 
 By looking at a recent classification by Lijphart in 1999, one can note 
how a pluralist system of interest intermediation is negatively associated with 
density and coordination of associational life. The more pluralist countries tend to 
have weaker civil societies. Moreover, the cases of medium and low density civil 
societies (Great Britain, Ireland, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Greece) are 
all pluralist, and the medium-high (Austria, Germany, and Belgium) and high 
(the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries) are all corporatist. This 
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Table 16: Interest Group Plur ism, 1960s and 1980s. Rank and Indexes 
Rank index Pattern of al life 
al
  Association
United Kingdom 1 3.38 Plural 
Spain 2 3.25 Disjointed 
Italy 3 3.12 Disjointed 
Portugal 4 3.00 Disjointed 
France 5 2.84 Disjointed 
Germany 6 1.38                 Dominant 
Belgium 7 1.25 Dominant 
Netherlands 8 1.19 Dominant 
Denmark 9 1.00 Hegemonic 
Austria 10 0.62 Hegemonic 
Sweden 11 0.50 Hegemonic 
Norway 12 0.44 Hegemonic 
(Source: Lijphart, 1999, p. 177) 
 
 Still, corporatist theory presents some weaknesses if we want to use it to 
explain national patterns of associational life. First, it is restricted to occupational 
groups; in particular, it is biased towards unions and the working class. 
Associations from the countryside, like agricultural associations, that historically 
make also religious claims seem to be much less integrated in corporatist 
structures, and the pattern of relationship with the state is mostly pluralist.253 
Why this is so remains still a puzzle, especially because historically speaking 
                                                 
253 Truman, 1951, pp. 525-526; Lehmbruch, 1977, p. 96. 
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associations in the primary sector were more corporatist, whereas in industry and 
services associations were more competitive.254 For instance, in Sweden religious 
s and how 
ciations in the countryside were religious 
                                                
associations based on the countryside were integrated in the regime with public 
policy functions (also in the parliament, the Riksdag) in alcohol consumption and 
education policies.255. 
 Second, historically agrarian and middle-class associations have had a 
decisive role in the creation of conditions propitious to corporatist development, 
especially because they were central in alliances with workers in the context of 
the late nineteenth century, alliances which were decisive for corporatist 
implementation. In fact, the emergence of corporatism in Western European 
societies is not only a result of the mobilization and institutionalization of the 
working class but also of cross-class coalitions involving many different actors, 
like farmers, and also sectors of the business community. It is then necessary to 
explain the success and failure of these coalitions in different setting
they were shaped by institutional legacies and processes of state transformation 
(e.g. a coalition of employers exposed to foreign competition allied with farmers 
and low wage workers for the growth of social welfare in Sweden).256 
 Third, western European societies were weakly urbanised until at least the 
1920s, and most of the population lived in the countryside. In this sense, one 
should look at the initiatives for association building that were being developed 
in the countryside. In this context many associational ventures emerged, much 
before the emergence of the first mass industrial unions during the late nineteenth 
century. Many of these first asso
organizations (temperance societies in Scandinavia, Christian associations in the 
Netherlands, and so on), and were also strong social movements for both political 
and religious reform.257 
 Another neglected aspect in corporatist theories is the political party, and 
its links with interest associations. Because of an excessive focus on delimitating 
the properties of the systems of interest intermediation as being different from the 
 
254 Lehmbruch, 1982, p. 7. 
255 Nedelmann and Maier, 1977, p. 43. 
256 On this see also Swenson, 1991 and Baldwin, 1990. 
257 Nedelmann and Maier, 1977, p. 43. 
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party system, there was a lack of attention to the degree that these two channels 
could be linked and empower each other. More specifically, it is crucial to know 
the degree to which the party system affects density and coordination of 
associational life organizations. This aspect was considered crucial by early 
scholars of political parties. Stein Rokkan called it the degree of Verzuiling of the 
 words, societal corporatism, or dense and 
                                                
two systems of interest intermediation. In his words it refers to the «degree of 
interlocking between cleavage-specific organizations active in the corporate 
channel and party organizations mobilizing for electoral action».258 
 The relation of political parties to associational life is an ambiguous one. 
Tocqueville discussed this subject in a chapter of Democracy in America aptly 
titled the «Relation of civil to political associations».259 His argument was that if 
political associations were prohibited, civil associations would also be rare. There 
was a double relation between these two types of associations. Civil associations 
facilitated political associations in the sense that associationalism per se makes 
men mingle for the same purposes and so it was easier to advance their common 
association in the political sphere. Political associations «strengthen and improve 
associations for civil purposes», because politics is a sphere where there is always 
a need to cooperate. As Tocqueville put it, «political life makes the love and 
practice of association more general».260 More recently Lehmbruch linked neo-
corporatist theory with the development of political parties, arguing that the two 
subsystems are complementary. In his
highly coordinated civil societies and what I have called the Hegemonic and 
Dominant patterns of associational life, shows «strong links between interest 
associations and the party system».261 
 Previous research suggests that associational life tends to grow in tandem 
with political parties: The stronger the parties, all other things being equal, the 
stronger will be associational life. Liberal parties during the whole nineteenth 
century were the first cases (although only in some contexts) in promoting 
associational life. Liberals championed the creation of membership organisations 
 
258 Flora, Kuhnle, Urwin, 1999, p. 52. 
259 Ignazi and Ysmal, 1998; Morlino, 1998; O’Donnell, 1992, pp. 47-49; Przeworski, 1995, p. 54. 
260 Maier, 1981, pp. 50-51. 
261 Lehmbruch, 1977, pp. 93, 99. 
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in order to be able to get the vote in political systems that were becoming 
increasingly more competitive. Gradually interest groups developed links to 
political parties and helped them recruit and propose candidates for elections (e.g. 
by proposing a union or religious organisations leader in an electoral list), 
channeled monetary support, and publicly supported the party through 
demonstrations, petitions, and press campaigns. A situation emerged in 
competitive liberal party systems where double affiliations were common; 
individuals were members of both the party and its ancillary voluntary 
associations.262 The majority of associations became «structured along partisan 
leavag
party and unions, both in the Left (the Socialist party) and 
                                                
c es», «associated with one of the parties».263 One of the first examples 
occurred in England with the Liberal Party in the mid-nineteenth century, and it 
was soon imitated by the Conservative Party.264 
 This model would be later copied by other parties, especially by religious 
parties (both Catholic and Protestant) and by socialists/social-democrats, by the 
end of the century. Parties evolved to what is now called the mass party, an 
ideologically coherent organization with a permanent body of functionaries and 
professional politicians, internally centralized, bureaucratic and representing a 
specific associational subculture within a society (for example the Socialists 
milieu or the Catholics). 265  Austria was an exemplary case, where party 
membership is historically very high and associational life as well. There were 
strong links between a 
the Right, through the Peoples’ Party links to agrarian interest groups and 
Catholic associations. In the 1960s, one third of the socialist electorate was 
affiliated in parties.266 
 After the transition to democracy, these links between associations and 
political parties allowed associations to have easier access and influence to policy 
making, to be recognized as partners in policy, and to receive state support in the 
form of corporatist inclusion, which allowed them to grow in density and to 
 
262 Epstein, 2000, p. 12. 
263 Daalder, 1966, pp. 58, 64-66; Manin, 1995, p. 213. 
264 Epstein, 2000, p. 112. 
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achieve a higher coordination capacity. For this to happen, as Lehmbruch argued, 
the empowerment of parliament was vital. In fact, studies have shown that the 
cooperation between capital and labor at the national and cross-industry/sectoral 
levels needs the support of the parliamentary sphere and the backing of politics 
represented by parties in parliament. In Weimar Germany, the ZAG 
(Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft), an attempt in concertation of business and labor, 
depended on the party support so as to avoid intra-organisational tensions within 
the unions and the employers’ associations. In contemporary Austria, the strong 
oid competition with each other and 
                                                
delegation of an almost legislative power to associations of labour and capital is 
sustained by a «close and mutual penetration of party and interest 
organizations».267 
 Where parties are weak as organisations, also associational life tends to be 
weakly developed. France is a case in point, since there mass parties always 
found it difficult to consolidate and build networks of voters across the country. 
Politics has always been highly characterised by localism. The representatives 
from the countryside tended to see themselves more as representatives of 
localities rather than as defending a political ideology for the whole country. 
After 1945 only the Communists developed an organisation along the mass party 
model, whereas the other parties, the socialists and the Right, were still organized 
around the cadre/elite models (the UNR). 268  During the 1970s transitions to 
democracy in Southern Europe, parties and associations were weaker than in past 
transitions to democracy. The transitions to democracy have encouraged parties 
in the founding moments of the regime to av
to rely mainly on the distribution of offices as a way to become rooted in the 
society.269 In Portugal and Spain (and in France but less so in Italy), this pattern 
dates back to the late nineteenth century.270 
 As can be seen from the next table, where party membership is higher, 
also associational life tends to be higher. The countries within the Hegemonic 
pattern of associational life, with the exception of Denmark, have the highest 
 
267 Lehmbruch, 1984, p. 74. 
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269 Kriesi et all, 1995, p. 37. 
270 Skocpol and Amenta, 1986, p. 140. 
 106
rates of membership in political parties (10% to 14% of the adult population), 
followed by the countries in the Dominant associational life type (between 6% 
ion in 
 6%. And  of Disjoi  ass n 1% 
ain) and 6% (I
le 17: Membership in political parties, 1990-1993 (% adult population) 
nk  Pattern of Associational Life 
and 10%). Divided associational life (England) has middle levels of affiliat
parties, the cases nted ociational life all fall betwee
(Sp taly). 
Tab
Ra Country % 
1  Norway  14 Hegemonic 
2  Austria  12 Hegemonic 
3  Sweden 10 Hegemonic 
3  Netherlands:  10 Dominant 
5  Germany  7 D  ominant
6  D k enmar 6 Dominant 
6  Belgium 6 Dominant 
6  U.Kingdom 6 Divided 
6  Italy 6 Disjointed 
10  Portugal  5 Disjointed 
11 Ireland 3 Divided 
11 Switzerland 3 Divided 
11 France  3 Disjointed 
12 Spain 1 Disjointed 
(Source: Ulzurrum, 2004, p. 309)  
 
 Finally, the strength of the welfare state seems to be strongly and 
positively correlated to the density of associational life. Voluntary associations 
have had historically an important role in the promotion and provision of welfare, 
and this aspect has been neglected in many studies, where the public role of 
associations is considered to be only in the participation in economic and 
industrial policies. Still, one could even argue that historically the primary role of 
associations was the provision of welfare for its members. Many contemporary 
voluntary associations grew out of the ancient regime corporations and guilds that 
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were abolished by the nineteenth century liberalism and the expansion of free 
markets. This process left many professional groups and local communities on 
the verge of destitution and these associations provided mutual assistance and 
self-help. Gierke called these associations’ economic fellowships or co-
operatives. They were risk and insurance associations with the aim of fighting 
against the economic misfortune of its members, for the «economic rights of 
citizenship» of the popular/working classes. 271  These organizations provided 
mutual aid through collective funds collected from members (to finance burials, 
provide for unemployment, sickness, and housing and sometimes even old age 
and widow’s survival pensions).272 Note that many of these associations were not 
only workers’ organizations, like the compagnonages in France, but also 
religious associations. Historically, several churches in Western Europe had been 
the main providers of welfare.273 In fact, «the parish did not exist prior to, and 
independently of, the collective charitable fund».274 In the modern age, many of 
these religious endeavors for welfare were transformed into modern voluntary 
associations. 275  In some places these associations were very successful. It is 
estimated that by the mid-nineteenth century the percentage of people affiliated in 
self-help associations and mutualities comprised almost half of the male 
                                                
population in England, two million members in France, and that 45% of the 
population of Prussia was ensured for sickness with each association with about 
one hundred members.276 
 At the same time, most welfare voluntary associations faced severe 
difficulties. They had problems of coordination that left many still poor; they 
were mainly local; and had problems in recruiting members. Usually only a small 
minority belonged to welfare associations, and most of the time it was only the 
better-off sectors of the working classes. The larger share of the population was 
left outside because they constituted a heavy financial burden on an association 
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and consequently a risk for the association’s survival. Thus, the ones who needed 
more protection were usually excluded. But because of this, associations tended 
to stay very personal, small in membership and capital, and highly dependent on 
a single community, say, of the same residential or occupational area.277 Self-
help associations tried to cope with this by creating broader networks at the 
national scale and by engaging political issues.278 Many unions evolved from 
 below a certain ages or the 
                                                
these mutual help associations, tried to fight for universal suffrage, and represent 
workers vis-à-vis employers and the State, while maintaining the original aims of 
mutual support of its members.279 
 Problems of coordination, funding and recruitment still existed though, 
and self-help associations tried to cope with this by engaging with the state in 
order to receive support and funding. In the 1860s, as argued by Gierke, free 
voluntary associations dedicated to self-help were compatible with «contributory 
state aid», and «a claim on state aid, indeed, is not the working classes privilege 
but their right».280 This state empowerment of the role of associations should 
even go beyond the protection and the legitimation of rights of the working 
classes, like the prohibition of hiring workers
restriction of work hours, but by giving associations a role in the distribution of 
material resources (old age, widower funds, investment, and relief funds) and as 
agents of intellectual and technical formation.281 
 In fact, the more states used these associations for the implementation of 
welfare measures, the stronger was membership in associations and their 
coordination role. What in the twentieth century became the welfare state has its 
roots in these associations that existed everywhere in Europe and that were 
successfully integrated within the state apparatus as providers of benefits. This 
increased both membership/density of associational life as well as coordination. 
First, density grew because of the use of associations, namely unions and 
charitable organizations, to dispense services, and resources to the subsided 
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population made them have higher incentives for potential members to affiliate. 
In many contexts, membership became even compulsory as these services 
became mandatory: examples were health care, social security, pensions, and 
education. Second, the state established central coordination agencies for welfare 
relief, and this made associations coalesce in national and hierarchical networks. 
The more nationwide plans for compulsory welfare and national collective 
insurance schemes for wage earners were enacted, the more associations became 
coordinated by peak associations and were able to include local, sectoral, and 
an and rural middle-class 
ile a
              
industry-specific self-help associations. 282  Moreover, the availability of state 
funds and the legitimacy of a public role provided associations with security, thus 
making them more viable and ensuring their survival.283 
 Between 1883 and 1932, these state-associational partnerships for welfare 
were attempted, becoming, with varying degrees, institutionalized in the interwar 
period. In the post World War II period, they stabilized into distinct types of 
welfare state. 284  Furthermore, the more encompassing and developed welfare 
states seem to promote a higher density of associational life. Hegemonic 
associational life grew in the "social democratic" and more equalitarian welfare 
states of Scandinavia. These welfare states were based on the idea of 
universalism. 285  Everybody in the polity was entitled to the same economic 
rights, independent of economic and social status. Full economic equality, 
employment and protection was the aim of these regimes. Although they were 
implemented by the Scandinavian social democratic parties after 1945, these 
programs were designed to serve the interests of the urb
wh t the same time putting the workers’ benefits at the level of this middle 
class.286 The dispensation of welfare services to the whole citizenry thus asks for 
the assistance of broad and encompassing associations. 
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 The "corporatist" welfare system in Germany, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands, where the state supplies welfare assistance but preserves many of 
the status differences of premodern society, is related to dominant associational 
life. 287  It continues the conservative welfare systems initiated in late the 
nineteenth century Germany where there were different welfare systems for 
different groups, especially because of the objective of maintaining the privileges 
of civil servants (Beamten) differentiated from the manual workers. It is a welfare 
state that has large services and uses many voluntary associations, especially 
unions and church related organizations, for the dispensation of welfare services. 
In fact, many modern associations evolved from pre-modern rigid corporate 
bodies and guild structures. But since it is not based on the idea of universalism, 
nally at 
very lo
                                                
different programs are adopted for different social classes and occupational 
groups, each having its own set of rights and privileges. Thus, the level of density 
and coordination of associational life organizations is smaller than in 
Scandinavian cases.288 
 The "liberal" welfare state system of Anglo-Saxon countries (Great 
Britain and Ireland) is characterized by limited assistance with very specific 
entitlement rules. It clearly rejects the idea of universalism, and it is means-
tested, that is, the potential recipients of welfare have to demonstrate their 
economic need. Social-welfare transfers from the state are low, and they cover 
only the lower income population. In this sense, this type of welfare state does 
not rely much on voluntary associations. It fosters a medium dense associational 
life, or what I have called a pluralistic associational life. Associations are not 
fully integrated in state networks for welfare dispensation, only occasio
cal level and in particularistic ventures. In fact, this kind of a welfare state 
is mainly based on the notion of voluntarism, and historically it continues the 
poor relief tradition of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that was based on 
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The statist model of welfare state is typical of countries like France, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain, and it is associated with the weakest civil societies. 
According to Manow and Pallier, they are characterised by «long-time absence of 
an unemployment insurance», «the dominance of pension payments in public 
social spending», 290  frequent clientelism in the attribution of benefits, 
fragmentation of social welfare provision, and high status-differentiated 
policies.291 In these countries, the ideal of universalism never really took root, the 
inclusio
ons are unable to participate in the design and provision of 
welfare funds, and it is the government that alone formulates and manages 
policie 294 Because of this, family strategies of welfare provision have become 
widespread and substitute state and associational action. Also, in spite of being 
almost wholly Catholic countries, even church associations have a very small role 
in welf e policy.295 
                                                
n of the lower classes by welfare benefits was less developed, and the 
policies that were enacted were mainly in response to periods of extreme 
workers’ mobilisation after prolonged phases of exclusion and repression. This 
was clearest in the two Iberian cases, where welfare state measures arrived only 
in the 1970s after prolonged periods of authoritarian rule.292 
Here the state seldom uses voluntary associations for the design and 
implementation of social policies, and when it does, it is very selective and 
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Sweden Soc tic ial-Democra Hegemonic 
Norway Soc tic ial-Democra Hegemonic 
Denmark Socia ratic H  l-Democ egemonic
Austria Co t rporatis Hegemonic 
Germany Co t rporatis Dominant 
Netherlands Co t rporatis Dominant 
Belgium Co t rporatis Dominant 
Great Britain Liberal Divided 
Italy Statist Disjointed 
France Statist Disjointed 
Spain Statist Disjointed 
Portugal Statist Disjointed 
(Sources: Esping-Andersen, 1998, pp. 27-28; Salamon and Anheier, 1998, pp. 228-230; Lynch, 
2007, p. 92; Garcia and Karakatsanis, 2006, p. 114) 
 
 Note that it was not party ideology that determined the type of welfare 
state. Some scholars have argued that where social democracy was strongest, 
welfare state was the strongest, and consequently, associational life was also the 
densest. The social-democratic model posits that where working-class parties and 
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unions were able to exert effective political power, they established the most 
comprehensive welfare states, promoting benefits and rights as a political right. 
stitutionalised civil societies does not apply to the clear cases 
This implied that working-class based organisations gained control of the state 
institutions, via corporatism, centralised and encompassing unions organising 
workers for political mobilization and also for the delivery of social benefits and 
for their coordination with macroeconomic policy (social insurance programmes, 
welfare transfers, public housing, etc).296 
 Yet, social-democratic rule is not always related to a strong associational 
life. It is true that in the cases of stronger associational life rule by social-
democrats has been usually long. In 1980, social-democrats had ruled Sweden 
during 30 years, 28 in Norway, 25 in Denmark, and 14 in Finland. But the 
Netherlands, a country which also has a very dense associational life, only had 8 
years of social-democratic rule between 1945 and 1980. In fact, this country had 
more Christian-democratic years of rule between 1945 and 1980 than any other 
country in Europe (22 years). Austria had more social-democrats’ rule (20 years) 
than Finland, and Belgium had the same number of years as Finland. But their 
civil societies are less dense than Finland. Great Britain had also more years of 
labour rule than Finland, but she has a much weaker associational life. Moreover, 
socialists have ruled in Spain and in Portugal for many years, but had 
demobilising strategies and promoted a timid welfare state. In Spain in the late 
1980s, a socialist government was unable to make for full labor participation in 
pacts with employers. The communist trade union refused to participate and the 
socialist UGT was ambivalent, while the factory councils pursued a position 
independent of both trade union federations. 297  In sum, the argument that 
socialist incumbency and strong social-democratic parties and unions have 
produced strongly in
where socialist parties and unions are weak as organisations. Inversely, in the 
Netherlands, with a very dense associational life historically, but weak socialist 
rule; finally there is the case of Great Britain where there are strong Socialist 
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unions since the mid-nineteenth century but associational life is less denser than 
the Netherlands.298 
 Also, there are many instances where Christian democratic parties have 
promoted associational life and welfare state development, mobilising in the 
process important segments of the working class. Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Germany represent this pattern. In fact, Catholic political and associational life 
has taken two forms in Western Europe. Catholic mobilization by Christian 
mocr
tate regulation, in both 
nomic and industrial policy-making, shape associational life. The 
echanisms through which they can empower voluntary associations range from 
e easiness of granting public status and material resources to associations and 
y deciding which groups should be present in the policy-making process 
roducers or consumers; business or labor, and so on).299 
 
                                                
de atic parties (ideological egalitarianism, able to govern in coalition, or to 
establish pacts with left-wing parties) or the form of a right-wing party (France, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain), which mobilise only when responding to spurts from the 
left and working class mobilization, but that in general refrain from a 
mobilisation strategy. 
 To conclude, the previous discussion suggests that the levels of 
associational life development in western Europe in the period after the 
1930s/1940s, from the highest type (hegemonic) to the lowest (disjointed), rest on 
a specific balance and interaction between the state, the regime institutions, and 
the associations. The more these three dimensions empower each other, the 
stronger is the associational life in a given country. Associational life will be 
stronger and become more institutionalized when a strong and high-capacity state 
is combined with a set of very inclusive institutions: corporatism, equalitarian 
welfare state, and mass parties. As the more recent research on voluntary 
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       Table 19: Facilitating Conditions of Patte of Associatio ife, 1945
Interest Group 
System
    Parties Welfare-State 
 A l 
Li
rns nal l -2000 
 
     
ssociationa
fe 
Sweden C M SD Hegemonic 
Norway C M SD Hegemonic 
Denmark C M S H  D egemonic
Austria DC M C ominant 
Germany DC M C ominant 
Netherlands DC M C ominant 
Belgium C M C Dominant 
Great Britain P C/M L Divided 
Italy P C/M S Divided 
France P C S Divided 
Spain P C S Divided 
Portugal P C S Divided 
(Interest Group System: C: Corporatist, P: Pluralist; Parties: M: Mass, C: Cadre; Welfare-State: 





Chapter 4: An Alternative Theory. The Historical and Political Origins of 
Associational life 
 
 The fact that density and coordination of associational life in democratic 
regimes grows with welfare state, corporatism, and mass parties means that the 
state and institutions of the previous regime were open and elastic enough to 
recognize the legitimacy and public role of these associations and to integrate 
them in policy making and welfare state services networks. In this sense, specific 
patterns of associational life in democratic regimes are the result of the 
institutionalization of past negotiations, and conflicts between ins and outs, 
between excluded populations that organize through associations and elites that 
control regime institutions for the definition of the meaning and scope of 
citizenship. As Reinhard Bendix stressed, the origins of the diverse types of 
associational life in Western Europe lie in how the «civic integration» of the 
lower classes was negotiated in the transition from a traditional to an industrial 
society.300 In order to discover the causal factors, one should examine how during 
the previous regime and during the process of transition to democracy pressures 
from below by associational life organisations interacted with processes of state 
building, elite strategies, and institutional legacies to produce different patterns of 
associational life in the democratic period. To this end, there are two 
complementary tasks. 
 First, associational life in democracies is partly the continuation of the 
previous regime forms of associational life, networks of solidarity, and forms of 
collective action. The stronger the previous traditions of associational life, the 
more autonomous these networks were, and the more they had resources for 
collective action, the stronger was the push for institutional integration and 
autonomous action before and during the transition to democracy. The extent to 
which populations formed dense networks of interaction, especially the existence 
of strong associational and/or communal ties, made it easier to act collectively 
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and to form organizations.301 Accordingly, one should look at the processes of 
change and continuity of the previous pre-modern institutions as well as patterns 
of interest representation, namely the urban guild system, and religious and 
peasant forms of corporate representation, and social organization. 
 Second, associational life does not develop in a void. In this respect, the 
social and political contexts matter, and we must research how traditions and 
forms of collective action have interacted with regime institutions, processes of 
state building, and elite strategies. As Lipset argued, different pre-democratic 
regimes reacted differently to lower class mobilisation, which in turn conditioned 
the capacity for organisation and the degree of radicalism of the ideology of the 
lower classes. More specifically, Lipset argued that the more closed a political 
system was to pressures for inclusion (in terms of political, civil, and economic 
rights), the more radical was be the opposition to the system, leading in some 
contexts to the consolidation in those classes of revolutionary ideologies (e.g. 
Marxism and Anarchism).302 In closed and non-inclusive institutional settings, 
elites refrained from creating linkages to the lower classes through organizations. 
Instead, they formed stronger links with each other, thus erasing the boundaries 
between political cleavages. Particularly decisive is whether elites collude or 
compete during the transition period to the new democratic regime. If elites 
pursue a deliberate strategy of demobilisation in the moment of transition to 
democracy, this will set a pattern of elite interaction that will shape the character 
of the subsequent regime for years to come. More competition between political 
blocs at the moment of transition to democracy (the Scandinavian countries, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom) had the inverse effect. Open and 
inclusive institutional legacies at the moment of associational development will 
produce competitive elites in the political arena that will have an interest in 
mobilizing the citizenry through party and civic channels in order to accentuate 
their differences.303 
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 To conclude, in to order explain patterns of associational life established 
after the stabilization of European regimes between the 1930s/1940s and the 
1970s, it is necessary to look at how varying patterns of associational life 
developed during the previous non-democratic regimes and interacted with 
processes of state and institutional change in the polity. In this sense associational 
life in the post-1930s/1940s era was shaped by larger dynamics in the decades 
before. Voluntary associations fought for inclusion and recognition between the 
mid-nineteenth century until the 1930s, but by the interwar years, I argue, the 
specific patterns of associational life were already taking shape and they were 
consolidated after 1945. The highest case for the development of a dense 
associational life in the interwar years was when a strong and mobilized 
associational life pressuring from below and organizing for protest encountered 
open and inclusive institutions (Scandinavia). The weakest case for associational 
life development was when already weak associational life associations in the 
interwar period faced highly closed institutions (Iberia). I argue that there were 
three causal conditions present in the European polities between the years 1800-
1930s that were important in explaining this variation. 
 
4.1. The Legacy of Pre-Modern Corporate Representation 
 
 Pre-modern European associational life was mostly organized in three 
pillars, sometimes interchangeable: urban guilds, religious corporations, and the 
aristocracy. In the Scandinavian case, there was a fourth pillar: the peasant estate. 
These pillars were ascriptive in the sense that birth determined future rank in 
society, and that these groups were closed communities that determined specific 
codes of behavior, political position, and economic condition.304 There were two 
important arenas of associational life: the oligarchies of mercantile and 
independent municipalities, and the free peasant communities. Both had enjoyed 
rights of self-rule versus landlords, the church, and kings. In the countryside there 
were community courts, elective communal bodies like assemblies, and the right 
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of self–taxation.305 Both were forms of almost democratic self-rule, but they were 
based on  corporatist rather than individualistic principles. These localities, both 
urban and rural, had often the capacity to raise taxes, and they sometimes 
negotiated and fought for their freedoms. Thus, they were able to conquer rights 
of self-rule and gain immunities.306 
 The modern principles of individualism propagated by political and 
economic changes (the French and industrial revolutions) tended to dissolve these 
corporate bodies and the idea that individual identity existed only within a 
collective body. In the countryside, state centralisation and the expansion of 
commercial forms of agriculture led to the subdivision of property, the end of 
communal lands, and the elimination of the institutions of self-rule. As Gierke 
noted, «in villages and among groups of peasants, the right to free assembly» had 
been «withdrawn from the communities».307 
There were still, as Schmitter has argued, «differences in the nature of 
premodern associational life» in the sense that already before the French 
revolution there were societies that were more corporate structured than others.308 
Moreover, societies in the course of modernisation were differently affected by 
the modern economic and political conceptions of individualism. This had several 
forms. First, communal and corporate forms of organisation of lower classes still 
existed in many parts of Europe. According to Gierke, by the end of the 
nineteenth century there were still many cities in western Europe, especially in 
Germany, where the form of rule was guild-like, cities were democratically ruled 
by the craft guilds, or the guilds had so much power that it was committees of 
citizens that ruled the city.309 Also, the peasantry was able in certain settings, 
especially in the Germanic lands, Scandinavia, and central Italy, to set up 
organizations and institutions in order to resist landlords’ and capitalists’ attempts 
of expropriation of common lands by transforming the old communal 
associations of the countryside into modern associations. This led to the 
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formation of rural associations, of which two types were of particular importance: 
first, associations for the independent smallholders, with the role to gather 
capital, distribute goods, and organise joint production; and second, the rural 
worker or rural wage-laborer associations that was used to promote political 
freedom. 310  Importantly, this organisational capacity of peasants and middle 
proprietors was determined less by the type of property existing in the 
countryside and more by the institutional recognition and status attribution within 
the local and/or national political regime. Historically, similar classes of peasants 
(e.g. middle-class proprietors, smallholders, or rural proletarians) have been 
mobilized by voluntary associations to varying degrees and with very different 
ideologies, ranging from left-wing moderate socialism to extreme right-wing 
reactionarism. In France, middle proprietars have a stronger tradition of leftism, 
whereas in Italy the small proprietors of Tuscany are more conservative, 
historically supporting Christian democracy. As Juan Linz argued, it was more 
the «organization of labor than the property structure as such that seems to 
correlate with politics».311 Still another important factor is the degree to which 
established religion has a political influence in the countryside. Where there was 
still a strong nobility and church with some degree of control of local life, Linz 
argued, peasants’ political behavior tended to be conservative.312 
 Second, the upper classes, like the nobility, or elites like the church had a 
form of corporate representation. There would be local, and later national, 
parliaments where the representation of societal interests was to be done by 
corporate groups: the church, the nobility, urban guilds, and the peasantry. In 
sum, corporate bodies and corporate or group-like forms of representation were 
still vibrant and recognized by the political regimes in many countries in the late 
nineteenth century. In many European countries until the late nineteenth-century 
there was the revival (even in contexts where they had been moribund) of forms 
of estate/corporative assembly representation, something that Gierke considered 
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the «territorial estate bodies», as opposed to individualistic representation. 313  
This can be seen clearly in the processes of representation in national parliaments 
in the late nineteenth century. Throughout Europe elites sought to maintain 
power, but the specific forms through which this was achieved varied greatly and 
could be termed either corporatist or individualist. For instance, if looking at 
misrepresentation devices at periods of suffrage extension, in order to limit the 
impact of majorities in electoral processes in some places, elites did that through 
forms that maintained group representation. These were: 1) indirect voting: the 
electorate voted for a grand elector and not for particular candidates, and then the 
grand electors chose the representatives for parliament; 2) plural voting: wealthy 
and/or well educated citizens or representatives of certain institutions like 
churches or universities would receive extra votes, and especially; 3) curia/estate 
voting: this system gave a highly disproportionate number of seats to the upper 
estates, usually wealthy families, the nobility, and the clergy. To explain, the first 
estate had direct representation by male heads of noble families, the clergy estate 
was represented by high-ranking clergy, the burgher estates were filled with 
elected representatives by plural voting and by burghers with certain professional 
and income qualifications, and the peasant estate was elected by indirect voting 
by independent farmers.314 
 I argue that the more intermediate bodies and forms of corporate 
representation survived up to the early twentieth century, the denser and the more 




The higher the degree to which traditions of estate and corporate representation 
existed in the late 1800s-early 1900s, the stronger associational life 
was in the twentieth century. 
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 As Colin Crouch has argued, in societies where the institutional 
configuration of the polity in the late nineteenth century was organised in a 
corporate and functional manner (Ständestaat), the more the state used and 
recognised collective representation and encompassing voluntary associations for 
the establishment of «social order». These organizations (e.g. guilds) served as 
precursors to modern associability.316 The more polities were corporate in the late 
nineteenth century, the stronger associational life would be in the period between 
the 1930s/40s and the 1970s. 
 Several mechanisms were at work here. First, from the point of view of 
the communities, the higher the tradition of corporatism from feudal Europe was, 
the higher became group and/or class consciousness in the modern period, and 
the more cohesive were lower class groups like urban workers or farmers. It was 
easier to engage in collective action by these groups and by transforming this 
identity in formation of strong associations.317 In the case of rural associations, it 
was the legacy of this institutional structure that gave the peasantry capacity for 
autonomous action that by the mid-nineteenth century, when state rulers 
promoted again state centralisation and unification, the peasantry could negotiate 
from a better position their entry into the national state in certain societies. 
Because the peasantry was organised around protected enclaves like rural 
parliaments, councils, and assemblies that defended their group liberties, it 
managed to negotiate better with state builders its position within the polity.318  
In fact, at the core of this issue was also a process of institutional 
homology between groups competing for power and influence in the polity. 
Although corporate representation was meant to consolidate the power of existing 
traditional elites and to crystallize political differences by corporate criteria, at 
the same time it provoked the consolidation of corporate organisation in the 
excluded classes, thus augmenting their solidarity as a group and subsequent 
higher capacity for collective action. Moreover, the struggle for incorporation 
would be done through fighting for the recognition of the popular classes’ 
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aspirations as group aspirations, not as individual claims. Citizenship was to be of 
a corporate form. For instance, in the countries where guilds still existed in the 
late nineteenth century, employers/capitalists would have a strong degree of 
organisation as a group, and this tended to make workers and lower classes have 
a stronger impetus for organisation building as a corporate group, in order to 
counteract the power of employers. In contrast, countries where corporatism did 
not exist in the nineteenth century, when pressures for inclusion appeared at the 
end of that century, they would be institutionalized according to the 
contractualist, liberal, and individualistic principles already inscribed in state and 
regime rules and norms. 
 Second, the fact that corporate differentiating criteria were seen as 
legitimate by the regime, and the more these corporations had survived liberalism 
and economic freedom during the nineteenth century, the more likely it was that 
modernising states would integrate them, in the context of modernisation from 
above in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, into policy-making 
networks of welfare and economic policies, thereby recognizing the «autonomy, 
jurisdiction and self-administration» of voluntary associations. 319  This, then, 
stimulated a process whereby corporate groups, guilds, and others were 
transformed into modern associations with relative ease, hence generating a 
modern associational life with high density and coordination levels, which would 
grow in partnership with the state until the 1930s and serve as the antecedent of 
the hegemonic and dominant types of civil societies in the post-1945 
democracies. This hypothesis was first coined by Gerhard Lehmbruch, who 
argued that the post-1945 corporatist systems (or what he calls corporatist 
concertation), operating at a national level and encompassing several industries, 
were facilitated by the existence in the late nineteenth century of traditions of 
what he calls «sectoral corporatism». These were the partnerships developed by 
the state, guilds, chambers for economic (protectionism), and welfare policies, 
initially at the local level.320 In the case of welfare policies, the state used the 
self-help associations of artisans and craftsmen, and it regulated their compulsory 
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membership, self-regulation autonomy, and forms of protection for members,321 
thus promoting centralized and monopolistic sectoral associations.322 
 These policies were preferred in Austria and in Germany, where social 
insurance (social insurance elected boards, welfare ministries) was pioneered but 
with the aim of maintaining traditional society.323 In the Netherlands, Germany, 
Switzerland, Austria, and the Pope’s territories in central Italy guilds and 
corporate forms of representation survived until almost the early twentieth 
century.324 According to Gierke, after the French invasions most German states 
and Austria were able to preserve the old trades’ corporations as associations in 
public law, thus transforming the old system of craft guilds.325 German states 
attributed authority to these associations in matters of commerce and gave them 
corporative rights. 326  But it was after 1848 that workers’ associations were 
integrated in the system of public institutions and given a public role in the 
provision of services and goods for status groups (Stand) and professions.327  
German employers’ associations (then the German Trade Congress) were also the 
almost unbroken continuation of guilds, trades’ corporations, chambers of 
commerce, and commercial associations.328 
 Urban and rural autonomous forms of corporate representation were 
preserved in Germany and Austria. Rural communities in Germany were freer 
than in the rest Europe, according to Gierke. There was a continuation of the old 
forms of rural fellowships in the states of Nassau, Hanover, Frankfurt, and 
Schleswig-Holstein. Old autonomies were preserved through protection by 
imperial courts, by territorial estates, or by the writing of chartered corporations. 
They allowed the community to have more autonomy and even financial self-
administration in matters like religion, teaching, and poor relief. 329  Towns 
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maintained their autonomy in relation to the central state and allowed for the 
participation of organised interests in city affairs. For instance, in Austria «the 
communal ordinance of 1849» stated that «the free community is the basis for a 
free state».330. In the Netherlands, also, «there was an almost unbroken continuity 
with the medieval system of corporations»,331 and both there, in Belgium, in parts 
of Italy, and in Catalonia and the Basque country in Spain the urban self-rule and 
guild-like administration of medieval times by a competitive capitalist elite 
continued until the late nineteenth century. 332  This was the pattern also in 
Scandinavia, where groups of merchants, peasants, and urban workers were 
represented in estates and city councils (although to a much larger extent in 
Denmark than in Norway and Sweden).333 
 By the early nineteenth century, Britain, France, and the Iberian countries 
had abolished corporate representation and the guilds. In France the absolute 
monarchy had given them a serious blow, and the revolution of 1789 finally 
eliminated them. In particular in France, the subsequent laws on associational life 
were very restrictive, with the several penal codes stipulating that associations of 
more than twenty individuals would need the approval of the government, and as 
a consequence the formation of modern associations was harder.334 England was 
the pioneer in Europe in abolishing corporate representation in the parliament by 
individual representation already in the seventeenth century. The English 
parliament was never a body of estates.335 
 If looking at suffrage misrepresentation devices, one can see that 
corporate forms of misrepresentation existed in most of the same countries where 
guilds and corporations were maintained. In Austria, Norway, and Sweden 
indirect voting existed until the twentieth century. In Austria, between 1861 and 
1901 in the fourth curia and after 1897 in the fifth curia. In Norway and Sweden 
until 1906 and 1908 respectively (although in Sweden the vote was only partially 
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indirect after 1866). In Sweden, due to indirect voting in 1900, approximately 
150 noble families had the voting power equal to 23,469 burghers and 10,184 
peasants. In Prussia, indirect voting lasted until 1918 (although not in the 
imperial elections).336 In the Netherlands, indirect voting existed until 1848.337 
Plural voting existed in Sweden until 1866, in England it existed also but had a 
very small impact (only for 7% of the electorate in 1911), but it was important in 
Austria and Belgium. In Belgium, plural voting existed between 1893 until 1919. 
House owners and owners of real estate above a certain value received an extra 
vote and people with college education received two extra votes. Although the 
franchise was broadened in this period in Belgium, at the same time the richer 
classes received extra votes. The curia and estate system existed in Sweden until 
the reform of 1866, in Prussia until 1918, and in Austria until 1906. In 1897, 
Austria reintroduced a fifth curia with universal suffrage to male citizens above 
twenty-four years of age. At the same time, all the electors of the second curia 
gained a second vote, and so between 1896 and 1907 40% of all Austrian males 
cast two votes.338 Countries like Denmark, France, Italy, and Britain did not have 
any of these institutional suffrage conditions.339 
 Adding these regime and societal characteristics together, one can build 
an index of degree of corporatism for the period encompassing the turn of the 
twentieth century. I do this by dividing the countries between a high, medium, 
and nonexistent degree of corporate representation. Each classification is the 
result of a combination of four indicators of corporatism: the existence of urban 
corporate bodies, of rural corporate bodies, of plural/indirect vote, and of the 
existence of curia system. Countries with a positive score in all four indicators 
will be classified with a high level of corporatism, with positive score in just two 
or three will be classified as medium, and with none with inexistent corporatism. 
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Table 20: Strength of Corporate Bodies of Interest Intermediation and Corporate 














Scandinavia Y Y Y Y H 
Austria Y Y Y Y H 
Germany Y Y Y Y H 
Netherlands Y N N N M 
Belgium Y N Y N M 
England N N N N I 
Italy N N N N I 
France N N N N I 
Spain N N N N I 
Portugal N N N N I 
(Y: Yes; N: No; H: High; M: Medium; I: Inexistent Corporatism; sources: Bartolini, 2000; 
Ebbinghaus, 1996, pp. 60-62; Ertman, 2007, p. 44; Gierke, 1990; Hobsbawm, 1999; Flora, 
Kuhnle, Urwin, 1999; Lipset, 1992; Note: indirect voting existed in the Netherlands and 
in Portugal, but was abolished in 1848 in the former and in 1852 in the latter. 
 
 One could ask still, why countries showed such varying levels of 
corporatism in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries? I argue that 
these varying patterns were dependent of processes of state building, namely the 
timing of state building and/or the international status of the region/country 
where the corporate structures existed. More specifically, I argue that the later the 
process of state building occurred and/or the lower the international status of the 
country was, the higher was the continuation of corporatist structures up to the 
early twentieth century. Early state builders, countries that consolidated their 
borders already by the mid-seventeenth century and/or that were major 
international powers in the period between the seventeenth and early nineteenth 
century, tended to eliminate corporate bodies much earlier. This was because 
state centralisation was achieved much earlier, and there was a quest for 
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resources to wage war since very early on, which made these states more 
predatory of the resources of the corporate bodies. Also, market unification and 
capitalist accumulation was achieved earlier (especially in England), thus 
eliminating the internal geographical and corporate barriers to trade and capital 
mobility. 
 This is the case in countries like England, Spain, Portugal, and France, in 
contrast to the corporatist cases which were mainly the late state builders 
(Norway, Denmark, Germany, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands) and 
peripheral areas not subject to so much war (Scandinavia). Sweden is a dubious 
case in this respect because it was an early state builder, but after 1700 it has been 
only a small regional power. What differentiates England, France, Spain, and 
Portugal from the rest was their much higher international status, and as a 
consequence their exposition to war. Since the sixteenth century, all of these 
countries were naval empires that fought for global domination, fighting major 
wars over America, Africa and Asia. Inversely, the remaining countries were 
peripheral areas or small regional powers (Sweden). Austria was a stagnated 
continental empire that started to participate more in international affairs only 
after the French revolution, and until then it had been a crusading frontier empire. 
Germany (although unified under the Holy-Roman Empire) and Italy were at the 
time only a collection of small states. Norway had been under Danish and 
Swedish rule until 1905. Belgium was under Austrian rule until 1794, under 
French rule between 1794 and 1815, and rules by the Dutch until 1830. The 
Netherlands were only a small maritime commercial power if compared to 
England or Spain.340 
 Two mechanisms were at work here. First, early state builders (from the 
mid-1600s until the early 1800s) and/or states that were major players in the 
international military competition for power in the seventeenth and the eighteenth 
centuries were subject to higher military pressures. As a consequence, they 
tended to expand a uniform administration and to crush autonomous bodies in 
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their demand for resources to finance war. 341  In this sense, these countries 
abolished the guild system and corporatist structures much earlier, and as a 
consequence guilds had already disappeared by the late 1800s. An extreme case 
are the Iberian countries, in particular Spain, where by the late seventeenth and 
the early eighteenth centuries the process of state-building led to «the curtailing 
or even elimination of privileges enjoyed by powerful institutions and groups like 
the monarch, the Church, noblemen and corporations».342 
 Second, the state apparatus of the early state builders or international 
major players became more centralized and dirigiste since it was formed in a 
context of military conquest. An important case is Spain, whose bureaucracy was 
made for the armed conquista of the Americas. Their state apparatus (army, fiscal 
capacities, and so on) was created in and for this context. Consequently, the 
relationship of these states with societal organised interests in the future, namely 
in the context of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, would be 
more based on imposition from above and less on partnership with organisations. 
The forms of linking the state with pressures from below became mainly 
bureaucratic control (France and Iberia) or local notable control through 
parliament (England). Statism would be, especially for the cases of Iberia and 
France, the future form of dealing with organised interests. This refers to an 
organisation of political authority where the political center is remote and 
buffered from society. Society is considered «an arena» of «particularity and 
conflict of interests» that represents a private sphere subject to State tutelage», 
which is a «sponsor of a higher moral order». Society and politics must be 
«grounded in an “objective” search for national interests. Individual activism is 
considered partisan and threatening», and consequently the society and the state 
stand in an antagonistic relationship. This legal tradition emerged in societies 
with strong militaristic and theocratic traditions, and it is exemplified in both the 
centralised monarchical state of pre-1789 France and post-1789 Napoleonic era. 
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In both contexts, local rulers’ state agents, called intendants and later préfets, 
were nominated by the central government, and they were the main actors 
mediating between the state and the society. A system of field services was 
coordinated by state representatives (the prefectoral system) and hierarchically 
subordinated to the government in a «quasi-military manner». Local and smaller 
administrative and political units are seen as the administrative emanation from 
the central power and their reason for existence is to «implement national 
policy».343 
 Inversely, late state builders and peripheral countries developed a 
different state structure. The political center accepted more easily, recognized 
legally, and incorporated societal interests. Interest formation, representation, 
bargaining, and politicking were seen as legitimate. «Authority lies in a public». 
The Scandinavian countries fall into this pattern. The rule of law is identified 
with the sovereignty in society, and so «access to the public sphere is less 
restricted». 344  Late state building also shaped the strength of religious 
mobilization, in particular Christian democracy. As Caramani showed, religious 
mass parties appeared mainly in late state building countries. These countries 
consolidated only in an era when pressures from below for political recognition 
where at their climax (e.g. when socialists and workers pressured for inclusion), 
and consequently they were less capable of repressing these demands. The 
political Right saw here an opportunity to counter-mobilise against the Left. On 
the contrary, in early state builders, the political Right already was consolidated 
before, and less through mass organisations but more through informal networks 
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Timing of State 
Building (before or 
after the 1830s) 
Pattern of 
Associational life 
Scandinavia P E Hegemonic 
Austria P L Hegemonic 
Germany P L Dominant 
Netherlands P L Dominant 
Belgium P L Dominant 
England C E Divided 
Italy P L Disjointed 
France C E Disjointed 
Spain C E Disjointed 
Portugal C E Disjointed 
(P: Peripheral; C: Central; E: Early; L: Late; Netherlands and Belgium achieved independence in 
the 1830s, Italy in 1861-1870, Germany 1867–1871 and Austria Ausgleich was in 1867) 
 
4.2. Democratization and Parliamentarization 
 
 The degree of democratisation of a polity refers to the degree that laws 
and institutions attribute broad rights of participation and of protection from 
arbitrary state power for popular sectors.346 In the context of the modernisation of 
western European societies since the nineteenth-century, three aspects have been 
crucial: 1) the expansion of voting rights towards universal (first male) suffrage; 
2) civil liberties like freedom of thought, speech, association, and assembly; and 
3) an autonomous parliament. These aspects do not necessarily go together and 
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have not emerged at the same time. For instance, as Ziblatt argues, in Bismarck’s 
Germany universal male suffrage was introduced in 1867 and 1871, but the 
powers of parliament were much lower, whereas in the late nineteenth century 
England there was restricted suffrage but a strong parliament.347 Also in southern 
Europe, for instance Spain had an institutionalised universal suffrage in the late 
nineteenth century, whereas Portugal had not, although both countries tended to 
institute very repressive laws of associability. 
 The more a polity is democratised and parliamentarised, the stronger will 
be its associational life. Polities and contexts of extension of the rights of suffrage 
and association tend to promote strong associations at the national level. Lower-
class groups are more empowered, associations form more easily alliances and 
bridging social cleavages. 348  As Skocpol argues, «national elections enhance 
civic engagement … because they encourage popular involvement and build 
national solidarity».349 Crowley and Skocpol found that the degree of electoral 
competition is positively correlated with the foundation of voluntary associations 
in American states between 1860 and 1920.350 Inversely, where the legislation on 
these rights is more restrictive, by giving for instance more power to police 
interference towards organisations and movements or by giving authorities 
discretionary powers over the internal life of the associations (e.g. permission to 
hold meetings, the degree to which legal rules are clear or ambiguous, and as a 
consequence allow more easily for manipulation by authorities), the less 
participation in civic associations will grow and the more associations will 
represent only parochial interests, not develop horizontal links with other 
associations, and in extreme situations evolve into small sect-like organisations 
devoted to political violence.351 
 Within this group of rights, the parliament plays a decisive role. It could 
be argued that semi-presidential and presidential systems foster higher 
participation, since they provide more points of institutional acess to societal 
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claimants and organised groups, and as such they could promote higher 
mobilization. On the other hand, these systems also provide more points of 
blockage, where mobilization could be stopped or reverted.352  The degree of 
parliamentarization refers to the relative powers of the parliament in relation to 
the government or the executive, in particular its ability to make government 
responsible to parliamentary majorities in a lower house. This means that the 
parliament has high control of the formation, decisions, personnel, and policies of 
the executive.353 
 There are several mechanisms at work here. First, the stronger the 
parliament, in the words of Philippe Schmitter, the more they become arenas 
where «appeals could be addressed», 354  the more associations will seek to 
influence parliamentarians, to establish links with the MPs and political parties, 
and build their own agendas according to parliamentary agendas and cycles. 
Since strong parliaments represent the whole nation, associations will tend to 
become national in scope, and as such more coordinated through the territory, 
with associational leaders creating links and alliances that run through several 
regions and localities of the country. As Tilly observed in relation to England for 
the period from 1758 until 1834, as the parliament became the more important 
political institution, it also became the target of popular contention and 
association building. The issues debated in the parliament became more 
important to individuals, and since these issues were national in scope, 
association building shifted from the local to the national level. Inversely, weak 
parliaments were less procured by associations, and as such associations have 
tended to be of smaller scale, narrower in scope, local, and particularistic, since 
their main are the asking of favors from local administrators or trying to influence 
directly the executive and the bureaucracy.355 
 Second, stronger parliaments present higher opportunities for lower 
classes and common people to influence politics. Consequently it is easier to 
form associations to that effect. Stronger parliaments give a stronger role in the 
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polity for party and associational entrepreneurs.356 Tocqueville noted this when 
he was referring to France and noting that in the regions where after 1789 
representative estates were maintained (Bretagne and Languedoc) the third estate 
had a much higher participation in the debates of the affairs of the community.357 
Also Gierke has argued that strong parliaments «contributed directly and 
substantially to the consolidation and deepening of the people’s conviction of the 
necessity of popular participation in the system of the state, by means of popular 
representation».358 
 Since the electorate is decisive in a politician’s choices in a strongly 
parliamentarised system, it is easier for associations to establish links to political 
parties, while political parties will be more interested in creating permanent and 
not episodic links with associations in order to achieve a higher reach among the 
electorate.359 As Weber argued, with high parliamentarisation, parties become 
more interested in mobilisation, and as a consequence they tend to be more 
competitive with each other, to become more bureaucratic, professional, national 
in scope (tending to create a national party bureaucracy over the whole territory 
to coordinate political action and mobilization), stable in their leadership, develop 
mass propaganda, and consequently develop stronger connections with 
associations. During early party development, this implied the creation of party 
youth organisations, cooperatives, consumers associations, and unions.360 
 This had been the case of some workers’ movements. In fact, to 
strengthen the powers of the parliament has historically been always one of the 
aims of the workers’ movements, together with proportional representation, 
because it has been seen as a way to gain influence in the polity. In contexts of 
strong parliamentarism, workers built later alliances with liberal parties in order 
to induce universal welfare state and universal suffrage.361 
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 Inversely, weak parliaments inhibit party development, party competition 
and associational development. In contexts of executive predominance, 
plebiscitary or even ceasaristic tendencies tend to be stronger, since the center of 
power lies mainly with the executive leader. As a consequence, parties and 
associations are less able to develop permanent links with each other, and elites 
refrain more easily from mobilising newcomers to the political system.362 This 




The higher the degree of democratisation of the regime (in particular its level of 
parliamentarisation), between the 1880s and the 1930s, the stronger was 
associational life between the 1930s/40s and 2000. 
 
 
 Europe has exhibited much variation in the power of parliaments since the 
middle ages. The first parliaments emerged in Europe in the middle ages as 
places of deliberation and control over the monarch, and where the main sectors 
of society were represented (monarch, aristocracy, burghers and clerics and 
sometimes the peasants). The main issues under debate were the maintenance of 
group and corporate liberties, privileges, and especially the control of taxation, 
and declarations of war. 364  By the late eighteenth century there was already 
variation in Europe between countries’ relative powers of parliament. According 
to Ertman, there were two types of monarchical regimes in Europe. In absolutist 
monarchies, the monarch had both executive and legislative powers, and 
consequently parliaments had very low power. This was the situation in France, 
Spain, Portugal, Denmark, and the kingdoms of Savoy, Tuscany, Naples, the 
German principalities. In constitutional monarchies, the legislative power was 
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shared by the monarch and a representative assembly, Britain and Sweden being 
the examples.365 
 There is a debate about the degree of continuity between these pre-modern 
bodies and modern conceptions of parliamentarism. According to Huntington, in 
the places where these medieval assemblies survived the period of absolutism, 
populations gained a higher control of the actions of the sovereign and they could 
have had stronger opportunities for autonomous participation. England, Sweden, 
some of the German states, and Catalonia in Spain are examples here.366 Gierke, 
although arguing that modern parliaments «did not spring form the estate-based 
constitution», also affirms that for Germany «the influence which the remnants of 
the constitution of the territorial estates exercised on the emergence and 
formation of the principle of representation» «cannot be underestimated».367 
 Still, for the period from the nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century we 
may rank European polities according their degree of parliamentarisation. Cases 
of high degree of parliamentarian power were Great Britain, the Scandinavian 
countries (especially in the two countries where there was continuity of pre-
modern to modern parliaments), Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.368 In 
Britain, full parliamentary control of government was established at least by 
1832, and the power was gradually extended to the lower classes in 1867, in 
1884, and by the reforms resulting in universal male suffrage in 1918. In Sweden, 
in the old regime the powerful four estate riksdag was transformed into the two 
chambered Riksdag in 1866. Governments resigned frequently because of 
parliamentary pressure, even in spite of the king’s opposition, and in 1917 the 
parliament gained full power. Universal suffrage was instituted in 1921. In 
Denmark in the 1890s, governments depended for their continuation in power 
mainly on the parliament’s will, and in 1901 the king accepted full 
parliamentarisation of the regime, which led to universal suffrage in 1915. In 
Norway, full government responsibility to parliament (the Storting) was 
established in 1884. Universal male suffrage was established in 1898. In the 
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Netherlands parliamentary government was established in 1848, with the 
transformation of early corporate representation in a modern parliament. The 
king’s actions became fully controlled. Finally, in Belgium since the 
independence in 1831, the main power was in the elected chamber and the king 
never interfered with daily political affairs.369 
 The cases of medium parliamentarian power are Italy, Germany, and 
Austria. In Italy parliamentary control of the government was instituted in 1852 
in the kingdom of Piedmont, and after Italian unification governments always 
depended on the results of elections and on the will of the chamber deputies. 
Universal male suffrage was instituted in 1919. Still, according to Bartolini, the 
influence of the king and the royal house was constant. Prussia had also elements 
of high and low parliamentarian power. After German unification in 1866, the 
new 26 states of Germany maintained their sovereign powers, were able to elect 
representatives to the upper house of the federal parliament, and could veto 
legislation of the lower house, the Reichstag. In this sense there was a high 
degree of parliamentarisation, especially at the federal level. Gierke called 
Germany at this time a «system of shared sovereignty».370 At the same time, 
Prussian power within the German state inhibited parliamentarisation at the 
national level. It corresponded to three fifths of the territory and population, the 
King of Prussia was the German emperor, and the prime minister of Prussia was 
the national prime-minister (chancellor). Moreover, it was the emperor who 
appointed the chancellor, and the dissolution of the parliament was common. 
Finally, in Austria the provincial estates were recognised as regional parliaments, 
and the notion of constitutional government was established in 1860. At the same 
time, the dissolution of the national parliament, the Reichsrat, by the emperor 
was common.371 
 Cases of very low parliamentarism are France, Portugal, and Spain. The 
estates general of 1789 and the national assembly conventions of 1792 and 1793 
instituted full parliamentarisation, but France was for most of the century 
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alternating between periods of autocracy and explosions of full democracy by 
social movements, in the words of Aristide Zolberg (1830, 1848, and 1871).372 
Finally, in 1875 with the creation of the so-called third republic (1875-1941) 
parliamentary sovereignty and universal suffrage were instituted, but the regime 
of the third republic rested always on shaky foundations; the threat of a military 
conspiracy to restore monarchy was always looming in the background, and it 
was subject to presidential dissolution of the lower chamber (e.g. the president 
MacMahon dissolution of the lower chamber in 1877, the coup attempt by 
general Boulanger). Until the 1930s, there were permanent conflicts between the 
lower chamber and the senate. 373  Portugal and Spain, much like France, 
experienced alternating periods of extreme parliamentarisation with the radical 
constitutions of the 1820s, but even more than in France these were very short 
lived experiences. By the late nineteenth century until the 1930s in Portugal and 
until the 1920s in Spain, elections were always dishonest, the king was the main 
center of politics (the poder moderador) – although in Portugal only until 1910 - 
and dismissed at will governments without consulting with the parliament.374 
 
Table 22: Degree of parliamentarization of European regimes, 1870s-1930s 
 Parliamentarization Associational Life 
Norway High Hegemonic 
Sweden High Hegemonic 
Denmark High Hegemonic 
Austria Medium Dominant 
Germany Medium Dominant 
Netherlands High Dominant 
Belgium High Dominant 
England High Divided 
Switzerland High Divided 
Italy High Disjointed 
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France Medium Disjointed 
Spain Low Disjointed 
Portugal Low Disjointed 
4.3. State Capacity 
 
 My third hypothesis posits that states with strong capacity will have an 
impact on associational life that will make them stronger and to have higher 
density and coordination levels. The higher a state’s capacity, the higher will be 
associational life density and coordination, all other things being equal. 
According to Peter Evans, state capacity refers to the «extent to which state goals, 
however determined, can actually be carried out».375 States with high capacity 
have at their disposal an organisational and bureaucratic apparatus that allows it 
to implement policies and to establish goals autonomously decided by the 
government in spite of resistance from actors within the society. In this sense a 
high capacity state has a body of functionaries or state officials, managers whose 
goals and interests are independent from societal forces. These state officials 
must have developed an ethos of career advancement and promotion based on 
merit; they must be professionalised. The state itself must have developed an 
autonomous capacity for resource extraction (taxes), for military and police 
control that applies the law over the territory (coercive power), easy 
communications over the territory, and what Mann calls infrastructural power, 
which means the power to coordinate associational life.376 
 There are two mechanisms at work here. First, states with high capacity 
are more able to impose a uniform jurisdiction and control over a territory, and 
they will produce associations that imitate their pattern. In this sense, it is easier 
for associations to develop through the whole territory, to connect different 
geographical areas, and to be coordinated by peak associations. A unified state 
encourages associations to spread networks and to make alliances easier with 
other points and other associations within the national territory. Inversely, states 
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with lower capacity are states that coexist with claims of self-rule in regions or 
parts of the territory. Consequently, associations will tend to be more local, 
regional, and as such less able to form coalitions with each other from different 
geographical areas. Consequently peak associations will not emerge or they fail 
to crystallise. As Martin Shefter has argued for the case of political parties, deep 
regionalism has been established in countries that have been subject to state 
collapse, which has made for later party developments producing less national 
oriented parties and more parties that control specific territorial bastions. This 
inhibits mobilization, because no gains will be achieved by trying to mobilise in 
other regions, because victory in the rival’s bastion is always almost 
impossible.377 
 Moreover, more centralised and high capacity states will paradoxically 
allow for associational coalitions representing the interests of the lower classes to 
form, since these projects will not be encumbered by territorial barriers. It will be 
easier for associations to spread through the territory, as consequently to form 
coalitions. Lower classes, in countries where the state has lower capacity, will 
tend to become more local and secluded in specific areas, less likely to form peak 
associations, and they remain attached to local issues, be used by local 
powerlords or churches. The historical meaning of this coalition for the 
nineteenth and the early twentieth century was the project of a coalition of the 
lower urban and rural classes. This is what happened in Scandinavia, and it was 
in fact Gramsci’s hypothesis for the building of a counter-hegemonic 
emancipatory associational life. 378  In the Scandinavian countries social 
democratic regimes were the product of coalitions of the working classes with 
small producers’ and farmers’ organisations.379 The importance of this alliance 
was stressed by Juan Linz when he argued that the possibility of contact of the 
peasantry with urban unions and ideologies favours the creation of broad class 
alliances. In some contexts outside Scandinavia, it was possible to mobilise a 
reformist agricultural movement allied with center left and left and with the urban 
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working class unions. In Catalonia, the Rabassaires of the 1930s were a 
movement of prosperous share tenants (small and medium landowners and some 
farm laborers), affiliated with the Unió de Rabassaires (21,542 members) and 
linked to the Catalan Left, the Esquerra.380 
 Gramsci was right in a theoretical sense. He had these hopes for Italy, 
which only proves that all societies have similar potentialities within them, as 
Marx argued, but for historical reasons some alternatives are preferred to others. 
Gramsci developed these ideas in two fascinating essays on Italy. For Gramsci, 
the end of capitalism would only come about if an alliance of workers and 
peasants could be created, but as he argued, in the case of Italy this was 
conditioned by a particular history and social structure, which he subsumed under 
two questions. The first was what he called the southern question, or the situation 
of the southern peasantry. He argued that the poorest and the neediest peasants in 
Italy inhabited the south, an area of «extreme social disintegration». 
Paradoxically, noted Gramsci, because of this the peasants «have no cohesion 
among themselves», and the «southern peasants are in perpetual ferment, but as a 
mass they are incapable of giving a unified expression to their aspirations and 
their needs».381  The point that Gramsci was making is that for peasant self-
organisation to develop it must come from a context of already secured autonomy 
from elites in the countryside, namely the Catholic Church (a powerful 
landowner in the south) and landlords. This did not exist in southern Italy, and 
consequently the peasants felt more isolated and weak. He made this point more 
explicitly in his essay on the Vatican question. In some contexts, Gramsci noted, 
peasants could have more autonomous power basis and as consequence be 
capable of self-organisation. In the northern Italian countryside, he argued, the 
church was strongly separated from the state and was not a strong property 
holder, thus allowing the peasants more room for autonomous action (e.g. the late 
1800s peasant insurrections).382 It was at this point that the peasants faced the 
decision to ally with the industrial workers, organised in cooperatives and factory 
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councils, for a cross-class alliance. His hopes were for a context where «the 
peasants of the south and the workers of the north (would rise) simultaneously, 
even if not in a co-coordinating manner».383 But this program failed in Italy and 
the peasantry of the south was unable to coordinate its actions with the workers, 
and the peasants of the north were partially co-opted by the Fascists after 1918.384 
 Second, high capacity states are more able to establish partnerships with 
associations for the development, for the coordination and implementation of 
economic and welfare policies, and for political mobilisation. Since the late 
nineteenth century, when one of the main functions of the state became also the 
promotion of economic development and capitalist accumulation, or 
modernisation policies, states have established partnerships which empower 
associations that give public policy functions to associations.385 Schmitter and 
Streeck call these PIG’s, or private interest governments. Modernisation policies 
of states will be more successful if economic agents and their representative 
associations develop their activities in an environment where the state 
administration is efficient, the army and the state officials are loyal, the tax 
system is predictable. States will more likely be able to count on the support of 
the population, especially of labor, if they are able to deliver welfare policies and 
implement social and economic rights. To this end, they need an efficient 
administration capable of collecting and generating revenue to fund those 
policies. Moreover, as Schmitter and Streeck argue, for these policies to be 
successful, it is necessary that the state be strong in the sense that «one important 
mechanism by which private interest governments are kept responsive to wider 
societal needs is the threat by the state to intervene directly if the group fails to 
adjust the behavior of its members to the public interest. In this sense, the public 
use of private interests requires a strong rather than a weak state». The more 
associations have public functions, the stronger the state has to be and to have the 
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The Higher the State Capacity, the Stronger Will be Associational life 
 
 In the process of development in Western European history two factors 
have shaped state capacity. The first was international and geopolitical 
competition with other states. Processes of international competition, which have 
lead to war and made the state suffer collapse, defeat in invasion, or foreign 
occupation, have promoted a weak state unable to control its territory. These 
states were more likely to suffer from pockets of regional/local resistance to the 
center jurisdiction, low tax extraction capacities, quasi-autonomous regionalism, 
politicisation of the civil service, and the establishment of non-professional 
clientelistic networks. As Tilly has argued, failure in war meant the failure to 
homogenize the population.387 Several aspects in this process have undermined 
state capacity. The first was the degree to which the army was divided by 
political allegiances.388 If army officers became permanently involved in politics, 
becoming political agents in their own right, a situation was created where state 
failure was permanent, and the common state of affairs was multiple sovereignty 
and fragmented national leadership. Extreme cases in Western Europe in the 
nineteenth century were Spain and Portugal in the aftermath of the Napoleonic 
invasions, where localism, caudillismo, and military fighting between regions set 
a pattern of military involvement in politics that would last until the 1930s. 
 As recent research has shown, extending Weber’s and Tilly’s early 
insights, victory in war makes for the emergence of nationally broad associations 
because governments will use more easily associations for national mobilization. 
Moreover, besides from war, other aspects of the international context, like the 
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economic competition among states and the distribution of wealth in the 
international economy, shape the degree to which interest groups are coopted and 
inserted into policy-making networks, especially in the areas of industrial 
policy.389 
 The second factor is state-church relations during the process of 
modernisation. The higher the degree to which the church has posed a barrier 
(especially territorial) to state expansion, the less likely it is that the state will 
develop a strong capacity. If state and church elites are allies in the process of 
nation building, the easier it will be to achieve national territorial unification, 
because the state uses church resources, personnel, networks, and apparatus for 
the implementation of state policies. This produces a more efficient state 
administration since this empowers the state capacities to monitor, gather 
information, and control several areas of the country. Moreover, as Crouch 
argues, it creates a predisposition in the state apparatus for the consolidation of a 
partnership ideology with societal forces that was used in future relationships 
with associations during the twentieth century.390 Historically, the church was the 
institution whose links with the populations were closer and went to the more 
micro level; the church was an organisation present at the level of the local 
community. The resources of the church were put to the education of the souls at 
the community level, and for this the church developed a network of educational, 
welfare, and even statistical services. The more states in the future could use this 
legacy, the more they become empowered, thus achieving a higher capacity. 
 This is a new approach to the role of religion in the modernisation of 
western societies. Old theories equalled modernisation with secularisation, but an 
approach more attentive to spatial and temporal variations has undermined this 
claim. A major finding, first argued by Colin Crouch, noticed that the more state 
and churches fought each other before the emergence of modern voluntary 
associations, the more authoritarian the state would become in the decades after 
the 1870s to new forms of mobilization from below.391 In fact, the church can be 
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considered to be the first form of proto-associational life. Mobilisation by the 
church was earlier than the emergence of modern ideologies like liberalism and 
socialism and broad societal transformations like industrialisation. 
 Moreover, state capacity was also shaped by the religious conflicts and 
settlements in the aftermath of the early modern European wars of religion. After 
the reformation, growth of state power was fostered by religious reforms, 
especially by Lutheranism and Calvinism (tough less catholic countries). The 
wars of religion in the 1500s promoted the building up of state administrations 
for the modernisation of the military. After the religious wars, rulers incorporated 
the churches in the state apparatus and used the church apparatus for purposes of 
poor relief and education.392 
 Finally, this doubled attention to the church led scholars to look for 
periods and critical junctures where patterns of state-church relations were 
established. A major context was the process of political and religious settlement 
after the European reformation, the religious wars, and the creation of national 
churches between the 1500s and 1648. This context determined the degree to 
which the churches were incorporated in the regime, whether they became 
national or territorial, and the future ability of states to incorporate voluntary 
associations. Given the validity of this perspective, I argue that the origins of 
variations in levels of associational life encountered in the nineteenth and the 
twentieth century Europe are partly explained by even more remote historical 
legacies, by ones that go back to the early seventeenth century.393 
 In western Europe, contexts of high conflict between the state and the 
church were the cases of France, Spain, Portugal and to some extent also Italy. 
The best known case is post-revolutionary France with its violent clashes 
between the state and the Catholic church over education that led to the 
emergence of an inaccessible and repressive state that later made labour 
movements radical in the forms of anarchism and communism.394 Other Catholic 
countries, however, reached some agreement between the state and the church, 
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like in the Hapsburg empire (the epicenter of the counter-reformation even) or in 
Belgium. Still, even in Austria the civil war between Reds and Catholics in the 
1930s is to some extent a state-church conflict. Other countries reached an 
accommodation with the church. In Prussia, the Lutheran church was part of the 
state apparatus, although in unified Germany there was the persecution of 
Catholics during Bismarck’s rule. The Anglican church of England, since early 
on, reached an accommodation with the state, although there was also conflict 
over religion in Catholic Ireland. Finally, Lutheran churches in Scandinavia and 
in the Netherlands were more accomodative. 
 In sum, I argue that if religious bodies were able to maintain their 
autonomy and corporate status until the 1870s, then, all other things being equal, 
associational life was to be stronger in the next century. For instance, Skocpol 
and Crowley found a positive correlation between the strength of Protestant 
denominations and the expansion of associational mass federations. In the 
American states, where between 1800 and 1860 Protestant denominations were 
numerous, in the period between 1860 and 1920 mass political federated groups 
tended to be stronger.395 The fact that religious communities were stronger meant 
also a stronger solidarity between group members (social capital in Putnam’s 
words or what Tilly calls «structures of commitment», relations among people 
that «promote their taking account of each other»), and a higher possibility of 
collective action. In the words of Varshney, they reduce transaction costs, since 
«it is less difficult to get people together on grounds of similarity than 
difference». 396  Moreover, these corporate pre-modern bodies could be 
transformed also into modern forms of associability and be conciliated with 
individual conceptions of participation. As Varshney argued for the case of India, 
there is no necessary contradiction between modern individualism and traditional 
group identity. This is, first, because traditional identities can be flexible enough 
to be transformed into modern associations. Second, because the idea that pre-
modern corporate groups based on religion (of locality or ethnicity) are totally 
ascriptive is only partially true, there is also an element of modernity, since they 
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can be used to perform modern functions (political participation, gathering 
resources for the members of the group to enter modern professions, and 
acquiring a modern education).397  
 Second, it was easier for states to develop strong bureaucracies and use 
associations or religious bodies as partners for welfare dispensation and policies, 
if they could count on traditions of partnership with the church and many 
approaches developed in pre-modern era by the church towards the poor. The 
case of social democratic, corporatist-conservative, and liberal welfare states 
followed the pattern of state-church fusion: Scandinavia with extensive social 
care, where the Lutheran church achieved a higher accommodation with the state; 
then Calvinism in liberal regimes. Here, as opposed to most Catholic countries, 
there was stronger tradition of partnership between state and societal interests, 
namely in the building of welfare states.398 
 In the next table, I combine these two predictors of state capacity – civil-
military relationships and state-church relationships – in order to classify western 
European countries in terms of the potential for state capacity. The higher the 
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Scandinavia Low 3 Low 3 6 
Austria Low 3 Low 3 6 
Germany Low 3 High 1 4 
Netherlands Low 3 Medium 2 5 
Belgium Low 3 Medium 2 5 
England Low 3 Medium 2 5 
Italy Medium 2 High 1 3 
France Medium 2 High 1 3 
Spain High 1 High 1 2 
Portugal High 1 High 1 3 
(High equals 1, Medium equals 2, Low equals 3; sources: Bailey, 1975; Ebbinghaus, 1996; Flora, 
Kuhnle, Urwin, 1999; Janowitz, 1960; Lipset and Rokkan, 1985; Stepan, 1988; Tilly, 1998) 
 
 All western European countries with the exception of France, Portugal, 
and Spain achieved almost full civilianization in the late 1800s. Militaries 
became professionalised and subject to civil authority and elected governments. 
This civilisation was part of the process of state modernisation and 
professionalisation of the bureaucracy. In most countries, the military saw 
themselves as serving the state, not political ideologies and not as political 
actors.399 
 Regarding state-church conflict, I argue that the more this conflict was 
directed against the state as such, the more intense were the rivalries between 
modernising states and the churches. Scandinavia was where the intensity of this 
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conflict was lowest. Since the state and the church were almost the same, the 
movements for church reform that emerged in the nineteenth century were at the 
same time directed at reforming the state, not opposing it. In Austria as well, 
there was a close partnership between the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the 
Catholic church of Austria. Countries with intermediate levels of state-church 
conflict were Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Great 
Britain could be considered a similar case to the Scandinavians, since the 
Anglican Church was part of the same apparatus to the same extent. Yet, in 
England there was a kind of state-church conflict in the form of the Irish quest for 
autonomy until the 1920s. The British state was in conflict with the Catholic 
church in Ireland, and this inhibited the rural classes (mainly in Ireland, and 
Catholic) from allying with the urban lower classes, who were mainly Anglican, 
or other denomination, and English. Also in Germany there was a fusion of the 
state and the Protestant church, but as in Britain a conflict developed with the 
Catholics during the Kulturkampf in the 1870s. In the Netherlands the same 
happened with the state Calvinist church serving as the backbone of the state and 
the Catholic church opposing its dominance. In Belgium, the Catholic church 
opposed liberal-secular policies, especially in education since the 1850s, but it 
accepted the legitimacy of the Belgium monarchy since it could find self-
expression through political parties and associations. In this sense the liberal 
Belgium regime accepted the church as legitimate. Finally, the Iberian cases, 
France, and Italy are cases of permanent and serious conflict, with a clear military 
dimension especially in Iberia and France, where the church rejected the new 
regimes and boycotted the liberal policies. Although in late nineteenth-century 
liberalism in Portugal, the Church personnel and territorial apparatus played a 
crucial role in various aspects of the process of state building and of 
implementation of government policies (several leading members of the clergy 
played an active role in liberal politics, both as Cabinet ministers and as 
parliamentarians), these were mainly episodic eceptions if we look at the long 
political development of Iberia in the 19th and twentieth centuries. The liberal and 
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later republican governments tried to undermine the church’s power even through 
such repressive measures like the compulsory confiscation of its property.400 
 
4.4. Conclusion: A Theory of Associational life 
 
 In the next table I have summarised my explanatory hypothesis or causal 
factors behind the types of associational life I have theorised. Hegemonic 
associational life (Scandinavia and Austria) is the result of the combination of 
high degrees of corporate representation, parliamentarisation, and state capacity. 
Austria is a borderline case, since its levels of parliamentarisation were not as 
high as in the Scandinavian countries. Still, these factors allowed for a dense and 
highly coordinated associational life to emerge by the 1920s-1930s that was the 
background for the post-1945 fully democratic period. The dominant 
associational life cases (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany) were the result 
of medium (Belgium and the Netherlands) to high (Germany) traditions of 
corporate representation, medium (Germany) to high levels of parliamentarism 
(Belgium and the Netherlands), and medium state capacity. Divided associational 
life, England, was the result of very low levels and legacies of corporate 
representation, medium state capacity, and high parliamentarisaton. Finally the 
cases of Disjointed associational life had the worst conditions for the 
development of dense and coordinated civil societies. Corporate representation 
was abolished very early in the political development of these societies. The 
parliaments had almost no power for most of the period, and the state had very 
low capacities. Still, one must differentiate these cases between themselves. State 
capacity in France was generally higher than in the others, and the levels of 
parliamentarisation and traditions of corporate representation that served as 
legacy for associations were higher in Italy. It was especially in Portugal and in 
Spain that these factors were the most adverse. Nevertheless, when compared to 
Portugal, Spain had a slightly higher state capacity, parliamentarisation, and 
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legacies of corporate representation at the regional level, in particular in the 










Table 24: Causal Factors Explaining Associational life in Western Europe, 
1800s-1920s 
 Corporate rep. Parliamentarization State Capacity 
Scandinavia High High High 
Austria High Medium High 
Germany High Medium Medium 
Netherlands Medium High Medium 
Belgium Medium High Medium 
England Low High Medium 
Italy Medium Medium Low 
France Low Medium Low/Medium 
Spain Low Low Low 
Portugal Low Low Low 
 
 
 My methodology gives primacy to the organisations themselves (see the 
appendix on methodology). This means looking at their long-term organisational 
developments as intermediaries between societal groups or constituencies and 
state and regime institutions, and to examine their size, number, services 
provided, membership traits, leadership profiles, and the degree to which they 
form peak associations. The present aim is to introduce a new and broader 
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comparative approach to the origins and effects of modern voluntary associations. 
I link my work to historical-institutionalist comparative debates in contemporary 
political science 401  and to the discussion on the role of elites and organized 
masses in the transition to democracy.402 
 The explanatory strategy that I pursue is historical. Many interesting 
political processes take long to develop, and there are unforeseen consequences 
(path dependency). Voluntary associations usually survive long after the 
contextual conditions of their emergence have long disappeared. Moreover, 
associations tend to appear in waves; there are periods of immense foundation of 
associations, and others of much slower growth.403 
 
401 Ragin, 1987; Steinmo, Thelen, Longstreth, 1998. 
402 Collier, 1999 and 2006; Morlino, 1998. 
403 Stinchcombe, 1986. 
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Part Two: Patterns of Associational life in Western Europe, 1800-2000 
 
Chapter 5: From Medieval Corporations and Guilds to Modern Associational life 
 
 In this chapter I analyse the common backgrounds and causes for variation 
between Western European associational structures from the middle ages until the 
1930s/1940s. Western European countries shared a common background of corporate 
associational strucutures from the middle ages to the late eighteenth century (in the 
countryside and urban worlds). This served as a basis for association building in the 
nineteenth century, but this legacy was differently incorporated by states during the 
years between the 1870s and the 1930s due to variations in state strength and regime 
building (in particular, the dynamics of democratisation), thus producing the diversity of 
paths of associational strucutures that I identified in the previous chapters. 
  
5.1. Medieval and Pre-Modern Associational Life 
 
 Between the late medieval period and the eighteenth century, popular 
associational life was composed of three forms of organisations: urban guilds, corporate 
rural bodies, and religious congregations.404 These were forms of associational life in 
the sense of being secondary associations that gather together people through formal 
ties, on a basis beyond family and community, and with varying degrees of exit 
possibility. They had functions of aggregation and intermediation of interests, 
representing them to the authorities, namely to kings and territorial princes, and they 
were the result of past struggles for the emancipation of the lower classes in urban and 
countryside settings. Initially they were organisations that fought for workers’ and 
artisans’ social recognition, economic rights of self-regulation, and they were behind 
many urban revolts in medieval Europe. Eventually, forcing their acceptance in the 
polity, they became institutionalised as governance bodies, especially in urban settings. 
They had collective rights and duties, took care of the welfare of their members, and 
controlled the allocation of resources for production as well as the production to the 
market.405 
 Urban guilds appeared first in twelfth century Italy, the Rhine area, and the Low 
Countries. It was a form of social organisation that united groups of craftsmen (e.g. 
shoemakers, printers, etc.) in order to regulate their professional activities and 
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405 Gierke, 1990, pp. 1-96 
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production for a larger market. Guilds were primarily responsible for the regulation of 
production and commercialisation of goods (regulations for hiring and firing people, of 
selling and product quality, of apprenticeship rules, and for the maintenance of 
prices).406 In this sense guilds were monopolistic bodies, since in each city or town all 
the members of the same trade had to belong to the same guild. Competition was 
strongly regulated in order to maintain quotas of the market for each guild. There was a 
strict control over members’ behaviour which led to regulations fixing the economic 
territory of each guild, competition, and entrance into occupations.407 Guilds had also 
welfare functions. In periods of stress they had the role of taking care of the education 
and welfare of its members and their families.408 They had a budget to fund insurances 
to support individuals in sickness, disasters, old age, and death. This was strongly fused 
with a religious ethic.409 Initially, guilds had a communitarian ethos of celebration but 
gradually they became Christianised. Guild members would organise their organisation 
under the protection of a saint and organise festivities in his honour. In the countryside, 
rural corporate bodies developed, and they shared similar functions.410 
 The establishment of guilds faced initially the opposition of landlords, 
monarchs, and the Catholic Church hierarchy, but gradually in some areas they were 
incorporated into the polity and given a role in the management of the cities.411 In some 
cities, being citizen of the city was synonymous with being a member of one of the 
guilds. 412  In cities the guilds were the basis for political factions, and they would 
compete for power and fight among themselves for market shares in the city. Groups 
without power experienced pressure to form guilds, like the unskilled labourers and 
newcomers to certain professions, against the monopolistic and established artisan 
guilds’ elites. Conflict was common between masters and apprentices and day-laborers, 
which led to the formation of new guilds. 413  In the sixteenth and the seventeenth 
centuries these organizations were fully recognised as associations possessing collective 
                                                 
406 Durkheim, 1996, pp. 19, 22-23, 26. 
407 Moore, 1978, pp. 127-131; Sewell, p. 19. 
408 Anderson and Anderson, 1967, p. 9; Bendix, 1996, pp. 50-51; Black, 1984, pp. 4-6; Durkheim, 1996, 
pp. 19, 22-23, 26. 
409 Black, 1984, pp. 4-6; Durkheim, 1996, pp. 19, 22-23. 
410 Durkheim, 1996, p. 26. 
411 E.g. like the preservation of public order. Black, 1984, p. 5. 
412 Weber, 1958, pp. 29-31. 
413 Black, 1984, pp. 7-11. 
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privileges, rightful monopolies of production and representation, and fully incorporated 
in the administrative structures of the regime.414 
  
5.2. Transformations of Associational life in the Eighteenth and the Nineteenth 
Centuries 
 
 In the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, new dynamics of state and market 
building clashed with the privileges and position of the guilds, corporate bodies, as well 
as with the privileges of the church and the old freedoms of the peasants. Monarchs, 
state officials, and liberal politicians in these centuries envisaged plans for national 
aggrandisement that involved the creation of a single unified polity and market, and the 
consequent end of all juridical, political, and economic particularisms, exemptions and 
privileges. First, monarchs sought the creation of a single unified national market. This 
meant putting an end to privileges, particularisms and corporate or geographical barriers 
to the free circulation of labour and capital, and the desired maximisation of resources. 
Since work was now seen mainly as a commodity, guild paternalism should end, and 
instead workers should be subject to individual contracts.415 In the nineteenth century 
these pressures became even stronger. The emergence of a full capitalist system based 
on the freedom of commerce implied the end of the system of artisan production and 
protected monopolies, and affirmed greater mobility for capital and labour. Moreover, it 
implied the end of artisan control of the production process and the loss of freedom in 
the workplace. It was replaced with the factory system where workers could be subject 
to closer production surveillance.416 
 Second, processes of state centralisation and expansion favored the elimination 
of corporate bodies, particularistic forms of self–jurisdiction, and autonomous 
governance. These bodies were subject to a common body of law and to pressures by 
the state for extraction of a bigger share of their revenue and resources in the form of 
taxes. This was first attempted by absolutist monarchs in the eighteenth century and 
later by the liberal regimes in the nineteenth century. It sought to expand an 
individualistic citizenry through the end of the privileges (which culminated in the 
prohibition of political and associational bodies between the individual and the state in 
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French revolutionary ideology) of corporate and religious bodies in order to promote 
conceptions of freedom of conscience, religion and commerce. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, the pressures for the elimination of guilds and corporate privileges 
existed almost everywhere in Europe, thus risking withdrawing any protective 
mechanisms against economic misfortune from most of the working classes (although 
there were lots of variation). At the same time these regimes, in the name of freedom of 
commerce, did not allow for the legal formation of associations to represent the interests 
of popular classes in the new polities. 
 Initially, the reactions of the guilds and corporate organisations were purely 
oriented to the reposition of the old norms of justice, privileges, and the ancient status 
quo. 417  These were conservative and backward-looking reactions, and they did not 
propose a new form of organisation of society where their autonomy would be secured 
under the new capitalist-liberal order. As Bendix has argued, instead it took the form of 
milenaristic rejections of the world, non-cooperation with authorities, social banditry, 
and populist monarchism (legitismism) in which peasants appealed to the king to restore 
the old ways.418 
 Gradually, however, artisans and guild masters mobilised in order to influence 
and shape government decisions, rather than just trying to overthrow it.419 Especially 
after the mid-nineteenth century the repertoires of protest changed from local defensive 
actions to formally organized groups.420 Urban and rural craft workers, who had lost 
economic security with the end of guild privileges and rural-religious corporate welfare 
protections, tried to organize for mutual aid, sociability, charity, religious, or 
professional purposes by using the remains of the organizational resources of the old 
guilds.421 
 Moreover, these associations became increasingly active in contemporary 
political issues, as they tried to promote changes in the existing distribution of power. 
Especially after 1848, industrial and rural workers started to organize in order to 
influence government decisions within national politics, namely through pressures for 
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suffrage extension, freedom of assembly, and association.422 In order to achieve these 
political objectives, associations began to establish links with each other. One of the 
most debated issues after 1848 (and until the interwar years in the twentieth century) 
was the question of solidarity between sectors of associational life, namely the issue of 
labor unity. How to evolve from craft, small, local, and particularistic associations to a 
national organization defending all workers?423 How to organize the unskilled workers, 
who were becoming very numerous in the new factory system? How to unite the 
interests of rural and urban workers in a common political platform?424 
 A wave of associational formation occured between the 1870s and the end of the 
first world war in 1918. Most analysts agree that this was the essential period of 
organization building and consolidation of modern forms of associational life. The sheer 
number of associations was overwhelming. For instance, in the city of Roanne in 
France, of the 275 associations formed between 1860 and 1914 ninety per cent appeared 
after 1890.425 The existing associations for charity, housing, of producers’ or workers’ 
self-help, cooperatives, and unions grew in size and number, as Gierke has noted.426 
The diversity of types of associations augmented as well. As Kenneth Boulding put it, 
from the «Audubon societies to the Zoroastrians», the variety of interests is 
enormous.427 Examples referred to by Gierke and which appeared during this period 
included the following causes: war veterans, professionals, trade, women, languages, 
fire brigades, protection of immigrants, stage actors, lawyers, the press, teachers, 
landowners, family defense, and care for children. 428  It was also a period when 
associations tended to acquire a mass scope and more encompassing national scope. 
They became professionally run and bureaucratized. After the 1880s, we can see the 
formation of major mass and large associations of employers, of workers (unions, who 
now encompassed both skilled and unskilled workers), and of religious groups as well 
as new associations in the agrarian world. 
                                                
 There were several causes behind these transformations. First, there was a more 
open climate towards freedom of association. In the second half of the nineteenth 
century and especially after the 1870s, elites started to think gradually that it might be 
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more useful to grant and promote freedom of association as a device to control pressures 
from below and to rely less on sheer coercion. After the guarantee of minimal rights of 
association in the decades after 1848 (although it was very uneven), it became more 
difficult for elites to rest their power only on personal connections. Instead, it became 
obvious that they needed organizations to establish links with the population in order to 
integrate them in the political system in manners not contradictory with the maintenance 
of the traditional elite’s political supremacy.429 In this context, after the decades of 1860 
and 1870 the establishment of the first laws legalised associations and unions. In the 
case of unions, for instance, in the 1870s they were more tolerated in Belgium, France, 
Germany, Austria, and the United Kingdom. 
 In this period, associational freedom generated a process of elite competition for 
the mobilization of the lower classes that in turn stimulated more association-building. 
New elites appeared, especially the socialists and the new politico-religious leaders. The 
liberals had been the first to mobilize, in order to counteract the traditional status and 
sources of the power of the conservative groups. But then both liberals and 
conservatives responded to the new threats posed by the socialists and the new religious 
parties by creating mass party organizations and by supporting associations linking 
them to workers, rural proletarians, and the lower middle-classes of the cities. 
Conservative elites began to use associations for political mobilization and nationalistic 
purposes.430 For example, the German Conservative Party established links with the 
Agrarian League (the association of the Junker East Elbian rye producers); the Italian 
Nationalist Association of 1910 was under the control of Ligurian steel producers and 
evolved into a party.431 Important cases were the new leagues of peasant associations 
that were either conservative or leftist depending on the context.432 
 Parties of all orientations were able to attract the masses. The cadre or elite 
networks of notables were replaced by large mass associations with interlocking links to 
interest organizations. This was the period when most European socialist parties were 
created: Germany (1863/75), Denmark (1871/78), Belgium (1877/85), France (1880), 
Switzerland (1880/88), the Netherlands (1881), Norway (1887) and Sweden (1889), 
Austria (1889) and Italy (1889). 433  Christian democratic movements, comprised of 
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parties, unions, and associations for religious defense, appeared also during this period, 
thus replacing the previous forms of religious associational life based on the local elite 
charity associations. Now religious leaders promoted mass associations, parties, and 
unions that opposed clearly and through popular mobilization and protest the 
secularization policies of liberals. Of special importance were educational issues. 
According to Ebbinghaus, the «school dispute mobilized religious communities against 
the secular Nation-State and gave rise to the formation of parties of religious defense, 
out of which Christian-Democratic parties grew».434 
 Changes in the nature of the state after the 1880s led associations to coordinate 
their activities at the national level. 435  This was promoted by the new geopolitical 
context in the last third of the nineteenth century. There was an increased military and 
economic competition between states, especially after the German and Italian 
unifications in the 1870s. Europe started to be divided into two opposing camps. 
Germany made an alliance with Austria and Italy, and Great Britain with France. These 
two blocs increased their competition for territorial control (e.g. the scramble for Africa) 
and economic primacy,436 and this need of economic and military self-assertion in the 
international arena led states to expand and to develop like never before. Now, not only 
did states put higher fiscal demands on their populations but there was also a need to 
promote economic development which made them establish the first economic and 
social regulative measures, like tariffs protecting national industries and agriculture. 
States expanded their transportation and communications networks. This was linked to 
growing military objectives, like the need for rapid deployment of troops, and the 
manufacture of arms in great quantities. Militaries and officers become increasingly 
professionalized. Their size increased dramatically, especially after the 1870 Franco-
Prussian war. If in 1870 the French army  had 250,000 men, in 1874 it was composed of 
1,750,000 men. Laws of universal compulsory military service were approved in some 
countries: Britain in 1916, France in 1889 (military service for two years), Germany in 
the 1870s.437 Ideas of nationalism started to be spread by the national elites in order to 
convince and mobilize the populations into these new collective endeavors. Finally, 
states developed new specific agencies with clear mandates for direct policy-making, 
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they implemented the professionalization of the bureaucracy higher, and they 
introduced civil service reforms. 
 This led to a qualitative change in the nature of the state. The state evolved from 
an organization that was mainly devoted to coercion and war-making to an organization 
that tried to promote economic development directly, that redistributed economic 
resources among groups, that operated as an authoritative referee of disputes among 
members of the polity, and that was a direct mobilizer of collective identification 
through the idea of nation.438 This process led to the expansion and complexification of 
interest organizations and associational life in general. 
 Indirectly, state expansion stimulated the creation of mass organizations. Since 
the state became more active in policy-making and more interventionist in many 
people’s affairs, this stimulated the organization of groups to support, to stop, or to 
influence the state’s policies and initiatives. Many groups were created that were 
dedicated to influence public policies directly by pressuring the bureaucracy, by 
lobbying directed at state agencies and parties, but also by linking to political parties, 
and through campaigns in order win over the public opinion. Issues like tariff policies, 
the creation of the first social welfare measures, taxes, and public works become the 
objects of major political disputes.439 
 Directly, the state influenced the formation of organized interests. State 
bureaucrats and politicians used the administration to directly co-opt, include, and 
coordinate societal interests in policy-making efforts, for political mobilization purposes 
and for nationalistic socialization. In this respect, several mechanisms were introduced. 
The first was in the arena of welfare policy directed towards the lower classes, or the 
productive classes. Liberals and conservatives in many European governments 
implemented welfare benefits that were to be administered by partnerships between the 
state and associations. Unions and workers’ brotherhoods became vehicles for 
dispensing state resources in the form of pensions, insurances, and so on. These 
measures were meant to secure the solidarity of workers serving in national armies and 
producing for the new organized capitalist system and to avoid their mobilization by 
socialists, Anarchists, radicals, republicans, and religious extremists. In this respect, 
mass mobilization for war was a direct cause for these welfare measures. The state 
needed healthy men for its armies and to this effect arranged for the large-scale 
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provision of services in food and healthcare during wartime. After armies were 
demobilized, many of these services were maintained, and even enlarged like in the case 
of the administration of veterans’ pensions. In France in 1926 these pensions accounted 
for thirteen per cent of total government expenditures.440 
 Associations had also another role. Especially capitalists, industrialists, agrarian 
producers started to participate directly with the state in policy-making efforts. In the 
words of Alfred Chandler, this happened because the «volume of economic activities 
reached a level that made administrative coordination more efficient and more 
profitable than market coordination». 441  In general, state initiatives in welfare and 
economic policy promoted the growth and the legal recognition of associations, but also 
their incorporation into state structures. In turn, this attribution of public functions 
fostered their rationalization, capacity for inter-organizational coordination, and 
monopolistic representation. Where these efforts succeeded, associations achieved 
national scope and became part of larger networks of associations (federations and peak 
associations) that were the direct interlocutors with the state and that spoke and 
intermediated the interests of a vast group of smaller organizations.442 
 
5.3. Variations of Associational life in the 1920s/1930s 
 
 Altough most European states experienced the challenges described in the 
previous section, they would respond to them in varying ways during the interwar years. 
In particular, the different forms of response would lead to differences in the level of 
encompassigness of associational life and degree of civic engagement of the citizenry. It 
would be in the interwar years that this process of full incorporation and recognition of 
associational life would achieve, in some countries, its full expression, and in others, 
fail completely. 
 The degree to which the workers’ movements and many other interest groups 
became involved with governments in the First World War efforts (1914-1918) would 
shape state-associational partnerships in the ensuing years. Where it was successful, 
labor was recognized as a national partner for collective bargaining in a system 
coordinated and supervised by the state (in labor courts and bodies for the mediation of 
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industrial conflict) and in arenas for the dispensation of welfare. In comparison with the 
decades before the war, the main difference was that now welfare and collective 
agreements became national in scope, not restricted – as before – to specific regions, 
industries, sectors, or groups.443 Previous trends for the inclusion of the workers in 
policy-making became even more acute with the needs imposed on states during the 
war. When the war ended, workers had become so empowered that they started to 
protest immediately for full political recognition, and especially for political rights. The 
establishment of universal suffrage became – for some countries permanently, for others 
momentarily – a norm in the interwar years.444 The right to strike also became universal 
in this period.445 
 The interwar years are what David and Ruth Collier have called an incorporation 
period.446 It is a period in the history of societies when the interaction between regime 
elites, parties, and economic interest groups representing interests from below worked 
in a way so as to produce varying forms of mutual recognition and partnership that 
became stable over time and reproduced their properties for decades to come.447 This 
was the context when national patterns of associational life that lasted well into the 
1980s became established. As Lipset and Rokkan have argued for party systems, the 
cleavages of European democracies around which party identities and competition were 
structured between 1945 until the 1970s reflect the cleavages established in the 
1920s.448 Stefano Bartolini has argued that the post-1945 rankings of union membership 
were already established in the 1920s. 449  Carolyn Warner has a similar position 
regarding religious associational life. It was in the 1920s and in the 1930s that 
associations and parties organized around religious identities that were linked to the 
masses, which was deepened after 1945. In France, the Catholic Church preferred to 
maintain informal links with the established political elites rather than to mobilize 
around an explicitly religious identity, whereas in Italy and Germany religious parties 
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were the preferred strategy. Both strategies, however, were established already in the 
1920s.450 Finally the national, institutionalized systems of exchange between ministers, 
employers, labor, and farmers with simultaneous functions at the level of coordinating 
the economy and implementing welfare measures that characterized many European 
democracies after 1945 (neo-corporatist and social-democratic and corporatist welfare 
states) were  established also during this period for the first time. Sweden’s 
Saltsjöbaden agreement in 1938, Norway’s 1935 Basic Agreement, and Germany’s use 
of labor courts and arbitration under Weimar are the examples of this process.451 In 
other countries these institutions, although there were plans for their development, did 
not achieve the same levels of extension as in Scandinavia or in Germany. The extreme 
cases were the Iberian dictatorial state-corporatist systems that resorted to the 
bureaucratic imposition from above, and to the police and the military for the control of 
pressures form below.452 
 In the case of associational life, I argue that these suggestions are only partially 
true. For some countries, one can already observe in the 1920s and in the 1930s the 
same rankings in both density and coordination that these countries occupied later in the 
post-1945 period. For other countries, their relative position was very different for what 
would become after 1945. Here the critical juncture was the context of the World War II 
and its immediate aftermath. 
 In fact, it becomes evident from Table 25, on the values of union density for the 
period 1920-1940, that some countries’ ranking position resembles the post-1945 
rankings for density of associational life (in the absence of data of levels of affiliation of 
adult population in voluntary associations, I have used union density). The countries 
that rank higher are Austria and Denmark, both above 40%. They are followed by 
Sweden, Belgium, and Germany. Great Britain, as in the postwar period, is already 
ranking in the middle of the chart. Last come the cases of lowest density of 
associational life (less than 20%), which include Spain and France. Still, there are 
important exceptions. Italy ranks together with the first set of countries with very high 
levels of membership (Austria, Denmark). Norway and the Netherlands, which in the 
post-1945 era ranked higher, have values close to the two Iberian cases. 
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Table 25: Approximate Union Density Rates 1920–1940. Values (%) and Rankings 
 % Rank 
Austria 48.8 1
Denmark 41.8 2
Italy  41.2 3
Sweden 37.6 4
Belgium 36.6 5




Spain  18 10
France 14.4 11
Portugal  10.4 12
(Source: Mann, 1995, p. 20; Density: percentage of total labor force who is union members; In Portugal 
the labor force was composed of 2516692 individuals in 1930, and the number of unionized workers was 
263000 in the mid 1920s. Freire, 2006, pp. 19-20, Rosas, 1994, p. 25) 
 
 The next table looks at indicators of coordination of the labor movement, 
monopoly (here the percentage of the labor force affiliated in the main union), and 
centralization (the degree to which it the main confederation has the power in relation to 
its affiliates in terms of control of strike funds, strike calls and wage demands) for the 
year 1938. Again, Denmark, Austria, Norway, and Sweden occupy the main position in 
terms of coordination of associational life at the end of the interwar period. The 
exception is France, which ranks equally to these countries, but this could be the 
occasional effect of the Popular Front government. Then there is a heterogeneous group 
composed of the UK, Germany, Italy, and Belgium. Of these countries, Belgium and 
Germany reached higher coordination levels and Britain and Italy lowered their position 
in the postwar years. Again, the explanation here resides in the events during and 
immediately after WWII. Finally, as predicted, Portugal and Spain already have the 
weakest coordination levels of associational life, although accompanied by the 




Table 26: Coordination of Labor Unions, 1938 
 Mon. Rank Cent. Rank 
Combined 
Rank 
Denmark 92.2 1 L 3 4
Austria 86.6* 3 H* 1 4
Norway 85 4 H 1 5
France 90.9 2 L 3 5
Sweden 84.7 5 H 1 6
UK 77.1 6 L 3 9
Germany 65* 8 M* 2 10
Italy 76.9* 7 L 3 10
Belgium 61 10 H 1 11
Spain 64 9 L 3 12
Netherlands 39.6 11 L 3 14
Portugal 26.6 12 L 3 15
(Mon.: Monopoly; Cent.: Centralization; *Italy: refers to 1914; Austria and Germany refers to 1925; 
sources: Crouch, 1991; Portugal: data refers to 1925. Of the 263000 unionized workers only 70000 were 
affiliated in the main confederation (CGT). Freire, 1992, p. 204; In Spain the Anarchist CNT in 1936 has 
one million and six hundred thousand members out of a total union membership of 2.5 million. Maura, 
1971, p. 74; Pérez-Díaz, 2000, p. 8) 
 
 As can be seen from Table 27, the two dimensions of associational life that are 













































 Finally, by combining the two dimensions of associational life (coordination and 
density), it is possible to group the countries by patterns for the interwar years. Again, 
the cases of higher associational life strength after 1945 were established already during 
the 1920-1940 period: Austria, Denmark, and Sweden. Similarly, the cases of weakest 
associational life after 1945 were established as well: France, Portugal, and Spain. 
Norway and Belgium occupied the medium-high position they would later have 
(although Norway has had a higher position after 1945). The anomalies are Italy (too 
high in relative terms when compared to its postwar position), and Great Britain, 
Germany and the Netherlands, all too low when compared with their postwar position. 
Certainly in these countries the decisive events that made them change their relative 
position reside partially in the context of the Second World War and its immediate 
aftermath. In the next chapters, I analyze each pattern of civil order in order to highlight 











Table 28: Patterns of Associational life, Western Europe, 1920-1940 
         Coordination Density Total Global Rank 
Austria 4 1 5 1st 
Denmark 4 2 6 2nd 
Sweden 6 4 10 3rd 
Italy 10 3 13 4th 
Norway 5 9 14 5th 
France 5 10 15 7th 
Belgium 11 5 16 6th 
Germany 10 6 16 8th 
UK 9 7 16 9th 
Netherlands 14 8 22 10th 
Spain 12 11 23 11th 





Chapter 6: Hegemonic Associational Life. Sweden, Norway and Denmark 
 
 The pattern of associational life classified as highly encompassing, and which is 
composed of the Scandinavian countries, had the best conditions for the growth and 
expansion of voluntary associations. In these countires, there was a continuation of 
corporate forms of representation in cities and the countryside until the late nineteenth 
century. The power of parliaments, both pre-modern and modern, was always high and 
state capacity was also strong. Since early modern times, the Scandinavian countries 
had developed a competent and professionalized bureaucracy fostering a self-conscious 
body of civil servants that were used to promote partnerships with associations for the 
implementation of policies at the local level. 
 
6.1. Paths Towards Hegemonic Associational Life, 1800s-1970s 
 
 In Scandinavia, the peasantry constituted a strong, independent body since the 
early nineteenth century. Especially from the 1860s onwards, peasants organized 
themselves for political action, namely through puritan religious-cultural social 
movements opposing the established Lutheran church, which was considered too 
corrupt by its closeness to political power. These movements defended pietist and 
fundamentalist doctrines, but they were also was also a form of critique of national 
politics and of the established elites. They were centered on networks of associations at 
the national level, composed of folk high schools, philanthropic organizations, agrarian 
cooperatives, and temperance societies.453 
 In Norway, associational life was dense and well organized from the start. Since 
the early nineteenth century, there was a strong social movement activity based on a 
dense network of associations. There was a strong historical connection between 
associations and social movements that lead to the principle that every form of 
participation must be formalized and organized.454 The agricultural movement, labor, 
temperance, religious, and Norwegian language and culture were all associationally 
based social movements. The Thrane movement emerged in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, and it was composed of workers, poor peasants and small 
impoverished landowners. Between 1848 and 1854 it included 273 associations with 
                                                 
453 Rokkan, 1966, pp. 75-79. 
454 Norris, 2002, p. 177 
 171
20,854 members.455 In the late 1800s, peasants organized in the Friends of the Peasants 
Movement (1865-1879), a national network of traveling lay preachers and cooperatives 
ventures that covered the whole territory and had 21,000 members. 
 From early on, Denmark had a very dense associational life. In the 1840s, there 
was an expansion of several types of associations. Its main elements were the co-
operatives in agriculture (which became state subsidized but at the same time remained 
locally autonomous), schools and cultural associations of the local life, and agrarian-
religious social movements. All social classes were organized in associations, and 
business and employers’ associations among self-employed master artisans continued 
the earlier guild structures.456 
 Also in Sweden there was a historically strong tradition of estate representation 
of the farmers, who were very autonomous and self-conscious as a political group. Here 
we see the development of the same pattern of religious-agrarian social movements 
since the early nineteenth century, representing the middle classes (like non-noble 
ironworks owners, wholesalers, non-noble landed proprietors, and prosperous farmers), 
the labor movement and the peasantry. The main movement in the 1860s was the Free 
Church Movement that aspired towards the creation of a more equalitarian Christian 
society and the democratizing reform of the aristocratic and clerical political system. It 
was made of a network of libraries, temperance movements, newspapers, publishing 
houses, co-operatives and unions. Approximately one third of the population was 
affiliated in these movements.457 By the end of the nineteenth century, these popular 
movements had become national mass organizations with a strong national center and 
with a strong penetration of local society to the extent that this period was labeled the 
age of associations.458 
 In the 1880s, these movements of agrarian-religious reform allied gradually with 
the urban liberals (composed of reformers and radicals in the cities, like artisans, 
teachers, and lawyers) in a program for the extension of suffrage. In Norway, they 
formed the Left, or the Venstre. This alliance gained power in the parliament in the 
1872 and 1882 elections. At the same time the Right counter-mobilized and formed the 
Conservative Party. The fight between the Left and the Right was bitter, and according 
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to Dahl the country was on the verge of civil war. Rumors had spread that the king was 
about to dissolve parliament and to use the army to repress the mobilization of the 
peasantry. In fact, the opposite happened and conflict was channeled through existing 
institutions. The parliament was a solid organization within the political system, and 
this meant that political struggles would be contained within the law and according to 
the principle of parliamentary rule.459 In 1884, a coalition of farmers, liberals, and urban 
radicals in the Venstre formed a government for the first time, and in the governments 
of 1897-1902 it instituted universal suffrage. Independence from Sweden came in 
1905.460 
 In Denmark the same alliance occurred. As Collier refers, a middle-class 
movement for reform, of students and in connection with the bourgeois in the 
Wholesale association and the farmer’s movement (who fought for local self 
government since early on) created in 1840 the Society of the Friends of the Peasants. 
Also, as early as the 1840s, a party of liberal-agrarians, the Venstre or United Left, won 
the lower chamber elections under a program for social and tax reform.461 
 In Sweden, competition continued for the extension of suffrage and the 
attribution of more powers to the parliament after the 1866 reform, which replaced the 
four estates parliament with a bicameral parliament. Much like in the other 
Scandinavian countries, farmers joined with urban liberals to form the Venstre or 
agrarian party in the mid-1800s, which was their native version of the liberal 
movements. 
 The final push for extreme mobilization and association building came with the 
formation of the labor parties after the introduction of universal suffrage in late 
nineteenth century and with the creation of lib-lab alliances. In Norway, the Labor Party 
was created in 1887 (initially was very small, had only 0.6% of the votes in the 1897 
elections), and it allied with the Venstre for universal suffrage. The party started to 
mobilize both urban and rural workers. Gradually, it inherited the associations that were 
in the orbit of the Venstre, becoming so powerful that the old agrarian leftist divisions 
started splitting, resulting in 1921 in the emergence of the Agrarian Party, representing 
the interests of commercial farmers. In the 1927 and 1933 elections the Labor Party was 
supported by the Agrarians though, and the subsequent governments institutionalized 
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programs of support of workers and supports for the agrarian economy. An agreement 
for welfare state, full employment, and subsidies for agriculture was settled in 1935. 
They were to be fully implemented afterwards in successive sessions of collective 
bargaining.462 A new cleavage emerged, between labor allied with small parties like the 
agrarians against the old Left, now the liberals, and the Right, or the conservatives, 
which lasted well until the 1960s.463   
 In Denmark this alliance of liberals and rural classes opened to the workers 
movements in the late nineteenth century. In the 1870s, the Social Democratic party was 
formed and many workers’ associations appear as well. By 1898, it was able to get 
twelve seats in parliament. In 1901, although now in control of government, the liberals 
suffered from a split that founded the Radical party (det Radicale Venstre), more clearly 
defensive of the small farmers interests, and which afterwards became an ally of the 
social democrats. In 1913 both parties formed the government, and the social democrats 
became gradually the leading party in this coalition of workers, town and country 
entrepreneurs, and rural workers. In 1915 the coalition implemented universal 
suffrage.464  
Again in 1929 there was a coalition of social democrats and radicals, which was 
broadened in 1933 to include the Venstre, which was then the second largest party in 
parliament. The inclusion of the farmers’ interests represented by the Venstre in the 
government coalition, which was led by the social democrats and the radicals, allowed 
for the enactment of measures to support both agricultural and workers’ interests. The 
former received protectionist policies for agriculture through agricultural funds, tax 
relief, loans, and artificial price increases. The latter received industry support 
measures, public works in order to generate employment, and welfare state supported 
relief and house subsidizing.465 This political coalition dominated the political system 
up to the 1970s.466 
 In Sweden, the labor movement that emerged in the late nineteenth century 
became very well organized. It was based on the leadership of the Social Democratic 
party, that led a network of associations of consumers’, tenants, workers’, educational 
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societies, charities/self-help, pensioners, funerary, and youth (e.g. scouts).467 In the late 
nineteenth century the Venstre suffered a split, as in Denmark, when its left-wing sector, 
which was mainly based in rural working classes, the Free Church movement and in 
some sections of the urban liberals, formed the Liberal Party. Gradually, this party 
moved towards an alliance with the socialists.468 
 The coalition of liberals, workers, and agrarians was consolidated with the 
implementation of political and social welfare measures already by the turn of the 
1900s. In 1912, the National Board for Social Affairs was created to implement policies 
of worker safety and social housing, all in partnership with labor representatives. This 
institution had a national scope, and it broadened many of the policies already existing 
at the local level. In 1902 there was the implementation in city councils of deliberative 
bodies with representatives of labor and employers with more than just an advisory 
function to authorities but also of implementation and supervision of labor policies. In 
1912 the chairman of the main union confederation, the LO, and the employers 
association leader, SAF, were given seats in the agency, as well as in other 
subcommittees.469 The 1913 pension reform introduced an universal right to income 
support in old age (for both industrial and rural workers) and it was provided by the 
state with the help of a system of tax transfers.470 The Law on Poor Relief was approved 
in 1918; the Ministry of Social Affairs was created in 1921. Liberals had a fundamental 
role in the implementation of these reforms through the CSA, the National Association 
of Social Work, a reformist association that had the main role in the first three decades 
of the twentieth-century in the establishment of central state institutions in the field of 
social welfare. 471  Finally, this coalition implemented universal suffrage in 1918 
(although conservatives in 1907 had first instituted universal suffrage for the lower 
chamber).472 
 In the 1930s, this coalition ended and the social democrats, who became now the 
strongest party, allied with the Farmers’ Party in 1933. Between 1937 and 1939 both 
parties agreed to a policy of support for agriculture through state loans and price 
measures, and for support of industrial workers through unemployment benefits and 
active labor market policies. A general universalistic policy of welfare was created for 
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all citizens in areas like social legislation on old age and disability benefits, free 
maternity care, rent allowances, and dental care.473 
 In sum, between the 1920s and the late 1930s powerful party alliances of 
workers, farmers, and sections of the middle-classes institutionalized the participation 
of associations in centralized partnerships with the state for the provision of welfare 
benefits and for the governing of the political economy (especially in employment 
policies and the regulation of the labor market). This system was institutionalized as a 
corporatist system, including business, government and labor. Gradually, this 
integrative system extended to all types of organized interests through active state-
sponsored policy programs that were implemented in partnerships with associations. 
Social welfare subsidies, unemployment relief, unemployment insurance, old age 
pensions, all forms of workmen’s compensation, debt relief programs, and subsidies to 
farmers were all channeled through associational life organizations.474 This meant that 
the creation of highly inclusive organizations intertwined closely with the regime and 
the state institutions, and it was institutionalized through a regular exchange of 
information, and negotiations. 475  Norway’s “Basic Agreement” of 1935, Sweden’s 
Saltsjöbade agreement of 1938, and Denmark’s post-war settlement were all based on 
the principle of organizational concertation, and they extended organizational 
membership to the majority of citizens.476 
 Since the 1900s, there has been a context of high associational engagement of 
the population in Scandinavia. Associational life became thus hegemonic in the sense 
that the organizational field was very dense, the population was highly engaged in 
associations and its activities, societal groups defined their self-interest mainly through 
associational representatives, and associations tended to form hierarchical confederative 
structures. There were strong opportunities, incentives, and resources to participate, 
which lead to high membership rates, high volunteering, strong autonomy, and 
independence of associations. But more importantly, associational life absorbed the 
interactions and exchanges between individuals and other collective actors. 
Associational leaders historically have a leading role in the direction and definition of 
national interests and in the maintenance of social and political order. In this sense 
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organizations and their leaders are hegemonic, and as such they constitute the basic 
pillars and motors of both political order and change.  
 In these countries, associations function as pillars for social order through the 
principle of organizational concertation. As Peter Katzenstein argues, the compromises 
between business and labor, and the willingness to achieve compromise and share 
power have led to the emergence of social concertation, bargaining, interest 
accommodation, and the development of a shared ideology of social partnership.477 This 
principle of corporatist integration was not restricted to industrial organizations (unions 
and employers/business associations), but it extended to civic and religious 
organizations. Small business associations were responsible for the implementation of 
support funds from the state; farmers associations channeled subsidies for farmers. In 
Sweden, the temperance movement has functions at the level of municipalities and in 
the parliament (within supervisor’s bodies) regarding alcohol consumption.478 In fact, in 
the 1970s, 74% of government agencies had corporatist arrangements and one third of 
all members of agency boards were representatives of organizations.479 In general, the 
people leading or working in voluntary associations or in charity organizations received 
a representation post or even a job in government agencies.480 Moreover, most of the 
associations are in large measure funded by the state since the 1930s. In Sweden, Youth 
organizations and adult educational societies, for instance, derived 70% of their 
resources from the state in 1987.481 In today’s Sweden, study circles involve 40% of the 
adult population, of which about half are covered by public funds.482 
 In contemporary Sweden, state commissions on a variety of policy areas have 
always representatives from the parliament, civil service, independent experts, and 
associations of the areas affected by the policy. Associations view these commissions as 
the main arena to influence policy, and in general policy decisions try to accommodate 
the views of all members of the commissions. This procedure exists also at the level of 
local governments and in specific supervisory boards of the state administration. For 
instance, the advisory delegation for the National Traffic Safety Office has 
representatives from the union of transport workers, of the automobile transport 
employers association, of the home and school association, of the abstaining drivers 
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association, of the Federation of Swedish farmers, and of others up to a total of fifteen 
different associations.483 
 Also in Norway, organizations have been historically very close to the public 
sector through partnerships to implement government policy. 484  Organizations are 
entitled to participate in all phases of government policy-making as representatives of 
specific interests. In about a thousand government committees, organizations are 
represented in 50% of them, even in the ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs. 
Many of these associations are economic interest groups (trade unions, employers, 
fisheries, and agricultural associations), but it is also very common for religious, 
cultural, humanitarian, youth, sports, and recreation groups to be represented.485 These 
organizations, like environmentalist groups, implement policies, serve as interlocutors 
between the government and the citizens, and generate proposals for the parliament.486 
The nature protection groups emerged in the early 1900s, and since 1934 they have been 
funded by the government when the ministry of church and education gave financial 
support to the Conservation Society. 487  Since 1987, a movement for sustainable 
environmental development has been supported by the state through the Environmental 
Home Guard, an institution formed in 1991 which serves as an umbrella federation in 
which other groups may affiliate.488 In sum, this incorporation has not been restricted to 
associations in corporatist arrangements (unions and employers) but it has been open 
also to new social movements, single–issue, and citizen initiative groups.489 Particularly 
important have been the associations in the health and social sectors, which have grown 
together with the expansion of the welfare state.490 
 Because of the full integration in national-level networks of peak associations, of 
their governing functions, and of the support from parties in broad coalitions, 
associations tend to become bureaucratic, and to have a high recruitment capacity. In 
Sweden, about 75% of all associations are members of national peak associations and 
only 25% are purely local.491 Associations have easy access to become represented in 
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state bodies, and they are able to redistribute state resources. Also, they have a high 
recruitment capacity. An important point to note is that unions control unemployment 
funds.492 This has promoted the growth of the number of associations. After the 1940s, 
the founding rate of associations increased: 3,000 organizations in 1940, 6,000 in 1990. 
If in 1940 there was one organization for 49 inhabitants, in 1990 the ratio was one to 33 
(many after the 1960s are choral and leisure).493 
 Looking at the figures regarding the adult population’s affiliation in voluntary 
associations, these countries have the highest records. In Norway, in 1968 it was 70%, 
in 1983 61%, in 1990 77%, and in 1997 75%. Sweden has had the highest level of 
membership, always above 80%, and with smaller differences in terms of class 
participation associations.494 Moreover, the population not only joins associations and 
participates actively in them, but it also has the highest figures for unpaid work in 
associations.495 In Sweden in 2002, 33% of the population was affiliated with a sports 
club, 32% with consumers’ cooperatives, 27% with tenants’ organizations, and 12% 
with cultural organizations. The study circles that are organized by associations devoted 
to popular education are also very popular in Scandinavia. They are small groups of 
adults who study and debate a diversity of subjects from politics to food and languages. 
In Sweden the average number of participants is 8.6, and about 75% of the adult 
population attends one of these groups regularly.496 Finally, existing research does not 
show that membership in associations is declining. In Sweden even more people are 
now members of more than one association, and membership in all types of associations 
has grown with the exception of the temperance movement.497 
 In this respect, unions have been very important. In Denmark, union density has 
actually grown, which is explained by the fact that since the post-war era Denmark has 
had a highly centralized collective bargaining and union-managed unemployment 
insurance schemes.498 If we look at Table 4, union density in Denmark has been in 
continuous growth since 1970. In 1970 it was 62% of the labor force, in 1980 and 1990 
81%, and in 1997 84%. In Norway, it has grown from 57% in 1970 to 63% in 1980, to 
66% in 1990, and to 68% in 1997. In Sweden it was 67% in 1970, 78% in 1980, 82% in 
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1990, and 84% in 1997. In Sweden, 36% of all employees have participated at least 
once a week in union meetings,499 and 14% of LO members have served as elected 
representatives. 
 
6.2. Old and New Corporatism 
 
 As seen in Scandinavia, associational life was already very strong by the mid-
nineteenth century. In this part of the world there was the continuity of corporate forms 
of representation in the urban and rural worlds until the late 1800s. This meant that the 
transformation of pre-modern urban guilds (which were especially strong in the Hansa 
cities) and corporate village organization could easily be transformed into modern 
associations. Strong continuity, inheritance of the corporate collective resources and 
rigid status demarcations gave the lower classes both a secure identity and capacity for 
collective action. Until the reforms of the 1860s, the Scandinavian countries preserved 
four estates: noble, clergy, burgher, and peasant. Relevant here is the decisive presence 
of a form of institutional representation for peasants in Scandinavia, or the fourth estate 
of autonomous peasant representation that led to the spread of strong self-organized 
social movements. 
 In Sweden, already by the seventeenth century the crown and the nobles did not 
possess much land and had to share power and land with independent farmers.500 The 
peasant estate was vital in the political alliances of the period, and it allied often with 
the clerics or the kings against the nobility.501 Until 1866 the peasantry was represented 
in the parliament as a fourth group in addition to the clergy, nobility and burghers, and 
it was from this class of peasants and small farmers that the liberals emerged in the 
nineteenth century as well as from the dissenting religions that allied with social 
democrats and unions for universal suffrage.502 In the second half of the nineteenth 
century, this strong mobilization of the peasants made it possible to control liberal 
policies of the state through the creation of farm and agricultural cooperatives that 
became very successful in using the market for the preservation of the autonomy of the 
independent farmers. Initially, these organized peasants for the collective purchase of 
food or fertilizers but soon successful participated in capitalist ventures through the 
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production of butter, cheese, flour, and potatoes, and they were the basis of equalitarian 
and democratic political organizations.503 After the end of corporate representation in 
1866, the first peasant associations and parties were formed easily. The Lantmannaparti 
(Ruralist Party) was represented in the lower house already in 1868. It was a more 
conservative organization, and it merged with one of the antecedents of the 
Conservative Party in 1912. But in 1913 the Farmer’s Party (Bondeförbundet) was 
formed, representing mainly the interests of smallholders, and in 1915 the more 
conservative National Association of Farmers (Jordbrukarnas Riksförbundet) was 
created. They would merge in 1921 to create the Farmers’ Party that later allied with the 
social democrats.504 
 In Denmark since 1834, there were consultative assemblies of city burghers, 
rural estate owners, and small farmers. 505  In Norway the constitution of 1814 
recognized voting rights to four categories of citizens: the burghers of the cities, the 
peasants (freeholders and leaseholders), citizens in cities defined by a minimum real 
estate, and officials of the national government.506 This institution was decisive because 
it granted Norway’s autonomy from Sweden through an indirectly elected parliament 
(Storting), empowered a considerable part of the population (45% of all adult males 
could vote) and so it made it easier for the rural classes to mobilize and organize against 
the elites. Rural classes were able to fight and resist big landowners, bourgeois and the 
bureaucratic elite interest in acquiring land and expand taxes for the building of the 
army and state apparatus.507 
 In the urban world, there was a simultaneous transition to the modern form of 
state and the use of existing corporate institutions in order to modernize the country. 
The transfer of resources from the old corporations to new forms of organization like 
unions and employers’ organizations was easier, and it tended to create fewer divisions 
in the labor movement, like for instance the ones that became deep in Southern Europe 
between socialists and anarchists in the late nineteenth century. Functional interests 
were seen as legitimate, as sources of advice to the government and as institutions for 
participation. As a consequence, strong trade associations emerged in the late 1800s.508 
Moreover, employers maintained a cooperative attitude. Unions and employers, since 
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the early twentieth century, established bargaining at the national and cross-branch 
level. Remarkable is that in some cases the employers’ strong organization preceded 
unions’ organization and pressed unions to get organized before they negotiated with 
them (Sweden). Moreover, the employers who were more organized were the ones who 
had already based their resources in the guild trade associations.509 
 In Norway, the guilds were abolished in 1869 but they were incorporated in the  
government structure.510 As Eckstein has argued, contemporary Norway «has derived 
from premodern life … traditional corporatism». 511  In Sweden, the four estates’ 
division lasted until the 1850s reforms (noble, clergy, burgher, and peasant), and the 
commercial bourgeoisie was powerful in the cities of Stockholm and Göteborg since the 
eighteenth century. 512  In Denmark from 1870s until 1910, the organizations that 
continued the guilds representing all trades and branches were able to form at the 
national and regional levels in all towns (the Danish Federation of Artisans and 
Industry, the Federation of Copenhagen Office Workers Union, and the Danish 
Retailers Federation). They acted as pressure groups in the parliament against the 
workers represented by the social democrats. In Denmark in the 1890s, the union 
movement developed on the former guild basis and employers were able to centralize 
and coordinate also at the national level.513 According to Bartolini, by 1895 almost all 
former guilds had adopted the trade union form of organization.514 In sum, the new 
regimes were able to adapt the corporatist structures of absolutism into a «corporatist 
m».515 
.3. Early and Strong Parliaments 





 The second decisive factor in Scandinavia was the fact that parliaments 
constituted a major counter-power vis-à-vis the king, and that they were politically 
central institutions. Strong traditions of parliamentarism were continued through a 
gradual transition to modern parliamentarism. By the seventeenth century, Sweden’s 
parliament, the Riksdag, was «probably the most democratic parliament in all Europe» 
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with a chamber for burghers, nobles, clerics, and peasants, and where only tenants of 
noble lands were excluded. 516  The Riksdag dates as far back as the local village 
parliaments in Germanic times that represented the free peasants of the village. It had 
many powers, and already in the fifteenth century it administered justice, public works, 
and charity initiatives, and it was in full control of every tax.517 The seventeenth and the 
eighteenth century wars did not curtail its power, as happened with many parliaments in 
Europe (France or Brandenburg-Prussia), but it grew stronger  since participation in the 
wars was also dependent upon the Riksdag’s permission.518 The parliamentary reform in 
1866 replaced the old estates system with a two chamber parliament while increasing 
the representation of independent farmers.519 Although until 1884 the government was 
not accountable to the parliament and the executive authority was in the hands of 
nominated officials, in 1884 an alliance of peasants and other groups (doctors, teachers, 
and lawyers) gained a majority in the parliament and founded the first political party, 
the Venstre, which forced the Swedish king to yield to the primacy of this institution.520 
Although in 1917 there was still the fear that conservatives and the king would use the 
army to repress the workers’ movement, the king never broke with the principle of 
rliam
           
pa entary responsibility to the lower house.521 
 In Denmark, although until 1895 the conservatives ruled by decree with the 
support of the king, and although after 1871 with the fears created by the Paris 
commune the conservatives became more authoritarian (between 1870 and 1900 unions 
are outlawed), the counter-mobilisation from the Right would be developed under 
democratic auspices and the Right never attempted a real change in the nature of the 
political system. The Conservative People’s Party was formed in 1915, as a 
reorganisation of the old Tory party, and its aim was mainly to mobilise the middle-
class under a mass conservative movement. In general, the Right was unable to mobilise 
lower classes, both urban and rural. Instead, the social democrats made this coalition of 
workers, town and country entrepreneurs, rural workers, and office workers, and it was 
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institutionalised in the 1920s.522 Universal suffrage was established in 1898 in Norway, 
in 1907 in Sweden, and in 1915 in Denmark.523 
 The political centrality of parliament in the nineteenth century made these 
institutions the focus of political disputes, and it facilitated the organisation of the lower 
classes into national social movements and associations. At the same time, the existence 
of strong parliamentarism secured conservatives’ survival and the possibility to coexist 
in the new system. The established parties competed for an alliance with many 
associations in order to gain mobilisation capacity, develop associational subcultures, 
and once they gained power they used the associations to strengthen their own power.524 
Moreover, dominant parliamentarism meant that freedom of association was gradually 
granted. In 1846 and 1864, the Swedish parliament eliminated any laws banning unions. 




th icalisation of the workers movement after World War I was not repressed.525 
Moreover, there has never been a legal limitation on strike or on unions.526 
 The struggle over parliamentarisation pitting liberals against conservatives in 
national parliaments was typical of this century, and it made the liberals seek alliances 
with lower class groups, thus allowing for the gradual inclusion of lower class groups 
by established elites and facilitating the expansion of organizations for lower class 
interests. This tradition of political accommodation under new forms made the Left 
reformist, the Right accommodative, and the center Liberals mobilizing.527 This gave 
birth to a form of liberalism that was strongly oriented towards mass mobilisation and 
the building of party and associational organisations. Strong liberal parties were a 
common trait in these societies, and they should be seen as a result of solid 
parliamentarism. From early on in Denmark, cross-class coalitions were formed, and 
from 1849 to 1864 the country was ruled by a coalition between the National Liberal 
Party of the urban middle-class and the peasant Venstre. 528  In S
p ntarism ensured that by the early 1900s the liberals were the largest party in the 
Parliament, and from 1920–1932 the pivotal party in any government.529 
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 The centre-orientation of mass liberal parties provided a fertile ground for the 
implementation of inclusive reformist policies oriented towards the amelioration of the 
working class condition. Liberal associations were concerned with the so-called social 
(or labour) question, and they were very influential in the liberal parties. These 
associations were composed of upper middle-class politicians, bureaucrats, and 
economists, some of which would later staff the welfare state apparatus. In Sweden, the 
main organisations were the Verdandi founded in 1881 by Karl Staaff, a liberal deputy 
and later Prime Minister; and the National Association of Social Work, founded in 1902 
and that promoted the values of self-help and philanthropic activities but complemented 
it with a call for a stronger role for the state in poor relief.530 The first sickness fund 
l democrats fought together to expand universal 
          
with state subsidies was adopted in 1891 after a proposal by agrarian and liberal 
deputies, and it was extended to both rural and urban workers. 531  According to 
Bartolini, at this point half of the industrial workers (in 1885) were members of 
insurance associations.532 
 Finally, parliamentarism made possible a strongly mobilized working-class 
pressuring from below in order for it to be seen as a possible ally for the coalition of 
farmers and liberals against the conservatives since the late nineteenth century. In 
Sweden, the liberals and the socia
suffrage and to legislate social welfare measures, that later included the agrarian 
parties.533 These red-green coalitions emerged in all Scandinavia, constituting in the 
early twentieth century such a united front against conservatives that it was impossible 
to repress without risking civil war. 
 As a general consequence of high parliamentarism, the links between parties and 
voluntary associations became adamant from the 1920s until the 1970s. Between the 
early twentieth century and at least until the late 1970s, the creation of voluntary 
associations like unions, business associations, co-operatives, agricultural pressure 
groups, educational associations, temperance groups, and dissenting sects was forged 
with strong links to parties and party blocks.534 In this period, Swedish parties were 
divided into such fully integrative blocs that, according to Boli, they had achieved a 
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«comprehensive party politicization» of society.535 The tendency of the population to 
have a high degree of participation within associational life organisations and to be 
active within them went hand in hand with the solidification of parties and of party 
blocks, and with parties being the main actors in a society.536 In Sweden the strong 
linkages between the social democrat party with the major blue collar union, the LO, 
ensured that the LO leadership was usually members of the parliament. The same was 
true of the white collar unions who had closer ties with the liberal and center parties, 
and the business organisations provided some MPs for the conservatives.537 Voluntary 
associations were even seen as party-integrative organizations. They had the political 
political norms of unions in Norway and Sweden favoured the social 
roportion of failure to indicate party preference or vote in Norway, Finland, 
function to integrate the electorate into the party network, to support a parliamentary 
ally by providing manpower for the leadership and a party cadre, and to contribute with 
financial resources. 538  New organizations and social movements that were formed 
without any links to parties tended to create those links in time. 
 Party profiles resemble associational profiles and the preferences of the rank and 
file of voluntary associations. Pestoff argues that in nine organizational types identified 
as potential party-integrative organizations six have party-specific norms, while the 
other three have strong bloc preferences and they function as supporting organizations 
only at the elite level. Associations tend to be divided by party preferences. In the 
1970s, the 
democrats. The political norms of producer co-operatives have favoured the Centre 
Party in the two countries. Academic and professional associations’ bloc preference was 
for the Conservative Party in Norway, and the liberal and conservative parties in 
Sweden.539 
 Moreover, individual political attitudes and behaviour tend to be shaped by these 
networks. There are indications that individuals who belong to voluntary associations 
abstain less in national elections. In contrast, non-members of associations have the 
highest p
and Sweden, while members of party-integrative associations express the higher rate of 
vote and party preference. Party newspapers are also important in these countries. 
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Readership figures are high in Sweden, and they are seen to complement the daily 
press.540 
 At the elite level, the data suggests that there strong linkages between parties and 
associations. A study on nominees for parliament found that organizational membership 
erts and professional bureaucrats, and the 
bureaucracies could be counted to implement fairly accurately the 
late nineteenth century and the 
930s. 542  These bureaucrats were simultaneously professional but also autonomous 
om p
different regions of the countries and promoted the emergence of central coordinating 
                                                
is an important criterion for selection. Deputies have usually higher associational 
memberships than the average voter, and frequently they occupy leadership positions in 
these organizations. Most labor candidates are members of blue collar unions, some in 
white collar, and a few in farm or producers’ associations. The conservative parties’ 
candidates had at least one member in religious or temperance organizations while only 
one third of them had members in organizations common to other parties.541 
 Finally, state characteristics in Scandinavia allowed for a rapid expansion of 
associations at the national level. First, almost from the start, the state had a very strong 
capacity that allowed for an empowering of societal organizations through the use of 
these groups as vehicles for resource transfers, as sources of information, and as 
partners in coordinating state policies. There was a high capacity state available when 
inclusive policies started to be designed in the late nineteenth century. Historically, state 
agencies have been staffed with competent exp
Scandinavian 
economic, labor, and social policies between the 
1
fr olitical pressures. Policy implementation was in the hands of semi-autonomous 
boards that were not under the direct control of the ministries, and as such bureaucrats 
were agents in their own autonomous right.543 
  
6.4. State Capacity Fostered by Church Incorporation 
 
 Territory in the Scandinavian countries was strongly unified since at least the 
sixteenth century, and it was almost fully controlled by the central state administrations. 
This trait, combined with the high parliamentarism of the regimes, allowed for the 
development of networks of voluntary associations at the national level. They connected 
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peak associations in order to run the common affairs of associations from different 
points of the country. It made possible links and alliances of disparate interests in order 
 influ
uld now use the church parishes to control and to implement policies at the 
 the eighteenth 
                  
to ence the national center. The waves of partisan and civic mobilization that 
emerged in the nineteenth century were centered mainly on the definition and 
aggregation of citizens’ interests towards the state and not in questioning the state’s and 
the regime’s authority and legitimacy.544 Social movements assumed easily a national 
form. 
 These state characteristics were the result of long-term paths of development 
dating back to the sixteenth century, in particular state-church relations. As Anderson 
argues for the case of Sweden, during the Reformation King Gustav Vasa confiscated 
the church resources and incorporated the church into the state apparatus. Lutheranism 
became the official state church in Sweden after 1593, and the «identification between 
the state and the church was total».545 This tight fusion of the state and the church led to 
a high administrative unification of the territory from the sixteenth century on, because 
the state co
local level. For instance, a system by which to register the population and its resources 
was established early on by using the parish organization of the church, which 
facilitated the collection of taxes and simultaneously created direct relations between 
the state and its subjects. The church was also used by the state to administer the school 
system.546 
 This shared responsibility for policy implementation between the state and the 
church, favored by the Lutheran model, served later as a model through which 
corporatist and welfare policies were implement during the late nineteenth and the early 
twentieth centuries.547 It was seen already as legitimate that the state could rely on 
secondary bodies for policy coordination. As a consequence, in the late nineteenth 
century almost no obstacles existed within the state bureaucracy to use unions and 
cooperatives for the implementation of social insurance laws in old age pensions, 
sickness, accident, and unemployment.548 Moreover, because of the state-church fusion, 
any religious reform or dissenting movement that emerged to reform the established 
state religion (in Denmark and Sweden the pietists and Moravians in
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century) was also inevitably directed against the state itself. 549  Consequently, 
 movements spread easily through the territory, and when the workers’ 
eared in the late nineteenth century, it was easier to form an alliance 
parliament without the need to resort to repression and violence. Finally, this broad 
alliance conquered national government in the 1930s as the coalition promoting the 
transition to democracy. Because it was so hegemonic, it could use the traditions of 
state-church partnership to build an extrememly broad welfare state and corporatist 
partnerships in industrial policy that to this day sustains a highly participating citizenry. 
                                                
religious/agrarian
movement app
since both were interested in changing the central state; both had a common adversary. 




 The Scandinavian countries had the best conditions for the development of a 
fully developed and encompassing associational life. In Norway, Sweden, and Denmark 
traditions of estate and corporate organization survived until the late nineteenth century 
especially in the countryside, and a very efficient state that relied on partnerships with 
the Lutheran church for policy implementation. Also, the state was highly unified and 
had a high control of the territory. These two conditions promoted a strong capacity for 
collective action and organization building during the first two thirds of the nineteenth 
century, especially in the form of religious and agrarian reform movements. In the 
context of growing workers’ mobilization from the late nineteenth century to the 1930s, 
these movements were able to become receptive to workers’ demands and to build 
broad coalitions crossing class boundaries: farmers, workers, and sectors of the liberal 
elite (representing more progressive and open economic sectors). This was possible 
because strong parliaments and an open legal system created incentives for popular 
classes to address their claims to the parliament, and elites became more open to 
pressures from below since rival claims could be accommodated within the national 
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Chapter 7: Dominant Associational Life in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands 
 
 
 In the pattern of dominant associational life, there was also the survival of pre-
modern forms of corporate representation until the late nineteenth century and their 
integration through cooperation with the state in policy making. Although stronger in 
Germany than in the Netherlands and Belgium, parliamentarization was lower in 
Germany and higher in the two other cases. The cases of dominant associational life 
rested on a mix of high corporatism and medium parliamentarism (Germany) or high 
parliamentarism and medium corporatism (Belgium and the Netherlands). Still, both 
had in common a state with medium capacities. Although staffed by professional 
bureaucrats and composed of autonomous agencies, the state could rely only partially 
on a tradition of cooperation with religious bodies. This was achieved only partially in 
Germany and in the Netherlands with the fusion of the state and the Protestant churches, 
but it failed to attain a complete control of the territory because a part of it was 
controlled by the Catholic church. In Belgium, although at the beginning of her 
independence both liberals and the Catholic church had supported independence from 
the Calvinist Netherlands, later liberal policies alienated (which were stronger in the 
cases of Belgium and the Netherlands) the Catholic support for the state, and a conflict 
(although expressed through party channels) was ever present. In this sense the state 
could not develop as much as in the hegemonic associational life cases, inhibiting full 
territorial control, and as a consequence social movements and efforts at association 
building were more regional/local. Hence, there were higher barriers to an alliance of 
urban workers and the rural middle and lower classes. 
 
7.1. Paths Towards Dominant Associational Life 
 
 In Germany, from the late eighteenth century to the late nineteenth century 
associational life was already well developed. The field of middle class/bourgeois 
Protestant associational life was strong, and Protestant territories had the highest 
associational densit. 550  Urban merchants, wealthy artisans, entrepreneurs, and 
professionals were organized in professional associations (e.g. the Association of 
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German Scientists and Doctors was founded in 1810) and in local cultural and 
recreational clubs (male choirs, musical academies, shooting societies, beer and wine 
drinking societies). Many of these associations were nationalistic, since they were 
created in the aftermath of the French invasions. For instance, the widespread 
gymnastics associations were created to show the “love of fatherland through 
gymnastics”.551 
 By the end of the nineteenth century, Protestant middle-class associational life 
was very strong throughout Germany. From the 1880s to the 1930s middle-class 
Protestant groups were mobilized by nationalism, populist anti-Semitism, popular 
conservatism, and later by fascism. 552  Patriotic societies emerged all over in the 
Kaiserreich after the 1870s. The new state’s nationalist project of imperial affirmation 
led to the creation of organizations like the Pan Germanic League (1886), the German 
Army and Naval Leagues, and veterans’ associations.553 
 Workers’ associational life started to appear in the 1830s in the form of charities, 
clubs, funeral societies, mutual aid societies, and fire brigades.554 The 1840s witnessed 
the emergence of a strong wave of workers’ protests, namely by the guildsmen and 
handicraft laborers, who formed the basis of the German labor movement.555 In 1848, 
they organized a trade convention of tailors, printers, sailors, and stevedores demanding 
the creation of benefit funds for the disabled and the sick, the right to conduct their own 
affairs. Moreover, they declared opposition to economic freedom and a return to a 
corporate form of organization. In June 2-4 1849 there was the national congress of all 
German guilds in Hamburg that demanded that work conditions should be set by local 
guilds, that they be appointed to municipal councils, that members of the guilds be 
appointed in state legislatures to advise on manufacturing policy, and that announced 
the creation of a national craft assembly regulating the affairs of all trade organizations 
side by side with parliament.556 After 1848, some of the restrictions of associations 
were removed in many German states which lead to the formation of many new 
associations until the 1860s: the cooperative movement, mutualities, and workers’ 
educational clubs.557 
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 By the late 1860s, workers’ associational life was heavily based around 
networks of associations for leisure time, sports, choirs, and unions. In 1875, the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) was created and it established itself in the guild movement. It 
evolved from 300,000 members in 1890 to 2.6 million in 1913.558 In 1912 it had 8.5 
million workers as members of the trade unions associated with it. Still, less than half of 
the industrial workers were unionized in this period. The social democrats had their 
ancillary singing, cycling, sports, nature, mutualities, and youth associations as well as 
popular theaters.559 According to Panebianco, the SPD was «a powerful bureaucracy, 
self-financed, centralized, with a bureaucratic structure extending from the centre to the 
periphery and ensuring the dominant coalition's tight control over the party».560 
 These organizations were persecuted and prohibited, especially in Prussia and 
Saxony. From 1878 until 1890, antisocialist laws were in place, although mutualities 
and choral clubs were allowed to continue, and there was a socialist faction in the 
Reichstag.561 With the fall of Bismarck in 1889-90, the socialist movement recovered to 
its full force again. 
 The Catholics of southern Germany were organized in associations after the 
1870s. The process of German unification by Bismarck was identified with a Protestant 
state church, and this politicized the Catholic identity. Moreover, Bismarck declared 
that Catholic culture was to become illegal. The Kulturkampf (1871-73) was thus 
initiated by Bismarck against the Catholic Church in order to control their schools and 
property. Although not very successful, it pushed the Catholics to the mobilization of 
German workers. From these networks of Catholic associations, the Center Party was 
created, lay associational life expanded at both regional and national levels, and the first 
Christian unions are created in the 1890s.562 In the 1870s and the 1880s, support for the 
Center Party grew. It was able to win 20% of the seats in the Reichstag in the 1873 
election. In the regions of Rhineland and Westphalia, the Catholic party had 63% of the 
vote. Moreover, it was a very sub-cultural vote, because Catholics in Germany hardly 
voted for any other party.563 
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 By the 1870s, the German state started to promote corporatist policies that 
implied the recognition of some organizations in the state structures.564 Associations 
became semi-administrative bodies. Fire brigades were funded by city authorities.565 
Business and employer organizations were co-opted in order to support the state’s 
policies of industrialism through tariffs and cartels. 566  Workers’ associations were 
included within the state administration in order toimplement welfare policies (and to 
curb workers’ radicalism). 567  Under Bismarck, labour was given a role in the 
management of local sickness funds, which were run by elected boards. Unions started 
to run for these boards, and they became soon dominant.568 The employer’s Liability 
Act of June 7 1871 established the first laws for compensation of accidental death or 
injury. The 1883 sickness insurance law stipulated that sickness funds should be 
financed by employers’ and workers’ contributions and managed by committees with a 
two thirds representation from the workers. 569  In June 1884, the first broad and 
comprehensive system of obligatory insurance for public accident, sickness, disability 
and old age insurance was established. The insurance was administered by a body 
composed of civil servants, deputies, workers’ and employers’ representatives.570 The 
handicraft protection law of 1897 created a nationwide network of chambers of artisans 
with authority to control and oversee the apprenticeship program. The chambers had 
authority to certify craft exams, to revoke a firm’s decision to hire a particular worker if 
his training was not considered sufficient, and to set limits to the number of trainees.571 
After the accession of Willhelm II to the throne in 1890, antisocialist laws were 
repealed to the satisfaction  of the Catholics. 
 By the early twentieth century, Germany had developed such an associational 
life that it was said to suffer from Vereinsmeierei, or «associational fetishism or 
mania». 572  The workers’ movements, both socialist and Catholic, were cohesive 
subcultures organized around dense networks of a party and its ancillary unions, 
cooperatives, and cultural organizations. The policy of cooperation with the state 
continued. Because of these state policies, workers’ associations (both Catholic and 
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socialist) became more centralized and expanded their membership. Moreover, 
coordination was extended to the relationships of unions and employer associations.573 
This promoted the specialization, bureaucratization, and nationalization of associations. 
Now, associations were more focused in influencing institutions like the parliament and 
the bureaucracy in order  influence the market by determining prices and welfare 
policies. Associations evolved to more hierarchical national-level organizations 
organizing conventions of representatives that chose the directive boards. Associational 
leaders became more professional. 
 Although dense and coordinated, German associational life was also separated 
and growing aggressively antagonistic. Catholics and socialists formed two separate 
subcultures. Moreover, the Protestant middle and lower middle classes, with their own 
strong traditions of associational life, were separated from the other lower classes, and 
they became very nationalistic and xenophobic. 574  This was a consequence of the 
regime’s characteristics. After 1890, the regime started to mobilize workers and 
Germans in general through a unified right-wing platform. This never led to the creation 
of a unified right-wing party, but in the early 1900s all parties, with the exception of the 
social democrats, supported Germany’s expansionist policy (including the Catholic 
Centre, which became part of the government and the progressive liberals) and its main 
vocal organization, the Pan-Germanic League.575 
 The associational life that developed in urban and rural Belgium and in the 
Netherlands was almost as powerful as in Scandinavia, with early mobilization from 
below transforming itself into well institutionalized networks of associations. At the 
same time, a religious cleavage ran through these organizations. In the Netherlands this 
meant that associational life was based on an equilibrium between the divided religious 
cultures, Catholic-Calvinist, because each one was run separately by and for the 
different groups.576 In these countries, delegating state functions to associations could 
be done but at the same time it would not be as developed as in Scandinavia. An 
alliance of liberals-farmers-workers would not develop here because these groups were 
divided by religious issues.577 Belgium and the Netherlands emerged out of the United 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, founded in 1814-15, that comprised the independent 
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provinces of the northern Netherlands and the former Habsburg provinces of the 
southern Netherlands. They were created by England, Prussia, Austria, Russia, and 
Russia to form buffer states against Napoleon’s France. Initially this regime was 
absolutist and similar to Austria’s monarchy. The executive branch was mainly in the 
hands of the monarch, although the lower house had members chosen by the provincial 
estates, organized in the three orders system. The regime had the internal opposition in 
the 1820s of a group of French-speaking liberals (lawyers and professionals) and of the 
Catholics in some of the Dutch provinces, who both opposed the role of the Dutch 
Calvinist church. The Catholics aspired to freedom of education from the Protestant 
controlled system, while the liberals were antagonized by the monarchy’s economic 
policies and pressed for freedom of the press and ministerial accountability to a more 
representative parliament. Although the liberals were fearful of an alliance with the 
Catholics, they began to unite under the Belgian Union of Oppositions which fought for 
religious and political pluralism through the mobilization of the population, petitions, 
and street demonstrations. The 1830 July revolution in France sparked a radical uprising 
in Brussels in August of 1830 which led to the formation of the new state of Belgium.578 
 The Netherlands instituted a liberal constitution in 1848 with a limited franchise, 
and the pattern of competition was set around a liberal-conservative cleavage. 
Calvinism was the official religion, and it was supported by the conservatives. The 
Dutch elite was mainly Protestant, although it was liberal in its political views.579 In the 
1860s, a religious-secular cleavage emerged when the liberal governments tried to 
dismantle the policies of public funding of religious schools. Seen as an attack on 
religion by the religious establishment, the Calvinists rejected any religiously neutral 
national system of education. For the defense of these prerogatives, the Protestants but 
also the Catholics (whose church had been reestablished in 1850) started to build strong 
associational mass movements in order to curb the liberal governments’ policies.580 
 A movement of Calvinist reformists and puritans separated from the dominant 
Protestant state church (the Dutch Reformed Church). It was led by the reverend 
Abraham de Kuyper, who had founded the Anti-School Law League in 1872, a working 
class organization called Patrimomium in 1876, and the Anti-Revolutionary Party in 
1879 which became soon a mass party. This party fought for Calvinist rights which 
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were seen as the liberty to maintain autonomy and even self-rule in the spheres of the 
family, the church, and the school. This movement was able to mobilize the orthodox 
lower middle classes and it also fought for their enfranchisement. Between 1888 and 
1913, it occupied about twenty per cent of the seats in parliament.581 
 Kuyper’s puritan movement triggered Catholic association building. In the 
1890s, Catholic associations formed a common political platform, the General Union of 
Catholic Electoral Associations.582 Although a Catholic party, the Roomsch Katholieke 
Staatspartij (RKSP), was founded only in 1926, until this date the Catholics had an 
important role in several coalition governments, both with the Anti-Revolutionaries or 
the orthodox Protestants between 1888 and 1940.583 
 In the 1860s, the pattern of competition in the parliament arena was structured 
around Protestants/Calvinists (in the Anti-Revolutionary party that replaced the 
conservatives as the main party), liberals (who had a capacity to mobilize the working 
class), and Catholics. The common interest of Calvinists and Catholics in state 
subsidized religion made them cooperate in parliament against the liberals. In 1888-
1891, 1901-1905 and 1908-1913 they formed a series of coalition governments.584 On 
the average, the Catholics occupied 26 per cent of the seats in the parliament between 
1888 and 1925.585 
 In 1881, the socialists appeared in the political arena and they became a serious 
adversary to the liberals. Based on the previous tradition of mobilization of artisans and 
workers already mobilized by self-help societies and unions, they demanded universal 
suffrage. Until 1918, they fought for democratization through protests, union and 
association building, and petitions to the parliament.586 Finally, facing competition from 
the religious parties and from the socialist Left, the liberals developed a mass 
organization, although in 1911 they allied with the socialists against the religious 
parties. 
 By the eve of World War I associational life in the Netherlands was strong but it 
was structured around a religious cleavage. It was composed of four blocs: liberal, 
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socialist, Catholic, and Calvinist.587 Workers were mobilized by both labour socialist 
unions and religious unions like through the Organizational Office of Crafts (Catholic), 
the Christian national federation of crafts (Protestant), and the Dutch federation of trade 
unions (socialist).588 The extreme Protestant and Catholic movements set up their own 
denominational schools, whose attendance grew from 20% in 1860 to more than 40% in 
1917 (and 75% in 1975).589 
 As in the Netherlands, Belgium’s associational life between the late 1800s until 
the mid-1960s was characterized by ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic groups 
organized into separate societies that were composed of associations and parties. This 
pattern came to be defined as pillarized (verzuiling), when self-defined sub-cultural 
groups acquired sovereignty in their own circles by building separate networks of 
churches, schools, newspapers, associations, and parties.590 
 After Belgium’s independence in 1830, there was a growing competition within 
the rules set by the new liberal constitution of two forces, the Catholics and the liberals. 
They developed party and club associations in the 1840s that became increasingly dense 
and coordinated, as the competition between these two parties grew. Liberals sponsored 
and established links with many mass associations, but they were mainly restricted to 
the urban centers, whereas Catholics were stronger in the countryside.591 Between 1848 
and 1884, the two parties competed for the mobilization of the electorate and alternated 
regularly in government.592 
 Also after 1848 working class groups started to organize and demand universal 
suffrage. Based on craft associations, mutual aid societies, and consumers’ cooperatives 
in Wallonia by the 1870s they were based on a strong network of class associations. The 
Labor Party was formed in 1885. Gradually, liberals allied periodically with socialists 
against the Catholics and implemented government policies of subcontracting the 
administration of social welfare to associations, which led to an expansion of 
mutualism. In 1893 the Belgian Labor Party elected thirteen MPs to the parliament.593 
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In 1890s massive strikes are organized by the socialists for suffrage enlargement, but 
this was instituted only in 1918.594 
 At the same time, the Catholics launched a network of associations to compete 
with the socialists for lower class support and to press for universal suffrage. This 
associational network was based in part on the previous network of the Flemish 
movement, a social movement that emerged in the 1850s for the recognition of the 
Flemish language and that usually allied with the Catholics against the liberals.595 They 
were able to defeat the liberals in the 1884 elections, thus becoming the dominant party 
in Belgium’s governments until 1914. In the government, Catholics instituted an 
educational system where religious denominations acquired a public role. The local 
communes decided whether to have a Catholic or a secular school. In cases of religious 
schools, Catholic voluntary associations were called in to provide the teaching.596 
 During the interwar years, voluntary associations in the Netherlands, Belgium, 
and Germany acquired important policy-making functions, and they were incorporated 
in state-sponsored networks of governance. During World War I, government-
associational partnerships become decisive in sustaining the war effort, and this led to 
the centralization, increased membership, and coordination capacity of peak 
associations. In Germany the pre-war business peak associations, the Central 
Association of German Industrialists (heavy industry) and the Federation of German 
Industrialists (medium and small size firms and light industries) were incorporated and 
centralized into one single organization. This unity was provoked by the government, 
since it needed the associations for the allocation of raw materials, and to fix prices and 
to control exports and imports, activities which become centralized and coordinated at 
the national level in a tighter manner during the war.597 Also in 1914, socialist workers’ 
unions collaborated with the government in the war effort through the auxiliary service 
law.598 
 With the end of the war and the brief full democratization of Germany as the 
Weimar Republic, there was a consolidation of dense associational-party networks. 
Complete parliamentarization and freedom of association and the continuation of 
corporatist public policies contributed to this outcome. Weimar governments deepened 
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the previous trend to use peak associations as instruments of public policy. 599  For 
instance in the arena of welfare and educational policies, the SPD governments 
instituted the Youth Welfare Act in 1922 that gave a role for Christian organizations in 
education; and in the 1920s, Heinrich Brauns, a Catholic Zentrum’s Minister of Labor 
instituted a system of state-funded welfare services that used religious voluntary 
associations for implementation purposes.600 
 The working classes were organized around the Social Democratic Party, and 
they had a strong sense of identity and a dense associational field. In general terms, 
most workers, the unemployed, and the new electorate were mobilized and voted for the 
left.601 A Catholic bloc was represented in the Center Party and its Bavarian affiliate, 
the Bavarian People’s Party. The Protestant middle and lower classes (especially in the 
rural small towns) organized small associations (the old nationalist male choirs, musical 
academies, and sharp shooting societies). With the desegregation of centrist and liberal 
parties, they were mobilized by a deeper cult of nationalism and homeland (Heimat) 
represented by the Nazi Party.602 The Nazi Party was able to mobilize the Protestant 
associational milieu during the Weimar republic. A study of Thalburg, a small 
Protestant German town densely populated with associations and clubs (choral societies 
and hunting clubs among others), shows how the community consciously rejected the 
social democratic party and accepted Nazism. 
 Between 1933 and 1945, Germany was ruled by a National-Socialist dictatorship 
that curtailed liberties and repressed associations. Still, many of the centralized and 
comprehensive peak associations of the Weimar period survived, and this model was 
even broadened to include more groups for policy-making purposes. For instance, the 
model of nationwide networks of associations existing in the chambers of artisans was 
extended to commerce and industry.603 
 Just before the First World War, the Netherlands had started to develop patterns 
of collective bargaining and a broader inclusion of associations in policy-making. Full 
democratization arrived in 1917 when the new constitution introduced universal 
suffrage.604 A pact between liberals, socialists, and the religious parties was established 
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in the 1917 Constitution to provide state support to religious schools. In agriculture it 
was institutionalized among top bloc leaders' annual summit meetings between the 
leaders of the three farmers associations for negotiations and mutual consultation in 
1922.605 Welfare measures that were initiated in the late nineteenth century received a 
boost after 1918. The Act of 1901 had been passed by a liberal-conservative 
government, was inspired in Bismarck’s legislation, and aimed at compulsory collective 
insurance. The handicapped and old age pensions were instituted in 1919, and sickness 
insurance law in 1913 (although it was fully enacted only in 1930).606 Finally, a labour 
insurance with parity of representation of employers and workers was enacted in 
1920.607 
 These measures promoted the growth of density and coordination capacities of 
the Dutch associational life, although in lower levels than in the Scandinavia countries, 
because of the religious cleavage in the Netherlands (as in Germany and Belgium) that 
ran deep in society. This was a pattern of associational life organized around strongly 
separated networks of associations based on religion, each with their own religious 
educational system, as well as on the non-religious sector, the socialists.608 In 1926, the 
Catholic Party was formed (Roomsch Katholieke Staatspartij-RKSP), and it became the 
center of the confessional pillar, thus coordinating a vast network of associations. It also 
became an electorally decisive party achieving an average of 30 percent of seats in the 
parliament between 1929 and 1940 and introducing in the 1930s measures to support 
agriculture (fixed prices, quotas, direct financial support). 609 In 1939 the social 
democrats were invited to the government, but contrary to Scandinavia they never 
became the dominant party in government coalitions.610 
 Belgian democracy arrived in 1919 with a pact between the king, Catholics, 
Liberals and socialists to introduce universal suffrage.611 Because of the war experience 
the dominant parties of the system, the Liberals and the Catholics, invited the Socialists 
to form a grand coalition after 1917. This pattern of broad coalitions were common 
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during this period (1917-1921, 1925-1926, and 1935-1945). In turn, this allowed for 
broad state intervention in the economy and the society, and it contributed to a trend 
accommodating the interests represented by the coalition partners.612 A global program 
of public spending in public works was instituted during this period, and government 
involvement was strong in the economy, while the civil society used associations (both 
religious and non-religious) to implement public policies. The government started to 
subcontract state services, like the provision of unemployment and health insurances, 
working class housing, and subsidies to union networks and mutualism societies in the 
Socialist and Catholic arenas. In 1921 the Catholic partial control of the education 
system was fully recognized.613 Again, as in Germany and in the Netherlands, this led 
to a stronger vertical integration and membership density of the subcultures through the 
expansion and coordination of the ancillary organizations of Catholic and socialist 
pillars with the state,614 a process that Strikwerda has called «subsidized liberty».615 
 These patterns became more solid after the Second World War with the 
strengthening of interlocking ties between parties, interest groups, and associations, 
although not in a strong manner as in Scandinavia. In Germany after the allied 
occupation in 1949-1950, many interest organizations dissolved by the Nazis were re-
established and strengthened, in particular employers’ and business organizations, and 
unions. 616  Trade, industry, employers, and workers all organized themselves into 
encompassing associations that played a public role in industrial relations, welfare and 
economic policy. According to Anheier, all firms were represented in industrial 
business associations, employers’ associations and chambers of commerce and industry, 
which by their turn were vertically integrated in peak associations. Ninety percent of all 
industrial companies were represented in the BDI (peak association for industrialists) 
and 80% of the BDA (peak association for employers).617 
 The principle of providing social services through voluntary associations became 
stabilized in the area of social and welfare policies. It was called the principles of 
Wohlfahrtsverbände, and associations had the task of implementing social and health 
services. They received for this purpose about one third of their resources from federal 
and state budgets. This allowed the growth of the number of such agencies from 
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382,000 to 937,000 from 1970 to 1993.618 Both secular and religious associations were 
important in this arena. After 1950 the two churches, Catholic and Protestant, were 
granted legal status and ecclesiastical law was made equivalent to public administrative 
law. In fact, churches formed corporations of public law. At the same time, they were 
exempt from many taxes, and they were funded by a state-imposed religious tax, which 
allowed them to develop educational and welfare activities.619 Cases in point were the 
institutes of adult education (Bildungsstäten) that were organized in three national peak 
associations, two religious, one secular: the Council of Catholic Academies, the Council 
of Evangelical Academies, and the Working Council of German Bildungsstäten for 
secular and non-political academies.620 At the local level, the two religions had almost a 
status of official religion, and local governments channeled the public funds aimed at 
welfare purposes through religious associations.621 Moreover, the two largest German 
religious peak associations – the Protestant Diakonisches Hilfwerk and the Catholic 
association Caritas – were able to veto during the most of the postwar period any social 
policy that they might have disliked.622 
 The medium to high density and coordination of associational life was also 
related to strong links between associations and parties. The social democrats were 
organized in the SPD and the Christian democrats in the CDU/CSU, now a party 
representing both Catholics and Protestants. Each party continued and strengthened the 
historical links to interest groups. Business and employers’ associations were close to 
the Christian democrats. The social democrats continued their tradition of links to the 
unions but they went as far as sponsoring even leisure and sports associations.623 Both 
parties also developed strong youth movements that were organized within a national 
peak association. The Ring Politischer Jugend (Circle of Political Youth) was a peak 
association for people between eighteen and thirty founded in 1950, and it organized the 
party youths of each main party (CDU-CSU, SPD, FDP, and also the Young Democrats, 
who left FDP in 1982). It served an important function of elite recruitment, formation of 
future party leaders, and as a forum for debate that made it easier to form future 
alliances and policy consensus across party lines.624 
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 For this reason, associations have had\privileged access to the legislative 
process, and they were frequently represented in parliamentary committees and able to 
present their claims there.625 Surveys on MPs have shown strong links with interest 
groups. 51% of the social democrat MPs have reported to have regular contacts with 
unions, 15.3% with citizens’ groups, and 24.5% with business associations. 20.5% of 
the liberals have reported contacts with unions and 45.8% with business, while 21% of 
the Christian-democrats have contacts with unions, 60.4% with business associations, 
and 33.1% with religious organizations.626 
 Although highly developed, German associational life is not as strong as in the 
Scandinavian countries. The centrality of religion and of status demarcations for the 
professions and occupational groups inherited from the previous regimes inhibited a full 
expansion of encompassing associations through the state and the more extensive 
coalitions between rural and urban lower classes. In federal Germany, the attempts to 
establish a unitary union system did not fully succeed because the strong presence of the 
Christian federation institutionalized a less universal welfare state. Also, the efforts for a 
unified union confederation for blue (DGB) and white collar (DAG) workers failed, 
because the separate social insurance schemes fostered the independence of white collar 
workers in a separate union. Finally, also farmers had their own insurance scheme.627 
The German welfare state became more based on status divisions than on the 
Scandinavian universal rule, and consequently associational life did not become as 
encompassing as in the hegemonic type. The postwar plans for a comprehensive and 
universal social security system failed because of the determined opposition from 
employers, particularistic regulations of certain categories of employees and for the self-
employed and professions like the doctors, represented by the remaining parties except 
the SPD. The Christian-democrats’ (CDU/CSU) victory in the 1949 elections ensured 
that the new welfare state came to be «squarely based on the pre-Nazi structures», with 
different funds and schemes for different groups and occupational categories. The 
influence of the churches in the CDU gave birth to a health and social service regime 
that was based on the principle of «subsidiarity» and not on the idea of universalism.628 
 Also in the Netherlands after World War II, the inclusion of associations in the 
state and the links with parties were strengthened. The German occupation of the 
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Netherlands during the war  built on the existing labor-management pacts and regulated 
on corporatist lines for instance the sickness funds. In 1945, the Foundation of 
Agriculture was created, and in 1950 the Social and Economic Council with 
representatives of socialist and religious labor unions, employers, and of the 
government (15 for each, 45 total members). The Council had a comprehensive 
statutory organization to be established in all branches of industry, it made rules with 
that had the force of law for industry (two thirds of the members had to approve), it 
possessed an almost decisive advisory power, and it acquired a permanent staff.629  
There was also the STAR, the Foundation of Labor, where social partners met in the 
absence of the government. In 1952 compulsory state unemployment insurance was 
enacted, thus strengthening the prewar system of consultation between workers and 
employers.630 In education, Calvinist and Catholic schools received state jurisdiction, 
and in the 1950s they taught 47% of all Dutch non-college students.631 This pattern can 
be seen at the local level as well. In the Netherlands, in the city of Zwolle a survey 
found that between 1993 and 1995 most associations stayed in touch with the 
administration (72%), that associations with paid staff were more in contact with local 
government than associations without it, and that the majority of contacts between 
organizations and municipality were initiated by both sides (56%).632 
 Party links strengthened this as well. The close links of socialists and Catholics 
with networks of voluntary associations continued after the war, and they were even 
strengthened in an encompassing consensual system that had became the norm for inter-
elite relations during the war, when the experience of exile brought political elites 
together.633 This formed the basis for broad government coalitions during the period 
between 1946 and 1958 and the full consolidation of the three political-associational 
subcultures of socialists, Catholics, and Calvinists.634 
 As a consequence, unions and employer organizations became stronger in the 
next decades, and they had a higher recruiting capacity and comprehensive national 
level structures.635 Between 1951 and 1960 there were approximately 340 unions and 
2000 employers’ and trade associations, which were all reunited in sub-sectoral, sectoral 
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and peak associations, but until the 1970s they were divided in pillar lines. There 
existed three peak union associations, for instance, for the Protestant, Catholic, and 
socialist pillars.636 
 Although the religious and socialist pillars may have become weaker since the 
late 1970s, there is still a strong associational life in the Netherlands and a strong Dutch 
inclination to form associations. There are still many unions, employers’ associations, 
artisan guilds, health care and social welfare associations, housing corporations, school 
associations, literary societies, environmental associations, and sports clubs that now 
merged not based on the previous Catholic, Protestant, socialist and/or liberal identities 
but through a process of associational professionalization of staff and leadership. Still, 
new organizations tended to structure in a pattern similar to the old pillar organizations: 
hierarchically organized, with a strong leader authority over followers, rules of 
consensus and mutual tolerance, and proportionality in advisory bodies to the 
government. 637  Also new social movement organizations have had access to state 
decision makers by subsidization and incorporation in advisory bodies.638 These new 
associations have «autonomous jurisdiction» guaranteed by the state and enforce and 
administer state policy in areas like health policy, public housing, and the 
environment.639 
 As in Germany, the welfare state did not develope like in Scandinavia. The 
pivotal role of religious parties in the governments after 1945, either liberal or social 
democratic rule, did not allow for a coalition of rural and urban workers.640 This had an 
impact on associational life, which became less dense and coordinated as in 
Scandinavia, since full social democratic policies, like full employment, were never 
pursued. Although the Dutch welfare state was a highly generous system, it never 
pursued active labor market policies. It became based on a mix of Catholic (importance 
of the male bread winner and resisting the entry of women to the labor market) and 
social democratic principles, the parties who ruled the country after the war until 1958 
in the so-called Roman–Red coalition.641 
 The Belgium experience after World War II was also one of strong links 
between parties and associations, and with a public role for associations in the welfare 
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state and policy-making. It became a political system where socialist, liberal and 
Catholic associational party networks were used, vastly financed, and coordinated by 
the state in paritaire commissions for the implementation of health, unemployment 
benefits, and other collective goods.642 
 Voluntary associations have achieved a degree of strong institutionalization 
within the state and the regime by acquiring the character of a public authority.643 For 
example in the Netherlands, during the German occupation the experience of exile led 
to cooperation between Liberals and Socialists for a future common government with a 
strong consensus basis, which became decisive in the promotion of agreed policies of 
wages, prices, and welfare after the war.644 The “Social Solidarity Pact” of 1945 was the 
starting point for this. It implemented the principle of organizational concertation and 
tried to extend organizational membership to the majority of citizens.645 The National 
Labor Council was created in 1952  with the functions of advising the government in 
social policy and with a permanent place for equal representation of labor and capital 
organizations. Until the late 1970s, the Labor Council determined issues like working 
hours, maternal care, and holiday pay. The negotiations at the Council were then applied 
by sectoral committees, who passed them to paritaire committees to debate the 
implementation details. At each level social partners were represented and the Council’s 
decisions were binding to all actors.646 Finally, in 1958 the three parties signed the 
school pact, where both the state and the Catholic school systems received equal 
funding and were granted equal autonomy.647 A specific combination of three factors 
made associational life in these countries strong and coordinated but not at the levels 
found in Scandinavia. 
 
7.2. Old and New Corporatism 
 
 In all four cases the pre-modern tradition of corporate organization through 
guilds, estates, corporations of burghers, lawyers, and merchants survived well into the 
twentieth century (although it was stronger in Germany than in the Netherlands or in 
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Belgium).648 In Germany, the corporate form of organization became fully established 
in 1648 in the cities of Münster and Osnabruck, the main cities of the Holy Roman 
Empire, that granted privileges to the three existing denominations (Catholicism, and 
the Lutheran and Calvinist varieties of Protestantism) and established the representation 
of Catholics and Protestants as corporate bodies in the constitutional structure of the 
empire. This relationship was guided by the principle of parity and equality between 
religions that were represented in two religious bodies in the imperial diet. Divergences 
of interest could only be decided by deliberation and not by majority vote.649 
 With the Napoleonic invasions, and end of the empire,and the formation of the 
new German states after 1815 (Prussia, Bavaria, Baden, Saxony, Württemberg) the 
principle of religious parity was maintained (although in Prussia Catholics were 
strongly discriminated).650 In the 1850s, the rulers of the German states resorted to guild 
regulations to resolve the “social issue” by creating a state-dominated social welfare 
system with the churches.651 This agreement was ultimately embodied in the concept of 
"subsidiarity" that was considered as the guiding principle of social policy. 
Consequently, the German states were strongly predisposed to have close working 
relationships with secondary organizations, namely voluntary organizations.652 
 The modern Reich was created by maintaining the autonomy of the previous 
corporate bodies that existed in the smaller states annexed by Prussia. No law ever fully 
destroyed the existence of old corporate bodies like it happened in France with the Loi 
Chapelier or in England with the general combination act of 1799. Especially the status 
groups (stände) of commerce and the crafts remained intact. 653  The guilds were 
formally abolished in 1869, but they suffered a rapid transformation into modern 
voluntary trade and industrial associations. 654  The journeymen formed mutual aid 
societies who now replaced the welfare functions of the guilds.655 In fact, in the 1870s 
the new socialist organizations took the form of old guild structures. For instance the 
cutlers organization had a statute similar to its guild antecedents (it replicated the 1789 
statute) and applied guild practices, like the existence of only one apprentice and one 
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journeyman per master.656 In the white collar professions, like the civil servants, there 
was also a continuation from eighteenth century corporate structures. The middle 
classes saw themselves as part of a stand or a corporate group with a sharp separation 
from the working classes.657 
 Also the Dutch maintained their guild structure until the late nineteenth century. 
As Crouch argued, especially the urban guilds continued in the Netherlands. Although 
they were eliminated in the late nineteenth century, their cameral structures remained as 
the urban basis of the country.658 Employer organizations became densely organized 
because they continued the trade corporations. 659  Finally, rural communities were 
powerful independent bodies of self-rule that dominated the Dutch provinces and part of 
Belgium’s Flanders since the sixteenth century. Here landlords, monarchs, and the state 
had to share sovereignty with these bodies, with long established traditions of local 
liberties. Still, the tradition of corporate structures was weaker than in Scandinavia and 
Germany, especially for urban workers and artisans. In Belgium mutual aid societies 
appeared after the dissolution of the guilds in 1818, which was earlier than in the other 
cases. In any case, the first unions, formed in 1857 by the cotton spinners of Ghent, 
were based around the corporate form of organization. Also in the Netherlands workers’ 
associational life was difficult to organize. The first union movement appeared only in 
the 1880s, and although many mutual aid societies were allowed to exist during the 
century, to replace the former guilds, workers’ combinations were persecuted until 
1872.660 In Belgium and in the Netherlands, corporate power was more in the hands of 
the commercial oligarchy; city organization was less democratic than in Scandinavia 
although still allowing for a high degree of freedom.661 
 As a consequence, the tradition of state reliance on associations to develop 
public policy never disappeared in these countries. It was common for associations to 
receive representation monopolies from the state and policy functions, and this in turn 
made these states, especially the Bismarckian state, regimes rooted in corporate bodies. 
In the context of the late nineteenth century, the plans of these states for national 
economic and military expansion were more easily based on the existing societal forces, 
which had a corporate form. In the case of Germany, the plans for industrialization 
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empowered, although in a stratified way, these corporate groups by co-opting them to 
the state. For instance, industrial workers were given a special status in terms of higher 
job security and welfare benefits. 662  In turn, this promoted the self-organization of 
associational life and the political mobilization of groups.663 Between 1890 and 1912 
union membership affiliated with the SPD rose from 100,000 to 900,000.664 
  
7.3. Variations in Parliamentarization 
 
 While Germany had stronger traditions of corporatism than Belgium and the 
Netherlands, these two states had higher levels of parliamentarization. In Germany 
universal suffrage was introduced early, in 1867 by Bismarck, in order to ensure greater 
popular support for the conservatives against the liberals, and the SPD even achieved 
democratic representation in the Reichstag. After 1890, approximately 20% of the seats 
in the Reichstag were won by the socialists (in the 1890s the SPD won between 9% and 
14% of the seats, and  in 1903, when reached about 30% of the votes cast, the SPD was 
able to won 20% of the seats in the Reichstag). In 1912 the SPD became the largest 
party in the Reichstag, and its membership rose from 500,000 to 2.6 million by 1912.665 
At the same time it was barred from entering the government.666 
 The problem was that the Reichstag was not politically responsible; the 
government did not depend on it. It had some powers over legislation and the budget, 
but the chancellor and the ministers were alone responsible to the emperor. The 
monarch had despotic tendencies, and personal liberties and rights could be suspended 
arbitrarily. The majority of ministers came from civil bureaucracy or the army, and the 
government used parliament mainly for attempts of plebiscitary acclamation.667 
 Political parties, then, in particular the liberals, in Germany became very weak 
because they could not develop links to the masses and depended more on the good will 
of the emperor to stay in power. The parties that were represented in government (the 
German Conservative party, the Free Conservatives and the National Liberals) did not 
depend of the electoral results to conquer power but more of the direct links with the 
bureaucracy and the army. As a consequence, at the same time that the Catholics and 
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the socialists were growing their implantation in the electorate, the parties remained for 
long as mere collections of notables without links to the masses.668 Moreover, their 
potential electorate drifted away to the more aggressively mobilizing extreme right 
parties: the anti-Semitic Christian Social movement, the Farmer’s League, and 
especially the anti-Catholic Protestant League that was founded in 1887 to fight the 
Center Party, that became the largest lay Protestant organization with about 500,000 
members. In 1906 an iron-rye coalition of National Liberals and conservatives 
supported the expansionist colonial policies.669 
 As a consequence the route of gradual inclusion from below was closed for 
workers and farmers fighting for inclusion. 670  The National Liberals and the Left 
Liberals opposed equal, direct, and secret voting for the Prussian parliament. 671  
Moreover, freedom of association could not be defended as strongly as in other 
countries because few if any pushed for it in the government or the parliament. In this 
sense, there existed weak incentives for the parties of the system to establish cross-class 
collaboration and alliances like in Scandinavia between the liberals and/or farmers and 
the social democrats. This was reflected in the arena of associational life through sharp 
cleavages. Until 1933 the organizational worlds, so to speak, of the middle and the 
working classes were divided by profound barriers. No single workers’ peak 
organization was ever able to encompass both blue and white collar unions. Instead, 
these organizations looked for extreme differentiation. Especially white collar unions 
desired not be seen as workers and gradually evolved to espouse an anti-Semitic and 
nationalistic ideology, like the case of the German National Union of Commercial 
Employees.672 
 The level of parlimentarism was very strong in Belgium and in the Netherlands. 
Belgium was highly parliamentarized since its inception as a country. The 1830 
constitution, molded to the aims of liberals and the Catholics against the old regime 
forces, stipulated that the real power resided in parliament. There has never been in the 
nineteenth century any monarchical interference. In the Netherlands since the medieval 
period parliaments were powerful. They established the rule through independent 
charters in the medieval and early modern cities. There were also provincial parliaments 
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that had control over the laws, taxes, and matters of war and peace. By the seventeenth 
century, these provincial parliaments started to send representatives to a national 
parliament, the states-general of Holland, which became the main institution.673 The 
transition to modern parliamentarism in the mid-nineteenth century was peaceful and 
the early rights to resist unlawful action of the sovereign were maintained with the first 
modern parliament in 1848. 674  The Netherlands became a peaceful parliamentary 
monarchy between 1848 and 1868.675 
 As a consequence, in Belgium and in the Netherlands there was elite openness to 
social movements, who were free to address the parliament, to seek allies in the party 
elites, and to create links with the political parties. This environment also created more 
competitive elites. In Belgium the initial parliamentary competition between liberals 
and Catholics spilled rapidly to the mobilization of the disenfranchised. With the 
emergence of socialists later on, mobilization and competition between parties became 
even stronger. The extension of the franchise from the 1880s to 1910s leading to 
universal suffrage was consequently a more or less peaceful process. 676  Moreover, 
freedom of association was established early, just after the 1848 revolutions, and 
absolute freedom of religion and unions was legal already in the 1860s.677 
 
7.4. State-Building and Religious Conflict 
 
 In all these societies the characteristics of the state made it possible to establish 
partnerships with associations that empowered associational life to a high degree, but 
they were less inclusive and encompassing than in Scandinavia, especially because of 
divisions created by religion. The German state is an extreme example. It was able to 
implement these welfare and corporatist programs because it could rely on efficient 
state machinery. State formation in Prussia since Frederick the Great in the late 1700s 
left a legacy of state efficiency, unitary administrative institutions, efficient taxation, 
and the inexistence of corruption or patrimonialization as in France. 678  Prussian 
bureaucracy became so strong during the Hohenzollern dynasty (1640-1786) that the 
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Prussian state became almost synonymous of the notion of bureaucracy.679 In 1806, 
examinations were introduced in the recruitment of civil servants. This tradition was 
strengthened during the second empire, and Bismarck’s rulership in the nineteenth 
century survived the Weimar and the Third Reich periods and continued during the 
federal republic.680 In contemporary Germany a law prohibited parties to place their 
agents in a civil service career.681 
 This was the legacy of a pattern of state development where there was partially a 
fusion between the church and the state as in Scandinavia. In Germany, as discussed 
above, those partnerships both with Catholic and Protestant churches were used since 
the seventeenth century to implement social policies. Also in Belgium and in the 
Netherlands religion was partially used by the state to empower the bureaucracy’s 
capacity. In the Netherlands, the fusion between the state and the Calvinist church 
allowed for the creation of national social movements directed at both the state and the 
official church and aimed at reform. A case in point is the Calvinist reform movement, 
also know as the Society for the General Good, an association that in the early 1800s 
planned to introduce educational reforms of a brand of the reformed pietism. Liberal 
minded rulers used this association to establish a nationwide school system, namely 
public schools for the poor.682 In Belgium the initial alliance of Catholics and Liberals 
for independence in 1831 saved the country from religious conflict, and a state crisis 
was avoided. The state was used for fostering sometimes the church interests, other 
times the church served the state. But Catholic elites were a constitutive element of the 
Belgian constitutional order.683 This tradition allowed for later institutionalization in the 
interwar years through public policies and state-association partnerships for the 
distribution of collective goods. 
 At the same time, state-church relationships were not as pacified as in 
Scandinavia. The cases of dominant associational life may be said to be characterized 
by a mixed pattern of state-church relationships. In Germany with the proclamation of 
the Second Empire in 1871 conflicts started between the state and the Catholic Church 
(the Kulturkampf) which lasted until 1891. The state tried to crush the church’s 
autonomy over such issues like education, culture, and welfare while at the same time 
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promoting the Protestant church. 684  Bismarck reacted to the 1870 dogma of papal 
infability by abolishing the Catholic department of the ministry of religion, banning the 
Jesuits, and imposing political control on Catholic education.685  This crystallized a 
cleavage between Catholics and Protestants that did not allow for lower class alliances 
and the middle class remained mostly in the Protestant field, thus reinforcing patterns of 
high associational development but within separate and antagonistic fields. It laid the 
foundations for the conflicts during the period 1918-1923 that were only pacified after 
1945 with the creation of a single Christian party: the CDU.686 
 In Belgium and in the Netherlands over the nineteenth century religious conflicts 
emerged gradually. In Belgium, it was between the liberals and the Catholics, and 
between the liberals, the Catholics and the Calvinists in the Netherlands. The religious 
cleavage in these countries pushed the working classes to ally either with the liberals or 
with farmers/religious actors, but they were never able to form a massive front.687 For 
instance, in the nineteenth century Belgium, the Workers Party after decades of struggle 
and six general strikes found support in the Christian wing of the Catholic Party which 
was based among working class Catholics. But this alienated the middle class 
liberals.688 In the Netherlands, the Catholic Party was always torn between its Christian 
democratic wing, which represented unions and farmers against the upper class in its 
own party, and a tendency to ally with the social democrats.689 A coalition of all three 
forces – urban workers in the social democratic parties, rural workers in the religious 
parties, and middle class professionals represented by the Liberals – could not be done 
because of religious differences. This divided the lower classes and produced an 
associational life less extensive than in Scandinavia. Consequently it promoted a less 
developed welfare state, one that was less focused on a universal notion of rights but 
more on maintaining religious differences through public policy.690 
 This made a totally unified state church, like in Scandinavia, impossible and 
maintained the religious cleavage that inhibited both higher state capacity and 
possibility of alliances of all lower class groups. The state could not develop as much as 
in Scandinavia because of the fact that religion was still a divisive issue for elites and 
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masses. As consequence, these religions had to be run by themselves and thus the 
attribution of public status, first to religious organizations, afterwards to other pressures 
from below like the socialists, could not be as extensive. Inclusive policies were not as 
extensive as in Scandinavia and had a smaller role for associations, in particular unions. 
Although the state maintained its powers intact, it could not be used to impose stronger 





 The pattern of dominant associational life rests on a particular combination of 
variables. As in the pattern of hegemonic civil society, there was also the continuation 
of corporate forms of interest intermediation inherited from the pre-modern period that 
were modernized since the late nineteenth century to build modern societal corporatist 
states, but these were more denser in Germany (and Austria) than in Belgium and in the 
Netherlands. On the other hand, these two countries had a higher level of 
democratization, which allowed for popular classes to be represented in the polity and to 
form organizational links with elites, especially with the liberals. In Germany, however, 
parliaments were weaker, a point which made liberal elites immune to pressures from 
below. Additionally, in all these countries there were deep traditions of state-church 
partnership, but not as deep as in Scandinavia. In all of these cases, there were religious 
conflicts with state builders in some periods. Especially Catholics were antagonized by 
rulers for long periods, which led to weaker patterns of incorporation of the church and 
as a consequence divided the popular classes, especially after the appearance of the 
workers’ movement at the end of the nineteenth century. Workers were mobilized either 
by religion, or by socialism, but it was never possible to form a broad coalition of 
religious reformists and dissenters with the workers and sections of the liberal elite as it 
happened in Scandinavia. After the transition to democracy in the 1930s and the 1940s, 
these societies built less comprehensive welfare systems and corporatist institutions for 
policy-making, thus not promoting civic engagement as the levels found in the pattern 






Chapter 8: Divided Associational Life – England 
 
8.1: Paths towards Divided Associational Life 
 
 In the eighteenth century England, there existed a rich associational life. Clubs, 
lodges, and brotherhoods (like the Masons), friendly societies and craft unions, 
Protestant associations (like the societies for the suppression of felons, watch’s and 
ward societies, and the society for the suppression of vice) were common in this period. 
Because of the fear of a spread of revolutionary ideas from France after 1789 and the 
war with this country that followed the French revolution in 1789, there was a brief 
period of repression of associational life. Between 1790 and 1819, six combination acts 
are directed against unions and political associations, which were very much similar in 
purpose as the Chapelier law in France.691 Yet, soon enough unions became legal, as 
well as workers’ mutualities and brotherhoods (burial societies, sickness and insurance, 
and educational associations).692 
 Since the late eighteenth century, there was a strong current of popular 
associational life that was based on radical craft unions, and many of them were 
sympathetic to the Jacobin ideals of the French revolution.693 The Owenites appeared in 
the 1840s and were a social movement composed of hundreds of thousands of artisans 
and laborers. They resisted a machine dominated productive system, and instead fought 
for a society based on the principle of co-operation and structured around a network of 
co-operatives societies.694  The Chartism movement was more political, and through 
demonstrations and the presentation of petitions to parliament it sought to secure 
universal male suffrage, a charter of people’s rights, secret voting, and the payment of 
MPs. After the 1848 revolutions in Europe these movements, although they failed to 
achieve the extension of the suffrage, were able to secure special work legislation for 
women and children, and the ten hour work day.695 
 These movements had also a religious basis. The dissenting sects of the 
Anglican Church that appeared in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries 
defended a kind of radical associational life of artisans and middle classes, and they 
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called themselves the “industrious classes”. Dissenters amounted to about 10% of the 
population and 20% of the regular church attendees, and they developed associations 
that were networks of local-regional cross-class coalitions, including both workers and 
many liberal politicians who depended on the sects’ support to get elected. Since very 
early on, the churches stimulated the development of cross-class and cross-regional 
cooperation.696 In 1820, Thomas Chalmers, a Scottish evangelical minister, defended 
voluntary associations as vehicles that would bring stability to industrial society.697 
 In the last third of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, 
England had a varied associational landscape. Many groups and classes were strongly 
represented by associations, like business leagues, professional organizations, and 
unions. Closer relations with the government and the bureaucracy became important 
channels for representation in addition to voting, and negotiations between interest 
groups were widespread.698 The labor movement was sizeable in comparative terms but 
at the same time also decentralized, still very much just based on the mobilization of 
skilled and prosperous segments of the working class, and it was unable to mobilize the 
unskilled workers.699 
 Until the early twentieth century the expansion of associations was heavily 
fostered by the political centrality of the parliament. Already in the 1810s most 
associations emerged in order to influence and put new themes on the parliamentary 
agenda. The so-called Subscribers’ Societies were associations of the urban middle 
classes, whose members paid monetary dues and organized cash subscriptions from the 
general public to receive additional funding. It was the first model of a modern 
voluntary association in England. Their members debated frequently in public spaces, 
and they were organizationally proficient, for instance with the publication of the first 
annual reports and the creation of coordinating committees. Their model was later 
copied by other associational ventures, like the Leagues of the Chartists, the anti-slavery 
movement, and the Anti-Corn Law Movement. Also dissenting religious groups from 
the Anglican Church, like the Unitarians, tried to influence the parliament and even 
used it as associational model.700 
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 In the second half of the nineteenth century most social movement efforts were 
directed at influencing the parliament. A combination of voter mobilization, mass 
meetings, demonstrations, petitioning, and lobbying of the members of parliament were 
the tactics of groups like the Fabian Society, the Anti-Corn Law League, the Liberation 
Society, The National Education League, and the UK Alliance. The reform league had 
similar aims as the chartists, and it was able to establish links with the existing parties, 
the liberals and the conservatives, who saw the extension of suffrage and mobilization 
from below as a rewarding strategy for their mutual competition. In fact, also because 
there was intense elite competition within the parliament, there was an increase in 
voluntary associations. Two main groups competed for power in the first half of the 
nineteenth century: the conservatives or Tories, a section of the elite recruited more in 
landowning families and close to the established church (Anglican), and the Whigs or 
liberals, who were more supportive of the dissident churches and more urban based.701 
In 1867 the liberals expanded suffrage rights to the upper strata of the working class. 
Afterwards, political parties evolved definitely from collections of notables to mass 
associations.702 
 The British version of the continental socialists or social democrats was the 
Labor Party, founded in 1900 by a federation of independent unions. Still, when 
compared to the socialist parties in Scandinavia or in Germany, Belgium and the 
Netherlands, the party-union network was weaker. It depended on episodic alliances 
with the liberals to get MPs elected to the parliament; levels of individual membership 
were low, and they were introduced only in 1918.703 Most unions, reformist workers’ 
organizations, and dissenting religious associations had closer links with the liberals. 
 As in the rest of Western Europe, the early twentieth century and in particular 
the context of World War I was a period of implementation and planning of social and 
welfare reform. As was discussed in the previous chapters, states started to intervene in 
the economy and in the promotion of the welfare of their citizens. Liberals were 
particularly important in this respect, as they were the forerunners of the first measures 
of social solidarity implemented in the modern world, much before social democrats 
became real players in electoral politics. 704  Between 1905 and 1914 the liberal 
governments of Lloyd George planned to create state-sponsored social services in order 
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to gain the working-class vote. 705  The funds were to be derived from the tariffs 
collected from trade with the British overseas empire and from the savings of the old 
poor law. The pension act of 1908 was built on a coalition between the government and 
the workers. It was financed through tax transfers, and it was paid to every individual 
over seventy years age and below a certain income. Universal unemployment coverage 
was also planned in 1908. A network of 1,200 labour exchange agencies was designed 
to implement it, and they would be the places where benefits were paid and would be 
run by the unions (and with some funding from employers also).706 
                                                
 As in other European countries, during World War I and its immediate year’s 
labour movements became even more important for the government. First, the war 
effort needed successful mobilization for the armed forces and the cooperation of the 
unions in the war effort. Some integrative measures were taken in this period, like the 
introduction of social insurance schemes, works councils in factories, and consultative 
agencies at the national level. Already by 1914 Lloyd George’s budget used charities to 
channel government resources like maternity support, child care, home help, or work 
with the blind. In fact, by 1934 thirty percent of the income of charities came from the 
state.707 
 In the immediate years after World War I the competition between the organized 
parties within the system for lower class support increased even more. The creation of 
the National Federation of Professional Workers and of the MUC, the Middle Classes 
Union who are strongly anti-workers movement and anti-left, represented the success of 
the conservative party in the mobilization of lower class segments. Those liberals who 
were closer to the conservatives organized an antisocialist coalition led by Lloyd 
George, while those closer to the labor party, like the group around former Prime-
Minister Asquith.708 
 Still, comprehensive welfare programs and corporatist intervention in the 
economy like in Scandinavian or in German models became never institutionalized in 
Britain. The universal unemployment coverage of 1908 was never capable of financing 
directly the mass of the unemployed, and Britain soon turned to the old methods of poor 
relief.709 The first labor governments of 1924 and 1929-1931 tried to implement it again 
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but failed. With the conservatives’ victory in 1931, middle class mobilization and 
integration of the lower classes was no longer pursued. Welfare measures became again 
basically synonymous to charity dispensation, through the activity of networks of purely 
voluntary localistic efforts dominated by the conservative sectors of the suburban 
gentry, and professionals. The government exploited the divisions between lower class 
associations. Though in 1932 the NFPW started to pressure for social and medical 
insurance and unemployment benefits, other lower middle class association like the 
Over-Forty Fives Association endorsed the principle of self-help against the extension 
of social insurance which was seen as taxation.710  
In sum, the voluntary associations responsible for welfare were not unions, craft 
brotherhoods, or religious mass organizations as in the cases of hegemonic and 
dominant associational life, but mainly middle-class private charitable organizations 
with the aim to educate the poor with middle-class values. The values associated to their 
action were not of the welfare as a universal right, as in Scandinavia, or as the 
consolidation of status of a particular group, a collective right, but an entitlement which 
fell on individuals who could not support themselves in the market society. In this sense 
it became associated with individual social, moral, and economic failure. An important 
network organization in this respect was the Charity Organization Society that insisted 
that all welfare aid should be combined with moral reform.711 
 Moreover, the government was unsure and hesitant in expanding welfare 
measures directed to the lower classes because that would mean to empower indirectly 
the Irish cause. After 1919, Ireland escalated into a civil war, with the Irish nationalists 
fighting for independence from the British. In 1922, Ireland was partioned into two, 
with the north staying under British control while the rest of Ireland had an autonomous 
status similar to Canada and South Africa. Still, the south declared its independence 
from Britain in 1937. The fights over the Irish question between 1919 and the 1930s had 
an impact on the degree to which British governments would favor fostering lower class 
interests through the expansion of welfare measures. First, because it diverted resources 
and time from the British state that were used to crush the rebellious Irish, and second, 
because too much expansion of lower classes rights could favor the Irish cause. Finally, 
it estranged the English lower classes and the Irish lower classes from each other 
because of nationalism and religion (Catholics in Ireland, Anglican and/or dissenting in 
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England). As a consequence it was not possible to form a broad class coalition between 
rural (mainly in Ireland) and urban workers (mainly English) as it happened in 
Scandinavia.712 For all these reasons, interwar associational life, in particular the labour 
movements, was not very strong but instead fragmented and weakly centralized, and in 
contrast to countries like Sweden or Germany.713 
 Only in the years between 1945 and 1951 did governments introduce more 
serious state sponsored welfare measures and intervention in the economy.714  After 
1945 there were again plans for a universal welfare state by the labor government 
(1945-1951). Measures in this sense were the Family Allowance Act of 1945, the 
National Insurance Act of 1946, the National Health Service Act of 1946, the National 
Assistance Act of 1948, and the nationalization of key industries for the redistribution 
of wealth.715 Still, a full-fledged welfare state failed to materialize and the charitable 
and philanthropic model continued. There was a permanent shortage of government 
funds for welfare and the charitable agencies continued to grow alongside the state 
agencies.716 The government ended up maintaining and using the already established 
charity system after the late 1950s by increasing the public funding of the private 
agencies. This became crystallized in the 1973 Voluntary Services Unit, which made a 
rigid distinction between public, private and non-profit systems of welfare. There was 
neither a fully integrated national welfare system as in Scandinavia nor a status group 
based system but a generous welfare system like in the pattern of dominant 
associational life, but a not too much funded and pluralistic welfare system, with at least 
three divergent logics. The three welfare agencies were the state providers of services, 
the voluntary sector that sometimes was subcontracted by the state, and a sector 
composed of private citizens that acted independently in the development of charity 
initiatives.717 
 In sum, although labor was early recognized as a legitimate actor in British 
politics, the expansion of forms of associational representation within the state 
apparatus for the dispensations of welfare rights and the participation in economic 
policy-making was much weaker than in the previous cases. Collective negotiation has 
been almost non-existent, associational leaders cannot speak with authority for a broad 
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range of issues, and they are not consulted in policy issues.718 In fact, dispensation of 
welfare through charities in England has tended to promote deliberately a citizenship 
that is insulated from political issues and debates, contrary to the hegemonic and 
dominant types where welfare is channeled through unions and religious associations 
that have historically been politically engaged. For instance, charities can have their 
public statute suspended if they engage in advocacy or political issues and activities.719 
Finally, since the structure of the welfare state is not tripartite and public funding is not 
so generous, this makes it more difficult to encourage the formation of comprehensive 
and national scope peak associations of whatever kind. Voluntary associations that 
establish partnerships with the state are usually not sure for instance whether they will 
continue to be funded.720 
 Consequently, Great Britain’s post-1945 associational life has been less dense 
than in the previous cases. The origins of this pattern of associational life rest on the 
interaction of three variables: early elimination of corporate organization, a medium 
level capacity state, and high parliamentarism. In the next section, I analyse the impact 
of each of these particular variables in English associational life. 
 
8.2. The Elimination of Pre-Modern Corporatism 
 
 In England, such corporate organizations like the guilds were eliminated quite 
early. Contrary to all of the countries so far discussed, England did not maintain guilds 
and corporate forms of association into the modern period. After the revolution of 1688, 
corporate rights were abolished, in particular the peasant rights to communal lands, and 
village immunities. Any vestiges of an independent farmers’ society were eliminated 
early in English history, a point which promoted extreme peasant proletarization, and 
consolidated instead the power of big landowners and the full commercialization of 
agriculture. In the Irish countryside, the direst situation emerged that resembled 
southern European latifundia. There, a confiscation of Irish land by big Protestant 
landowners after 1688 led to extreme poverty and proletarization of rural workers and 
an early radicalism opposing the British monarchy and the Anglican Church.721 
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 This process continued in the early nineteenth century, and it was accentuated by 
geopolitical reasons. Between 1790 and 1815 the wars with France in the context of 
Napoleonic expansion and the American independence led to the expansion of the 
military and state bureaucracy. A large military was created and a period of repression 
ensued at home. The costs of war augmented and to face these, taxes were raised from 
17 million pounds in 1790 to 80 million in 1815.722 The need for more resources to 
finance the war clashed with corporate rights and groups. Price regulations were 
eliminated by 1800, like the ones on the price of bread, trade monopolies, and protective 
tariffs were all eliminated by the 1820s. In 1804 a law abolished the guilds, the statute 
of artisans was repealed in 1813-1814, and in 1820 corporate artisan restraints on wages 
and apprentice rules were removed. In 1834, the poor law excluded artisans from the old 
regime paternalistic relief system.723 This process continued after the 1840s. The Corn 
Laws were repealed in 1840, and communal and feudal rights were completely replaced 
by individual property rights. Thereafter any property or goods could be freely 
commercialized.724 
 After the break of the estate system, freedom of association existed but there was 
a prohibition of workers’ combinations. 725  Associational life was developed, but it 
lacked coherence and group identity as in Scandinavia and the northern European cases 
of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany. A very individualistic society replaced the 
old regime of paternalism, with poverty and economic distress being seen as caused by 
individual failure and not because of social conditions. 726  In the Irish countryside, 
instead of association building there was mass emigration, especially to America. The 
Irish Tenant League, which in the 1850s fought for land redistribution for the small 
holders and opposed the power of the big English landlords, failed in its efforts of 
mobilization.727 
 Only in 1871 were the trade unions completely legal, but they were never 
incorporated into the policy-making bodies of the state, and their role was rather 
formulated in the general laws of freedom of association. Unions were never included in 
partnerships with the state. The Trade Union act of 1871 conceived unions as bodies 
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with protection, but it did not extend them rights and positive functions.728 The Trade 
Disputes Act of 1906 reinforced this aspect of English law. 729  Consequently, the 
capacity for self-mobilization from below was less strong than in the cases of 
hegemonic and dominant associational life, both in the rural and in the urban areas, 
since there were no institutions on which to base collective action, only some church 
dissenting sects. The only exceptions were very specialized and functionally 
differentiated groups that could count on identity and resources for associative 
collective action, like for instance the miners.730 
 
8.3. The centrality of Parliament 
 
 Although lacking corporate representation, England shared with the previously 
analyzed cases of associational life, with the exception of Germany, high levels of 
parliamentarization. Because of the centrality of parliament in the British political 
system, associational life developed to medium levels, not as high as in the 
Scandinavian countries or in the Netherlands, but much stronger than in the cases of 
southern Europe and France. Parliamentarization promoted the development of 
associational life in England. After 1688, after many years of civil war and revolution, 
the parliament became the dominant institution vis-à-vis the monarchy, and the central 
institution of Britain’s political life.731 As early as 1750, the parliament already shaped 
collective action in decisive ways. It was the parliament that granted permission and 
legislated the activities of assembly, association, and petition. Elections became rapidly 
events where assemblies tended to gather, and political debate spilled over to the public, 
thus becoming a public debate. It was in this period, according to Tilly, that modern 
forms of participation emerged like the mass meeting, the voluntary association, 
marches, petitions, and demonstration. Also, the growing electoral competition between 
factions in the parliament gradually came to involve the common citizenry which was 
brought into politics by the purposeful act of the elites in the parliament promoting 
associations to that effect. The opposition mobilized the population against the 
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government (e.g. John Wilkes and Lord George Gordon) and the supporters of 
government did the same (e.g. the antirevolutionairies of the 1790s).732 
 Between the 1780s and the 1830s, the parliament augmented its power even 
more.733 In 1835, it became responsible for policing. The municipal police forces had a 
stable executive leadership but that was accountable to the parliament. Thus, the state 
became much more pacific, contrary to other western European cases, like France or 
Spain, where the police depended directly on the ministry of interior and the 
government. 734  The centrality of parliament continued to promote the expansion of 
associational life both directly and indirectly. Indirectly, issues like the question of 
Catholic emancipation lead to Catholic organization building directed at influencing the 
parliament, and at the same time generating a counter-mobilization by Anglicans, in the 
anti-Catholic Brunswick clubs, and in the Metropolitan Political Union.735 Workers in 
the Chartist movement organized massive demonstrations around the parliament, and 
many other groups’ direct petitions, like the anti-slavery societies.736 
 Links between voluntary associations and parties also became stronger. 
Conservatives and liberals looked gradually for support from below in order to win 
elections. Workers were initially mobilized by the liberal party. Liberal craft unions 
have been significant from very early on in England, much before the appearance of 
socialist ideologies.737 Gradually, lower classes were brought into the system. The 1832 
reform act incorporated the middle class; the reform acts of 1867 and 1884 did the same 
for the working class and enfranchised two thirds of male workers. Many associations 
created by the liberal party were designed for this purpose. More directly, the Social 
Science Association, founded in 1857, aimed to promote legislative reforms in the 
House of Commons on issues like education, penal policy, and public health, and it was 
led in the 1880s by key members of the liberal party, for example by Gladstone.738 
After 1869 and well into the 1880s, the end of the Reform League gave place to the 
Labor Representation League for the promotion of working class registration.739 The 
freedoms of association, reunion, assembly and the legalization of unions became 
                                                 
732 Tilly, 1997b, p. 239. 
733 Tilly, 1997a, pp. 74-76. 
734 Bailey, 1975, pp. 342-343. 
735 Tilly, 1997b, p. 236. 
736 Thomas, 1978, p. 62, 73. 
737 Ebbinghaus, 1995, p. 83. 
738 Katznelson, 1996, p. 31. 
739 Collier, 1999, pp. 62, 65-66. 
 225
secured in the 1870s and in the 1880s. This promoted an associational life that was 
national in scope and well organized.740 
                                                
 Simultaneously, it was an associational life that was never a serious threat to the 
established elites, and they never faced a really threatening labor movement. After the 
1860s, the conservative party transformed itself gradually from a purely elite and 
patronage party of rural notables who controlled the vote in their constituencies. Party 
leaders became mainly from the parliament. Disraeli and John Gorst created in the 
1870s the National Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations whose idea 
was to transform conservantism into a mass movement. It set up a conservative 
committee in order to select local candidates for parliament that was responsible for the 
electoral victories in the 1870s and 1880s, thus making the Conservative Party a real 
mass party since the 1880s up to the mid-twentieth century. 
  
8.4. State-Building: Territorial and Religious Conflict over Ireland 
 
 Finally, the process of state building also encouraged the spread of association 
building at a national scale and allowed for some policy measures but that stopped short 
of integrating the lower classes and recognizing a public role for associations. The state 
was not as uniform or of such high capacity as in Scandinavia, although it was 
professionalized considerably from the mid-1800s. But it was closer to the pattern of 
medium state capacity of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany because of state-
church conflicts, in particular over the Catholic/Irish question. 
 First, recent research has shown that in England since the 1600s the state 
developed a strong infrastructural power. By the late 1600s England had already healthy 
public finances and during the nineteenth century civil service reforms were enacted 
that reduced the role of patronage in England (the Corrupt Practices Act of 1883 and the 
Reform Act of 1884). The Corrupt Practices Act of 1883 (and the Franchise Act of 
1884), transformed radically electioneering conditions by the limitation of electoral 
expenses and punitive provisions against illegal practices. The major reforms that 
undermined patronage as a system for access to administrative office were issued by the 
Orders in Council of 1870 and 1871, which established a hierarchical examination and 
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open competition for much of the civil service741. In the 1880s, only one third of the 
positions in the Treasury, for instance, were by party nomination.742 
 Another factor that contributed to high capacity in England was the pattern of 
state-church relations. As in Scandinavia, the Protestant church became a state church. 
In the sixteenth century the king triumphed over the Catholic Church and «destroyed the 
dualism of spiritual and worldly power», thus eliminating many obstacles and 
regionalism in the way of uniform state control. Under Elizabeth I all ecclesiastics were 
required to make an oath of fidelity to the queen as supreme governor, and disobedient 
clergy could be dismissed from its ecclesiastical functions. This control of the church 
allowed for the growth of the power of the state. Church officials became also state 
officials, paid by central government. The bureaucratic apparatus became more efficient 
because it had now incorporated the «ancient parish administration» of the church, and 
used this as a provider of collective goods and as an instrument to gather information. 
The parishes became an administrative organ that was used for other tasks of policy 
implementation (poor relief, maintenance of highways, and so on).743 
 This had the effect of making social movements spread easily through the 
national territory by creating national confederations. The recurrent dissenting sects 
identified the established church as corrupt, and they aimed at reforming it and the state 
at the same time, very much like in Scandinavia. Evangelicals were active in 
humanitarian causes and political reform, and eventually the churches left a legacy of 
cross-local associational building that was inherited first by the liberals, then by the 
labor movement and other associational ventures in the late nineteenth and the early 
twentieth centuries.744 
 On the other hand, the pattern of state-church relationships had another source of 
conflict that diminished state capacity. While within England itself religious conflicts 
within the Anglican Church and its dissenting sects tended to promote state 
centralization, the other source of religious conflict, between England and Catholics in 
Ireland, tended to create territorial strains in the state.745 Since the restoration of 1660, 
Ireland was treated as a colony. Catholics only possessed about twenty percent of the 
land, and the Irish territory was subject to continuous tax extractions in order to finance 
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the English monarchy. 746  In 1801, the Irish were granted representation in the 
parliament, but it was restricted only to the Protestant Irish. This divided the lower class 
movements in the cities and the countryside over issues of religion and territory, 
something that did not happen in Scandinavia, and which happened only partially in 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany where there were religious divisions between 
Catholics and Protestants but which did not have the form of a territorial separatist 
movement. In Ireland it had. During the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, lower 
classes mobilized for the expansion of rights and addressed petitions to parliament, thus 
acquiring a national scope, links to parties, and an impact in the public sphere, but they 
were always divided by the Catholic/Irish question. For instance, in the 1700s the 
Protestant MP George Gordon formed a nationwide Protestant Association against any 
Catholic autonomy claims in Ireland, while at the same time a national level Catholic 
mobilization ensued that addressed its issues to the parliament by petitions and marches. 
In the 1820s, popular movements organized campaigns both for Catholic rights and 
emancipation (like the one led by the Irish barrister Daniel O’Connell), and Protestants 
counterreacted with popular mobilization through the Brunswick Clubs.747  
Moreover, it divided liberals, thus inhibiting the full development of a more 
progressive liberalism as happened in Scandinavia. The National Liberal Federation, 
created in 1877, was divided over the home rule issue for the Irish in 1870s, thus 
making the liberals’ factions that favored mobilization from below less powerful.748 
This had the consequence of making very difficult the alliances between lower classes 
in the countryside (most of it in Ireland and thereby Catholic) and in the urban world 
(mainly in England and Protestant). Lower class movements for Anglican reform in 
England (Quakers, Baptists, and Presbyterians) never allied themselves with Catholic 
Emancipation movements in Ireland in order to reform the British regime and further 
democratization.749 As Morris argues, later in the nineteenth century, the «growth of 
labor and working-class organizations» was hampered by the divisive issues of religion 
and the territorial tension with Ireland. This served more to «divide and exclude rather 
than create true subscriber democracies».750 
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 Like the previous patterns of associational life in Europe, also England had some 
propitious conditions for the development of mass voluntary associations. England 
possessed an efficient and coherent state, which had been fostered by the incoporation 
of the Anglican Church and by severall anti-corruption acts, and since early on it was a 
highly parliamentarized polity. These traits fostered national level mass movements, 
especially of religious reform, but also of craft workers, because national integration 
made easier the conection and communication of associational leaders within the same 
social movement. Moreover, the centrality of parliament allowed claims to be debated, 
and it made viable the entry of the popular classes into organized politics by the creation 
of links between parties (both the liberals and the conservatives) and associations. At 
the same time, two other features inhibited the development of associational life in the 
levels found in the hegemonic and dominant patterns, and instead they pushed for a 
dualistic society. First, there was the religious issue over Ireland, which gave a fatal 
blow to an alliance of farmers (mainly Catholic and Irish) and workers (mainly English 
and Protestant/dissident). Second, the form of the British polity since the seventeenth 
century was essentially individualistic and corporate, as in the cases so far analysed. 
This made it impossible to create national level policy-making corporatist institutions as 
well as a developed welfare state in the 1930s and the 1940s that could have integrated 
voluntary associations in their social schemes. Instead, welfare and corporatist benefits 
were weak, dispensed from above by elites and not through organizations, thus 
promoting a dual and not coordinated associational life where social inequalities 
strongly determine the civic engagement of the citizenry.  
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Chapter 9: Disjointed Associational Life: France and Italy 
 
9.1. Paths Towards Disjointed Associational Life 
 
 Initially, the aftermath of the 1789 French revolution led to an expansion of 
voluntary associations. Between 1789 and 1795 French political societies reached the 
number of 5,500 and spread throughout the country, even in the countryside. They are 
able to attract both workers and farmers, and they were deeply involved in the political 
disputes of the day. They were used by the Montagnard government to fight the 
aristocrats and girondin bourgeois rivals. During the radical phase of the revolution, and 
especially in 1794, the fact that many of these associations had backed the terror led to a 
growing opposition to the right of association and the spread of the notion that 
associations were a hindrance to the national interest. The Declaration of Rights of 1795 
put limits on the rights of associations, forbidding them to be named societé populaire, 
to affiliate with each other (or make federations), or to exchange correspondence.751 In 
the Napoleonic period, the legal code of 1810 declared that associations with more than 
twenty members needed a special permission from authorities to be formed, and the 
government set up a strict supervision of associational life, and extended police control 
even to the smallest associations.752 
 During the Restoration of the Bourbon monarchy (1815-1830) there was more 
tolerance regarding the freedom of association. Elections became a procedure for 
alternation in power which promoted the organization of liberals and loyalists through 
popular associations and the registration of citizens to vote (e.g. François Guizot created 
in 1827 the first major association for liberals that spanned over thirty five departments 
of France). In the July monarchy of 1830-1848 there were even better conditions for the 
development of associational life. Although it ultimately failed, the new regime was an 
attempt that for a while tried to institutionalize a liberal constitutional monarchy. The 
parliament received more powers and the king’s (Louis Philippe of Orleans) 
prerogatives were curtailed.753 Elections became part of the routine of daily politics, a 
fact that pushed for the development of associations by the several political factions, the 
liberals, the republicans, and the legitimists. 
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 During this period, republicans expanded much of the existing associational life. 
Networks of newspapers, workingmen’s brotherhoods (compagnonages) continued the 
tradition of old corporations. Initially, they were organized not for political purposes but 
in order to provide welfare and insurance to their members (funds for funerals, 
unemployment) and as centers of social activity (e.g. drinking clubs). Gradually these 
organizations became republican and on the left.754 After the 1830s, the mutual aid 
associations evolved gradually into workers’ associations, when questions of job 
placement and support for workers in disputes with masters and workers became their 
main aims. Little by little, they became fertile ground for the spread of republican and 
the socialist ideas emerging with Louis Blanc and Pierre Proudhon755 and aimed at 
building such a movement at the national level.756 They achieved also a modern form: 
they were constituted as voluntary clubs sustained with paid dues from the members and 
with deliberative weekly assemblies.757 Many of these societies opposed the existing 
regime and sought its replacement by a republican regime. The regime became very 
repressive; republicans were severely persecuted in the years 1834-35, and in November 
of 1834 the government introduced a bill forbidding associations. 758  Consequently, 
associations became very secretive, like the Society for the Rights of Man that was 
divided into small groups with ten to twenty individuals in each, and that aimed to take 
direct action in order to overthrow Louis Philipe’s monarchy.759 
 With the 1848 revolution there was an explosion of voluntary associations. 
Initially the revolution was based on an alliance of sectors of the bourgeoisie, mainly 
republican, and the workers’ movement. For a brief period in the 1848 constitution, the 
right of association was legitimated. But in June of 1848 this right was already restricted 
and it was finally abolished with the 1852 coup of Louis Napoleon that ended the brief 
republic. In 1851 the restrictive Napoleonic legal code was reinstituted,760 while at the 
same time there was a bloody repression of the associational republican-socialist 
movement.761 
                                                 
754 Huard, 2000, p. 142; Sewell, pp. 163-166. 
755 Sewell, pp. 213, 219-236. 
756 Huard, 2000, pp. 141-142. 
757 Sewell, pp. 94-100. 
758 Huard, 2000, pp. 140-141 
759 Gould, 2002, pp. 46-47. 
760 Huard, 2000, pp. 138, 142. 
761 Tilly, 2004, p. 122. 
 231
 After this period, most attempts to form a national network or confederative 
structure of workers’ clubs into a national association failed. 762  Many republican 
workers’ mutualities became secret societies.763 The labor movement saw itself more as 
a «small republic in the workplace» and as independent from the regime and outside 
society. 764  In the countryside guilds and corporations had also been definitely 
eliminated after the La Chapelier Law. The rural associations that developed in the 
1840s, the Chambres, were considered illegal, and existing associations became 
secretive and semi-clandestine. Associations would become inactive during periods of 
repression, and when the regime suffered sudden openings, come out into the open in an 
explosive manner.765 There were also some attempts to form Catholic associations in 
the countryside, but in general they failed when compared to the denser and more solid 
Italian or Belgian Catholic movements. 
 Also in the several states in the Italian peninsula after the French revolution, 
there emerged many republican and Jacobin clubs, the first form of modern 
associational life in this area too. They were voluntary associations, mainly of 
craftsmen, merchants and of the lower class professions, and they were democratically 
organized around a member’s assembly.766 A stronger workers’ movement appeared in 
the 1840s in the form of artisan brotherhoods and self-help societies, especially in cities 
like Turin, Naples, and Milan. During the revolutionary wave of 1848, these 
organizations spread all over Italy’s states reaching smaller cities and the countryside in 
an attempt to create liberal states. Like in the rest of Europe, most of these revolts 
failed, although in Piedmont a liberal constitution was implemented and a liberal regime 
secured. In the remaining Italian states, the restoration of monarchical forces was the 
norm, and during the 1850s and 1860s there was a decline of associative collective 
action.767 
 In France during the Second Empire in 1864, strikes were legalized and some 
restrictions on the freedom of association were eliminated in 1868. The imperial regime 
attempted liberalization. The possibility of associational meetings for non-political 
purposes was legalized and political meetings were tolerated at electoral moments. Most 
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of the associations could exist only for temporary periods.768 The war with Prussia in 
1870 and the subsequent defeat of France created an opportunity for the republican 
movements to erupt into the public arena and to declare a republic during the Paris 
commune on March 28, 1871. Voluntary associations spread enormously in this 
context. Republican radical governments were established in the provincial French 
cities, and in Paris the Republican National Guard organized associations of 
neighborhood committees. During a brief period, republican organizations ruled the 
city. The Paris municipal government was elected by delegates from each 
neighborhood, which also elected the National Guard.769 The Paris commune would be 
short-lived though, and on March 14, 1872 a very repressive law of associations was 
approved that aimed especially at eliminating the workers’ movement in the 
International Workingmen’s Association. Still, the legacy of the commune would be 
picked up after the Third republic stabilized in 1877, which meant that it was easier to 
form associations.770 
 It was during the Third Republic that associations expanded more freely in 
France. As in most Western European countries, this was the golden age of modern 
associational life. A variety of groups were formed, alongside the already established 
workers’ brotherhoods and leisure associations of the provincial bourgeoisie. Hunting 
societies, musical societies, fire-fighters, Catholic charities, Catholic workers’ 
associations, youth organizations (e.g. holiday camps), and popular education societies 
were all created during this period.771 The workers’ movement started to organize also 
beyond the craft level to include factory workers, and the socialists party was formed.772 
 Still, the regime continued to pose strong barriers to associations. The 
government of René Waldeck-Rousseau passed a bill in October 1883 that gave the 
Minister of Interior the right to prosecute associations engaging in activities considered 
illegal. The laws on associations were made more liberal only in 1901.773 Associations 
could be created freely, and they were not obliged to declare their foundation to 
authorities, but on the other hand only the ones who had registered with authorities 
could acquire civil personality which gave them rights (like the possibility to own 
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buildings). At the same time the law put many restrictions on religious associational life 
and congregations were dissolved in 1901.774 
 From 1908 to 1938 the number of associations evolved from 5,000 to 10,000.775 
Most accounts seem to agree that on the eve of World War I France had a weak 
associational life. Catholic trade unions were created in the early 1900s, but the attempt 
to create a Catholic party after 1885 failed, and only in 1919 the first federation of 
Catholic workers appeared.776 
 Contrary to France, associational life seems to have been stronger in Italy in this 
period. Voluntary associations developed after the unification of Italy in March 1861. 
First appeared the elite clubs of liberal politicians. Many of them had the aim to 
mobilize the electorate and to run candidates for office. Very soon after that, workers’ 
mutual aid societies appeared, first in Piedmont and later in other regions including the 
south. Although some accounts argue that until World War I associational life was very 
localistic, short–lived, and that elites were unable to form coherent associations because 
of permanent factional splits, in the north of Italy the pattern of associational life was 
much stronger than in the south.777 
 Italian Catholic associational life was more vibrant than in France after the 
1860s. The first attempts of Catholic organization building were the calls by the 
newspaper Unità Cattolica, together with a small number of associations approved by 
the pope and organized by bishops in the 1860s.778 In 1874, the Catholic congress in 
Venice called for the formation of local associations in every parish to be run by one 
central national organization. The pope supported this organization called Opera dei 
Congressi. It had a permanent directive committee, and by 1892 it organized a national 
network of Catholic associations that was able to establish links with peasants unions 
and to organize cooperatives, saving banks, and agricultural credit associations.779 It 
was a national organization divided into diocesan and parochial committees following 
the structure of the ecclesiastical administration. This network included organizations 
like mutual aid societies, cooperatives, lending libraries, charitable organizations, and 
savings banks. The Opera was very strong in northern and central Italy. Of the four 
thousand diocesan centers in 1897, 2,092 were in north, 1,536 in the center, 206 in the 
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south and 144 on the islands. In 1897, it included 708 youth organizations, 554 rural 
funds, and 688 worker organizations.780 Moreover, based on this vast social movement, 
Catholics organized directly for political participation. In 1904, pro-Catholic deputies 
were independently elected to the parliament, in 1905 they formed the Unione 
Elettorale to coordinate electoral efforts, and in 1909 they were able to elect twenty-one 
Catholic deputies (although in an alliance with the conservative wing of the 
Liberals).781 Lastly, the first Catholic unions appeared in the 1910s.782 
                                                
 In Italy the workers’ movement seems to have been stronger and more organized 
than in France. Although there is a similarity between the two countries (as with 
Portugal and Spain), what distinguishes this pattern of associational life is the fact that 
the anarchist movement became important in both societies.  
In France, the anarcho-syndicalists became around 1900 the main workers’ 
current.783 The radicals espousing direct action against the state (Jules Guesde) became 
dominant versus the moderates (Jean Jaurès), who wanted the state to intervene through 
partnerships with the unions’ confederation, the CGT, for the implementation of non-
contributory social insurance. By opposing the state as such and by relying on direct 
action against the authorities, the workers’ movement in these societies could not grow 
as in the countries studied in the previous chapters, since partnerships with the state 
were foreclosed, as I will discuss below. Thus, the labour movement became very self-
secluded, and it tended to use the general strike as the main form of collective action.784  
Also in Italy, revolutionary syndicalism became an important ideology in the 
workers’ movement, the general strike was conceived as the principal form of political 
weapon, and in 1904 the first general strike of the world in Milan was organized, as 
protest against the Camera del Lavoro of Milan because of the deaths of workers who 
had been protesting. After this incident, the Italian workers’ movement became deeply 
opposed to the idea of state as such. 
 In Italy, though, the socialists were very strong as well and more so than in 
France. In the 1870s and 1880s, there was already an organized labor movement (the 
Fascia Opera) that was able to spread as a movement with a national scope, taking root 
in the cooperative and associative networks of urban and rural workers, especially of the 
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center and north.785 In the early 1890s, peasants started to form associations throughout 
Italy, like rural cooperatives and self-help societies, that were mobilized by the 
socialists. These were especially strong in the Po Valley and the North.786 In 1892, the 
Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI) was founded and solidified strong links with workers’ 
associations, sporting clubs, theater societies, and peasant leagues, thus becoming the 
head of a vast social movement although concentrated mainly in central and northern 
Italy.787 At the turn of the century, mutual aid societies were most important forms of 
association, including 936,000 members, half of which were in socialist trade unions. In 
the rural countryside, the socialists were able to consolidate their power with the 
workers of the Po valley, creating in 1901 a rural workers’ federation: Federterra.788 
Much more than in France, the workers’ movement in Italy was organized into 
encompassing peak associations like the socialist dominated Confederazione Generale 
Del Lavoro (CGL). The anarchists also had a strong federation that was especially solid 
in the south. 
 In the interwar period, French unions were weakly organized and they had no 
effective power in bargaining with employers and with the state. The labor movement 
was able to achieve some mobilization for protest, but in comparative terms its levels of 
both membership and protest actions were low.789 According to Crouch, French unions 
were the least centralized in Europe, in particular because the labour movement was 
highly divided between communists, socialists and anarchists, and also between these 
and a conservative, patriarchal current around corporatist-Catholic unions like the 
General Confederation of French Artisans (skilled tradesmen, masons, blacksmiths, 
cobblers, and carpenters) that was strong in Alsace. Moreover, these ideological 
divisions were regionally based. Organized labor in this period only grew in 1938 
during the Popular Front government, including up to 5 million members, but it fell 
sharply in the next two years.790 
 In Italy, the discrepancy between these two currents, socialists and anarchists, 
reached its maximum point with Italy’s participation in World War I. Unions were 
divided over whether to support the governments’ war efforts and accept nationalist 
                                                 
785 Collier, 1999, p. 69. 
786 Tilly, Tilly and Tilly, 1997, p. 145. 
787 As the distribution of party affiliates between 1890s and 1914 showed. Banti, 2000, p. 44. 
788 Lyttelton, 2000, pp. 71, 77. 
789 Crouch, 1993, pp. 129-136, 151-153. 
790 Crouch, 1993, pp. 157-162, 167-169, 174. 
 236
mobilization or to take advantage of this opportunity to bring down the state.791 With 
the defeat of Italy in the war and with the state almost on the verge of breakdown, 
unions and farmers’ associations took the opportunity to protest and acquire property. 
Italy suffered a wave of strikes between 1919 and 1920, and for the first time there was 
a simultaneous mobilization of industrial and agricultural workers. The antecedent to 
the socialist revolt had been the 1917 insurrection of the workers of Turin that had 
captured neighborhoods of the city. Now they proceeded to an even stronger rebellion. 
For the first time, the Socialist Party was able to build a national structure incorporating 
workers and peasants. In Turin in 1920, they sponsored the creation of factory councils 
(elective organs inside the factory) and pushed the peasant leagues and cooperatives to 
claim “land for the peasants” leading to many land seizures. 792  At the same time, 
anarchist unions tried to direct these revolts into a national rising. 
 If looking at Catholic associational life, one can see marked differences between 
the two countries. In France in the 1920s, there was an expansion of a network of 
Catholic unions, associations, charitable organizations, and leisure time groups. Many 
of these associations were very strong in the countryside, dispensing credit and 
insurance for farmers and also mobilizing them for political purposes. Most French 
Catholic organizations were founded during this period: Confédération Francaise des 
Travailleurs Chrétienne (CFTC, 1919), Fédération National Catholique (FNC in 1924), 
Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne (JOC, 1927), Jeunesse Agricole Chrétienne (JAC, 1929), 
Jeunesse Étudiante Chrétienne (JEC, 1929), Ligue Ouvrière Chrétienne (LOC), 
Mouvement Familial Rural (MFR), and the conservative Federation Nationale des 
Syndicats d’Exploitants Agricoles, (FNSEA). Also, a Catholic political party was 
founded, the Parti Démocratie Populaire (PDP) in 1924. Still, Catholic associational 
life remained weakly organized in general, especially in comparison to Italy. At most 
only supported occasionally politicians in some parishes and never reached a mass 
organization. Only in 1931, Action Catholique was established as a national 
organization.793 Moreover, the PDP never won more than 3 % of the vote in the general 
elections that it participated in the interwar period (1928, 1932 and 1936).794 
 Contrary to France, Italy had a well developed Catholic associational life that 
was consolidated after World War I. Catholic unions and agrarian Catholic leagues 
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expanded enormously, especially in the regions of Lombardy, Piedmont, and Veneto.795 
The lay association Azione Cattolica Italiana was also used in this period by the church 
to mobilize and influence voters through the spread of civic committees in the 
country. 796  A Catholic political party was formed in January 1919, the Partito 
Populare, winning 20.5% of the vote in that year’s election and becoming the centre of 
a mass Christian Democratic movement.797 
                                                
 Although the freedom of association was finally established in France in this 
period, associational life remained weak. A case study of the village of Wissous by 
Robert and Barbara Gallatin Anderson shows that in the 1920s there were about forty 
associations, but with very few members and very dependent of traditional institutions 
like the family and the church. Associations did not develop mass membership levels, 
and they did not engage in inter-organizational cooperation in order to form peak 
associations. Instead, they remained particularistic and linked to narrow special 
interests.798 This was in part the reason why the French did not develop welfare and 
corporatist partnerships between the state and the associational milieu. In the 1930s, 
there were in fact plans for a national and compulsory system of health, disability, and 
pension insurance that would cover all workers in industry and commerce. About seven 
hundred and seventy four funds (casses) of health, maternity, and death insurance were 
created and eighty for disability and old age in every region of the country, thus 
covering ten million workers (60% of the industrial force). Moreover, the Casses were 
supposed to be managed by workers’ and employers’ representatives. Still, this system 
was always heavily controlled and implemented directly by the state alone, and it 
excluded agricultural workers putting them in a different regime (régime agricole).799 In 
general, the system’s administration was highly fragmented.800 
 With the Popular Front government of the socialist Leon Blum (1935-1937), 
there was a serious attempt to incorporate workers through collective bargaining, 
Keynesian policies, and welfare state insurance. This coalition was similar to the 
progressive coalitions that developed in the same period in Scandinavia. It was also 
based on an alliance of unions, segments of the farmers, and the liberal middle classes. 
But it failed after 1936. For one, the labor movement was dominated by radical 
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syndicalism, represented by the CGT, who only very tenuously supported the 
government. They disagreed on the issue of private property and over labor co-
determination in the workplace.801 Second, important segments of business showed a 
very low willingness to deal with unions. These sectors would prove dominant in 1940 
because of a third factor, the German invasion and occupation of France. In 1940, 
business and conservative politicians took advantage of this opportunity and allied with 
the Germans and imposed a kind of Fascist corporatism, crushing autonomous 
associations and labour by force.802  In the new state-corporatist authoritarianism of 
Vichy, voluntary associational life was repressed. 
 In post-World War I Italy, there was a dense associational life, namely in the 
northern and center regions. Mass mobilization was very strong, particularly during the 
years 1919-1921 which saw workers’ mobilization and rural rebellion. There was the 
consolidation of two mass movements of party and voluntary associations, the socialists 
and the communist parties, and the Catholics, around the Popular Party (and after the 
war the Christian Democrats). These were based on extensive party-associational 
subcultures of socialists (the PSI) and social Catholic voluntary associations (the Partito 
Popolare) with trade unions, mutual aid societies, women’s and youth organizations, 
leisure, that were much stronger than in France. 803  Finally there were also the 
mobilization efforts by fascist organizations that wereable to build militias of ex-
soldiers who engaged in violent clashes with the left. Fascists competed with socialists 
and Catholic unions for the support of modest farmers, laborers, tenants, and small 
property owners, and they actually ousted these rivals. Fascists enjoyed the support of 
landowners and bourgeoisie, and they were able to dispense work to farmers, laborers, 
and tenants.804 In 1920, the Nitti government used fascist militias to repress workers’ 
demonstrations. Right-wing associations had been formed before the war, but they were 
relatively insignificant. Only after 1919 with the support given by the government and 
the elites in agriculture and in industry, they became strong and able to recruit the 
middle classes.805 In 1922 they took over the regime.806 
 The fascist period lasted from 1922 until 1945. It rested on a coalition of rightist 
parties in the center and on the right that was united under a charismatic leader, 
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Mussolini. It was the end of autonomous associational life.807 Associational life was 
channelled through state monopolistic organizations designed for class cooperation. The 
1927 Charter of Labor stated the principles of associational life organization. All 
workers and professionals had to organize into unions and professional organizations 
legally recognized by the state.808 Still, the political identities of reds and Catholics 
were strongly restored after 1945.809 
                                                
 After the Second World War in the new French democracy, associations 
continued to have a small role in social and political life. Most associations were small 
in size, dedicated mostly to local, leisure time activities, and mainly the offspring of 
informal networks of sociability like neighbourhoods and families.810 
 In the Fourth Republic, there was a division between communists and socialists 
in the labor movement. Communists were then able to use the 1945 post-liberation 
purges to control the opposition in the unions and in the Confederation Generale du 
Travail (CGT), to pursue extensive nationalization of the properties of collaborators, 
and to extend state control to key sectors of the economy (gas, mines, and electricity). 
Because unions had low access to the state and low membership levels, they tended to 
assert their power more through industrial conflict (in the street or in the workplace), 
since negotiation and partnership ventures were rare.811 
 In contemporary France, new social movement associations tended to be also 
scattered and weak. Less than one percent of adult women belonged to women’s 
movements. The environmental movement was stronger, organized in a national 
federation with 850,000 members, and in the 1990s it evolved into two parties, the Les 
Verts and the Génération Ecologie. Still, these movement-party organizations were 
weak, they suffered from high fluctuations in membership, and have copied the 
traditional political party model of organization and less the mass membership 
organization.812 As a consequence unconventional protests by new social movement 
organizations have been rare in France, and protest by old social movements stronger. 
Between 1975 and 1989, only 36.1% of the protest events were organized by the 
ecology, peace, nuclear energy, antiracism, squatters, women’s’ and homosexual social 
movements, whereas in other countries these organized a much higher proportion of 
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protest actions. In Germany they were responsible for 73% and in the Netherlands for 
65% of such events.813 
 In postwar Italy, unions were stronger than in France. Membership density in 
1950-1952 was 45% of the active labor force and 39.6% in 1989.814 Also Catholic 
associational life continued its stronger levels inherited from the interwar period, which 
seems not to have been eliminated by the fascists. Catholic Action played an important 
role in society. It was a hierarchical organization, with three million members in the 
1950s, and able to be present in almost every parish of the country. Catholic unions 
were also important, first the ACLI (Association of Catholic Workers), and later the 
CISL. 815  After the war the main Christian-democratic groups became the ACLI, 
rivalling both the socialist and communist unions and able to dispense welfare functions 
to its members and thereby recruiting about one million members. It had close ties with 
Catholic Action also, especially for political mobilization purposes, since both 
organizations had close links with the confessional party successor of the Partito 
Popolare, the Democrazia Cristiana (DC). Twelve members of the 144 that composed 
the National Council of the DC came from ACLI, and when CISL, the Catholic union 
confederation was formed, the ACLI continued to exist as a Catholic social movement 
aimed at the Catholicization of workers and farmers and their political mobilization.816 
 The differing relationships with the state explain much of these different patterns 
between France and Italy. In France there was a higher predominance of the state over 
associations in policy formation and implementation. Collective bargaining between the 
state and organized interests was rare, and economic and welfare policies emanated 
directly from and were imposed by the state. For much of this period, labor was 
excluded from wage and macroeconomic policies at least until 1968. 817  When it 
happened that state rulers decided to make partnerships with associations, the process 
has been historically one of selectively picking one or a small set of associations at the 
expense of other associations, which are left out and usually complain about and 
criticize the whole process. As Keeler argues for the case of unions, «the official union 
is more equal than the others». The state gives it «exclusive access to formal councils, 
privileged informal access to state officials, devolved authority for the administration of 
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important aspects of public policy, favourable reforms of regulations affecting the 
sector, and substantial monetary subsidies».818 
 An example during the Fifth Republic was the place given to the main 
agricultural union, the FNSEA (Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d’Exploitants 
Agricoles). Government agricultural policies recognized the need for the cooperation of 
farmers for the implementation of policies in the early 1960s. The budget of the 
Ministry of Agriculture grew 900% between 1960 and 1976, and the FNSEA provided 
the state with a reliable partner. It served as a bargaining actor and a partner in the 
implementation of policies. Still, this partnership was only able to serve between fifteen 
to twenty percent of all farms, and many regions were outside any agreement. This led 
to reactions by those outside the association or in rival associations. A survey of 
farmers’ class concluded that fifty five percent thought that the FNSEA was too 
dependent upon the government. The rival union, the Communist MODEF (Mouvement 
de Defence des Exploitants Familiaux), channelled this discontent through 
demonstrations. 819  This pattern of state-association relationships just identified for 
agriculture was somehow typical of France since the late nineteenth century. Workers, 
the management, and the state have always been unable to start negotiations, and 
bargaining tends to occur only at peak level and after mass mobilization and strikes.820 
As Val Lorwin put it for the French labor movements, it was characterized by a 
combination of «low immediate hopes and utopian dreams».821 
 Corporatist and welfare policies in Italy have been more inclusive of organized 
interests, developing into partnerships between the state and the society. In the 1970s, 
the unions were able to create fixed roots in the workplace, and together with 
management they had a decisive say in work hours, work rhythms, internal mobility of 
labour, and salaries. 822  In terms of welfare policies, most old-age and disability 
pensions, family subsidies, children funds, and some unemployment benefits which 
were channeled by the national social security administration (INPS) were the result of 
a permanent tripartite consultation process with unions, religious associations, 
employers, and the state. 823  Moreover, the Catholic associational networks had a 
decisive role in welfare provision and education policies. During the fascist regime, 
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Catholic associations and charities were responsible for the social welfare and education 
programs. For example, the 1929 Concordat with the Catholic Church required religious 
instruction in public elementary and secondary schools. These functions continued until 
at least the 1960s.824 
 The other part of the story related to these different patterns is the relationship 
between parties and associations. In France, especially during the Fifth Republic, their 
links were weak. With the creation of a semi-presidential system after 1958, the 
executive was less dependent on party politics. Ruling was more in the hands of the 
president himself and the state bureaucracy.825 Parties never developed into the mass 
pattern typical of the countries analyzed in the previous chapters. In France, party 
membership levels have been in decline, and the parliament is seen by the public as 
corrupt and inefficient. 826  For instance, the French Christian-democratic party after 
1945, the MRP, soon collapsed with the transition from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic. 
The main party of the right became a cadre party dependent of the president De Gaulle 
that tried to attract also the Catholic vote, but that did not organize for mass 
mobilization on Catholic grounds or on any other, and that even opposed many 
principles of Christian democracy, like the notion of subsidiarity, and preferred a more a 
technocratic and top-down statist orientation of public policy.827 As a consequence, the 
Catholic unions, farmers’ associations, youth organizations, and several Catholic groups 
lacked a party they could address to and establish links to form a national level political 
movement.828 
 Contrary to France, there were strong links between parties and associations in 
Italy that continued the pattern of associational-party red/white subcultures developed in 
the interwar years. In the 1960s, wrote Joseph LaPalombara, «the conflict between 
organized Catholicism, on the one hand, and the anticlerical and laical groups, on the 
other, permeates all aspects of society».829 In issues that divide the distribution of goods 
in society, like in the spheres of education, civil rights, the arts, agriculture and industry, 
«each individual group tends to be identified with only one party, either as a structure 
conditioning what the party does or as mere instrumentality and extension of the party 
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itself». 830  As a consequence, voting tended to be determined by the specific 
associational-party subculture (White/Catholic, strong in the regions of the northeast 
and eastern Lombardia or Communist/Red, in the center) to which one belonged.831 
 The Italian Communist Party (PCI) considered itself a party of movement as 
well as a party of government. Both socialists (PSI) and the PCI had strong links to the 
Italian General Confederation of Labour, CGIL. 832  Data of the 1960 PCI congress 
shows that among delegates there were fourteen national CGIL leaders, 125 provincial 
leaders, and 59 local union leaders. In the 1960s in the PSI, eight of the ten members of 
executive committee were CGIL leaders. 833  Alongside the workers’ movement, 
Communists provided an institutional framework where new social movements could 
grow. In the wave of social mobilization of the 1960s, the Communists were able to 
attract important segments of the urban, feminist, and ecology movements. 834  The 
Christian Democratic Party was allied with the Catholic trade union movement in the 
north, the Italian Confederation of Workers’ Union, becoming a mass party, and that 
was also connected to the employers association, the Cofindustria. It used the Catholic 
Action as well as religious associations and the church network as grass roots 
organizations for its political campaigns.835 
 A combination of three factors has produced these patterns of associational life 
in France and Italy. In comparative terms, the two countries belong to the under-
mobilized and weakly developed pattern of associational life. Still, there are also 
differences between France’s and Italy’s associational lives that require an explanation, 
specifically the denser and more coordinated associational life in Italy. Next, I offer an 
explanation for both sets of question. 
 
9.2. Common Patterns of State Building: Clientelism and Religious Conflict 
 
 In both Italy and France, the state has been characterized by a weak capacity. In 
both countries’ sourthern regions, the legacy of the absolutist monarchy was one of a 
semi-clientelistic state. The tradition of the old regime tax farmers continued in the 
nineteenth century through widespread corruption (although on a lesser scale in Iberia) 
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and the use of state resources by government electoral candidates.836 During the process 
of Italian unification, the absorption of the bureaucracy of the Kingdom of the Two 
Sicilies was achieved by maintaining its patrimonial traits. Since it did not have a strong 
bureaucracy capable of dominating the other states, the northern regime of Piedmont 
that unified Italy, had to rely on the old bureaucracies which meant that the 
consolidation of the new state after unification was achieved through the expansion of 
clientelistic networks. Moreover, they were reinforced, since the stabilization of the 
regime required pacts between the northern and southern elites. The south had resisted 
northern plans of taxation and army conscription through guerrillas and frequent rural 
insurrections, which tended to be brutally repressed. But after the new regime became 
an accomplished fact, the northern and southern elites found a new modus vivendi 
through the share of the spoils of the state.837 
 In France, an additional factor was the military’s involvement in politics that 
affected state capacity. This was especially acute in the Third Republic, which always 
faced the opposition of the Right and the Catholics, who had links to sectors of the 
military who thought of bringing down the regime and replacing it with a monarchy.838 
 Also, in both countries there was a deep state-church conflict since early on. In 
Italy, the first anti-clerical laws had been passed in the kingdom of Piedmont. A 1848 
law replaced the church as the sole source of education, and in 1851 the religious 
jurisdiction of church courts in civil affairs was eliminated. After the unification in 1861, 
the Vatican lost all of its territories except for the domain within the city of Rome. 
Other church property like convents and monasteries were taken by the state, religious 
bodies were suppressed, and civil marriage was instituted in the 1870s.839 
 In France, the state-church conflict had also been a constant of political life even 
before the revolution of 1789. Thoughout the nineteenth century there were continuous 
attacks on the church, especially over the issues of its property and its role in 
education.840 Church schools were disbanded by force and replaced by a statist laic and 
republican system, the 1833 Loi Guizot that established universal elementary 
education.841 During the Third Republic, the Loi 1905 finally eliminated the church 
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from any direct intervention in social welfare and replaced it with full state 
responsibility for these tasks. It was the Ministry of Interior that became responsible for 
public poor relief and health services. Local church charities were expropriated by the 
state and given to the municipalities.842 
 The Church in France, deprived of resources and persecuted by the republican 
authorities, sided with anti-regime forces during the Third Republic. It supported 
military attempts to the regime, the so-called Boulanger affair in 1887 and the Dreyfus 
affair in 1894, when a Jewish officer was falsely accused by anti-republican military for 
being a German spy. Although these attempts to bring down republicanism always 
failed (contrary to the Iberian cases, which I analyze in the next part), the republicans 
were counter-attacked by state repression. In the aftermath of the Dreyfus affair, the 
state dissolved more than one hundred religious congregations, enacted a law separating 
the state and the church in 1905 and removed the clergy from state payroll. These 
conflicts between Catholics and republicans would last at least until the 1950s, with the 
church support even of the German backed authoritarian Vichy regime in 1941.843 
 Because of deep rooted clientelism and state-church conflicts, this pattern of low 
state capacity affected associational life in Italy and France, and it is the main factor 
responsible for these countries having lower density and coordination levels in their 
respective associational landscapes. State-church differentiation and overt conflict made 
difficult the institutionalization and incorporation of pressures from below, and they 
favored instead the localism of associations, since it was more difficult for associations 
to form national coalitions. The state and the church relations inhibited a complete 
control of the territory and led to a deep separation of rural and urban societies. The 
church was closer to local society, but at the same its resources were not put on the 
service of the state for the delivery of social policies, like in many countries where there 
was a fusion or a partnership between the state and the church (e.g. England), or where 
the Catholic Church was integrated in the political process through politico-
parliamentary mass parties (e.g. Belgium). As a consequence, associational life was 
more local. For instance, when Catholic Action was created in France in 1931, it was set 
in a way by bishops that diocesan groups would be favored, thus keeping it more as a 
network of local associations, not as a mass national movement. 844 . Initially, this 
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promoted localism in Italy. Although the Church forbade Catholics to participate in 
national politics, it promoted organization-building in local politics and the formation of 
alliances with conservative liberals.845 
 Also, this pattern of state building made the formation of cross-class alliances 
even more difficult. This was especially true of France during the Third Republic, 
where the regime issue divided the Catholic population between those who wanted to 
mobilize as such and accepted the democratic-republican regime (social Catholics like 
Albert de Mun), and those that were monarchists and relied on a military coup to return 
to the old monarchic order (the royalist Catholics). The impulse for association building 
by Mun through the circles of Catholic workers and his party, the Action Libérale 
Populaire, created in 1901, were never very successful, because of these divisions 
between Catholics.846 
 Although sharing similarities in the nature of state capacity, Italy did develop a 
stronger associational life. The reasons for this will be analyzed in the next section, and 
I argue that they are related to the two other variables I have singled out in my model: 
the degree of corporate representation inherited from the past and the degree of 
parliamentarism. 
 
9.3. Variations in Corporate Legacies 
 
 Very early in France, there was an elimination of corporate forms of 
organization. In the eighteenth century traditional forms of associational life like 
religious confraternities, congregations, and trades corporations were crushed by the 
ancien régime state builders. The absolute monarchs from Louis XVI to Louis XVI 
expropriated corporate and religious bodies through the nationalization of their 
property.847 This process was carried further by the post-revolutionary governments. 
The Code Napoléon reinforced state guidance and supremacy over associations, and the 
liberal governments continued this process. After the revolution, the estate system 
ended abruptly, corporations, guilds and feudal privileges like restrictions on the 
admission to crafts, self-regulation of wages and work hours were abolished in 1791.848 
The Chapelier Law in 1791 prohibited journeymen to form brotherhoods, and mutual 
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funds and all workers associations were banned.849 In the countryside, the revolution 
transformed property relations into a very individualistic pattern. Agricultural 
relationships were simplified into rental contracts, and big portions of the land 
belonging to the church and the aristocracy were taken by the state, divided, and sold.850 
 In the Italian states during and immediately after the Napoleonic invasions, 
guilds and premodern corporations were partially destroyed,851 But this process was less 
full blown than in France. There was a higher vibrancy and survival of corporate forms 
and brotherhoods, especially in many regions of the center and north of Italy. First, 
there were much higher traditions of urban self-rule in Italy that had already been 
eliminated in France.852 Guilds were abolished only in 1864 in Italy.853 Although by  
the seventeenth century the cities of northern and central Italy were not the republican 
polities of the middle ages, organizational remnants of these traditions still existed, 
especially very strong bodies of artisans that were autonomous from political power. 
These associations, as Putnam argues, were based on 
 
«pre-existing traditions of collaboration and sociability. Often an ancient guild found 
reincarnation in a pious society in the eighteenth century, which in turn evolved into a mutual 
aid society, which encouraged cooperatives, which subsequently formed the basis for labor 
unions and mass-based political parties».854  
 
Lyttelton has the same opinion. In Piedmont, there was also continuity between 
the workers’ associations of the 1860s and old traditions of corporations and even of 
religious brotherhoods.855 In the north, the state and organized capitalists were trying 
together to induce industrialization.856 
 This made the nineteenth century Italy a fertile soil for the development of 
associations. As Neufeld argues, «the variety of cooperatives in Italy made that country 
unique in the world of cooperation».857 As documented by Putnam, after 1848 there was 
an exceptional growth of associations in Italy: self-help societies and mutualities 
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(illness, accident, and old age), popular drinking clubs, choral societies, charitable and 
educational societies, and cooperatives of producers and consumers in agriculture (e.g. 
rural banks) and in industry (labor cooperatives and credit). Membership in these 
organizations grew fourfould after 1870.858 Moreover, at the end of the century, these 
organizations were gradually mobilized by Republicans, Socialists and Catholics. They 
were brought together, and they were the basis of the emerging trade union movement. 
It was in the regions where associational life was stronger and where Socialist and 
Christian-democratic movements became also stronger. In 1883-84 the Opera Dei 
Congressi had 993 parish committees in the north, 263 in central Italy, and only 57 in 
the south.859 
 Moreover and contrary to France, because Italy was a late state builder, the 
church’s corporate identity was well preserved. 860  The Italian church had been 
historically an autonomous state. Although initially the Pope Pious IX did not recognize 
the new Italian state, the new kingdom of Italy recognized the pope as the spiritual 
leader of Catholicism and also as a leader of an independent state.861 Because of this 
autonomy, the Italian church by the time of the peninsula’s unification had higher 
resources with which to promote collective action through association building, much as 
it happened in Germany or in Belgium. The Vatican functioned almost as a corporate 
entity and as such had a capacity to promote mobilization as the new state was created, 
and when the pope gave permission for participation in the regime’s political life, 
Catholic parties and associations were able to mobilize many people. This led to the 
building of the dense network of associations analyzed in the previous sections of this 
chapter and to institutional incorporation by the state. As Crouch argues, by the late 
1890s there was a reconciliation between the Italian state and the Vatican. 862  For 
instance, in 1929 Mussolini signed a concordat with the church that recognized the 
autonomy of the Vatican and gave the church a main role in education in public 
schools.863 
 In France, the capacity for collective action by both farmers and workers was 
strongly affected by the abolition of corporate bodies, since it made them economically 
dependent, institutionally unprotected, and politically repressed. Urban and rural lower 
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classes had low resources for collective action, and this affected their possibilities for 
building interest associations. Compared to Germany or Scandinavia, France’s 
peasantry was economically weak and did not have any political institutions on which to 
base its claims for collective action. Also the labor movement was weak, when 
compared to countries like Germany or even England. In the late nineteenth century, 
unions were weakly institutionalized, and being a member of a syndicate did not mean 
being an active member, to comply with a coherent ideology, or to even pay dues but 
just the acceptance of a certain solidarity in the name of workers. 864  Moreover, it 
divided the labor movement into small and separate ideological groups, almost sects. 
The fact that social movements on the left were divided organizationally and 
ideologically, paradoxically made the left as a whole rather weak. This pattern 
continued until the twentieth century with the split between Communists and Socialists, 
and made the institutional integration by the state more difficult.865 
  
9.4. A Higher Parliamentarization in Italy 
 
The two regimes differed in their levels of parliamentarization. Compared to 
Italy, the role of parliament in the several French regimes since the eighteenth to the 
twentieth century has been exceptionally low. During the absolute monarchy regional 
parliaments were weak from a comparative perspective. Between the early 1700s and 
1789 they were only called once, in fact by Louis XVI on the eve of the revolution.866 
The French revolution had the consequence of making the power of the executive and 
the state apparatus very strong to the detriment of the parliaments. The political system 
of Napoleon and the Bourbon restoration after 1815 were obvious non-parliamentary 
bureaucratic dictatorships.867 These regimes were characterized by a frequent use of the 
police for political purposes. After the revolution, the monarchy’s rural police was 
transformed into the republican Gendarmerie in 1791 but it even strengthened its 
repressive functions as during the monarchy. The police was a semi-militarized body, 
and it was supported by the army for the repression of public contestation. It was 
directly responsible to the king and not to the parliament.868 
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Since they were strongly repressed, the French would use informal settings for 
the expression of protest and political networking. Funerary events, coffee houses, the 
theater, and churches became the main settings for dissent. 869  Second, associations 
would gradually develop an anti-state attitude and organize around associations that 
conspired to bring down the existing regimes. Unity was only found in «resistance 
practices».870 When for some reason repression by the authorities was lifted (e.g. during 
the Franco-Prussian war of 1871) and the state faced breakdown, revolts would spread 
through the territory. Collective action tended to evolve in advances and retreats.871 
Political participation acquired the form of revolutionary shocks, like in the 1830s, in 
1848, and during the 1875-76 crises.872 
The second institution for societal control that was used by the central 
government in France since 1789 were the prefects. The prefects were a kind of 
commissars of the central government in the provinces. They imposed a common 
administrative rule over the whole territory, and maintained a tight control over village 
and city life. These agents had usually more power than local elected bodies. They 
could suspend an elected council and a mayor for a month as well as approve the 
appointment of the mayor and of municipal officers and the police. They interfered in 
local affairs frequently. A minister acted as an absolute ruler over his ministry and used 
the prefectorial system to his advantage in politics. This pattern functioned at least until 
1918.873 For instance, in 1910 the new law of associations maintained that associations 
needed to register at the prefecture in order to have legal status, recruit members, 
employ staff, rent buildings, and sign contracts.874 Moreover, governments used the 
prefectorial system to staff the state apparatus with their supporters and then use them 
as agents to mobilize voters (in particular state employees). This practice was 
widespread until at least the 1960s.875  In contrast, although in Italy the use of the 
prefects was common, it was less developed through the territory and concentrated 
mainly in the south. 
The Third Republic (1877-1940) was the first parliamentary democratic 
experience in France. After the defeat of France in the war with Prussia in 1871 and a 
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period of intense republican popular mobilization, universal suffrage was reinstituted in 
1877 (France had adopted universal, equal male suffrage in 1848). The new regime was 
formally democratic, but it was a democracy where the parliament did not count for 
much. The political class depended on local voters mobilized by regionally based 
notables established in prefectorial system. The new republican political class used the 
resources of the state and its agencies (the Ministies of Interior, of Education, of Ponts 
et Chaussées) to employ their political friends, thus excluding full parliamentary 
politicians of influence. 876  Moreover, the president could dissolve the parliament 
(although only with the consent of the senate).877 
This had consequences for association building. What counted for associations 
was establishing links within powerful ministries and bureaucracies, and to become part 
of their clientelistic networks. Since the more important elites were in the state 
apparatus and the prefectorial system, voluntary associations did not develope as much 
as they could have. Associations became more dependent of personal favors, 
preferences of state bureaucrats or powerful politicians, and as such they developed less 
of a mass character. What counted for their institutionalization was less to mobilize the 
citizenry through petitions presented to the parliament, for instance, and more the 
informal links with state bureaucrats, prefects, and powerful ministers.878 
In Italy there was a much higher level of parliamentarization. Mass liberalism as 
an ideology and as a political movement was more accepted in Italy. After 1848, the 
Kingdom of Sardinia, which included the regions of Piedmont, Liguria, Sardinia and 
Savoy, under the rulership of King Victor Emanuele II, was a fully liberal, 
constitutional and parliamentary regime that recognized in its founding constitution the 
right of association. The Kingdom’s constitution became the ideal polity for all Italian 
liberals. This state gradually spread its institutional form as it conquered other Italian 
states and fomented liberal revolts all throughout the Italian peninsula. In 1859 
Lombardy was taken from Austria, and later the Papal States, Emilia and Romagna, the 
duchies of Parma and Tuscany and Sicily.879 
After the unification of the Italian states many radical-democrats did not see the 
regime as legitimate. In fact, in 1861 the radical-republican opposition was declared 
illegal. Still, since parliament was strong, after 1861 segments of the democratic-
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republican camp split and accepted the regime, forming the constitutional left, which 
later would evolve to mass socialism. There were antecedents to this in the Kingdom of 
Piedmont. An alliance between the monarchy and the left Liberals had been established 
in the 1850s under Cavour. The king needed the Liberals in order to expand his 
territorial domains, and the Liberals needed the crown to achieve national unity. This 
alliance that was made possible under a strong parliamentary competition did not give 
any room for the extreme Republicans on the left (Mazzini) to grow, as well as clerical 
reactionaries, groups that became much more important in politics in France and 
especially in Iberia. 880  In sum, as Lyttelton argues, with the unification the 
«parliamentary regime made possible the successful negotiation de facto of areas of 
liberty in which associations could function freely». Although sometimes associations 
were suspended by the prefects, at the same time «the authorities were anxious not to 
alienate the support of parliamentary deputies, who could protest on behalf of their 
constituents».881 
In Italy, a higher degree of parliamentarism made possible liberal elite-mass 
links to a higher degree than in France. The moderate liberal elites everywhere in Italy 
in the first years after unification helped to promote workers’ associations through links 
with their own elite clubs and workers’ brotherhoods. Many of these workers 
associations would thus support the monarchy. 882  Although Italy became (in many 
respects unfairly) known as a place of electoral corruption, in fact its system was much 
more competitive than for instance in Spain, where corruption was much more 
widespread. In Italy, in order to conquer power politicians had to mobilize voters and 
create majorities in the legislature. By contrast, in Spain, Portugal, and even in the 
French Third Republic massive electoral fraud was more common. 883  This factor 
explains why the development of Italian associational life was much higher than in 
France during the interwar years, as argued at the beginning of this chapter.  
This pattern continued after 1945 when both countries made the transition to 
democracy. In the case of Catholic associational life the Confédération Francaise des 
Travailleurs chrétienne, second in membership in the French unions, which would have 
been the MRP’s natural support group, made it clear already in 1946 that it wanted to 
remain fully separate from the MRP. It even declared that holding a position in the 
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MRP would be incompatible with holding a position in the union. The union also 
eliminated the reference to Christianity in its name and renamed itself into 
Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (CFDT) in 1964. Also, the Catholic 
agrarian interest groups like the JAC and the Mouvement familial rural (MFR) did not 
tie themselves to the MRP in the post-war France but to the more personalistic Gaullist 
RPF or to other conservative parties. De Gaulle’s RPF included successfully the 
Catholic vote, but it inhibited Catholics to evolve as a mass movement, since Catholic 
candidates presented themselves to elections as independent candidates. This promoted 
associational localism and reinforced the power of local barons, who had the subsequent 
role in negotiating state subsidies to farmers of their electoral circle through the 
Mutuelle of the Sécurité Sociale agricole.884 
In fact, the transition from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic in 1958 reduced even 
more the power of parliament. The new semi-presidential political system created a very 
centralized executive around the power of de Gaulle in the presidency. De Gaulle’s 
system strengthened the notion of supra-party and supra-factional interest politics. 
Governments should pursue policies and make decisions that are remote from interest 
groups and party influences, as represented in institutions like the parliament or the free 
competition of associations in the public sphere. De Gaulle’s system gave also a 
stronger role in policy-making to the state bureaucracy, which unilaterally imposed and 
implemented social policies without any concertation with organized interests.885 
This had an impact on associational life by making it more local, less dense, and 
less coordinated. The groups that relied on party brokerage to advance their interests 
lost power to those groups that were more specialized and small scale. For instance in 
agriculture, mass peasant organizations like the FNSEA-Federation National des 
Syndicates d’Exploitants Agricoles lost power to specialized and technical associations 
of producers that had links to elites in the state administration. Mass organizations in 
agriculture declined in membership. A second impact was the return of violent protest 
(e.g. by shopkeepers and artisans). Attacks on tax offices, kidnapping tax inspectors, 
and fights between the police and shopkeepers became more common.886 
Italy developed a more parliamentarized regime after 1945. The legislature was 
a strong institution in the sense that the government depended on it. It elected the 
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President of the Republic and a third of the members of the Constitutional Court. 
Consequently, since they had higher access to parliament, interest groups focused their 
action there and developed partnerships with political parties.887 
Many leaders of associations were members of parliament as well in the 1960s. 
The DC included leaders of Catholic associations such as Catholic Action, ACLI, CISL, 
and the Coltivatori Diretti. The Communist and Socialist parties included in their 
electoral lists representatives of unions (CGIL), women’s associations, and youth 
groups. The employers’ association, Confindustria, had some spokesmen in PLI and DC 
parliamentary groups.888 For instance in the 1953 general elections, the CISL was able 
to place twenty three deputies and one senator in the legislature, and in 1958 one 
hundred candidates of the DC were coming from CISL. Ten percent of DC’s deputies in 
1964 were union, not party, members. The same happened in the left camp. The CGIL, 
the Communist-socialist union, placed about ten percent of the legislature deputies in 
1953 (more than half being in the Communist group).889 
Moreover, in the 1950s and 1960s the Italian parliament had a system of 
standing and investigating committees that recognized that alongside bills introduced by 
the government and the parties, also interest associations (as well as the National 
Council of Economics and Labour) could initiate legislation. There was not even a limit 
on the number of private-member bills that could be introduced. This was called the 
procedure of sede deliberante, which gave associations some decisive influence over the 




 In disjointed associational life, the conditions for development of associational 
life were weak. The traditions of corporate representation were extinguished early, 
parliaments historically had very low powers, and the state had a very low capacity 
because of protracted territorial state-church conflicts, civil war leading to state 
collapse, and clientelism. Associational life became local and with weak links to 
political parties, thus facing high administrative barriers imposed by a distant and all-
powerful state. Partnerships with the state for the dispensation of welfare benefits and 
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corporatist coordination never became the norm of policy-making. The combination of 
these three variables inhibited the development of a dense and coordinated associational 
life. 
 Still, there are differences between these societies that are worth exploring. For 
now I will leave aside the cases of Portugal and Spain, which will be analyzed in the 
next part, and summarize here only the important differences between Italy and France. 
Generally speaking, Italy (especially in the center and the northern regions) has had 
historically a denser associational life than France. Again, the same set of factors I have 
pointed out earlier explain the variations between the types of associational life and also 
distinguish these two cases. When compared to France, Italy has had higher levels of 
parliamentarism, thus allowing for politics to become more competitive and for parties 
to create interlocking links with associations. Italy inherited a higher legacy of pre-
modern associational life than France. Although corporate organizations were abolished 
earlier in many parts of Italy, in some regions, because of the fact they were peripheral 
regions which were not subject to extreme and harsh rule from state builders, it was 
easier to transform premodern guild associational life in modern voluntary associations. 
Also, part of the conditions for the promotion of a stronger civic life in Italy can be 
attributed to the Vatican state. In contrast to the French (or Spanish and Portuguese) 
churches, when it was incorporated in the new Italian nation in the late nineteenth 
century, there was a vast body of resources that could be used for collective action and 
for sponsoring Christian democracy. 
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Part III. Associational life in Iberia, 1800-1940s 
 
 257
Chapter 10: Antecedents: Associational life 1700s-1870s 
 
10.1. The End of the Guilds and the First Modern Voluntary Association 
 
In both Portugal and Spain, there was an early elimination of corporate religious 
and socioeconomic bodies. As in many Western European countries, associational life 
in the old regime was composed of corporations. Urban guilds of the masters and 
apprentices of the different economic trades with inherent immunities and privileges 
were common, and they fulfilled religious and welfare functions.891 The urban guilds of 
Lisbon, the artisanal oficios, were organized in a major federative structure called the 
Casa dos Vinte e Quatro (House of the Twenty-Four). It had a set of monopolies and 
the control of entrance into the professions. Originally a fourteenth century organization 
of craft and industrial interests, it formed the basis of a new public administration 
organization also at the local level. Gradually it acquired a strong role in the public and 
political life by regulating urban political and religious life and by providing health 
care, elderly care, funeral assistance, help to widows as well as religious services to its 
members and families.892 
There were also other corporate organizations for the protection of the needy and 
for the organization of the crafts. These were called confrarias (brotherhoods), 
corporações de mesteres (crafts corporations), mercearias, gafarias (church medical 
assistance units), hospitais de meninos (children’s hospitals), compromissos marítimos 
(maritime commitments), and confrarias dos mareantes (seamen brotherhoods). These 
organizations provided services to their members, like health insurance programs or 
direct assistance, mainly through the creation of hospitals, and sometimes they even 
provided charitable assistance to non-members. There were also the Misericórdias or 
Holy Houses of Mercy, charitable organizations of the church. The monarchy supported 
these institutions and conceded them privileges.893 
In Spain, there were important guild confederations. The Consulado de Mar, a 
guild that appeared in the thirteenth century in the eastern coast of Spain, promoted and 
protected the interests of Aragonese merchants. It set import tariffs, secured trade 
monopolies, had also functions of charity, and was a co-ruler in many of municipalities 
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of Eastern Spain since the 1400s (in the regions of Catalonia, Aragon, and Valencia).894 
In rural areas the main organization was the Mesta. The Honrado Concejo de la Mesta 
was a guild of Castilian wool producers founded in 1273 and that lasted until 1836.895 
In the city of Salamanca, and in the regions of Alta Extremadura and La Mancha, the 
Mesta since the thirteenth century to the eighteenth century maintained a monopoly of 
sheep-breeding by an alliance with the crown, giving in return to the king high taxes 
from the selling of the wool. The Mesta set the prices of the wool products, tariffs over 
imports, and regulated cattle commercialization.896 
Since the eighteenth century these corporate bodies started to be attacked by rulers, 
and by the 1830s they had been eliminated in Iberia. Centralizing absolutist monarchs in 
the eighteenth century sought to strengthen executive power over society and to expand 
a common state jurisdiction over the territory that clashed with claims for corporate 
sectoral rule. States expanded also their fiscal capacities over the lands, properties, and 
economic activities of these groups and of the church. 897  Lastly, projects of state-
directed industrialization for the creation of internal free markets led to attacks on the 
corporations, which became negatively identified with the idea of “privileges”. The 
crown had now a more active role in shaping society, in particular for the promotion of 
capitalist accumulation and a commercial society, and it was understood by the elites of 
the time that the resources of the corporate goods should be put to a more efficient use. 
This implied the end of market privileges.898 
The Spanish absolute monarchy was one of the more powerful European states 
between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries.899 The permanent engagement in 
wars with France and Britain since the sixteenth century left the national treasury 
without resources.900 Hence, Spain engaged in a quest for resources in order to finance 
its war machine since the early 1700s. In 1722 internal barriers to commerce between 
Spanish regions were suppressed. The merchant guild Consulado Del Mar and the 
Mesta lost many of their privileges, and they were called to finance the war efforts.901 
Free internal trade of grain affected especially the Mesta. The crown also looked for the 
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expropriation and then the sale of communal and ecclesiastical lands.902 After 1759 
with  King Carlos III’s rise to power and his minister Campomanes, many of the Mesta 
lands, free pasture lands, were confiscated by the state in order to be sold. The post of 
Entregador, one of the main officers of the Mesta was eliminated in 1796, and its 
functions were given to local state officers (alcaldes). 903  During Carlos V reign, 
Minister of State Godoy confiscated the Gremios property in 1789 in order to finance 
the public deficit, and in 1796 all corporate-guild price regulations ended in Spain.904 
By the mid-1700s, the policies of the Portuguese absolute monarchy, most 
represented by State Minister the Marquis of Pombal, pursued a similar line regarding 
organized interests. In 1761, the end of corporate regulations was decreed in the copper 
industry, and new licenses for industrial production were given to factories that were 
not subject to the corporate structure. It created an institution to regulate the new 
industrial factory system, the Junta do Comércio (1757), with representatives from the 
state and business, with the functions that once belonged to guilds, of establishing rules 
and programs for the factories, tax benefits and the attribution of privileges to 
companies.905 
The extension of state authority and extraction of resources to finance war 
extended also to the Catholic Church. Pedro Campomanez and Gaspar Jovellanos, 
bureaucrats of the Consejo de Castilla, defended the thesis that church land should be 
used for commercial purposes in order to improve production. Between 1798 and 1808 
one sixth of church property was sold.906 Also in Portugal, a significant share of church 
property was confiscated and sold by Pombal. In both countries much of what was 
confiscated was property of charity institutions like hospitals, misericordias, 
orphanages, monasteries and convents, and brotherhoods.907 
This process of attacking corporate and religious bodies continued in the 
nineteenth century. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic invasions, the liberal systems 
continued this policy. The Napoleonic invasions of Iberia in 1808 terminated the 
absolutist regimes abruptly. After a bloody guerrilla war against France, and with the 
support of Britain, the defeat of Napoleon was followed by civil war between Liberals 
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and supporters of old-regime absolutist politics (the Carlistas in Spain, the Miguelistas 
in Portugal). The restoration of absolutist regimes after the defeat of Napoleon was 
short lived (Fernando VII in Spain, D. Miguel in Portugal) and only to be followed by 
very unstable liberal regimes after the 1830s. 
The new liberal forces proceed to destroy by force the power basis of the church 
and such ancient regime institutions like the remaining corporate bodies. In both 
countries, the periods of monarchical restoration after the defeat of Napoleon had 
persecuted and condemned to death many moderate liberals, all with the support of the 
Catholic Church. When moderate liberalism appeared again in the 1830s, the church 
and many noblemen sided with the militarist neo-absolutist attempts to bring these 
regimes down. As a reaction, the Liberals expropriated most of the church lands in the 
1830s and 1840s. According to Payne, the Catholic Church, the «most important 
nongovernment institution in Spain was completely alienated from the liberal 
regime».908 
In Spain, the so-called desamortización in 1837 sold most Church lands. 909  
Religious congregations were banned in Portugal in 1834, and a big part of the church 
property was expropriated and commercialized, a process know as desamortização.910 
Until the 1860s most of the properties of the church (convents, churches, parishes, 
brotherhoods, hospitals, asylums, and charity bodies) were sold. In the 1868 law, the 
only church property that could not be expropriated was the priest’s house!911 
The remnants of the guilds and corporations were all abolished also by the liberals. 
They were declared to be an obstacle to freedom of commerce. In Spain in 1812, the 
abolition of corporations was declared, and their properties were confiscated and sold 
by the state,912 and in a decree on  December 6, 1836 the Grémios lost their capacity to 
regulate professions and commerce. 913  In Portugal the compulsory end of the old 
corporate and gremial structure came in May 1834.914 
Although there was recognition of the right of petition, assembly and speech in the 
first phase of liberalism in Iberia, only elite and upper-middle class associations were 
allowed. The first type of these associations was a fusion between old aristocrats and 
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new liberals. These were places where the liberal proto-parties cultivated their links 
with provincial elites. In Spain the salons of Madrid become the main influential 
organizations for literary and political debates. The first, the Ateneo, was founded in 
1835, but soon many emerged throughout the country.915 These societies of debate, or 
Academias continued espousing an ideology of state rationalization and free enterprise 
and commerce.916 In Portugal, elite cultural associations and salons of upper-middle 
class liberals initially appear in Lisbon and Oporto but soon spread to provincial 
capitals. They were of several types: musical societies (Academia Filarmónica 1838, 
Sociedade Filarmonica Portuguesa 1840), social clubs (Club Lisbonense in 1840 and in 
the 1850s the Assembleia Lusitana, Assembleia Lisbonense, and Sociedade da 
Peninsula), 917  and theater associations (Coimbra’s Academia Dramatica 1839, and 
Sociedade União and Sociedade Juventude Recreativa Dramatica created in Porto in 
1846). 918  Elite associational life included also business interests. Merchants and 
employers’ class associations were created in the 1830s. In 1834 the first associações de 
comércio (commercial associations) were founded in Lisbon and Oporto. Between 1835 
and 1860 commercial and business associations emerge in many other cities (Figueira 
Foz, Setúbal, Ponta Delgada, and Funchal); in 1849 the Associação Industrial 
Portuense was founded, in 1860 the Associação Promotora da Industria Fabril, in 
Lisbon, and in 1860 the agricultural interests in the Real Associação Central da 
Agricultura Portuguesa-RACAP (the Royal Central Association of Portuguese 
Agriculture).919 
Inversely to middle class associational life, workers’ associations were not allowed 
by the liberal regimes. In Spain, the constitution of Cádiz (1812) and the penal code of 
1822 prohibited trade union organization. The Chapelier Law in France was the main 
influence of Spanish legislation on associations. The Real Orden of February 28, 1839 
restricted the formation of associations only to self-help societies and only under 
supervision of authorities. The penal code of 1848 submitted all associations to the need 
of state consent in order to become legal. Strikes were also forbidden under the pretext 
that they increased the cost of work. Finally, the royal order of August 25, 1853 
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prohibited associations to have political aims and the formation of national level 
associations.920 
Nevertheless, from the mid to the late nineteenth century workers’ organizations 
were founded, in spite of being illegal by the existing legislation. Although facing these 
prohibitions, the remnants of the guilds were used by workers to build their own new 
organizations for self-protection. In Iberia these have been called by diverse names, like 
Cofradías in Spain and Sociedades de Socorros Mutuos, Mutualidades in Portugal or 
Cooperativas in both countries. As a Portuguese advocate and first analyst of 
associational life said in 1876, «the worker, by associating to worker, taking every week 
from its pay a small parcel, guarantees resources for his days of sickness».921  
These associations had several functions. Some aimed at the protection from risk 
of their members, providing monetary support for disability suffered at work, and to 
widows and orphans in the form of pensions. Others were educational societies for the 
intellectual and moral development of workers. Among these were the instruction 
societies and temperance association, aimed at fighting workers’ «passion for 
drinks». 922  Finally, there were the more economically oriented associations, like 
cooperatives and workers’ credit associations (Montes da Piedade in Portugal) that lent 
capital at low interest rates for agricultural or industrial ventures.923 
In Portugal, the first modern workers’ association was formed in 1839, the 
Sociedade dos Artistas Lisbonenses, by Silvestre Pinheiro Ferreira.924 In the 1840s in 
the neighborhood of Alcântara in Lisbon, workers would gather in these associations to 
party and organize religious ceremonies. Only in Alcântara there were five of these 
associations. 925  In the 1840s and the early 1850s, many modern associations were 
founded by the direct action of Francisco Sousa Brandão, Vieira da Silva, and Lopes de 
Mendonça, who were professional printers. They were particularly active in one 
organization, the Associação Operária, through which they attempted to organize 
mutualities, consumption and production cooperatives, libraries, a musical society, and 
a popular bank. Together they published the newspaper Eco dos Operários. The 
Associação had the form and procedures of a modern voluntary association: every year 
the fifty members who would take their places in the general assembly were elected by 
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vote of all the associates. In 1852, the Centro Promotor dos Melhoramentos das Classes 
Laboriosas was created, which is considered to have started the modern workers’ 
movement. 926  The Centro Promotor espoused the socialist ideals of equality and 
fraternity, and it affiliated itself in the tradition of the 1848 revolution. It was founded 
by the first socialist intellectuals (José Fontana, João Bonança, Antero de Quental, 
Azedo Gneco, and Teófilo Braga) but also included old republicans, radical liberals, and 
masons. It organized conferences, funded newspapers, and promoted the associational 
development of workers with the aim of an ideal of a community of small proprietors 
that were self-administered.927 Still, the accounts at this time say that most workers did 
not belong to any association; associational life seemed to be restricted to the more 
prosperous trades like the printers.928 
In 1870, the Caixa Económica Operária was founded, that became the more 
important cooperative of consumption and credit. Yet, in the whole country there were 
only a few dozen cooperatives.929  In 1871 the working class was organized in the 
Associação Protectora do Trabalho Nacional (which later became anarchist).930 In the 
early 1870s according to Goodolphim, there was an irregular growth of associations, 
and in general associations had difficulties in recruiting members. Sources of the time 
show that at this time in Lisbon the more successful associations were the 85 
mutualities that provided disease support funds with about 30,000 members 
(discounting double memberships). Also the associations of public employees and of 
commerce employees were relatively strong. The remaining of the associational 
landscape had low funds, inability to recruit members, and unscrupulous leaders. 
Fraternities report a lack of funds for the growing need to distribute more benefits to a 
higher number of members and potential recipients, that the quotas on members were 
unable to sustain the expenses on burial funds, widow pensions, pharmacy, and medical 
services. Only a minority received such funds.931 At this time in the whole country, 
there were about three hundred associations with 70,000 members but with enormous 
regional variation: they were mainly concentrated in Lisbon and Porto.932 
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In Spain the first artisans’ associations were created in the Catalan cities. The first 
textile association appeared in 1835 with the creation of the Asociación Mutua de 
Tejedores by Juan Muns.933 Between the years 1835 and 1855 many other workers 
organizations emerged in the textile branch whose model of organization was gradually 
adopted by other professions. In 1854 a confederation of the different branches of the 
textile industry was created: the Unión de Clases. Between July 2 and 12, 1855 it 
organized a series of strikes demanding higher salaries, and it was able to mobilize fifty 
thousand workers and to send a petition to the parliament asking for freedom of 
association that was signed by about thirty thousand people. The strike was severely 
repressed by the government (Espartero) and the associations had to remain semi-
clandestine. In this condition, they organized in 1865 a secret workers’ congress with 
representatives of forty workers’ organizations, including consumers’ and producers’ 
cooperatives.934 
In the 1870s, Spain had the traits and the potential for the development of a 
modern associational life. According to Zorrilla, workers’ and lower class associational 
life spread all over Spain in the form of recreational, mutual-help, and instruction 
organizations. There were about 2,441 associations in the whole country: 1,568 were 
recreational societies (65%), 458 mutualities (18%), 305 cultural-instruction societies 
(12%), and 43 social welfare and beneficence associations, 30 industrial associations 
(proto-unions), fifteen political associations, fifteen professional and seven were 
religious associations.935 
When comparing Portugal and Spain with this data, already in the 1870s Spain had 
a density of voluntary associations that was a slightly more than double of the 
Portuguese. In Portugal, the population in 1878 was 4,160,315 people,936 which gives 
about one association per 13,867 people. Spain, with a population of 16,622,000 in 
1877,937 had one association per 6,808 people. Moreover, some regions had a decisive 
impact in the emergence of modern Spanish associational life. Especially in Catalonia, 
but also in the Basque country, it was easier to form modern associations with high 
coordination capacities, levels of membership, and capacities for collective action. In 
Catalonia there was a high associational movement of the lower classes both in rural 
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and urban areas that were organized within a federative network of mutual help 
societies, popular education associations, and cooperatives.938 This is explained by the 
fact that in Catalonia and in the Basque country there was a continuity of pre-modern 
representative corporate institutions.939 
The region of Catalonia had conditions more favourable to the formation of 
associations. Here the guild/corporate organizations of the old regime were able to 
transform themselves into modern associations more easily than in most other Spanish 
regions or in Portugal. The arrival of liberalism did not affect them much. The 
organizations in the Associación Mutua de Tejedores of 1839 were corporative 
monopolies that had been reconverted in the nineteenth century into a modern 
association. They maintained the characteristics of the old guilds, like controlling the 
professional career by keeping the old divisions and career steps of apprenticeship, 
officer, and master, and they were able to establish price regulations, to avoid imports 
from other countries and to postpone for long mechanical innovations. Guilds existed at 
least until the 1860s, and this form of organization was extended to modern industry. 
Professions (oficios) became monopolistic groups with control over production and raw 
materials and with a mandatory membership for anyone who wanted to enter it. The 
guild structure was kept in Catalonia in the many oficios of the city that became work 
cooperatives. For instance, this was the organizational form of associations like the 
carpenters of ship-building, La Maestranza Naviera founded in 1850, the printers in the 
Taller de Oficiales Impresores founded in 1855, and many other professions. The Hat 
Makers association in 1860 grouped almost 50% of the class.940 
Also in Valencia the legacy of the Grémios was still alive, making it easier to use 
their resources and patrimony for the creation of artisan’s societies that become 
Associaciones de Socorros Mútuos. Finally, also in the Basque country there was 
continuity of the guilds. In the city of Santander the three Sociedades de Socorros 
Mútuos of the mid-nineteenth century corresponded to the old Grémios. Outside these 
regions, the cities of Cartagena, Palma de Maiorca, and Zaragoza had also similar 
structures.941 
Moreover, the city and regional authorities maintained the integration of these 
corporate bodies in the local systems of rule. Some crafts (the building crafts, baking, 
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brewing, tailoring, metal, and especially printing) were included in local bargaining 
structures together with the political authorities. In Barcelona they were in a factory 
inspection committee, and a bipartite conciliation system, the jurados mixtos, was set up 
for the textile industry in 1873. According to Amsden, the municipality even channelled 
credit to the Asociacion Mutua de Tejedores for the continuation and modernization of 
their activity and its transition to the modern factory system.942 Later, a consultative 
Comision Permanente de Gremios was created, renamed later the Junta de Clases, by 
the city authorities. Finally, most Gremios in the city of Barcelona had a governing role 
together with the church structure that existed in each parish as organs for the 
dispensation of charity and welfare.943 
In spite of the impact of Catalonia, Spain had a weak associational life by the late 
1860s and the early 1870s when compared to the rest of Western Europe. There was a 
tendency for associations not to be political and to remain local. Especially in the 
countryside, the early abolition of the guilds and the sale of church property benefited 
only a small portion of the Spanish population, a new middle class of liberal politicians 
and state bureaucrats that bought the land at very low prices, a point which generated a 
strong concentration of land.944 The end of resources for collective action, in terms of 
land possession, communal privileges, corporatist and/or religious protections against 
labor market crisis, generated an extreme proletarization of urban and rural workers.945 
For instance, the 7,300 shelters, 2,200 hospitals, 106 orphanages, and 67 foster homes 
that the church had in Spain all disappeared with the desarmortización.946 Rampant 
unemployment, lack of secure income, seasonal jobs, and above all an extreme poverty 
became the common existence of a large rural proletariat (especially in the south) and 
also of many urban workers.947 This process was similar to the one James Mahoney 
identified for Central America in the same period, which he calls a radical liberal policy 
of agriculture modernization. He argues that a sudden, coercive, and highly 
encompassing land privatization promoted by the state leads to an extreme 
marginalization of the rural peasantry.948 
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This created, especially in the Iberian countryside, a population with very low 
capacity and few resources for collective action and organization-building, but at the 
same time totally alienated from the new liberal regime and engaging frequently, when 
external circumstances allowed it, in anti-system revolts.949 In the nineteenth century 
there was a growth of rural banditry (in Portugal banditismo, in Spain bandolerismo), 
land occupations (e.g. Spanish province of Malaga in the 1840s), and sudden explosions 
of revolt against the authorities (e.g. Castilla and Arágon provinces), involving 
frequently the burning of churches and the killing of animals and sometimes local 
politicians.950 In 1857, a group of peasants in the Seville region burned all state records 
of the selling of the communal lands; in 1861, Rafael Pérez del Álamo, a republican-
socialist who became known as the Spanish Spartacus, lead ten thousand peasants in 
Andalucia and took the city of Loja and was heading to conquer Granada when he was 
stopped by the army. In general these social movements were short lived, lacked and 
did not leave any legacy of organization.951 
In the northern lands of Portugal and Spain this process generated reactionary and 
neo-absolutist rural movements opposing the simple existence of the liberal state: 
Carlismo in Spain and Miguelismo in Portugal. The process of land commercialization 
had expropriated medium and small peasants, making them an ally of the church and of 
traditionalist elites. In Spain, traditionalist peasants united under the banner of the 
brother of King Fernando VII, D. Carlos, who claimed the throne accusing his brother 
of being too liberal. After the death of D. Fernando in 1833, a war started between the 
supporters of D. Carlos and the descendents of Fernando VII that lasted intermittently 
until at least the 1880s. Especially in the regions of the Basque country, Catalonia and 
Navarra, Carlista revolts spread to the extent that they were able to control portions of 
this territory. 952  In Portugal, a similar process occurred with traditionalist peasants 
supporting the Causa de D. Miguel, the neo-absolutist reactionary brother of liberal-
moderate King D. Pedro. Miguelista revolts in the Portuguese countryside, in particular 
in the north, continued until the 1850s.953 
If the rural classes were highly unorganized, preferring political action through 
sporadic protest and revolts, the urban working classes were not much better. The 
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existing traditions of associational life remained very localistic, encompassing peak 
associations were always difficult to sustain. Moreover, popular class associational life 
became anti-regime as well, first being the place for the consolidation of radical 
republicanism and later anarchism. This is related to the two other variables: weak 





In Iberia, traditions of very weak parlimentarism did not encourage the national 
spread of associations, their incorporation with political parties, and the acceptance of 
the legitimacy of the liberal regime. Popular class interests faced many obstacles in 
being represented in parliaments since the early 1800s in Iberia. In fact, the Cádiz 
constitution of 1810-1813 introduced extreme parliamentarism in Spain. The king had 
limited powers, faced strong limitations to his suspensive veto and was checked by the 
elected Cortes.954. Also in Portugal the constitution of 1821 gave the parliament an 
important role. Ministers were responsible to parliament, and although the king had the 
capacity to nominate and dismiss secretaries of state, he had no legislative initiative or 
the power to dissolve the Cortes.955 But these constitutions were short-lived and after 
intermittent periods of military fighting between Liberals and conservatives, and 
between the several factions of the liberals, the constitutions that became prevalent in 
the political system in the 1830s gave little power to the parliament. 
In the 1830s, liberal-moderate constitutions aimed to institutionalize the liberal 
camp and to regulate a peaceful competition between the factions of liberalism, 
conservatives/moderates, and radicals. The moderate Spanish Estatuto Real of 1834 
divided the Liberals into two camps, the Partido Progresista and the Partido Moderado. 
In Portugal, the 1826 Carta Constitucional was also a moderate document, opposing 
both liberal radicalism (vintismo) and traditionalism. Still, the several factions 
competed with each other through the force of arms, and not through parliamentary 
contradiction and mobilization of electoral bodies. This gradually made the 
contemporary kings and their rivals for the throne as heads of two military-political 
bodies, generating thus the dominance of the executive and individual ministries over 
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society at the expense of the parliament. The early 1810s and the 1830s witnessed fights 
between Liberals and absolutists that dominated the political scene. In the absolutist 
periods (D. João VI 1814-1821 in Portugal, and Fernando VII in Spain, 1814-20, 1823-
1833) parliaments were abolished, royal authority became supreme, and rule by decree 
was the norm. The provinces were directly administered by governors (frequently a 
military) of royal nomination. It was also restored the inquisition.956 
In the 1840s the conflicts were between moderate and radical liberals. In Spain, the 
government of General Espartero, with the support of the queen, the conservatives and 
liberal moderates in order to repress radicals instituted a form of state where parliament 
was pushed aside as a centre of power, centralizing power in the hands of government. 
The head of government ruled directly over the provinces through directly appointed 
mayors in the provincial cities and prefects over the regions. Since radicals were strong 
in many cities, municipal freedoms were crushed also.957 In Portugal in the late 1840s, 
there was a similar trend towards executive and administrative dominance. The Costa 
Cabral governments created a new administrative code that reinforced the centralism 
already present in the 1835 reforms of Mouzinho Silveira. In the 1830s Portuguese 
administration was established on the French model, with the division between 
provincias (ruled by prefeito), comarcas (subprefeito) and concelhos (provedor) similar 
to departments (préfet), districts (subpréfet) or arrondissements and communes (maire) 
in France. All these agents and the courts were nominated by the king.958 In the 1840s, 
these reforms were deepened, with the creation of seventeen administrative districts 
ruled by the new post of governadores civis (prefects), directly nominated by the king. 
Lower administrative territorial bodies, the concelhos and the parish were also 
coordinated by administrators chosen by the government.959 
The center of power of Iberian politics was the executive and the administration, 
not the parliament. As a consequence, it was more difficult for the popular classes to 
make their claims directly to politicians, since the parliament did not count for much. 
Prefects were in fact more agents of social control and repression over societal interests 
from the center than real intermediaries and facilitators of the organization of interests. 
The real center of power was the Ministry of Interior and its agents, the prefects. They 
were the ones to assure public security in the provinces, superintended the police, dealt 
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with associations, received organized movements of petitions, and became so powerful 
that they became gradually the real vote-gathers in the countryside, indispensable for 
the winning of elections.960 
The repression of lower class discontent and the harassment of workers became 
common practice towards associations, and freedom of association was frequently 
suspended. The right of association was not easily granted by the liberal governments. 
Until the late 1860s, most workers’ associations had to remain clandestine in order to 
survive. Early associations in Portugal, like mutualities and brotherhoods, replicated in 
their internal organization the structure of parliamentarism with its general assemblies, 
elections of the administration, and fiscal councils.961 Also, early liberal thinkers and 
politicians had plans for the development of popular class associational life. In Portugal 
after the civil war of 1834, there were plans for the development of welfare to be 
channelled through associations. In 1834, Silvestre Pinheiro Ferreira projected a Banco 
de Socorro e Seguro Mútuo, and in 1840 he had plans for the creation of a liberal 
sponsored Associação para o Melhoramento das Classes Industriosas. In 1844, the 
liberal thinker Alexandre Herculano published a book defending the social role of 
mutualities titled Das Caixas Económicas, where he defended a society where 
associations, mutualities, and cooperatives had a central role in welfare, politics, and 
economics. Andrade Corvo, a disciple of Herculano and Minister of Public Works, 
wrote the first report and proposals for the reform of associations defending a system 
close to the one operating in Belgium. Associations were to be legal and recognized by 
the government in order to promote their federalization.962 
All these projects failed. In Portugal, Andrade Corvo’s project faced the opposition 
of the church, especially by the action of the Bishop of Viseu.963 Also in Spain, early 
twentieth century proposals for freedom of association failed. In the first parliamentary 
meetings of the Cortes in 1820, the proposal of the deputy Álvarez Guerra to nominate a 
commission to write a project of regulation of political associations, which had the aim 
to legalize the sociedades patrioticas, was blocked by the government. In fact, 
September 16, 1820 patriotic societies were dissolved. The constitution did not 
recognize the right of association.964  The associations in the liberal area that were 
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devoted to a coalition with the lower classes had always a secondary role in politics. 
Other cases were the Institucion Libre de Enseñanza that was created in Madrid in 1875 
by university professors and liberal politicians in the spirit of the radical-liberal 
ideology of the revolution of 1868. It was committed to the creation of a liberal 
democracy with a dimension of social reform. Another association was created in 
February 1899, the Liga Nacional de Productores in Zaragoza (province of Aragon), 
under the presidency Joaquin Costa, and it aimed to mobilize the productive classes 
against the oligarchs in agriculture and industry. Costa’s aim was the creation of a new 
class of farmers that would break the power of local caciques.965 Yet, they were always 
very marginal in the political process. 
Weak parliamentarism did not allow associations to develop as much as they 
could. It was more difficult to institute freedom of association, associations could not be 
used by parties for mobilization purposes, and cross-regional links between groups and 
classes did not emerge so easily because the parliament did not debate national issues. 
Instead, the debate of local and regional issues was made more important by the 
institutional position of the prefectorial system. Associations become more local 
ventures and with difficulty spread throughout the territory. 
 
10.3.State Breakdown, Militarization, and State-Church Conflict 
 
The nature of the state strenghtened the general traits of Iberian associational life 
of weak density, weak coordination, and localism even more. Moreover, it added a new 
trait: extreme eruptions of protest, directed against the system, usually after state failure, 
and that could not sustain themselves organizationally through time. Voluntary 
associations erupted only in occasional circumstances. Its general pattern was one of 
erratic evolution in terms of density and capacity of coordination, marked by sudden 
advances and deep retreats. 
The pattern of state building in Iberia had produced very weak states. Although 
Iberian states were centralized and even despotic, at the same time they were subject to 
private appropriation of its resources by political and social agents, bureaucracy was 
weakly professionalized, and even because of divisions within its armed apparatus 
(police and the army) they had difficulties in controlling the territory. This produced a 
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system that combined a strong impetus towards repression of the centre over the 
periphery (through the police, the army, or the prefects) but that simultaneously let local 
power holders grow as the main political agents. Thus, extreme localism became a 
feature of these states. 
This was a consequence of the fact that the Iberian states were at a situation of 
permanent internal conflict, or even civil war, since the early 1800s until the 1870s: 
first, with the national guerrilla wars against the French during the Napoleonic invasion, 
afterwards in the several civil wars between Liberals and absolutists, and between 
moderate and radical liberals. This permanent state of war had several consequences for 
the traits of the Iberian states that would ultimately influence the shape of associational 
life. Although both in in Portugal and Spain there were elite settlement that somehow 
pacified political life (in Portugal between 1851 and 1890) and in Spain in the first 
decades of the Restauración (Restoration, 1874 and 1923), between 1874 and 1898, 
what is important to stress is that these settlements failed to produce a competitive and 
open liberal system and ultimately were unable to cope with external military and 
geopolitical pressures in the 1890s, which paved the way for their collapse by military 
action in 1910 (Portugal) and 1923 (Spain).  
The first was the consolidation of the power of the military as political and 
administrative agents at the expense of civilian politicians and party leaders. More 
precisely, civilian elites, both on the right and on the left, depended on the military to 
achieve their aims and would cultivate ties with sectors of the armed forces to promote 
their interests and achieve their objectives. Military men were political agents too, and 
political factions, from the extreme right to the extreme left, had links with specific 
sectors of the armed forces.966 
The role of the military in politics started with the wars against the French 
Napoleonic armies. The collapse of the Iberian monarchies put the military as the main 
arbiters of politics. In Portugal, the court even left to Brazil. In practice, the rule of 
Portuguese and Spanish territory was left to the military. The invasion had made the 
state structure of the ancient regime collapse, and the guerrilla war that followed led to 
the consolidation of the power of regional military officers that gradually assumed the 
position of political leaders. They were almost sovereign in specific parts of the 
territory, mobilized the population to resist the French invader in the name of the king 
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by creating military–guerrilla movements. Sometimes, these military leaders even 
fought each other and gradually aspired to a more national role.967 
After the 1820s and until the 1870s, during the fights between Liberals and 
absolutists, and factions of Liberals between themselves, the military became the main 
political actor in politics. As a consequence, armed violence, army coups, and 
conspiracies became the standard way to resolve political issues. In Portugal, the neo-
absolutist claimant to the throne in the 1830s, D Miguel, was a kind of military caudillo 
against his brother, moderate liberal king D. Pedro IV, who was called the “Rei-
Soldado” (“soldier-king”). Both organized military volunteer battalions to fight each 
other. Gradually, all of the main political men of the Portuguese liberalism who fought 
the absolutists were also from the military: Marquis of Saldanha, Duque Terceira, and 
Bernardo de Sá Nogueira. 968  In Spain, the neo-absolutists organized a body of 
volunteers to fight the liberal governments in 1821-23, and the Liberals created their 
civic para-military organization, the Milicia Nacional, which in 1839 had 173,481 
armed and 455,037 unarmed men.969 Finally, after 1836 the divisions within the liberal 
camp had also a military dimension. In Portugal, it was between moderates and radicals, 
with the radicals, the so-called Setembristas, being able to recruit many men in the 
lower ranks of the army.970 In Spain in 1836, the liberal-moderate government was the 
object of a revolt by radicals led by the sergeants of the army (because of delay in the 
pay of soldiers).971 
The second trait of the Iberian state was its extreme fragmentation. With the state 
collapse after the French invasions and decades of guerrilla and civil war, the center did 
not simply have coercive, much less infra-structural, control of the periphery. In each 
and every part of Portugal and Spain, a local strongman emerged who ruled frequently 
as an almost sovereign and who competed with other strongmen. The first case of this 
were the Provincial Juntas that appeared during the French invasions. These were 
bodies of local/regional defense that resisted the French but that acted quasi-
autonomously and without a national strategy. For instance in Portugal, the liberator of 
the city of Amarante, General Francisco da Silveira Pinto, rivaled with the liberator of 
the city of Bragança, General Sepúlveda, for the control of the whole northeastern 
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region of Portugal (Trás-os-montes). 972  The war against the French was in fact a 
collection of small guerrilla wars fought at the same time against a common enemy but 
without any coordination. As Payne argues about the war of independence in Spain, it 
was the «first modern guerrilla war of popular resistance».973 
This pattern of state fragmentation continued until the 1870s with the civil wars 
between miguelistas/carlistas, and Liberals in Portugal and Spain. Associational life in 
the countryside was composed mainly of regional popular-military bands that fought the 
central government. In Portugal, the miguelistas controlled significant parts of the 
territory until the 1850s. The Remexido, a regional powerlord, controlled the southern 
region of Algarve. João Brandão, another warlord, controlled parts of the center and 
northeast.974 In the regions of Catalonia, the Basque country and Navarra in Spain, 
carlistas organized the conservative peasantry, the priests, and sectors of the army into a 
mass military social movement that fought the central state in the name of the 
traditional monarchy. 
In sum, the Portuguese and Spanish states had very low capacity to control their 
own territories during most of the nineteenth century. They were also unable to count on 
the loyalty of their military men. This promoted deep localism. State control of the 
territory was so weak that local powerful men and caciques were the real agents of 
power.975 For instance, in Portugal the bandit João Brandão became in the 1850s a 
respected local politician whose influence was sought both by the governments and the 
opposition in Lisbon.976 The high militarization of the state made it more probable to 
use repression than cooptation when dealing with pressures from below. The 
militarization of the state and of the territory extended to the police forces that had been 
created to control the countryside and which were modeled on the army structure. The 
Guardia Civil, created in 1844 in Spain, was a national police force that was part of the 
military and run by army officers. Moreover, also in Portugal police brutality was 
common.977 
 
10.4. Outcome: A Local, Individualistic, and Radical Associational Life 
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Weak parliamentarism, high executive dominance, militarization of politics and 
low state capacity produced an associational life that was at the same time weak, local, 
and anti-regime. By the 1860s and the early 1870s, the existing popular classes’ 
associational life was very individualistic and strongly opposed to the liberal system in 
the form of radical-republicanism. This was especially evident in Spanish 
republicanism. It was a combination of anti-system radicalism with the project of a 
small scale and local democratic society, a project that could gain ascendance only in a 
regime combining high repression and bureaucratic control of associational life with an 
extreme localism. In Spain since the 1850s, the workers’ fight for the right of 
association is so intense that one of the slogans of the period was “Association or 
Death”.  Pi y Margall, the leader of the Federalist Party, was an admirer of Proudhon, 
and he defended a federal society organized around a network of small self-contained 
and governing communes. Proudhon’s federalism was since the 1860s very popular in 
Spain, and it was shared by many liberals and republicans.978 
Also in the 1860s, syndicalist ideas started to spread in Catalonia and Andalusia’s 
countryside. In 1868 Bakunin’s envoy, Giuseppe Fanelli, visited Spain.979 His visit was 
a success, since he was able to recruit many clubs of workers, like the printers, cobblers, 
and many craftsmen as well as students, to the anarchist cause. As in radical 
republicanism, one of the basic ideas was the organization of society around self-
autonomous units under the principle of mutual cooperation. Anselmo Lorenzano and 
Fraga Pellicier organized the first anarchist centers in Barcelona and a federative 
structure, the Centro Federal de las Sociedades Obreras de Barcelona.980 
Republicanism appeared in the late 1840s in Portugal spreading the spirit of the 
1848 revolution and organizing in secret societies like the Comissão Revolucionária de 
Lisboa (or Triunvirato Republicano) and the Carbonária Lusitana that were all soon 
repressed.981 In 1876, the Partido Republicano (Republican Party) was formed, and 
soon it acquired a small-bourgeois and workers’ support base.982 Especially in Lisbon 
and Oporto where political competition was more ideological, the republicans built an 
efficient network, organized rallies and conferences, and mobilizing citizens during 
electoral periods. Popular associational life was gradually taken over by the republicans. 
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The Republican Party itself, initially called Centro Eleitoral Republicano Democrático, 
was the result of a fusion of a series of republican clubs, centers, brotherhoods, and 
lower class popular associations. They were able to penetrate urban centers and urban 
constituencies: in the late 1860s they had 60% of their clubs in Lisbon, 10% in Oporto. 
Associational life was expressed fully and to higher levels only in exceptional 
circumstances, such as during a state crisis. The period between 1868 and 1874 that 
created the first Spanish Republic was one of those cases. The Spanish regime between 
the late-1850s and 1868 was an attempt to stabilize a system of liberal competition 
under the direction of the Unión Liberal, a moderate/conservative party led by 
O’Donnell, with a project of social, administrative, and economic reforms, and of 
extension of liberties (plans for freedom of association and expression). At the same 
time, the party was based on the old methods of electoral corruption and clientelismo 
which weakened it in the eyes of the growing number of radical-republicans, especially 
in the eastern coastal area (namely Barcelona). Furthermore, it was not conservative 
enough to the extreme right, the carlistas. Occasional Carlist risings and pressures from 
the extreme left led the monarch to dismiss the government in the autumn of 1864. 
After three small weak governments, Nervaez, a conservative general of the Partido 
Moderado (moderate party), was nominated as head of government by the monarch. His 
rule continued and strengthened the system of electoral corruption (the number of voters 
fell from 158,000 in 1858 to 418,000 in 1865). This led to the discontentment of the left 
liberals (progressitas) and the republicans or democratic-radicals who abstained to run 
in the elections of 1866, who launched an armed attack on the government. The San Gil 
rising, a military revolt of radical sergeants was brutally repressed in June-July of 1866, 
but progressive general Serrano rose again in 1868, thus bringing down the Isabeline 
monarchy. It installed a democratic republic, with the main parties being the Partido 
Progressista, the Partido Democrata, and the Union Liberal.983 
In Spain, the proclamation of the first republic marked a high point in associational 
development. The 1868 military revolt was backed by radical federal-republican civilian 
associations. It set up revolutionary juntas in parts of Spain, especially in the east, the 
center, and south. A new government was installed in Madrid, led by the progressive 
General Juan Prim. The government planned to introduce political democracy. 
Universal male suffrage was instituted, and a moderate constitutional monarchy was 
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established in 1870 with a new king, Amadeo of Savoy. Freedom of association and 
reunion was declared in the laws of June 20, 1869 and in the articles 17-19 of the 1869 
constitution, thus allowing workers’ organizations to become legal. As was declared in 
the manifesto of the revolution, «the freedoms of reunion and association for peaceful 
means have been recognized as fundamental dogmas of the revolution».984 
Freedom of association, constitutional parliamentarism, and universal suffrage 
provided an impetus for associational growth. The Centro Federal de Sociedades 
Obreras, the Spanish section of the International was formed, initially with 7,000 
members and 34 affiliated organizations. In 1872 in its congress in Cordoba, it was 
declared to have 25,000 members and in 1874 50,000.985 Initially the movement was 
restricted to Western Andalusia, recruiting 28,000 individuals in the period 1869-1873, 
although mostly artisans and not peasants. 986  Its ideology was anarcho-collectivist, 
since the Spanish sided with Bakunin against Marx. In fact, Bakunin’s ideas found in 
Spain a much more fertile ground, since they almost inversely mirrored  the nature of 
Spanish (and for that matter Portuguese, as I discuss in the next chapter) state and 
regime: a very repressive polity that at the same time had a weak capacity and that was 
very fragmented. Inversely, anarchism defended full participatory democracy (as the 
inverse of extreme statism of the Iberian states) but it was based on small scale 
organizations (as the direct expression of Iberian fragmentation), and whose 
implementation arrived by collective action directed at bringing down the state (as a 
mirror of the extreme repressiveness of the polity). Bakunin espoused the need to 
overturn the existing polities, by violence if needed, to terminate the state as such, and 
to replace it with workers’ co-organization in the local craft union, which would become 
the basic social unit. Then all craft unions would unite in a local federation, which 
would then get together with other federations in national federal committee. The 1870 
congress in Spain remained a federation co-ordinated through area units (local, county, 
and regional).987 
                                                
The constitutional monarchy and its subsequent federal republic did not survive. 
First, immediately after 1868, the local juntas spread over Spain and acted almost 
autonomously, many of them in the hands of extreme radicals and anticlerical mobs that 
imposed a reign of terror in the moderate middle classes and the church. Church land 
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was confiscated and seminars suppressed. The central government also allowed this, 
with the approval of laws of civil marriage, the secularization of cemeteries in 1871, and 
the control of the nomination of church bodies. Disappointed with the new constitution, 
Amadeo resigned from the throne in 1873 and declared it anti-Catholic. The 
government was weak and fell under a new radical federal-republican advance that 
inaugurated the first republic. 
In sum, the republic was unable to consolidate itself and faced two revolts: first, in 
Navarre and the Basque provinces the Carlists grew in mobilization (in fact, they had 
been fighting the regime since 1869). Second, extreme radicals in the republican-
federalist camp in southern and eastern Spain set up cantons that declared independence 
from Madrid. Facing revolts both from the right and the left, in 1874 a new military 




Iberian societies faced the hardest conditions for the development of a dense 
associational field. First, since the eighteenth century there was a direct attack on any 
corporate autonomous body by state rulers, first by the absolute monarchy and later by 
both liberals and reactionaries that much took away resources for collective action and 
self-organization of communities both in cities and the countryside. Second, there was a 
pattern of an almost failure of state building that left many areas of the territory out of 
the control of the center and national rulers, thus promoting local and clientelistic 
associational ventures. Finally, a very weak parliament, where party competition was 
largely a sham, left power in the hands of the king and the military. In these conditions, 
repression over associations was much easier but at the same time promoted 
associational initiatives directed against the existence of the state itself. 
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Chapter 11: Critical Juncture, 1880s-1918 
 
11.1. Failed Parliamentary Regimes and Weak States 
 
 After the permanent state of internal warfare between the early 1800s and 1874, 
the Iberian political systems attempted stabilization in the form of a moderate liberal-
constitutional political system at the end of the nineteenth century. In Spain, it was the 
period called the Restauración (Restoration), which lasted between 1874 and 1923. The 
main political figure was Cánovas del Castillo, leader of the Liberal-Conservative party 
(descendent of the Unionistas Liberales), who competed with the Agrupacion Liberal 
Fusionista, led by Sagasta (the heirs of the old progresistas, democratas, and left 
unionistas). In Portugal in 1876, the party systems stabilized around the competition of 
two parties, the Partido Regenerador, the more conservative party, and the Partido 
Progressista, the more liberal party (founded in 1876 by the fusion of two old liberal 
radical parties, the Partido Histórico and the Partido Reformista). 
 Contrary to many Western European countries, like England, Belgium or 
Sweden, liberalism failed to develop into mass liberalism in Iberia. Liberal parties never 
really developed competitive dynamics with each other. They remained strict elite 
organizations and stayed distant to popular sector voluntary associations. The fear and 
the inability to include popular mobilization led these systems to defensive positions. In 
Spain in the 1880s, Canovas and Sagasta decided not to push their competition too far 
in the Pacto Del Pardo in 1881 owing to a fear of giving opportunities for revolt by the 
republicans and/or Carlists. They inaugurated the so-called Turno Pacifico system, 
where under the monarch’s supervision each party rotated in office without the need to 
mobilize the citizenry. In Portugal, also the parties developed a system called 
Rotativismo, and rapidly the more left liberals, the Progressistas, when in government 
failed to develop the policy of inclusion that they had promised.989 
 In fact, the main political institutions of the regime were the king, the state 
bureaucracy, and the military, not the parliament. Continuing the patterns of the past, in 
both Spanish and Portuguese constitutions the king was the real centre of power, the so-
called poder moderador. Although more so in Portugal than in Spain, and with 
important consequences, as I explain below, the crown was the main arbiter of political 
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conflicts in comparison with rest of Western Europe, and he decided who would occupy 
government. The use of power by the king without obeying the parliamentary majorities 
was common, contrary to most monarchies in Europe.990 In the Portuguese constitution, 
valid between 1842 and 1910, the king was the head of the executive power, and could 
dissolve the chamber of deputies, nominate and dismiss ministers, veto parliamentary 
legislation, and was even considered as sharing the legislative power with the Cortes.991 
 Government change was more dependent of the will of the king than of electoral 
competition. As Blakeley argues for the case of Spain, «the king, with the agreement of 
the incoming government, would dissolve the parliament and call elections». 992  In 
Portugal in the period 1868-1890, the dissolution of governments by the king was 
common as a regular form to resolve political crises.993  Governments became very 
unstable as a consequence, because they depended to a large extent on the king’s favour. 
In this period, most Portuguese governments did not end their mandate (only three in 
twelve), and between 1852 and 1910 it was the country where government instability 
was highest. There should have been realized only seventeen elections, not the thirty 
three elections that actually took place.994 
 From the point of view of associations, parliament was a closed avenue to 
pressure for the advancement of their interests, and parties were distant and incapable to 
form stable coalitions and inter-locking links. But ironically, for many years, 
associations were willing to be incorporated through government and party channels. 
For instance, the Portuguese Fraternidade Operária and the Associação dos 
Trabalhadores were believers in the value of parliament. As late as 1895, the workers’ 
newspaper, the Eco Metalúrgico published articles defending the participation in 
elections and the parliament. But after the mid-1890s, they began to voice many doubts. 
An article published in April of 1897 claimed that «parliamentarism, that was defended 
by the most serious and honest men of the beginning of this century is today recognized 
as a social cancer». And a «burgeois deputy is the essence of fraud».995 Another one in 
1909 declared that workers should aim at the destruction of the state through direct 
action.996 In fact, there had been a decline of representations of interests to parliament in 
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Portugal. In the early 1880s, there was for a brief period a growing reliance of 
associations (of many types, like state employees, professional groups, citizens groups, 
workers, neighborhood, and Misericordias) to present petitions and send representatives 
to the parliament. In 1888 it received 205 representations, in 1889 135, in 1891 59, in 
1892 149, in 1894 60, in 1896 270, in 1897 134, in 1899 290, in 1900 380, and in 1901 
175.997 
 Moreover, traits of a state with a low capacity, in particular its inherent 
clientelism, did not provide incentives for elites to mobilize the population through 
competitive parties and ideological appeals. Parties of the system were mainly 
clientelistic organizations, which used the resources of the state in a private way in 
order to channel resources to their clienteles. In the late 1870s when these systems 
stabilized after decades of civil war, many of the old local powerlords and their 
successors were incorporated in the new liberal political parties, thus becoming agents 
of the parties in a certain area and serving as intermediaries between the center and the 
periphery. They were the first notables or caciques, whose power was based on the 
control of a particular city or village, and who could use that power to deliver support 
and votes to the elites in Lisbon. Local populations were linked to the caciques by 
personal ties, not by ideology, and the cacique sold his influence to any party in Lisbon 
in exchange for public works, tax and military exemptions, and jobs in the state 
machinery. 998  The system became one of widespread corruption, where also state 
officers like prefects became electoral agents of the government, and whose job was to 
find electoral support in the peripheries by buying the votes. In Portugal, for instance 
the Minister of Interior, who controlled the prefects, was called the «grande eleitor» (the 
big elector).999 
 This produced a local and small size associational life. Before the mass age, the 
population was already mobilized by networks of clientelistic relationships, which were 
mainly individualistic and vertical. The cacique dispensed favors to his clients, but the 
clients did not have any relationship with each other. This tended to favor a hierarchical 
and semi-authoritarian inclusion of the popular classes. Many associations in the 
peripheries, like religious brotherhoods and charities, were mainly instruments of social 
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control from above and instruments of clientelistic favor. For instance, many popular 
associations like cultural neighborhood associations were in fact used by local caciques 
for electoral support, and they were divided between the two main liberal factions of the 
late 1800s, the Progressistas (the liberal left) and the Regeneradores (the center right). 
Each locality was organized around a grand cacique, but links between popular classes 
of different localities were difficult to develop.1000 
 
11.2. Radical and Informally Coordinated Associational Life: Republicanism and 
Anarchism 
 
 These regimes failed to include and mobilize popular classes. In both Spain and 
Portugal, most associational life organizations remained without links to the existing 
elites and evolved into radical opposition to the system. Elites in the party system could 
not and/or were unwilling to establish links with associations and the citizenry, since 
mobilization of a broad electorate was not vital for them to stay in office.1001 In both 
countries, associational life became rapidly organized first by republicans and later by 
left-wing anarchists. Only these groups had an ideological program and capacity for 
mass mobilization and organization building. The demand for universal male suffrage 
became a central banner of the republicans, who took this flag from the dynastic left. In 
Portugal, the Republican Party was mainly based in the big cities, especially in Lisbon. 
In 1907, 35% of all their clubs were in Lisbon, 21% in Oporto, and 40% in the 
countryside. In 1883, it was estimated that three thousand people were members of the 
republican clubs in Lisbon. Based on this network for electoral support, in 1908 the 
Republican Party was able to wins seats in municipal elections in some small cities of 
the south and in August 1910 the first seat in the rural district of Alentejo.1002 In Spain, 
popular associational life, in the form of cooperatives, mutual aid societies, Casas Del 
Pueblo (people’s houses), was also republican.1003 Moreover, republican associational 
life was growingly anti-monarchical and opposed the regime.1004 In December 1887, the 
Portuguese Republican Party of approved the line of the radical faction (led by Manuel 
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de Arriaga) that defended the total incompatibility and intransigence in the fight against 
monarchic parties.1005 
 The Anarchist movement  grew in both countries in the 1880s. In Spain in the 
1880s, anarchism spread from being just an artisan movement to the rural workers of 
the southern regions. In 1882, the Anarchist movement had 57,934 members. Of these 
most came from Andalucia (38,349 out of which 20,915 were rural workers), which was 
also the place where there was the biggest number of clubs (in 130 cities). In Catalonia, 
the movement has 13,201 members and in Valencia 2,355.1006 
 In the 1880s Portugal, some individuals claimed to be Anarchists, supporting the 
section of the International led by Bakunin. There was a group in Porto led by Eduardo 
Maia who was linked to two anarchist organizations, the União Democrática Social and 
the Associação-União dos Trabalhadores. In 1887 there was a similar group in 
Lisbon.1007 In the countryside, there was some growth of anarchist associations in the 
southern latifundia region. Rural syndicalism appeared in 1894 when the first rural 
union in Montemor-o-Novo was founded, followed by an immediate succession of 
similar organizations in Évora, Santarém, Nelas, Santa Cita and other southern cities, 
which rapidly were recruited by the Anarchists.1008 In 1909, the first national structure 
of syndicalism was created, the Comissão Executiva do Congresso Sindicalista, which 
was divided into two trends. One was more moderate, preferring to work within the 
existing political order and in alliance with republican candidates. The other was more 
radical and opposed any cooperation with the regime and any party. In this period the 
number of registered unions was 777, and although the records declare that they had a 
short life-span, the Anarchists are able to gain ascendancy in the workers’ movement, in 
cooperatives and associations in general, much more than the socialists.1009 Still, at the 
end of the monarchy, the 98 existing agrarian unions had only 10,000 members, less 
than 1% of the active agrarian population.1010 
 Combining this with weak parliamentarism and clientelistic state, Iberian states 
suffered external shocks in this period that definitely affected their capacity, making the 
existing elites so insecure of their position, because of competition with other states, 
that they resorted to even more repression in order to stay in power, thus severing 
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definitely their already weak links with the popular sectors. These external shocks only 
aggravated this situation in the 1890s, making for weak links between parties and 
associational life. Portugal clashed with England over their corresponding ambitions in 
Austral Africa. Both wanted the land between Angola and Mozambique. In Portugal it 
was called the pink map, an ambitious plan to unite Atlantic coast (Angola) with Indian 
Ocean (Mozambique). This clashed with English interests to unite Cairo with Cape 
Town in South Africa. After delayed diplomatic confrontations, England threatened to 
invade Portugal if she pursueed these ambitions. In Spain, it was the military defeat in 
1898 inflicted by the USA over Cuba, the Philippines and Puerto Rico. 
 These external crises shook the power basis of already weak elites and 
contributed to undermine the legitimacy of the monarchies by providing opportunities 
for radicals within the loose confederations of associational life to attack the regime. In 
Portugal, the civic-republican associational life expanded strongly after the crisis of 
1890, when the republicans, and to a smaller extent the socialists, started to carry the 
banner of nationalism after the British ultimatum of 1890. In Porto, the Liga Patriotica 
do Norte was created in January 1890, a body composed of republicans, radical students 
and some leftists of the Partido Progressista that even proclaimed a counter-
government. Following republican demonstrations in the country, callings for the 
resignation of the King, and clashes with the police, there was even a military revolt of 
lower rank officers (sergeants) in Porto promoted by republicans on January 31, 
1891.1011 In 1908, the King was assassinated by radical-republicans of the Carbonária, 
and in 1910 a republican-military coup ended the monarchy and proclaimed the 
Portuguese First Republic. 
 In Spain after the 1895-1898 disaster, there was an opportunity for pressures 
from below to be directed against the regime. Associational life could expand when the 
state suffered a crisis induced by external events. In this period UGT grew until 1904 
(in 1888 it had 3,355 members, 6,154 in 1896, 34,778 in 1902, 43,665 in 1904).1012 
Many republicans become even more radical, adopting anarchism.1013 Initially, in their 
congress in Barcelona in 1881, the Anarchists were divided into two lines: the more 
moderate Catalan line and the Andalucian that was adept of the use violence for 
political purposes. The Andalucian tradition was partly based on the ancient claims of 
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the rural workers for the division of the big land properties and of the early nineteenth 
century radical federalist republicanism. The militants wanted the direct seizure of the 
land, organizing in 1882 a peasant uprising that became known as the Black Hand 
episode.1014 Instead in Catalonia, anarchism was called anarcosyndicalismo, its main 
agent was the union and the preferred tactic the general strike. 1015  But Anarchists 
became more radical with this opportunity of state crisis. There was a spread of the idea 
that the general revolutionary strike should be the main tactic of the Anarchists, a kind 
of armed mass rising to prepare the social revolution. In Barcelona in February 1902, 
150,000 workers went on strike for a week, 1016  and in 1903-1904 rural protests 
reappered.1017 Still, the main event was the assassination of Prime Minister Canovas in 
1897 by an Italian Anarchist, and in 1906 the killing attempt of King Alfonso XII.1018 
 A repressive trend is reinforced by the fact that after the external conflicts with 
the USA and England, governments fully dispensed with parliament, thus terminating 
the brief period of pseudo-parliamentarism of the mid 1870s to the early 1890s, and 
embarked on policies of authoritarian mobilization from above (and especially in Spain, 
militaristic expansion). In Spain, the plans of modernization by King Alfonso XIII 
(1899-1909) started in 1902 through the governments of conservatives Silvela and 
António Maura. Both attempted legitimize the regime with appeals to national 
Catholicism and by creating links between the population and politicians, putting aside 
the parties of El Turno, through a programme of social welfare (e.g. Silvela’s project of 
work accidents). 1019  In 1903, Prime Minister Antonio Maura declared that public 
opinion was his guide in politics. And in 1909 the government called the draft on the 
population for military expansion in Morocco. This programme continued with the 
governments of Dato in 1913, and during the years of World War I (1914-1918), 
although Spain remained neutral, the debates between anglophiles and germanophiles 
were so intense that the governments of Dato and Romanones (1915-1916) imposed 
rule by decree, suspending parliamentarism, and taking the control of financial expenses 
of the state out of the parliament’s control.1020 Also in Portugal, the monarchy assumed 
a project of authoritarian modernization that was deeply inspired by the German 
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example.1021 After ten years of unstable although repressive governments (1895-1905), 
the king nominates João Franco as a dictator in 1905 to rule without consulting the 
parliament and party politicians, and the legislative power of the government was 
empowered.1022 
 In the 1890s, Iberian governments had a clearly repressive stance towards 
associational life, and they relied on the police and the army to deal with pressures from 
below. In Spain, Anarchists were highly repressed by the governments until the early 
1900s, and they were able to come to surface only occasionally and to promote small 
uprisings especially in the provinces of Cádiz and Seville.1023 In 1896, a law against 
anarchism was approved and brutally enforced. Executions of Anarchists were frequent 
and the government usually called the army or the Guardia Civil to crush Anarchist 
demonstrations.1024 The period between 1898 and 1910 was one of brutal repression. 
Anarchists were deported and sent to prison, and many associations were closed.1025 
The most brutal case was in 1909, when the government imposed the draft in Catalonia 
for military service in Morocco. This provoked an Anarchist revolt, which was brutally 
repressed, in the events known as the tragic week. Paradoxically, Francisco Ferrer, an 
Anarchist leader and pedagogue but a representative of the more moderate factions in 
the movement, was executed by government troops in October 1909.1026 
 Also in Portugal, Anarchists were repressed by the government. For instance, on 
February 13, 1893 Prime Minister Hintze Ribeiro published even a law for the 
repression of anarchism. Strikers could be deported to Timor and defenders of Anarchist 
ideals could be sent to prison for up to six months.1027 It was common for prefects to 
suspend republican individual freedoms, to make difficult and not allow demonstrations 
and meetings in public places, and remarks about state institutions in public 
demonstrations were forbidden. 1028  Workers’ associations (associações de classe), 
although legal since 1891, were not allowed to promote strikes, had to have their status 
approved by the prefects, and had to ask permission to rent facilities. Finally, the 
formation of federations was forbidden.1029 The decree of  March 29, 1890 introduced 
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stronger restrictions, and according to Trindade Coelho, it meant the «end of the right of 
reunion».1030 The 1891 law on associations subjected the formation of associations to 
government approval and put many restrictions on their activities and the ability to form 
regional or national unions. 1031 Moreover, it was not possible to form political 
associations.1032 
 In Spain, this led to the lethargy of the movement in Andalucia until 1910. After 
1903, the movement was weakly organized in the south. In Córdoba there was only one 
Anarchist association listed in this period, and until 1910 only 19 strikes are registered 
in the whole country.1033 In general, the Anarchists could only organize episodic strikes, 
which evolved many times into sudden bursts of violence as in 1903 in the city of 
Córdoba.1034 In 1910, the Confederacion Nacional de Trabajo or CNT, an Anarchist 
confederation, was formed. The CNT received much of its inspiration from French 
revolutionary syndicalism. Direct action, factory indiscipline, refusal to participate in 
mediation institutions of labor issues, general strike, and sabotage became the main 
adopted tactics. Moreover, because of the growing expansion to the south, land division 
and armed insurrection were also part of the new ideology.1035 In 1911, the CNT was 
declared illegal by the government. 1036  Its first years of life were not that very 
promising. It gained only about thirty thousand members in the first years, and after a 
failed general strike in Barcelona in 1912, its decline began. Its rural wing, the 
Federación Nacional de Agricultores de España founded in 1913, was also very 
unstable, and in 1916 only had three thousand members. Strikes were also few: 23 
strikes in the rural countryside in 1915, 35 in 1916, and 46 in 1917.1037 In 1915, the 
CNT had only 15,000 members in all of Spain.1038 In fact, the growth of the Anarchist 
movement was never rapid or continuous: diverse federations proliferated but they were 
soon extinguished; it suffered periods of sudden growth and affiliation and then periods 
of persecution and clandestine activity when the movement became again only a small 
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group of militants. The organization could not institutionalize as a provider of services 
to its members because of almost constant repression from the authorities.1039 
 In Portugal, although a republic since 1910 and the right of association had been 
established in the 1911 constitution, the new regime would evolve into a hostile 
inimical position towards voluntary associations.1040 In fact, the new regime had been 
the result of an organized minority of radical republicans in the Carbonaria and in the 
military, which were successful less because they were able to sustain and organize a 
broad popular movement, but because they took advantage of state weakness to bring 
down the regime by a coup. The proclamation of the republic on October 5, 1910 was 
the result of the joint action of the Comité Militar Republicano and the Carbonária, 
who had infiltrated most military units of Lisbon and of the navy, and together with 
some civilian groups arrested the king. At most it mobilized 2,000 armed men.1041 
 In this sense, the republicans who got power in 1910 were not civic leaders and 
coming from a rooted associational movement. They were also not very civic-minded in 
the sense that they would tolerate any association. They were republicans first, 
democrats after. In fact, the new regime attacked all associations that could have a 
different ideology from radical republicanism and promoted its own policial type of 
civic associations. Repression from above, would again promote the expansion, if in an 
irregular pattern, of anarchism in Portugal, as it had happened in the Spanish monarchy. 
 The new republican regime used the Carbonaria to organize “popular 
battalions” that were strongly connected to the Republican Party in order to 
“republicanize” the recalcitrant groups, in particular the peasantry and the industrial 
workers. After 1911 the republicans of the Partido Democrático (the continuator of the 
old Partido Republicano of the monarchy) used the battalions to organize incursions in 
the countryside to attack both peasants who wanted a return to the monarchy (in the 
centre-north) and Anarchist rural workers. In 1911 in Lisbon, there were twenty six 
battalions with seven thousand members.1042 
 Already by 1911, the Anarchist movement declared war against the new regime 
in its first congress. In 1912, there was a strike of rural workers of the south (with a 
solidarity strike in Lisbon), where the prefect of the city of Moita was killed, the 
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federation was closed, and hundreds of syndicalists were arrested.1043 After 1910 there 
was a growth of rural syndicalism, especially in the south (Alentejo) from 4 unions in 
1910 to 168 in 1915 (37 in 1920).1044 In 1912, they were able to organize the first 
congress of the Federação dos Trabalhadores Rurais in Évora, encompassing 39 unions 
and representing 12,525 workers.1045 According to Bermeo, in 1914 there were 110 
unions for farm workers south of Tejo river (Tagus). Although weakly structured at the 
national level (despite the ephemeral attempt in the União dos Sindicatos Agrícolas 
Portugueses and another by the Associação Central da Agricultura Portuguesa), 
agrarian unions were represented in many counties of the south (70% of the counties in 
Beja and 75% in Portalegre), and they were able to organize protest activity: the Évora 
district had seventy strikes for higher wages between 1910 and 1925.1046 Strikes rose 
from 91 in 1900-1909 to 391 in the period 1910-1919.1047 With Portugal’s entry into 
World War I in 1917, the workers’ movement was mostly against the participation in 
the war effort contrary to many of the workers’ movements in Europe, and consequently 
it tended towards even more radical actions.1048 In 1914, the União Operária Nacional 
replaced the Comissão Executiva do Congresso Sindicalista, thus creating a clearly 
federalist structure with a permanent administrative commission under the direction of a 
new organ, the conselho central, composed of one delegate from each union. The 
general organization was a pyramidal structure of unions and federations. There was an 
organ for the current management of the confederation: a council with representatives of 
the base militants that met every one to three months and that possessed decision 
capacity between congresses.1049 Still, the confederation had very weak powers over its 
members. Combat tactics were to be chosen by each association, and each unit was 
autonomous. As it was declared in the Anarchist congress, «in the union movement, the 
influx comes from the bottom and not from the top».1050 
 In sum, low parliamentarism, weak state capacity, and a tradition of extreme 
individualism promoted in this period in the two Iberian countries a loose, local, and 
weakly dense but radical associational life, mainly in the hands of Anarchist and radical 
republican movements. There was also the expansion of this radicalism to the 
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countryside. Mass organized ideologies like socialism were very weak when compared 
to radical republicanism and anarchism.1051 This differentiates Iberia from the rest of 
Western European countries that were analyzed in the previous chapters. 
 But in spite of these commonalities, there were significant differences between 
Portugal and Spain. Spain had a stronger associational life that was more of mass type. 
In Spain, when compared to Portugal, there was the development of denser and more 
coordinated networks of socialist, Catholic, and nationalistic-regionalist voluntary 
associations. Again, as my model predicted, this was explained by the fact that in Spain 
1) corporate representation legacies continued in this period in some regions, thus 
promoting a denser and coordinated associational life, especially in the Basque country 
and Catalonia, 2) Spain’s degree of parliamentarization and democratization were 
higher, and 3) state capacity was also stronger. 
 
11.3. Variations in Iberia: Regionalist, Socialist, and Catholic Civil Societies 
 
 In Iberia, as elsewhere in Europe, the period between the 1880s and the 1930 
saw the biggest expansion and growth of modern associational life. For instance in 
Spain, seventy eight percent of all workers’ associations were founded in the years 
between 1899 and 1904 according to Riley.1052 
 According to Zorrila, there were 3,108 associations in Spain in 1887. Of these, 
53% were recreational, 21.3% were mutualities and self-help associations (664 
associations), 254 were literary, artistic, and educational associations (8.7%), 3% were 
political associations (freethinking, republican, conservative, liberal, and leftist); 3% 
were pressure groups of specific interests, 2.7% were economic associations of 
agriculture, industry, and mining, 2.5% were cooperatives, 2.5% were Catholic 
associations, 1.38% were associations of resistance, 1.38% beneficial-charity, and 
0.12% associations to provide the building of houses.1053 
 In 1904, there were 5,609 associations in Spain, and in 1916 there were 18,986 
associations. Of these, 14,214 were professional associations (workers, mixed, and 
employers' associations) while 4,772 were no-professional associations (526 were 
savings associations, 696 cooperatives, and 3,550 welfare associations). Although the 
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data on levels of membership is scarce, there are indications of a rise. In 1916, 348,265 
workers were members of class associations, and the 2,020 savings, cooperative, and 
welfare associations had 437,347 members (of a diverse social background). There was 
also a growth of political associations of workers. In 1904 there were 1,147 societies of 
resistance, and in 1916 4,764 unions existed.1054 Mutualities grew from 1,691 in 1904 to 
4,517 in 1916.1055 
 In Portugal, the years between 1891 and 1932 witnessed also the highest rate of 
formation of associations of several types (welfare, civic, employers’ and workers’, 
mutualities, recreational, youth, and religious). Brotherhoods and mutualities grew 
rapidly after the 1870s. In 1851-1853, there was an annual average of three, in 1886-
1890 the annual average was 21, reaching in 1889 the number of four hundred.1056 In 
Lisbon in 1893, 90 associations were registered: professions’ – shoemakers etc. – 
neighborhood, recreational, and beneficence, all devoted to organizing conferences, 
schools, meetings, and publishing public bulletins. Afterwards, they became more 
politically oriented.1057 
 According to Costa Goodolfim, at the end of the nineteenth century there were 
three hundred associations in Portugal with about seventy thousand members. Most of 
them were Socorros Mútuos associations, or mutualities, brotherhoods or self-help 
societies. They were mainly concentrated in Lisbon, with forty thousand members in 
this city.1058 According to Ramos, there 295 Mutualidades or Sociedades de Socorros 
Mutuos in 1882, out of which 65 were based in Lisbon, 61 in Oporto, the remaining 
throughout the country, and all comprising about 94,000 members. In 1898 there were 
about 480 associations, with 170,000 members in total; and in 1903, there were 559 
associations, of which 301 were based in Lisbon. Since each member could represent a 
family, Ramos argues that about 14% of Portuguese families were represented by these 
organizations.1059 
 Also Pereira puts the number of associations ataround three hundred in the 
1880s. In 1883 there were 295 mutualities and in 1889 392 (with a membership growth 
of 47%).  In 1909 there were 628 associations in Portugal (with a membership growth 
of 174%); in 1921 almost 700 associations (and a growth of members at 62%). Between 
                                                 
1054 Zorrila, 1997, p. 95.  
1055 Zorrila, 1997, p. 98.  
1056 Freire, 2006, pp. 19-20. 
1057 Almeida, 1991, p. 73. 
1058 Rêgo, 2001, pp. 70-71. 
1059 Ramos, 1994, pp. 80-81. 
 292
1921 and 1931, there was a reduction of the number of members (4% less), and 
associations: in 1929 there were only around 550 associations.1060 
 The evolution of the number of association members was the following: in 1889 
a bit more than 100,000, in 1905 300,000, in 1919 370,000, in 1921 490,000, and 
approximately 600,000 in 1930. The distribution of the associations’ members by types 
of associations, there was much more people in the mutualities than in the purely class 
associations: in 1921 class associations had 96,328 members and associações de 
socorros mútuos (health insurance, pensions, and funerary) had 615,000 members.1061 
 Finally, the geographical distribution of mutualities was very uneven. They were 
mainly concentrated in Lisbon and Porto. In 1883, 81% of the mutualist population was 
concentrated in Lisbon. Also, at the end of the nineteenth century about one third of the 
population of Lisbon held membership in a mutuality.1062 
 Pinto and Almeida note a rise in the number of associations between 1876 and 
1909. In 1874 they count 84 friendly societies in Portugal, in 1889 there were 303, in 
1903 there were about 473 and in 1909 number increases to 502 associations. These 
numbers are very similar to the ones presented by the previous authors. 
 









 Total  
 Number Members Number Members   Number Members 
1876 84 - 69 - 153  
1889 303 118,650 89 20,220 392 138870 
1903 473 141,900 113 33,600 586 175500 
1909 502 324,000 125 42,309 627 366309 
(Source: Pinto, Almeida, 2000, p. 9) 
 
 As in the previous decades, in this period we also find a higher density of 
associational life. In Portugal, there were 392 associations in 1887. Dividing the 
population (4,660,095 in 1890) by the number of associations, there was one association 
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for every 11,887 individuals. In Spain, the comparable figure is one association for each 
5,646 Spaniards (by using the total of the Spanish population in 1887 – 17,550,000 
people – and the existing 3,108 associations).1063 The same pattern continues in the 
early 1900s. In 1909 there were 628 associations in Portugal. Calculating that the 
population was of 5,900,000 (in 1910), there is one association for every 9,394 
Portuguese. In Spain in 1904, there were 5,609 associations. Dividing the population of 
the country (18,594,000 in 1900), there was one association for every 3,315 
individuals.1064 
 The first reason for a higher associational life in Spain than in Portugal in this 
period was the continuation of higher associational life traditions at regional level that 
continued and modernized the legacy of guilds and corporations, especially in Catalonia 
and the Basque country. As Riley has shown, in 1904 Catalonia and the Basque country 
had the highest number of workers’ associations relative to population (23 and 20 
respectively, per one hundred thousand people). The Castilla region had 11 and 
Valencia 13, with the rest of the regions of the country with a number of associations 
per capita between 4 and 8. In 1913, this number had grown even more and the top 
regions are the same. The number of per capita workers’ associations was 82 in the 
Basque Country, 49 in Catalonia, and 44 in Valencia. Asturias had risen to 41 
associations per capita. The importance of these regions for associability remains also 
when non-professional associations are counted (excluding unions, mixed employers-
employees associations, and employers associations). The per capita figures are 96 for 
Catalonia and 33 for the Basque country with the rest of the country’s regions with 
figures between 3 and 21.1065 
 In Catalonia during this period, according to Castillo, it was where federations of 
mutualities were strongest in Spain, continuing the tradition of strong associational life 
of the previous sixty years. In the city of Barcelona an exceptional case was La Union y 
Defensa de los Montepios de Barcelona y sus Afueras, a federation formed in 1896 that 
included most of the savings banks (montepios), mutualities, and welfare and mutual-
help associations. There were 554 associations in the federation, and it had 124,916 
members in 1911. In 1915 it included 747 associations and 167,623 members. In 1918 it 
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changed its name to Federación de Sociedades de Socorros Mutuos de la Provincia de 
Barcelona and included 827 associations and 289,773 members.1066 
 Many of these associations were recruited or formed by republicans. In 
Catalonia, besides the Anarchists, the radical republicans were also very strong. Their 
main party was Alejandro Lerroux’s Partido Radical (the successor of Unió 
Republicana), a lower-middle class radical party which combined an ideology of 
revolution, anticlericalism, and anti-catalanism, since they were centralist republicans as 
opposed to federalist republicans. They were able to penetrate with success especially in 
the non-manual workers’ milieu (commerce and industry): in 1900 they had the support 
of around 32,255 of the 128,000 Catalan workers,1067 and they had overthrew caciques 
and controlled much of the local government in Barcelona, and also had a presence in 
neighborhood associations.1068 
 In Catalonia, a higher tradition of associational life both of anarcho-syndicalists 
and radical republicans, and of both federalists and anti-federalists (Lerroux) included 
also the emergence of a nationalist movement after the 1880s. The sources of the 
nationalist movement in Catalonia are to a large extent conservative and rooted in the 
countryside traditions of Catholicism and carlismo that were locally strong. In fact, the 
Catholic Church should be seen here as a kind of corporate body, since it was always a 
significant part of the institutional structure of Catalonia and in partnership with it, 
contrary to most of the Spanish state where state-church conflicts were endemic. In 
Catalonia the church and the local politicians, defenders of regional institutions and 
autonomy, were allies, both fought a centralizing and rapacious state. 
 Since the late 1870s, the Catalan episcopate Josep Torras I Bages, like the 
bishop of Vic, defended the notion that Catalan culture was more Catholic than the rest 
of Spain. Bages argued that «there was no other nation as completely and solidly 
Christian as was Catalonia».1069 The first nationalist groups were inspired by this, like 
the Renaixença that was an association for cultural defence, and that promoted popular 
theatre and workers’ circles. The Centre Catalá, founded in 1881, allied with the 
Renaixença, with carlist groups and with Lliga de Defensa Industrial I Comercial de 
Barcelona (that included 146 corporations - corporaciones - of commerce and industry) 
and formed a new organization, the Lliga de Catalunya, for the protection of Catalan 
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language and culture.1070 These groups were able to include critical bourgeois/liberal 
elites who demanded from Madrid the openness for cereal imports and freedom of 
commerce for textiles. In 1901, they all gathered to form a party in order to participate 
in the elections, the Lliga Regionalista, and to compete with the dynastic parties and the 
republicans of Lerroux, their main rivals. In 1901 they elected four candidates in the 
Cortes. 1071  The Lliga Regionalista was led by Prat de la Riba and Cambó and 
constituted a well-organized, well-funded, and highly mobilizing mass organization 
with a conservative ideology. Moreover, it was able to institute regional autonomy 
through the creation of the regional government, the Mancomunidad, and use these 
institutions for social policies for workers and of the cultural defense of catalanism, thus 
continuing pre-modern and early liberal policies of partnership between local 
governments and associations.1072 
 Also in the Basque country, the continuing strength of pre-modern forms of 
organization, of church autonomy and alliance with local institutions of governance and 
the late elimination of corporate institutions of self-rule led to the higher density and 
coordination of associational life in the modern period, in particular through the creation 
of a strong Catholic movement and sometimes overlapping also with a mass nationalist 
movement. The Basque country and Navarra did not suffer the process of state 
centralization set in motion since the early 1700s by the absolute monarchy that had led 
to the abolition of the power of corporate groups and representative parliaments 
(Cortes). In Portugal and in the rest of Spain, these bodies were almost powerless after 
the mid-1700s, but the Basque Provinces and Navarra maintained their own assemblies 
and rights (both legislative and executive bodies), Fueros, until 1875.1073 This allowed 
these regions to have real governing autonomy from Castille, with the capacity to raise 
taxes and to organize its self-defence.1074 Moreover, the church also kept a high degree 
of autonomy, not found in other regions of Spain with the exception of Catalonia, thus 
keeping its property, privileges, and remaining embedded in the local laws and 
institutions of governance.1075 
 This allowed for a very strong mobilization of the peasantry against the 
centralizing national state during the whole nineteenth century. In both Catalonia and 
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the Basque country, Carlismo was stronger because these were areas where the church 
and the peasants formed a tight alliance.1076 In the Basque country and in Navarra, 
Carlist movements had been very strong until the 1870s, the time of the second Carlist 
war. In Portugal, on the contrary, Miguelismo was extinct by the early 1850s. As 
Hermínio Martins argues, the Miguelistas lacked a regional base like the Carlistas, and 
as a consequence their movement was weaker in organizational density.1077 The Basque 
Fueros were finally abolished in July 1876, when the Spanish central government 
imposed mandatory military service, the payment of taxes, and their replacement with 
provincial bodies imposed by the central government. Still, since these institutions were 
so present at the moment, it was easier to be transformed into a more modern movement 
for regional defense, which became the basis for a nationalist associational life.1078 
 Nationalist movements in the Basque country would thus be more based on a 
neo-traditionalist position and be very religious.1079 After the elimination of the fueros, 
many cultural and political organizations emerged for the recreation of traditional 
Basque institutions and culture. They were very able to attract popular classes in 
strongly Carlist regions.1080 Sabino Arana, the ideologue of Basque nationalism, was 
arrested in 1895 and afterwards created clandestinely the Bizkai-Batzara, a political 
association which became later the basis of the Basque Nationalist Party. The party was 
strong in the lower middle classes, some sectors of the working classes, artisans, and 
small shop-keepers.1081 It became very successful electorally, and in 1917 it conquered 
the majority in the region of Vizcaya. In 1918 it elected six deputies to the Cortes and 
strengthened its position in the rural areas.1082 It was linked to the Solidariedad de 
Trabajadores Vascos (STV), a nationalist union founded in 1911 and composed almost 
exclusively of Catholic miners, that rivalled the Socialist unions.1083 
 For these reasons, civic associations of Catholicism were also stronger in Spain 
than in Portugal, because of the impact of the Basque and Catalan regions. Although 
there are other reasons for the development of a stronger Catholic movement in Spain, 
as I explain later in this chapter (higher levels of parliamentarization and state capacity 
in Spain), it was undeniable that these regions had very high density of Catholic 
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associational life because of previous traditions of corporate associational life and a 
stronger corporate institutionalization the Catholic Church. 
 Catholic associational life appeared for the first time in Spain in 1868 with the 
formation of the first laymen’s association, the Association of Catholics, for the defense 
of Catholicism through political activity. It spread to twenty-nine provinces, declining 
during Alfonso XII’s restoration, with the exception of Catalonia.1084  In the 1890s, 
when the first Catholic trade unions were formed, they were very strong in the Basque 
city of Bilbao, as well as in the agrarian areas of north-central Spain, a region of small 
property holders.1085 After 1905, Catholic mass associational life developed in Spain. In 
Bilbao emerged small Catholic Uniones Profesionales, mixed worker-employer 
associations. In Barcelona, a network called the Accion Social Popular was founded in 
1907 by the Jesuit priest Gabrile Palau. In 1915 it had 15,000 members in Catalonia, 
distributed insurance and charity, and also organized the only white collar union in 
Barcelona, the UPDEC. Another successful Catholic group in Barcelona was the Old 
Age and Pensions and Savings Bank (Barcelona Caixa de Pensions per a Vellesa I 
d’Estalvis) founded in 1902 by a lay militant, Francesc Moragas, that provided 
assistance to many workers, even irrespective of their religion.1086 
 Between the 1880s and 1918, Spain developed mass voluntary associations at a 
much higher level than Portugal. Associations were stronger, denser, more able to 
recruit members, and more capable to form confederations. This led to the formation of 
socialist and Catholic mass political movements that were more developed than in 
Portugal. Besides the fact that Spain had already inherited a stronger associational life at 
regional level, two other factors explain this: first, higher levels of parliamentarization 
and second, a stronger state capacity to distribute and implement measures of welfare 
that empowered voluntary associations. 
 In Spain, the constitution that was valid between 1876 and 1923 foresaw that 
legislative power was shared between the Cortes and the king. The king designated the 
ministers but these were responsible to the parliament, and although the king had a right 
of veto over legislation, only together with the Cortes could a constitutional change be 
achieved.1087 Although this was a not fully parliamentarized regime, as in Belgium or in 
England, the parliament was more powerful than in Portugal. Moreover, this fact was 
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related to a higher level of democratization. This had been the legacy of the reforms 
taken in 1868, which introduced universal male suffrage, which was re-established by 
the Liberal Party in 1890. The number of voters increased from 847,000 in 1878 to 4.8 
million in 1890.1088 
 Portugal’s parliament, as we saw in the introduction to this chapter was much 
less powerful and had lower levels of democratization. Laws on the rights of 
participation, suffrage, debate, assembly, and discussion were more restricted in 
Portugal than in Spain, and elections were less competitive. Thus, not only was the 
parliament weaker, but the whole legal framework regulating associational life was 
more repressive and as such, the levels of democratization of the regime were lower. In 
fact in 1878, the right of the liberal parties, the Partido Regenerador, published a 
electoral law that was very open, allowed all adult males to vote (even if illiterate). 
After the 1890 crisis, the vote in the Republican Party grew, and there was a decline of 
monarchist parties. In 1895, a new electoral law by PM Hintze Ribeiro took the vote 
from the illiterates; voters should be men able to read and write, and who paid a fixed 
amount of direct taxes. Most workers and popular classes stayed outside the political 
system. The electorate in 1895 was only 9.4% of the population and 40% of the adult 
males. 1089  Although until 1890 the franchise was wider in Portugal than in the 
neighbouring country, except for the short period between 1868-1874. (In the mid-
1860s, the electorate as percentage of all population was about 3% in Spain and about 
9%-10% in Portugal; and in the 1880s it was about 6% and 19%, respectively)1090, after 
1910 in the First Portuguese Republic, the era of mass politics never arrived. 
Republicans did not implement universal suffrage. The 1913 law was even more 
restrictive of the electorate, which became 6.4% of the population, the lowest 
percentage since 1859. In 1910 the electorate was 47.3% of the adult male population, 
whereas in 1911 it had been 57.4%, and in 1913 26.5%.1091 
 The deeper parliamentarization and democratization of the Spanish political 
system had several effects on the development of a higher associational life. First, 
liberal parties became more competitive both between themselves and with external 
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adversaries (the Socialists and the Catholics). As Malefakis has noted, in Spain the 
parties of the el turno system, both the liberals and the conservatives of Maura, became 
more competitive, mass based, and more mobilized than in Portugal, where parties were 
more dependent of the king.1092 Parties developed more organic links to associations, 
and they allowed for more tolerant legislation on freedom of association and for 
inclusive social policies.  
 Spanish laws on associational life after the 1880s were more tolerant. In 1876 
the constitution recognized the right of association, and in 1881 workers’ associations 
were legalized.1093 The law June 15, 1880 regulated public meetings more freely.1094 In 
1887, the first Ley de Asociaciones was approved which allowed all types of 
associations to exist, including unions. Political authorities could not limit that right, 
only the courts could declare an association illegal (although there was a lot of 
harassment and bureaucratic impediments of associational life, such as very detailed 
procedures for registration, approval of statutes, and the need to inform authorities 
about the associational leaders and members).1095 According to Morena, these laws had 
a beneficial impact on the growth of associational life.1096 In Portugal, the laws were 
more restrictive. Even during the Republic, the decree of December 1910, a law on 
strikes, put many restrictions on the right to strike. It became known as the decreto-
burla,1097 
 Through a variety of social policies implemented by both liberal and 
conservative governments, associational life was empowered in Spain. In 1876, the 
Institucion Libre de Enseñanza was founded by Segismundo Moret, which was the 
liberal association of social reformism and linked to the Partido Liberal. Social welfare 
measures on security and hygiene at the workplace, regulation of women and children’s 
work, approval of Sunday rest, and construction of workers’ neighbourhoods were 
presented to the Cortes in July 1878. In 1880 was presented legislation to encourage 
workers’ self-help societies, the Montes de Piedad y Cajas de Ahorro. The so-called 
Social Question became an issue in the worries of reformers and politicians in Spain to 
a degree that never happened in Portugal. Also conservatives, like Antonio Maura, 
declared the need to «efectuar la revolución desde arriba, para evitar que otros (el 
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proletariado) la hagan desde abajo».1098 The CRS-Comision de Reformas Sociales was 
created on December 5, 1883 by a group of moderate liberals (Sagasta) and radical 
liberals, the Izquierda Dinastica, who had emerged in 1883.1099 
 The Commission had the mission to implement measures to improve the 
economic and social life conditions of the agrarian and industrial working classes. 
Provincial commissions were created in all the main cities of the country in order to 
gather information on the popular classes in each district and to supervise social welfare 
reforms in each locality, and also to mediate labor conflicts. In the early 1900s, it 
changed its name to Instituto de Reforma Social and implemented a system of local 
commissions of labour arbitration (to resolve issues like strikes or salaries). It was 
composed of twelve elected members, six of which were elected by the workers’ 
unions. Initially, the Socialists were more represented in these bodies, but after 1908 
they shared it with the Catholic unions.1100 In 1906, the Labor Inspectorate was also 
created like the National Institute of Social Security (Instituto Nacional de Previsión) in 
1908.1101 
 Portugal never developed anything similar to these institutions of social affairs. 
Work accidents in industry were regulated by the civil code. A first proposal in 1906 by 
a group of monarchist and progressive dissidents (the Left-Liberals) for mandatory 
insurance was only restricted to work accidents, and its funding would only come from 
the employers, not the state. Moreover, it excluded rural workers and fishermen.1102 In 
the Republican regime after 1910, there were plans for welfare initiatives by the state, 
but they were never really installed. Initially, the republican regime supported the 
mutualist movement; in fact, many of its leaders had been active in the mutualities 
during the monarchy, like Manuel José da Silva, the leader of the Conselho Central da 
Federação das Mutualidades, and Estevão de Vasconcelos, who became deputy and 
minister of Fomento (Development). A work accidents law was approved in 1912 to 
include industrial and rural workers (and fishermen), although it was only restricted to 
work accidents caused by machines.1103 It also created the Ministério do Trabalho e da 
Previdência Social (Ministry of Work and Social Welfare) with a department to deal 
with class associations and mutualities. Finally, the government allowed the creation of 
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the Federação Nacional das Associações de Socorros Mútuos in 1911, a structure that 
the existing law actually did not foresee.1104 
 Still, this all became mere legal formalities, and they were never really 
implemented through the cooptation of associations in policy and welfare policy 
networks. Workers’ mutualities complained at the time that they needed a stronger state 
intervention, that patrons’ contributions were very low, and that welfare based just on 
work accidents was very limited (leaving aside old age pensions for instance); finally, 
there was no clear statistical data on mortality and disease from which policies could be 
based. The first time the state channeled monetary funds to associations was a 
contribution of 50,000 escudos to fight the effects of the pneumonic flu epidemic in 
1918.1105 
 In contrast, Spanish associations had greater opportunities to expand, since they 
faced a more tolerant legislation, a more competitive party system that allowed popular 
classes greater incentives to build mass parties, and higher chances of participation in 
administrative welfare and policy-making bodies.1106 In 1893-1895, Republicans were 
able to win seats in the Cortes, with over 30 deputies elected.1107 The Socialists had a 
higher mass membership, a more ideological party, and a union confederation with 
some penetration in the workers movement, especially in the Basque industrial areas 
and in Asturias. In comparison, Portuguese socialism remained mainly a small group of 
middle class intellectuals and without any links to the workers’ movement and 
associations in general. 
 The Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE) was founded in 1879. In 1888, 
the Socialist union, Union General de Trabajadores (UGT), initially with 3,333 
members, was created.1108 The UGT proposed the establishment of unions in each oficio 
or especialidade who would then federate at local, regional, and national levels. For a 
long time PSOE’s and UGT’s strength was mainly based on Madrid’s printers. 
According to Amsden, there was a gradual evolution from 29 sections and 3,550 
individuals affiliated in 1888 to 351 sections and 57,000 members in 1905. 1109  
According to Malefakis, the UGT had 6,276 members in 1895 (mostly in Madrid, 
Asturias and Bilbao), and 50,000 in 1904, 100,000 in 1912, although declining to 
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89,601 in 1918. In 1919 it had 200,000 members and in 1921 240,113. Although the 
socialist workers’ movement was smaller than the Anarchists (the CNT had 699,369 
members in 1919), and never expanded in Barcelona and Catalonia, it was much 
stronger than the Portuguese.1110  UGT’s leader, Largo Cabalero, was elected to the 
Cortes and acquired a post in the Instituto de Reformas Sociales,1111 and the Socialists’ 
strategy at this time was to be part of the political system at both the local and national 
levels through a penetration of its institutions.1112 
 The Portuguese Socialist party, Partido Socialista Operário Português (PSOP) 
was founded by José Fontana and Antero de Quental in 1875.1113 But Socialists never 
had any important share of the vote, and they were never included in welfare and 
policy-making institutions. In the 1878 national elections, they received 44 votes in the 
city of Porto, in a total of 100,000 voters. The parties of the system of Rotativismo were 
able to get through clientelism networks the workers’ vote, and mainly the republicans 
attracted the ideological-protest vote. In 1887, Republicans elected three deputies to the 
parliament. It was only in the Republic in 1911 that the first Socialist deputy was 
elected, Manuel José Silva.1114 
 The Socialist Party’s first congress was in 1877, and the main ideas were put 
forward. Its aim was to defend the interests of workers in the polity, to advance 
democratization by universal suffrage, and to institute a federal state with the creation of 
legislative powers with elected representatives from each concelho (Proudhon’s 
federalism).1115 When it was founded, it had established links of cooperation with some 
workers’ organizations like the Associação do Protectorado do Trabalho Nacional 
(João Bonança), a mutualist-philanthropic organization, or the 1872 Fraternidade 
Operária (José Fontana, Nobre França, and Brito Monterito). In the first congress, 
twenty seven workers’ organizations were present, among them craft organizations and 
producers’ cooperatives from Lisbon and Porto. 1116  In 1876, the party had 5,800 
members, 3,600 in Lisbon and 2,200 in Porto.1117 
 Also the Socialists tried to organize workers’ associations, mainly under the 
form of mutualities until the late 1880s. In a letter by the Socialist leader Azedo Gneco 
                                                 
1110 Malefakis, 2001, pp. 231-232; see also Amsden, 1974, pp. 17-20. 
1111 Amsden, 1974, pp. 15-16 
1112 Maravall, 1997, p. 55. 
1113 Homem, 1993, pp. 132. 
1114 Mónica, 1985, pp. 86, 96. 
1115 Mónica, 1985, pp. 51-53. 
1116 Mónica, 1985, p. 53. 
1117 Mónica, 1985, p. 58. 
 303
to the painters of the southern city of Beja, he suggested to create an association of that 
city’s socialists, which could be called Federação dos Operários Bejenses. It would be 
divided in sections of crafts, which would form district associations. In a letter to a 
Socialist of the city of Faro, he advised them to create an association that would 
organize leisure activities as well. It should have a library and be able to organize 
festivities every three months, as well as in specific periods like religious holidays, the 
Easter, and new year’s eve, including dancing parties, in order to «let the women 
jump».1118 
 By the end of the 1880s, 20,000 workers were organized, in 1909 there were 
27,000 workers in unions, and in 1917 55,000. In the 1880s, union density was 22.2% 
(the industrial population was 90,000). But in 1910, it had declined to 4% (there were 
666,250 industrial workers in 1910). In 1909 the stronger unions were the freemasons of 
Porto (1,156 members), the metalworkers of Porto (731), the Porto carpenters (720), the 
soldadores of Setúbal, tailors of Lisboa, and the corticeiros of Almada, each with more 
than 400 members.1119 
 Still, since its foundation the Socialist party never managed to build a strong 
organizational structure, and it remained a decentralized organization in the early 
twentieth century. It was composed of sections (each with an executive commission), 
municipal centers, and regional centers (with a directive junta). The party was led by a 
central council (conselho central), and the class associations, cooperatives, recreational 
societies and political clubs were admitted as party sections. All these gathered in three 
regional federations, one in the north, and other in the south and another in the center. 
Most accounts say that the center federation never really had an existence, and that the 
two other had a very independent life from each other and from the national direction 
with their own political line and newspapers. Finally, party funds were very scarce.1120 
 Moreover and contrary to the Spanish socialists, it did not have a federative 
union like the Spanish UGT, and its links to the labor movement were weaker. 
Whatever links there existed, they were not through federative national structures of 
workers but through links to specific and single class associations.1121 Records of the 
period indicate that unions had a line of no direct involvement in the party debates of 
the day. The Asssociação Promotora do Trabalho Nacional, which was connected to 
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the Socialist leader João Bonança, was mainly worried about economic issues and 
demands on the workplace, and it expressed low interest in the contemporary political 
issues. Its official newspaper, O Trabalho, was very suspicious of bourgeois elites.1122 
In the 1870s, Socialist leader efforts to recruit workers’ associations faced the resistance 
of these associations, which put as a condition that the party abstains from electoral 
participation. Unions always tried to maintain a clear autonomy in relation to the party. 
In 1882, the Confederação de Associações de Classe proclaimed the principle of union 
autonomy. In 1885, the association of the wood workers (torneiros) revolted against the 
party and organized its own congress in order to defend a line of adaptation of workers 
to improve the workers’ material conditions and not to be directed under extremists and 
vague party ideologies.1123 Socialist leaders, on the other hand, complained that workers 
were not interested in politics, were undisciplined, going on wild strikes, and that they 
wasted the movements’ energy and political stance.1124 
 For similar reasons, Catholic associational life was be stronger in Spain than in 
Portugal. After the 1880s, Catholic associational life grew intensely. It was mainly 
spurred by the liberal governments’ anticlerical policies and also by the aim of blocking 
growing Socialist penetration of working classes. Apart from the Basque country and 
Catalonia, Catholic/agrarian associations spread intensely in the regions of Castilla, 
Navarra, and León, and they were able to mobilize and organize small and medium size 
rural proprietors. In 1881, the Catholic Union, a Catholic lay organization, was formed 
by Alejandro Pidal y Mon. In 1894, the Marques de Comillas (a Catholic millionaire 
from Barcelona) founded the Junta Central de Acción Católica, a lay association.1125 
Campaigns for the defense of Catholicism were organized by the Ligas or Juntas 
Católicas; Catholic Action expanded, Centros de Defesa Social appeared in many cities, 
and also the ACNP (Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas) emerged in 1908 
thanks to the Jesuit priest José Ayala.1126 
 In the 1890s by the action of Jesuit priest Antonio Vicente, a follower of French 
and Austrian Catholic corporatism, the first Catholic trade union was founded. Built in 
the remnants of old traditional crafts, it was organized as fraternities based on 
profession or neighborhood. Vincent and the Marques de Comillas promoted later the 
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Consejos Nacional de las Corporations Católicas-Obreras in Madrid in 1896 to serve 
as an umbrella organization to coordinate this ensemble of Catholic charity, mutual 
assistance, and recreational associations. In 1900, they had 485,000 members in 
workers’ circles and 275,000 in other associations. 1127  In 1916, the Federación 
Nacional de Syndicates Católicos-Libres was created by two Dominican priests, Pedro 
Gerard (leader of a Catholic union of vineyard workers in Jerez de la Frontera) and José 
Gafo (leader of a Catholic union of railway men in Madrid) from the old circulos 
católicos with the support of the cardinals Aguirre and Guisaola.1128 Another priest, the 
Asturian Maximiliano Arboleya, organized the miners and farm workers in Asturias, 
rival of the Confederacion Nacional de Sindicatos Obreros Catolicos, of Comillas, who 
was much dominated by employers. 
 In 1905, there were less than 70 rural cooperatives in Spain (in France there 
were 648 in 1898 and 2,060 in 1900; in Italy there were 1,092 rural Catholic societies in 
1904; in Germany there were 17,162 agrarian cooperatives of all types in 1905). But in 
1910 there were already 1,559 and 1,530 in 1915, and they became very strong stronger 
after 1912, when the confederation, the Confederacion Nacional Catolica Agraria 
(CONCA), was formed. As can be seen from the next table, the areas of Castilla-León, 
the province of Palencia, Burgos, Valladolid, Navarra, and Valencia became very dense 
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Basque country 69 
Navarra 7 






Castilla and Leon 427 





(source: Herrero, 1995, p. 135) 
  
 The CONCA was formed in 1912 in old Castile. It was a Catholic farmers’ 
association, and although its leaders were mainly recruited from the class of landowners 
of large estates, it became a strong organization in the regions of Castile, Leon, Navarra, 
northern Aragon, and eastern provinces of Valencia and Murcia. It was strong especially 
in Bilbao and in the agrarian areas of north-central Spain, a region of small property 
holders. 1130  It organized rural cooperatives of producers and consumers, instituted 
insurance programs, and savings and credit organizations. In 1922 it had more than half 
a million families, about three million people. It was as large as the CNT, but it had no 
presence in the southern latifundia.1131 In 1922, the movement had about half million 
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families, although it was limited to the regions of Castilla and Navarra where there was 
a very Catholic peasantry and where some landowners fomented the movement. Its 
regional distribution was: La Rioja: 148, Palencia 106, Valladolid 125, Astorga 84, 
Navarra 99, Murcia 25, Cuenca 15, and no data for Andalucia.1132 
 In the nineteenth century Portugal, there were also attempts to organize a 
Catholic mass movement, but it was much less successful than in Spain. The first 
Catholic association was the Sociedade Católica Promotora da Moral Evangélica, 
which was formed in 1843 to resist the secularization measures of liberalism  although 
it accepted the liberal regime.1133 In the 1870s, several other Catholic associations were 
founded to fight the emerging ideologies of Republicanism and Socialism in the cities 
of Porto, Braga, Guimarães, and Lisboa. The first charity associations were founded in 
1873 by the Count of Samodães, while the Catholic newspaper A Palavra had been 
established in 1872.1134 In the congresses of Catholic writers in Porto in 1871, in Braga 
in 1872 and in the First Catholic meeting in Lisbon in July 1881, appeals were made for 
the creation of a permanent Catholic organization capable of mobilizing the working 
classes. In the aftermath of these debates, the leader of the Catholic association of Porto, 
D. António Tomás de Almeida, and the União Católica Portuguesa was created in 
1882. This was an organization that clearly opposed socialist ideas and tried to establish 
a wider federation of Catholic organizations with the creation of the Associação 
Protectora dos Operários by another Catholic activist, Mendes Lajes, and with the aim 
to run in the elections.1135 
 In 1882, the União Católica Portuguesa failed miserably in the 1884 elections 
and disappeared after internal divisions. In 1895, a Catholic social movement, which 
included youth associations in Lisbon and Oporto, was formed by several Catholic 
centers in cities of the north with the aim to elect «genuine Catholics», but it was unable 
to elect a single deputy. In 1903 the Centro Nacional transformed itself into the Partido 
Nacionalista (Nationalist Party) in the nationalist congress in the city of Porto 
1903organized by the Catholic association of that city. Five hundred delegates 
representing eleven districts (Viana do Castelo, Braga, Vila Real, Bragança, Porto, 
Aveiro, Viseu, Guarda, Castelo Branco, Lisboa, and Funchal) were inspired by the 
German Zentrum party created the first attempt for mass Catholic associational life. 
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Their leaders were mainly big impresarios of center and northern agriculture who also 
sought protective measures for wine and agriculture in general, like lines of agricultural 
credit. They declared themselves leaders of a genuine Catholic party whose aims were 
the defense of the religious norms in education, in the mobilization of workers, and that 
aimed to replace the corrupt liberal parties.1136 
 It was never a successful organization. In 1905 when the regime moved clearly 
in the direction of an executive dictatorship with PM Hintze Ribeiro, Catholics saw 
their electoral avenues closed.1137 It ran in the elections during all years. In 1905 it 
managed to get two deputies by the Funchal and Braga circles elected, and in 1906 four 
deputies were elected in the northern districts. In 1908 only one deputy was elected. In 
fact, soon the nationalist party became strongly anti-democratic, never accepting 
universal suffrage, and in the end supporting João Franco’s dictatorship, thus entering 
the so-called anti-liberal bloc in 1910.1138 
 This inhibited any links with the workers’ Catholic movement. In 1905 the 
Catholic workers’ circles had only twelve thousand members, a small number when 
compared with the republican and socialist networks.1139 According to Neto, Catholic 
politicians and the Catholic workers’ circles and mutualities never «established any 
organic connection between themselves». 1140  Social Catholicism had appeared in 
Portugal in the last years of the nineteenth century to fight the influence of socialism 
and republicanism in the popular and industrial classes. In 1872, the association Amigos 
de Santo António, a charity for industrial workers, was founded in Porto, and after 1898 
the first workers circles appeared in Porto 1898 under the promotion of Manuel 
Frutuoso da Fonseca and the city’s bishop. In 1910, there were only 25 circles in the 
whole country, mainly restricted to the northwest, although they organized about ten 
thousand workers, in a universe of half a million workers in the country (left 
associations, especially anarchists and socialists, included 20,000 workers)1141. 
 Only in some rural associations in small areas of northern and central Portugal 
was the Catholic movement able to create roots.1142 Still, the sindicatos agricolas of 
small and medium farmers (sometimes land leasers) that were set up for credit and for 
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the spread of techniques to improve production had much less success in Portugal, and 
they remained elitist bodies. The mutualist associations of small and medium sized 
independent farmers, contrary to Spanish agricultural associational life, tended to be 
atomized and apolitical despite the efforts of the Catholics to organize them.1143 The 
first of the associations appeared in the village of Lagoa (in the island of S. Miguel in 
the Azores islands) in 1893 and in the village of Montemor-o-Velho in 1894. In 1910 
there were 98 of these organizations with about 10,000 members, which was less than 
1% of the agrarian active labor force. Half of these organizations were in the provinces 
of Ribatejo, Alentejo, Estremadura, and in some of the wine producing areas.1144 
 Finally, the producers’ class was divided. The southern landowners organized in 
the Real Associação da Agricultura Portuguesa (RACAP). The RACAP was created 
after two agricultural congresses in 1888 and in 1889 where producers asked the 
government special provisions to defend cereals agriculture and for protectionist 
measures, which in fact were enacted in 1889.1145 Moreover, in 1906 RACAP became a 
member of a government commission for policies in agriculture, the Conselho Superior 
de Agricultura, which had technical, tariff, and product classification functions.1146 The 
leaders of RACAP had also the plan to create a national network of sindicatos agricolas 
as a base for the expansion of a Catholic ideology and the protection of Catholics but 
within a democratic system. The main figure was Luís de Castro, who defended in a 
conference in 1899 that RACAP should have an interclass organization, from the big 
landowners to the rural workers. As he argued, it was imperative to organize rural 
workers because they would bring «democratic spirit and strength».1147  
Still, these efforts to create sindicatos that included big and small landowners, 
and workers were never fulfilled.1148 There remained always strong particularism and 
heterogeneity in the agricultural arena of interests, especially because of the opposition 
of northern and southern wine producers. As a consequence, RACAP was unable to 
represent all the Portuguese farmers.1149 
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 Because of the low level of parliamentarization and democratization of the 
Portuguese regime, and the process of state development, Catholic associations never 
developed as much as they could have. Elites, both economic agrarian producers, 
intellectuals and the Catholic hierarchy, always refrained and/or failed to mobilize the 
citizenry through an ideology of mass Catholicism and to develop strong coordinated 
networks of associational life because of institutional barriers. For instance, low 
parliamentarism created divisions within would-be Catholic mobilizers, between those 
willing to operate within a competitive liberal-parliamentary system evolving in the 
direction of suffrage extension, and between those that preferred to ally with anti-liberal 
traditionalists in the army, the crown, and the turno parties. Those that expressed in the 
Catholic newspaper A Palavra in 1881 that it was «possible to be a liberal and a 
Catholic, without contradiction and confusion of ideas» were defeated.1150 
 These tensions became even more acute with the fall of the Republic in 1910 
and with the declaration of a republican regime. As was discussed previously, the 
republican regime was even less parliamentarized, and many agrarian associations 
became even more divided between Catholics and supporters of the monarchist cause, 
which was composed by a band of dissident army officers in exile in Spain and that kept 
making military incursions through the country during the Republic. The republican 
coup in 1910 had been mainly a Lisbon phenomenon, and the republicans were never 
able to control the country and to unify the territory under a single regime and authority. 
As a result, there were many pockets of resistance to the regime, while the elites 
disagreed on rules for cooperation. 1151  Until 1913, monarchists continued to make 
military incursions from Galicia, in Spain, in order to install a new monarchical 
regime. 1152  Parliamentarization fell to a low, when the military began to intervene 
gradually, and for a period in 1915 the pro-monarchist general Pimenta de Castro ruled 
in dictatorship. Finally in 1917, pro-monarchist groups were also supporting the military 
coup that ended the first period of the Portuguese republic by General Sidónio Pais, who 
ruled for one year as a dictator.1153 Most of the sindicatos agrarios aligned with the 
monarchist cause and with the military, and as a consequence as soon as 1912 the 
Republican Minister of Interior declared them illegal.1154 Afonso Costa, the leader of 
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the Republican Party, considered rural syndicalism a form of «reaccionarismo» 
(reactionarism).1155 
 In terms of policy and welfare initiatives, the republican regime strengthened 
even more the legacy of statism and dirigisme, of state control over societal forces, thus 
not developing any partnerships or corporatist arrangements between the state and 
organized interests that would empower voluntary associations. For instance, the plans 
in 1912 for the creation of mandatory declaration of the agricultural production to be 
done through representative associations in the Directorate General of Agriculture were 
not pursued by the government. Instead, a system was instituted where each producer 
made his declaration individually and separately. Also the nomination of representatives 
of producers’ associations for consultative state organs like the Conselho Superior da 
Agricultura and the Conselho de Fomento Comercial da Produção were not pursued, 
and in 1913 they were replaced by the internal services of the ministries.1156 
 The most successful Catholic associations in Portugal were the ones that 
remained elitist and that cultivated links to the conservative sectors in the administration 
and the military. Associative Catholicism would remain elitist and authoritarian. In the 
institutional and political conditions of this period, mass organizations could not 
develop well. In 1917, the Centro Católico Português was created by António Lino 
Neto, which was a last attempt for mass democratic Catholicism. Still, it could never 
participate in the elections during the republic, it never even claimed to be a party, but a 
civic association and its parish organizations were only active during electoral periods. 
It fell under internal divisions, between those that were democratic and suspicious of the 
Fascist and authoritarian thesis that started to be advocated by certain sectors of 
Catholicism, like António Salazar, the emerging leader of a reactionary-clerical 
wing.1157 António Salazar was one of the main figures of the CADC (Centro Académico 
da Democracia Cristã) together with the future head of Portuguese Catholic Church, 
Manuel Gonçalves Cerejeira. The CADC was created in 1912 by a group of university 
students and professors in Coimbra under the motto “Piety, Study, Action”. It was 
clearly an anti-democratic group that refused democracy and individualism. Between 
1905 and 1909, it had only 100 members and it always remained an elite association.1158 
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But it was a far more successful association than the projects of mass Catholicism as 




 In this chapter I showed that most of the conditions that inhibited the 
development of associational venturesre continued during the period 1870s-1918, the 
so-called golden age of associability, where everywhere in the western world 
associations were being founded for many purposes. Iberian countries did not escape 
this trend, but a tradition of weak state strength became predominant with a system of 
façade parliamentarism that sustained itself mainly through corruption. When external 
conditions led to a confrontation with other states that had military overtones, this led to 
a crisis of legitimacy of these regimes that definitely put away popular classes from 
elites. 
 Still, it was also in this period that conditions in Spain lead to a denser civil 
society especially in some regions. At the regional level, in Catalonia and in the Basque 
country, there was a tradition of partnerships between the state, and corporate and 
church interests. Moreover, at the national level, the Spanish state showed a higher 
capacity both in the development of corporatist and welfare functions through 
partnerships with unions, like the UGT, and it showed higher levels of electoral 
competition and freedom of association than Portugal. Accordingly, civil society 
organizations were stronger in Spain. 
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Chapter 12: The Mass Age, 1918-1940s 
 
 In this chapter I analyze the development of Portuguese and Spanish 
associational life between 1918 and the early 1940s. It was in this period that the full 
potential for a mass associational life could have been achieved in Western European 
countries, but the outcome that was consolidated in the Iberian countries was a very 
small, particularistic, clandestine, low density, and uncoordinated associational life that 
stabilized under the establishment of authoritarian state-corporatist regimes in the 1930s 
and the 1940s. This provided the framework through which civil societies in the post 
1970s democratic period developed, and it explains the reason why both Portugal and 
Spain have the weakest associational life among western European democracies. 
Although there are differences worth exploring between civil societies between Spain 
and Portugal in the period 1974-2000 (this will be the topic of the next chapter), it was 
the inability of these countries to consolidate a democratic and participatory 
associational life in the interwar period that caused the contemporary weakness of the 
Iberian civil societies. 
  
12.1. Mass Politics in Iberia: Variations 
 
 When the First World War ended in 1918, a period began where there are higher 
pressures for the development of voluntary associations. Associations for a variety of 
reasons tended to form or plan to form peak associations representative at the national 
level. The mobilization of members and their engagement in activities was also very 
high, and the expansion of associational life was positively related to social protest. The 
so-called trienio revolucionário, the years between 1920 and 1923, were the high point 
of this process. It was in this period and in the subsequent interwar years in Western 
Europe that socialist, Anarchist, and religious networks of associational life competed 
for members and influence in the national polity. But the end result in the Iberian 
countries was to frustrate all these historical alternatives and to stabilize instead by a 
state-corporatist controlled associational life, highly non-coordinated, and with low 
density. 
In Portugal a military dictatorship gave the first steps in this direction in 1926, 
and they were later deepened by Salazar’s authoritarian Estado Novo in 1933. In Spain, 
the triénio revolucionário gave way to an authoritarian transition in 1923 with a military 
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dictatorship, which was briefly defeated in 1929 by a democratic experiment, the 
Spanish Republic, which would only last until 1936, when a right-wing military coup by 
General Franco started the civil war and the authoritarian regime. 
 In Portugal after 1918, one can notice the expansion of all types of associations 
as well as the emergence of nationwide confederations.1159  In 1910 there were 223 
unions, in 1921 there were 425 associations of workers in industry (46,277 members), 
219 for commerce, services and transports (39,127 members), and 86 for agriculture and 
fishing workers (11,018 members). Mutual aid societies numbered 668 and rural unions 
276. The total number of associations in Portugal in 1921 was thus 1,674. Trade 
unionism expanded to new social strata like the rural laborers, civil servants, and 
tertiary sector workers. There was a growing competition in the Left for the 
mobilization of workers. In 1925 there were 507 unions, with 263,000 members, out of 
which 67,000 were members of the main confederation (the Anarchist CGT). This was 
accompanied by an explosion of protests and strikes, especially in the two years after 
the war. The Soviet revolution in 1917 encouraged workers’ associations in Lisbon to 
go on strike and demand the nationalization of production.1160 Associations tended to 
form nation-wide confederations. Only in 1924 is granted the right to form federations 
or national organizations.1161 Moreover, the level of strikes rose. In 1900-1909 there 
were 91 strikes, in 1910-1919 391, and in 1920-25 127.1162 
 In Spain, workers associations’ capacity to mobilize constituencies grew 
immensely. In 1920 the combined CNT and UGT membership was at least 8 times its 
1910-1914 average, and in 1933 it was 10 times what it was in 1930.1163 In absolute 
terms in the 1930s, the membership of the CNT and the UGT (Unión General de 
Trabajadores) was around two million, and the total union membership was 2.5 million 
if we add the smaller trade unions.1164 In the trienio bolchevique, the Anarchist CNT 
had 700,000 members and in 1932 862,000.1165 
 When comparing the Spanish and Portuguese civil societies of this period, one 
can see that only for the period of Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship Spanish associational 
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life was less dense. There were 1,647 associations in 1921 in Portugal,1166 which gives 
one association for each 4,205 people if calculating from the overall national 
population.1167 In Spain in 1928, which was the last year of Rivera’s dictatorship, there 
were 3,804 associations, an association thus for each 5,600 people.1168 In 1933, during 
the Spanish Second Republic, there were 10,479 workers’ associations and 4,662 
employers’ associations, meaning 15,141 associations in total, and one association for 
each 1,556 Spaniards. In Portugal in 1934, just when the authoritarian regime was about 
to establish itself, there were 1,076 associations (754 of workers’, 285 of employers’, 
and 37 mixed), which gives one association for each 6,436 Portuguese.1169 
 For the first three years of the interwar period, between 1918 and 1923, the 
Spanish Socialists seemed to become even more successful. The PSOE in the 1918 
elections managed to elect seven MPs.1170 But the defeat inflicted by the Moroccan 
Kabile armies in July 1921 on the Spanish army sent to Morocco created the conditions 
for the 1923 Primo de Rivera’s coup. 1171  Rivera inaugurated a new regime, a 
modernizing dictatorship when compared to Portugal. This project replaced the Cortes 
with a corporatist assembly, in which sat a single party, the Unión Patriótica, and 
economic development programs became central for the new regime. Initially it was 
ruled by a group of generals that governed by decree and took ad hoc measures to 
“correct” the 1876 constitution. It established permanent military administration in the 
provinces (ruled by generals) and in the municipalities/ayuntamentos (ruled by 
captains). But this form of administration was not enough for the regime to persist, and 
so attempts to co-opt a more civilian elite started soon. In 1925, the military directorio 
was replaced by civilians, mainly technocrats that attempted to institutionalize a state-
planned and directed economy. Several measures were enacted: plans for taxing capital, 
a uniform income taxation system, an equilibrated budget, public works (roads, 
railways, and irrigation projects), and social welfare initiatives. In 1926, the single party 
was created, the Unión Patrótica.1172 
 An important trait of the new regime was its cooptation of the leadership of the 
UGT and the strengthening trends inherited from the previous decades. The State 
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Council had a place for Largo Caballero and the institutionalization of labor 
management boards (Comités Paritários) in 1926-1928, thus continuing the work of the 
Instituto de Reformas Sociales was done through a partnership with UGT.1173 These and 
other regulatory boards and commissions of the regime fostered the development of 
voluntary associations, since it recruited representatives from all the interested parties 
and also had obligatory membership. Rivera’s labour policy was a «mix of repression 
and favouritism» of certain segments of the unions. Repression, censorship of the press, 
and the use of the Somaten (a kind of armed police in reserve) was directed mainly 
against the Anarchist CNT, not the UGT.1174 
 To a large degree, Spain had a successful modernizing dictatorship between 
1923 and 1930, which allowed for the development of corporatist structures. First, it 
inherited a civil service that had many progressive and pro-labour technocrats and civil 
servants (progressive bureaucrats, like jurists, sociologists, academics, and humanists 
that served as consultants, arbiters, and committee officers for mixed consultation 
commissions) that went back to the Instituicion Libre de Ensenanza and that had 
worked in the Instituto de Reformas Sociales, the Instituto de Trabajo, and in the 1904 
in the Instituto de Reformas Sociales. Many of these individuals were Socialists and 
even members of the PSOE and its organizations and staffed the labour agencies, the 
Treasury, and the Ministry of Development, where they designed legislation over social 
issues. In Rivera’s government they were known as the “arbitristas” (Aunós, Calvo 
Sotelo, and Benjumea) that competed with the hardliners’ militaristic faction of 
Martinez Anido, the Interior Minister, and head of the State Security Agency.1175 In 
1924 the Ministry of Labour absorbed the Instituto de Reformas Sociales in order to 
improve the collection of social data and to link it with policy-making and the 
implementation of social legislation and of the new labour code. The local juntas of the 
Institute became delegations of the ministry.1176 
 In fact, more weight was given to social policies by the government. The health 
care program budget went from 4 million to 12 million pesetas. There were subsidies 
for public charities from 2.4 to 4.7 million pesetas. Provincial Institutes of Hygiene 
were created under the direction of the National Health Institute, and the National 
Insurance Institute (INP), the agency for the administration of social security, had 
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grown from being supported mainly by companies and cooperatives to a real 
bureaucratic agent, thus becoming the main provider of social insurance (from 20 
million in 1922 to 192 million pesetas in the budget of 1929). More importantly, the 
main vehicles through which support and placement of the unemployed were chanelled 
were the workers’ unions that received state funding for this purpose. In 1923, an 
annual renewable credit line of 500,000 pesetas was created in the Labour ministry to be 
given to workers’ associations with unemployment programs.1177 
 This allowed the UGT to grow and to become stronger as an organization. With 
the help of the state, it established Casas Del Pueblo in many parts of Spain and in 
those cities where no tradition of organized associational life existed. By 1924 there 
were 1,000 active cooperatives with 25,0000 members in Spain. The UGT had 
established cooperatives in the Casas Del Pueblo all over Spain. This allowed the UGT 
to augment its national membership: 41,000 in 1910, 148,000 in 1913, 100,000 in 1916-
18, 211,000 in 1920, and 223,000 in 1927. 1178  In Madrid, the Socialists became 
especially strong. The trade union officials developed more cooperative services, such 
as delivering savings, housing, medicine and consumer goods. In 1932, the Cooperativa 
Socialista Madrileña served 12,000 families of workers, had an annual budget of 7.5 
million pesetas, and enrolled by that year 14,000 members.1179 The number of workers 
covered by contracts negotiated in the comités reached one million in 1930, which was 
25% of all industry and service employees. 1180  Because of these policies, the 
cooperative movement grew immensely also in Catalonia. In 1924 the cooperative 
movement was organized under a regional federation with a permanent basis. It 
included 147 associations and provided services to 22,000 families. In the northern 
provinces of Burgos, Santander, and Logrono, cooperatives expanded also. The 
Cooperative Union of Northern Spain, founded in 1914 in Bilbao, consolidated as a 
regional federation in 1924 and served 18,000 families.1181 
 In July 1929, the military deposed Primo de Rivera from government. Since 
1928, Rivera had began to loose the support of the Socialists and envisaged plans to 
legitimize the regime with a new constitution in July of 1929, where the royal power 
would be limited. A new figure would be head of government, nominated by Rivera, but 
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with greater powers. The king opposed such plans and forced Rivera to resign in an 
alliance with both military conservative and republican sectors and politicians.1182 The 
Constitution of 1876 was reinstated, but now the king was also a weak figure, since he 
had previously supported Rivera and the old parties of the liberal system no longer 
existed. As a consequence, and with the Right discredited and the army paralysed with 
the expulsion of Rivera, the political space was occupied by the left-wing forces. 
Republicans, leftist Catalan nationalists, and Socialists agreed common action in the 
pact of San Sebastián in August 1930, and they won the municipal elections of April 12, 
1931. The king and the government were discredited and unable to use the army. After 
an ultimatum of the victorious left-coalition, they left the country.1183 
 A provisional government was enacted on April 14, 1931 to prepare the general 
elections that would mark a transition to democracy. The provisional government was 
constituted by several groups. There were the old Liberals of the El Turno system, the 
progressistas (Miguel Maura, and Niceto Alcalá Zamora), which were now the Right of 
the coalition; the republicans of the Partido Radical of Alejandro Lerroux (the center of 
the coalition); the parties Acción Republicana, led by Manuel Azaña, the radical-
socialistas of Marcelino Domingo and Álvaro de Albornoz, the Catalans of the 
Esquerra, the ORGA, a Galician party, and the PSOE together with its union, the UGT. 
Alcalá Zamora, the leader of the progressistas became the head of government, Maura 
Minister of Interior, Lerroux Foreign Affairs Minister, Azaña War Minister, and the 
Socialists occupied the Ministry of Justice (Fernando de los Rios), Work (Francisco 
Largo Caballero), and Finance (Indalecio Prieto).1184 
 In the first general elections in June 1931, the provisional government coalition 
had an impressive victory. The Right was even unable to present candidates, and the 
extreme Left, the Anarchists, stayed outside of the electoral process. The coalition won 
75% of the parliamentary posts. Within the governing coalition there were also changes 
in the distribution of power, with the Socialists and the radicals becoming the more 
important parties. 1185  The Second Republic achieved full democratization, and as a 
consequence a higher degree of party competition and concomitant associational 
competition and development. In Spain, Socialists competed with the Right and the 
Left, the Anarchists, to degrees much higher than in Portugal. The degree of regime 
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democratization was much higher in the Spanish republic of 1931-1926 than in the 
Portuguese republic during the period 1918-1926. As a consequence, it had much higher 
levels of mobilization and membership levels in unions and parties of the Right and the 
Left.1186 
 In the republic, the PSOE became the major left-wing party and a real mass 
organization, with 60,000 to 80,000 members and with a large and radical youth 
movement.1187 It continued to expand its unions under the UGT. In 1932 the UGT had 
one million members, organized Casas Del Pueblo across the country, and promoted 
local social, educational, and mutual benefit societies. Moreover, UGT attempted to 
mobilize southern agricultural workers, thus entering the Anarchists’ bastion. The UGT 
created a peasant union, the Federácion Nacional de Trabajadores de la Tierra 
(FNTT), in April 1930. By 1932 the FNTT had 392,953 members and 2,541 local 
committees, seven MPs representing it in the Cortes, sold a weakly newspaper of 
80,000 copies, and its membership was about 40% members of the whole UGT. 
 The socialists’ position was also strengthened because of state policies, which 
enabled a rise in the unions’ and party membership. In the first two years of the 
republic, Republican and Socialist leaders continued and deepened the institutions of 
labor cooptation inherited from the liberal past and Rivera’s period. New labor 
conciliation committees, the Jurados Mixtos, in a decree of May 7, 1931 replaced the 
Comités Paritarios, gained more powers, extended to agricultural areas, and spread in 
the areas of Socialist influence, thus increasing Socialist membership.1188 The Jurados 
Mixtos became a central institution of the regime, bargaining collectively bargaining 
and negotiating between capital and labor, with the state having an arbitrative and 
conciliatory role, a common procedure. Jurados Mixtos were established in several 
localities with the old aim of mixed representation for conciliation of work conflicts. 
They could intervene in cases of firing and negotiate collective bargaining agreements.  
The Ministry of Work became an engine of social policy. The ministry had two 
sections, one technical and the other corporative where workers and employers were 
represented in sub-committees and technical boards.1189 Programmes of social welfare 
were also expanded. Minimum wages, health insurance, paid vacations, and eight hour 
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day work were measures enacted by Largo Caballero as the Minister of Work. Lastly, 
the socialists’ plans for agrarian reform were also destined to conquer CNT’s traditional 
membership in the south. In 1931, the Socialists enacted a series of emergency decrees 
that forbade the expulsion of small tenants from their rented land: the prohibition of the 
employment of migrant workers by landowners (the Ley de Terminos Municipales). 
Furthermore, they forbade owners from withdrawing their land from cultivation, 
decreed wage increases, the eight hour work day, and a kind of closed shop in the rural 
labor market through arbitration boards in the Casas de Pueblo controlled by the 
FNTT.1190 The ley agraria of September 1932 aimed at property redistribution. The 
expropriated land was to be redistributed either in collective form or in individual 
parcels by the Instituto de Reforma Agraria. Although about 10,000 poor peasants 
received new land, in general the reform was weak and not very profound.1191 Still, this 
strengthened the Socialist unions and associational life in general. According to Payne, 
Socialists became a real mass movement after 1931: 40% of the union membership of 
the Socialists was coming from rural districts.1192 
 
Table 31: UGT and FNTT Membership and Number of Local Committees, 1922-1933 
UGT Membership 
 Local Committees Members 
December 1922  1198 208170
December 1929  1511 228501
December 1931  4041 958451
July 1932 5107 1041539
FNTT membership   
 Local Committees Members 
April 1930 157 27340
June 1930 275 36639
April 1932 2233 308579
June 1932 2541 392953
June 1933 3319 451337
(Source: Malefakis, 2001 (1970), pp. 426, 429) 
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 By contrast, the Portuguese political system had very weak levels of 
parliamentarization and democratization. Portugal had only very brief experience with 
universal suffrage in 1918 during the military rule of Sidónio Pais. In 1919 with the 
death of Sidónio Pais the electoral law of 1913 was reinstated.1193 Of the 6 million 
Portuguese in 1923, only 680,000 could vote. Moreover, only about 100,000 actually 
voted, since the system was highly controlled by the machine of the Partido 
Democrático.1194 The republic continued the pattern of caciquism and clientelism in the 
party system that was common from the monarchy but now through a dominant party, 
the Partido Democrático. It only lost one election between 1910 and 1926 (in 1921). 
The remaining parties were parliamentary personalistic networks or ad hoc coalitions 
during electoral periods.1195 
 In Portugal, the Socialists were much weaker between 1918 and 1926. There 
were no links between the party and the unions, and any incorporation of associations 
through public policies failed. In the labor movement Anarchists were dominant, and 
they had at this stage a clearly anti-state and revolutionary posture. The Socialists had a 
weak presence in the Federação das Associações Operárias, especially in the 
Federação Operária de Lisboa, that was run by printers.1196 In 1917, after the right-
wing military coup of Sidónio Pais, who brought down the first phase of the republic 
and tried to install a military-presidentialist regime, there was a form of truce with the 
workers’ movement, in particular with the Socialists, since they had been persecuted 
during the republic.  
The military insurrection of December 1917 by Sidónio Pais that brought down 
the republic and installed for a year a military regime was a consequence of Portuguese 
participation in World War I on allied side in 1917. Its’ aim was to keep possession of 
Portuguese colonies in Africa that faced a risk of being divided in the post-war 
agreements. It had the opposition of almost everybody (the monarchists, the Anarchists, 
and conservative-republicans). The officers of the rebellion were both monarchists and 
right-wing republicans, with some Catholics and early authoritarians who wanted a 
corporatist state, the Integralistas. Their aim was to end the domination of the PRP and 
its leader, Afonso Costa.1197 In fact, the regime instituted universal suffrage for the first 
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time in Portugal. Some leaders of the workers’ movement, like Martins Ruivo and 
Sebastião Martins, received places in the state administration, and the UON accepted 
places in the Conselho Superior do Trabalho. Political positions were given also to 
associational leaders. The leader of ACAP became minister of Agriculture in 1918, and 
the leader of the Associação Industrial do Porto became minister of commerce and 
finance (Xavier Esteves). Finally, Sidónio created a senate with corporative 
representation for interest organizations, like the ACAP, and for other business 
interests. All these measures failed almost immediately since Sidónio was killed on 
December 18 by a left-wing sergeant. Between July and November 1920, António 
Granjo’s government began some consultations between interest associations and the 
state in policies like wheat supplying, but they lasted only a few months.1198 
 Those welfare state and corporatist measures that were introduced after 1919 
also failed. In May 1919, a mandatory system of social security was created by the 
Socialist minister Augusto Dias da Silva. It incorporated a mandatory insurance in 
disease, work accidents, and old age. The Instituto de Seguros Sociais Obrigatorios was 
created under the tutelage of the Ministry of Work and Welfare (Trabalho and 
Previdência Social), and with the function to regulate the insurance distribution. State 
expenses with health, welfare and education grew until 1926: they were 4-5% of the 
public expenses until 1920, 11% in 1920-22, and 13% in 1926-27. Only unemployment 
insurance was excluded, but an institution to regulate employment policies was created, 
the Bolsas de Trabalho.1199 
 This new system gave associations (like the mutualities) the possibility to 
become mandatory membership associations in their respective concelhos. In places 
where there already existed many associations, like in Lisbon and Porto, the plans were 
to promote federations of associations. In the concelhos where no associations existed, 
the state stimulated the creation of a single mandatory association. Still, according to 
historians of Portuguese welfare state, this system was never really put into practice. 
First, it suffered from a chronic lack of funds. The state provided very low funds to 
pensions and subsidies because the system relied mainly on contributions form workers 
and employers, with the state having competence only for the organization of 
commissions of mutualities, for funding the work accidents courts and for supervising 
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the self-help associations.1200 State spending with social policies was negligible and 
always dependent on the debate of the issue of public deficit.1201 There was also only 
some relative success at the level of work insurance but the rest of the policies, in 
disease, old age, and the organizational structures were never implemented in the field. 
The tribunais de árbitros for the conflicts between labor and capital failed also. Finally, 
the associations were given the option of affiliating in the mandatory system. Most of 
the associations did not enter the system voluntarily. In fact, the state did not have the 
support of the mutualities.1202 Mutualities remained opposed to the state because of 
predominance of syndicalists. The minister resigned just after the approval of these laws 
on May 4, 1919 when the government and the workers’ movement, mainly Anarchist, 
clashed in Lisbon, with the government accusing the workers of terrorist acts.1203 At the 
end of 1924, a last attempt for corporate and welfare state promotion was led by the 
government of José Domingos dos Santos, of the Esquerda Democrática, allowing also 
for the first time for the legal existence of federations of unions and for the right to 
collective bargaining. It failed again, since the military started to move and impose their 
rule.1204 
 Catholic associational life was also much stronger in Spain than in Portugal. The 
Spanish Catholic associational life grew to achieve around half a million people in a 
network of associations like the Acción Católica, the congregations for the worship of 
the Virgin Mary, Catholic cooperatives, trade unions, and savings banks.1205 The trienio 
bolchevique gave also a great impulse to rural unions, most of them rural Catholic 
associations. There were 2,005 sindicatos agrarios in 1918 and 4,892 in 1922, which 
were very strong in the areas of small property like Castilla-Leon, Galicia, Aragon, 
Catalonia, and Pais Valenciano. 1206  In 1920 there were about 12,000 benevolent 
Catholic societies, of which 1,000 in Madrid, 800 in Seville, and 200 in Barcelona. Of 
these, 300 were educational associations, 3,000 charity, 2,500 medical care, and 1,800 
of denominational activities. 
 Workers’ Catholic organizations continued growing, especially in the Basque 
Country and Catalonia. The Solidariedad de Trabajadores Vascos (STV) expanded 
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greatly during the Second Republic in 1931. The Sindicatos Libres de Barcelona were 
created in 1919 by Carlist radicals that organized blue and white collar workers to rival 
the CNT, with whom they engaged in street fights. It was a grass roots organization that 
differed from the more upper class and paternalistic social Catholicism. It originated in 
the rural carlism of Catalonia, and had good relations with Gafo’s catolicos-libres. In 
1921, it had about 175,000 members (half of CNT’s membership), and when the CNT 
was outlawed they became the main workers’ organization in Spain in the industrial 
regions. In 1923, the Sindicatos Libres de Barcelona and the Federación Nacional de 
Sindicatos Católicos-Libres, of José Gafo merged, thus forming the Confederación 
Nacional de Sindicatos Libres de España with more than 100,000 members. They grew 
under Rivera’s dictatorship, but in the republic, when CNT was legal again, they were 
marginalized.1207  
In 1922 was created also the first Christian Democratic political party, the 
Partido Social Popular (PSP) that received its inspiration from the Italian Partito 
Popolare. Its membership was composed of Carlists, Social Catholics, and old 
Mauristas, who desired mass mobilization in a democratic system in name of 
Catholicism and in order to fight clientelism.1208 
 During Rivera’s dictatorship between 1923 and 1931, most Catholic associations 
supported the regime. 1209  José Calvo Sotelo of the PSP became Director of Local 
Administration and Minister of Finance. Also during Rivera’s dictatorship the ACNdeP 
took the main role in the defense of church interests, and although it remained an elite 
association, under Rivera it sponsored the expansion of a mass movement of Catholic 
unions by using the network of agrarian unions of the CONCA, and it became very 
successful in mobilization at the local level.1210 Still, some of the northern countryside 
was also partly alienated from the regime. The collusion between the UGT and the 
regime made the Catholic Unions hostile, who rejected UGT’s almost monopoly of 
comites mixtos and wanted instead a system of proportional representation. In the 
regions where Catholic syndicalists were strong there were fights with the UGT, like in 
the Basque country with the Solidariedad Vasca.1211 Some social Catholics were also 
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co-opted by the regime, but the tradition of rural associational life was less strong than 
with the UGT. 
 With full democratization it was through the direction of a real mass Catholic 
party that Catholic associational life expanded. After 1931 the Catholic party, the 
CEDA, dominated the political right and was able to represent the Catholic peasant 
mass. The CEDA (Confederacion Española de Derechas Autonomas), a Catholic-
conservative mass party led by Gil Robles, which integrated some old caciques, had 
links to La Patronal1212 and to the Confederación Nacional Catolica Agraria, a strong 
network of agrarian Catholic associations (cajas de ahorros, cooperatives, professional 
associations) of the medium and small peasantry of north-central Spain.1213 Consumer 
co-operatives, and educational and medical benefit societies were very strong in many 
regions, like in Valladolid for instance.1214 Catholic unions comprised from a tenth to a 
quarter of the total of farmers in Spain. Catholic peasant associations, mainly assisting 
small peasants through credit banks, cooperative machinery, and marketing schemes 
reached also landless laborers through the creation of special social programs.1215 A 
youth movement, the Juventudes de Acción Popular, and a Catholic parents’ association 
were also created, organizing about 50,000 parents in efforts to provide Catholic 
schooling as an alternative to state schools. Finally, the traditionalist carlists were 
reorganized in the Comunión Tradicionalista, a modern right-wing association that 
enjoyed a 5% of the electorate in 1933.1216 
 In 1933, with the collapse of the original left-republican coalition of the republic 
and after the general elections in the fall of 1933, CEDA became the main party in the 
Spanish political system. After 1933, there was no natural majority in the parliament 
and the president Alcalá Zamora decided to call the Radical Republicans of Lerroux, 
who were the second largest party, to form government. The radicals soon called the 
CEDA for support in parliament in order to reach a full majority, and in October 1934 
CEDA politicians entered the government. The new coalition reversed much of the anti-
Catholic legislation that the republic had enacted. For example, it restored the church 
budget and ended the ban on Catholic education.1217 
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 Catholic associational building expanded even more in certain regions during the 
Second Republic, especially in Catalonia, Navarra, and the Basque country. The Basque 
nationalist STV grew as a mass organization, and Gafo reorganized his former 
Católicos-Libres in the Basque-Navarrese Confederation of Professional Worker 
Syndicates (CVNSOP) which had 25000 members in 1934. In the first phase of the 
republic, the Carlistas from Navarra and the Basque nationalists had allied in a bloc for 
the defense of regional autonomy and of the church, but gradually the Basque claim for 
autonomy led them to separate from the Carlists, who rejected the decentralization 
policies of the republic. Also the PNV achieved representation in the Cortes during the 
Second Republic, and because it was committed to regional autonomy it did not support 
the CEDA. Basque local clergy served as party organizers. In fact in 1920, the Basque 
and Navarra provinces alone provided 33.4% of the membership of all Marian 
congregations (the major devotional associations in Spain), although these regions had 
only 4.8% of the Spanish population.1218 
 In Catalonia, Catholicism was strongly organized. It formed the UDC, Unió 
Democratica de Catalunya, in 1931 as a regionalist and Christian-democratic party, 
committed to social reform, trade unionism, and welfare redistribution. Its influence 
was small, and although it formed a Christian-democratic trade union, the UTCC (Unió 
de Trebelladors Cristians de Catalunya), it only recruited 3,000 members. 1219  In 
Catalonia most Catholics supported the Lliga Regionalista, a conservative nationalist 
group whose deputies voted for the right on religious issues and on the left on regional 
issues. It also created the Federació de Joves Cristians (FJC) in Catalonia in 1931, with 
7,000 members initially.1220 But the main party was the Esquerra Republicana, a left-
wing party.1221 
 After the insurrection of 1934, there was an attempt to unite all Spanish Catholic 
unions under a single confederation, with the exception of the Basque nationalists of the 
STV and the UTCC. The Confederación Española de Sindicatos Obreros (CESO) was 
created in 1935 with 273,000 members.1222 
 Portuguese Catholic associational life was less developed. A political 
organization resembling a party was launched by the Portuguese episcopate in August 
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1917, the Centro Católico, in which Salazar was the main figure. 1223  In the 1918 
elections during sidonismo, it elected four deputies and afterwards won seats in all 
elections, especially in electoral districts of the areas of Minho and Beiras. But it did not 
promote any Catholic associational life. In fact, it was divided between monarchists, 
who used the Catholic organization to relate Catholicism with the defense of 
monarchism, and the purely Catholics for whom the regime issue was unimportant. This 
provoked ruptures in the Centro Católico, and in the 1921 elections only two deputies 
were elected. Moreover, in 1919 monarchists under the direction of Major Paiva 
Couceiro, coming from Spain, established the so-called Monarquia do Norte (Northern 
Monarchy) in the north of Portugal that dominated all the provinces of Minho, Trás-os-
Montes, and Beiras for a month. This created major divisions in the Catholic camp, with 
many in it preferring to ally with the rebellious military and downplaying party and 
associational organization. Later, they would be defeated, when the city of Porto was 
conquered by southern troops and in Monsanto, close to Lisbon, the monarchists were 
finally crushed.1224 
 Catholic associational life did not have links with the Centro Católico. In fact, 
this organization was more a «Catholic pressure group» than a real party with a program 
and a solid structure like the CEDA in Spain. 1225  In 1921, there existed only 300 
agrarian syndicates and 390 in 1926. They tended to be circles of caciquist influence, 
used by informal networks of local elites to sustain clientelistic relationships and not to 
mobilize in mass levels. Most of these sindicatos were at the concelho level and very 
few existed at the district level (only in the cities of Santarém, Évora, Aveiro, and Angra 
do Heroísmo). They did not attempt to include small producers, but they were mainly 
associations of big producers and farmers, only exceptionally including medium 
producers or rentiers. For instance, the first president of the Sindicato de Coimbra was 
Francisco Costa Lobo, director of the faculty of sciences of that city and civil governor 
of Coimbra. 1226  Another example of weak relationships between associations and 
political parties was the ACAP. In 1915 this association complained that there was no 
single deputy who understood agriculture.1227 In 1924, the RACAP changed its name 
three times, first to the Associação Central da Agricultura Portuguesa, then to 
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Sindicato Agricola Central, and finally to União Central da Agricultura Portuguesa. 
These reorganizations were the result of internal conflicts between Catholics and 
Monarchists again, between the rivals’ monarchists in the Causa Monarquica (Conde 
de Azevedo) and the Centro Católico Português. Most of the monarchist associations 
left the ACAP.1228 A last example of the almost non-existing links between parties and 
associations was the case of employers’ association, União dos Interesses Económicos 
(UIE). This association was created in September 1924 by members of the 
Confederação Patronal. It defended a non-democratic ideological platform and ran in 
parliamentary elections, competing with the parties proposing the restoration of the 
senate of interests of the time of Sidonio’s dictatorship.1229 In the 1925 elections, it 
presented candidates in 104 electoral circles, electing four deputies, and amassing an 
important share of the vote in the circles of Viseu, Faro, Portalegre, Elvas, Évora, and 
Estremoz. At the same in the south, the landowners associations’, together with the 
police (the GNR) engaged in repressing the workers’ unions. But soon the association 
was in a conspiracy for the armed coup of April 18, 1925 by organizing civilian 
militias.1230 
 In Portugal the conflicts between the state and the church led to divisions within 
the Catholic field as well as between Monarchists and Catholics. This inhibited the 
mobilization by Catholic elites through mass organizations, like the CEDA in Spain. 
The upper classes organized in the ACAP and became gradually supportive of 
authoritarian ideologies, namely the Integralismo Lusitano, the Portuguese version of 
the reactionary-conservative French Action Française. They also supported small groups 
of Catholic reactionaries, like Salazar’s Centro Académico da Democracia Cristã 
(CADC).1231 
 Finally, the Anarchist movement in Spain was also much stronger in relative 
terms when compared to Portugal. In Spain between 1917 and 1923 revolutionary 
strikes organized by the CNT produced a state of almost civil war with the CNT 
wanting to show its opposition to the war.1232 In the period 1918-1920, there was an 
enormous strike and protest activity. In 1914-1917 there were 231 strikes of which 32 
were rural; in 1918 463 strikes, 895 in 1919, and in 1920 there were 1,060. As for rural 
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strikes, in 1918 they were 68, in 1919 188, and in 1920 they were 194. The number of 
days of work lost to strike activity rose from 1.8 million in 1917 to 7.3 million in 1920, 
and the number of strikers from 71,400 to 244,700.1233 
 In the congress of June 1918 it decided to reorganize its structure. Craft unions 
disappeared and all workers involved in a given industrial activity were grouped into 
one single union (e.g. the single union of the building trades, of metallurgy etc). After 
this, there was a territorial organization: all single unions in a given town were grouped 
into local federations. At the end of 1918 the CNT had 700,000 members and in 1920 
more than one million.1234 
 CNT also expanded in the countryside. In the 1918 Anarchist congress also the 
FNAE (Federación Nacional de Agricultores de España) was set up as a rural 
association, although independent from the CNT. After 1918-20 Anarchists spread in 
Aragon, the Levante area (eastern seaside), and in Andalucia. In the city of Cordoba, for 
instance, of 130,000 rural workers 55,383 were members of CNT. At the same time 
although more rural workers were entering the organization, it was still a very local 
associational life. It was in the associations in the localities that political initiative was 
coming from frequently. To cope with this, the FNAE in 1918 decided its fusion with 
the CNT in order to achieve a better organization. At the same time there was always a 
clear separation between rural and industrial sectors within the CNT and the 
organization was unable to synchronize the local spontaneous strikes with national 
guidelines of action. In sum, although there was a central authority, there was a high 
degree of internal factionalism.1235 
 With Rivera’s dictatorship in 1923, the CNT called for a general protest strike, 
which was not supported by the socialist UGT, and was forced into clandestinity. Two 
hundred Anarchist trade unionists were arrested. The contradictions within the 
movement, between radicals and reformists heightened in this period, with the radicals 
gaining a definitive ascendancy in the movement. A new organization, the Federación 
Anarquista Ibérica (FAI), was founded in secrecy in July 1927 that was a «true 
bakuninist secret society of young, fanatical revolutionaries», who preferred the 
promotion of insurrection by small clandestine groups to the traditional tactics of 
massive protest. Within the CNT the moderate line of Pestana was rejected, and the 
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Anarchists started to now favour more direct methods.1236 Moreover, Rivera’s welfare 
programme only applied to urban, not rural workers. The corporate organization of 
agriculture only started in May 1928, and in those regions that were already endowed 
with pre-existing organizations. The government was very prudent in expanding its 
programmes to the countryside because it did not want to alienate the landowners who 
feared that collective negotiation institutions would empower the rural proletariat.1237 
This made the gulf between urban and rural worlds deepen and created an even more 
antagonistic labour movement in the countryside. The Southern countryside and 
Catalonia had no political representation since they were dominated by the CNT, which 
had been put outside the law.1238 The UGT had also a weak penetration in these sections 
of rural society, and instead it protected its’ urban base (this would be different in the 
Republic). This radicalized even more the CNT and enabled it to spread through the 
rural areas.1239 Still, the CNT had half a million of members in 1930. 1240 
 In the Second Republic, the divisions on how to act became clearer within the 
new regime. The line of Juan Peiró opposed any links with regime parties and 
institutional cooperation, whereas Angel Pestaña’s group was more moderate and 
favored short-term goals. At the same time both these leaders were now united against 
the leaders of the FAI, who managed to expel Pestana and Peiró from the CNT. Rivera’s 
dictatorship had radicalized the Anarchist movement. Now the organization was 
dominated by leaders «committed to uncompromising direct action more than ever 
before», such as Buenaventura Durruti.1241 During the Second Republic, the CNT never 
participated in labor conciliation boards, land reform projects, or elections, but because 
of full democratization and competition of Socialist unions backed by government 
policies, Anarchists pushed for the mobilization of workers.  
In 1931, the CNT had half a million members, in 1932 more than one million, 
and in 1936 one million and six hundred thousand.1242 In the mid-1930s it organized 
about 13% of the labor force, about the same as the socialist UGT (with Catholic and 
Communist unions 2% each). Catalonia provided 30% of its members, Andalucia and 
Valencia 15%. Its support centered on the rural laborers of Andalucia, Catalan and 
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Valencian textiles, and construction workers and peasant small holders in Zaragoza. 
Heavy industry was underrepresented, and only 5% were white collar workers. Still, the 
CNT was a highly decentralized federation, able to intensely mobilize many local 
communities but without a strong national presence.1243 
 In Portugal between 1905 and 1925, there were at least 777 unions, 15 industrial 
federations, and 23 local unions federations, which unionized more than 200,000 
workers. Although many unions were not included in the successive national union 
structures (successively CECS, UON, and CGT), there were strong attempts at syndical 
unity in this period.1244  In 1914, the UON (União Operária Nacional) was created, 
which was the first union confederation. In 1919 the CGT (Confederação Geral do 
Trabalho) was formed, the major confederation of labor, in a National Workers 
Congress (Congresso Operário Nacional) in Coimbra, where there were present 160 
associations representing 90,000 members. CGT was organized in local unions, which 
were then grouped into industry federations. These industry federations sent delegates 
to a top confederal council, and daily issues were run by a confederal committee elected 
by the congress. The CGT came to include between 40,000 and 150,000 members, and 
it was able to mobilize about 60% of existing workers associations.1245 As can be seen 
from the next table, there was a growth of Anarchist unions in the 1920-1925 period, 
which were particularly strong in the southern regions of latifundia (Alentejo) and 
Lisbon. 
 
Table 32: Number of Total Unions (Anarchist) 
       Year Number Variation 
  Nº     % 
1905 161   
1910 223 +62 +39 
1915 420 +197 +88 
1920 334 -86 -20 
1925 507 +173 +52 
(source: Freire, 1992, p. 122) 
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Table 33: Number of Anarchist Unions by Region 
 Nº  % 
Alentejo 193 25 
Lisboa 159 21 
Litoral 132 17 
Porto 102 14 
Margem sul 81 10 
Interior 54 7 
Algarve 45 6 
Indeterminate 11  
TOTAL 766 100 
 (Source: Freire, 1992, p. 124) 
 
Collective action in the countryside was also stimulated in the 1920-1925 period. 
Although never reaching their 1915 levels, after 1920 the number of rural unions grew 
from 37 to 67. 
 
Table 34: Rural Unions, 1905-1925 
Year 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925  
 1 4 168 37 67  
(Pinto, Almeida, 2000, p. 11) 
 
 Although after 1920 the syndicalists were the dominant organization in the left, 
they were also in decline as well, being highly restricted to Lisbon and Barreiro, and 
declining in the north and the south (Alentejo).1246 Between 1919 and 1922, CGT had 
80,000 to 100,000 members, in 1923 their membership had fallen to 55,000, and in 
1925 only partially recovered to 70,000 members.1247 Associations remained weakly 
funded, small and local with a high proximity between leaders and members. The 
proportion of leader/member varied from 1/3 to 1/20.1248 
 Again, this was related to the movement’s position of non-cooperation with the 
state. Since the start the syndicalist movement aimed at the creation of self-help services 
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to its members (in unemployment, disease, and accidents), building from the previous 
century tradition of mutualism, even creating services beyond the class association 
level, like the creation of funds at the federative level (e.g. the bolsas de trabalho/work 
funds in the construction, shoe making, graphics industry, who also had a role on 
providing information on job opportunities). The creation of welfare funds for all 
workers was defended by many in the movement. At the same time within the 
Anarchists, the group that opposed any of these welfare measures, and were contrary to 
the bolsas de trabalho and welfare subsidies, became dominant. These measures could 
be «the cause of death of the revolutionary spirit in the class», as Anarchist João 
Caldeira, a leader of the construction workers, argued in 1924 in the Anarchist congress 
in the city of Tomar.1249 Moreover, Anarchists did not trust the cooperative movement, 
both of producers and of consumers, which was seen as cooperating with the capitalist 
system and being too dominated by the socialists. To this movement of cooperatives-
socialists they called the «grocery shop socialism», a barrier to the revolutionary spirit 
of workers.1250 
 
12.2. Deep-rooted and Violent Conflicts in Associational Life 
 
 With the pressures for full democratization, expansion of density of associations 
and creation of confederative structures after the trienio revolucionário, Iberian 
countries saw also the intensification of conflict within associational life. The Anarchist 
movements became more mass mobilizing and also at the same time more anti-system 
and revolutionary. In Portugal the most important event in this respect was the 
insurrection in October 1921 of the Anarchists who allied with the extreme left 
republicans with penetration of the police forces, who controlled Lisbon for almost a 
month.1251 Socialists and Catholics competed more in the electoral and political arenas 
in general, but they were unable to structure that competition in peaceful ways. Center 
parties (e.g. the radicals in Spain) lost their capacity to mobilize the citizenry and 
decayed as organizations, plagued by corruption and personalized. 
 With the growing radicalism both of the Right and of the Left, the military began 
to intervene in politics again by promoting military coups against the unstable 
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democratic experiences of both countries: 1926 in Portugal and 1936 in Spain. The 
periods of 1926-1933 in Portugal and 1936-1939 in Spain saw the violent war of 
associational life associations against each other, which would be the prelude to the 
authoritarian regimes that between the late-1930s and the mid-1970s eliminated most 
traces of autonomous associational life. 
 Still, there are differences worth exploring between Portugal and Spain. Because 
Spain in the interwar period experienced a higher level of parliamentarization, 
democratization, and state policies directed at empowering associational life together 
with inherited regional patterns of stronger associational life, the civil war that followed 
the fall of the republican experience was bloodier and of greater magnitude because it 
was based on much higher levels of popular mobilization, both on the Left and the 
Right. Moreover, it also explains the varying structures of the authoritarian regimes that 
followed: a more ideological and mobilizational authoritarianism in Spain, and a more 
traditionalist and demobilizational regime in Portugal. 
 In Portugal the CGT refused to participate in politics, to support the participation 
in World War I, to ally with any of the existing parties, and it always espoused direct 
action through strikes, boycott, and sabotage while at the same it promoted social 
revolution.1252 In 1918, an attempted general strike failed, but another in 1919 was able 
to mobilize workers from construction, metal industry, water companies, printers, 
drivers, mail employees, shoemakers, street-cleaning workers, and many others. The 
government reacted by closing down unions and newspapers, and by extreme police 
repression against strikers. As a consequence, after 1920 Anarchists become more adept 
of using terror tactics, in particular the young syndicalists, like the targeted 
assassination at individuals or bomb attacks in public avenues. In January 1921 in the 
first congress of the syndicalist youths, a secret Comité de Defesa Social was created 
with the aim to push for the emergence of a revolutionary situation through the use of 
every possible means available. It was composed of three individuals, each of them in 
contact with groups of other five individuals, who by their turn contacted groups of 
other five and so on, in a pyramidal structure. They engaged in killings of judges, 
supposed traitors, policemen, and employers all throughout the 1920s. Bombings were 
at their height in the years 1923-1924, numbering about 200, thanks to a new radical 
organization, the Legião Vermelha (Red Legion).1253 
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 In Spain the Anarchist confederation, the CNT, was controlled by the extremists 
of the FAI in 1932. Because of competition with the Socialists who were then in 
government, Anarchists attempted to set up insurrectional communes in the early years 
of the republic. For instance, the CNT would take over a town, burn the administrations’ 
archives, destroy money, and kill the policemen of the Guardia Civil. In January 1932 
in the upper Llobregat valley in Catalonia, an insurrection of miners, textile workers, 
and peasants proclaimed libertarian communism in the area. The government repressed 
the movement and FAI leader Durruti was deported to Africa. Again, in Seville in the 
summer of 1932, a general revolutionary strike appeared, because of rumors that right-
wing General Majuro was about to seize power by a military coup. Another insurrection 
arose in January 1933 in Barcelona and spread to Madrid, Valencia, Cadiz, Seville, and 
the whole south. Finally, the biggest of the insurrections, with a massive peasant 
support and the only one that was national in scope, began December 3, 1933 in Aragón 
and spread to Madrid, Valencia, La Coruña, Cádiz, and Seville.1254 
 As has been described, after the fall of the left coalition that founded the 
republic, the Radical Party was called to government. In the 1933 elections, a 
government of Radicals sought to reverse many of the Left’s policies, by installing a 
new policy of order and property and by imposing a more repressive Ministry of 
Interior.1255 Moreover, Lerroux and especially the president Alcalá Zamora accepted the 
entry of the Christian-democratic CEDA in government in coalition with the radicals. 
When the government of Lerroux started to replace the members of the UGT in the 
Jurados Mixtos in the countryside and repealed the Socialist law of terminus municipals 
(which regulated the hiring of labor to be done first in the area of the land property, in 
order to provide employment for the workers of the area), the radical Largo Caballero 
gained ascendancy in the Socialist movement and excluded the moderate Juan Besteiro 
and his allies.1256 
 The Socialists reacted fast. Azana declared that the Cortes should have been 
dismissed and elections held, and he called for a general revolutionary strike. The UGT 
and its agrarian union, the FNTT, radicalized speech and acts and Largo Caballero, 
leader of the Socialist youth, defended openly the social revolution. The Socialists 
reacted again by forming a revolutionary movement with the aim of creating a republic 
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of workers through the actions of a new organization, the Alianza Obrera (a 
revolutionary alliance of all workers parties) that included some left republicans, in 
Catalonia the Esquerra and in Asturias even included the CNT and the Communists. 
The FNTT and the Andalucian section of CNT celebrated an agreement.1257 In most of 
the country the strike failed, but in Madrid there were violent fights with the police, and 
in Catalonia Lluis Companys declared the independence of Catalonia within a federal 
republic in Spain. In Barcelona, revolutionary committees were created and militias 
organized, but the revolution failed because it was unable to coordinate actions between 
the city and the countryside (unable to mobilize rural workers, the Rabassaires), and so 
the army was able to crush it. It was especially in Asturias where a huge workers’ revolt 
erupted. The revolutionary attempt in Asturias was a strong and major uprising in the 
mining region by the Alianza Obrera, a common front of workers of all ideologies. For 
two weeks the mining zone of Asturias was controlled by local committees of the 
Socialist republic and by the militia of the red army, but it was strongly repressed by the 
army coming from Morocco. Noteworthy was the fact that in the rest of the country the 
CNT stayed away always from the revolutionary attempts, not wanting to make an 
alliance with the socialists.1258 The combat with the army lasted fifteen days, thousands 
of people were arrested, including Azaña (for three months)and Caballero (one year) 
while Prieto was exiled. The government imposed one year of martial law after the 
defeat of the workers’ revolt by army units. 1259  After this, the gulf between the 
left/socialists/workers and the center/republican/bourgeois camps was definitive. The 
UGT and Llargo Caballero returned to radicalism. 
 In reaction to these events, in early 1935 a law in the National Parliament was 
approved that forbade all citizens from belonging to secret associations with heavy 
penalties (prison and exile) to those who dewfied the law. Special legislation was also 
approved for the suppression of freedom of association, expression, and reunion. The 
constitution of any association required the government’s permission, which was also 
supposed to approve the statutes and the directive bodies of the association. Moreover, 
the government could dissolve at any moment any organization, suspend its meetings, 
make itself represented in the meetings by special appointees, or dismiss its leaders, 
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especially if they were considered to develop activities contrary to the established order 
(decree-law 22468 of April 11, 1933).1260 
 But the center-right governments of CEDA and Lerroux fell because of scandals 
generated by the radicals’ corrupt practices. Lerroux resigned as PM in the autumn of 
1935. Until 1936 there was a succession of CEDA-radicals governments, mainly 
preoccupied with problems of budgeting, finance equilibrium, and reduction of state 
expenses. After a brief period of unstable governments, President Alcalá Zamora 
dissolved the parliament and called for elections. The rightist parties united in a 
“national front” and the leftist parties in a “Popular front” (socialists, Anarchists, 
Communists, and again the republican left).1261 
 After the February 1936 elections, led by Azaña the Left was again in power. It 
was a much more radical government. Socialists and Anarchists pushed for land 
occupations and formed militias to fight the Guardia Civil.1262 On March 3, 1936 a 
wave of land occupation started by the peasantry, partially under the autonomous 
direction of the FNTT. In the province of Badajóz, 60,000 peasants occupied 3,000 
properties, and the government was forced to legalize these occupations. Again the 
members of the jurados mixtos were replaced with individuals more supportive of the 
socialists, and the mandatory recruitment of workers of the area of cultivation was 
reintroduced. In June there was a huge general peasant strike by the CNT, the FNTT 
and the recently created Communist unions, that soon became also an anticlerical wave 
with the persecution of priests and the burning of churches. Moreover, the government 
decided to dissolve all municipalities that were ruled by conservatives, and in these few 
months proceeded to a redistribution of land on a scale much higher than any year 
before.1263 
 The radicalization of associational life organizations in both countries during the 
periods just analyzed served as a pretext for right-wing military interventions that put an 
end to the mass age. In Portugal in 1926, after a succession of unstable left and right 
republican governments, the military deposed the Republic. The period of military 
dictatorship lasted until 1933. Between 1927 and 1934, most workers’ associations lived 
in a situation of semi-clandestinity, since the new regime was frankly hostile to free 
associational life. A strong control was imposed on associations through the 
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reintroduction of the 1891 law which also forbade union confederations, imposed 
previous police permission for the creation of associations, and the presence of 
representatives of the government in the union meetings.1264 Unions like the CGT were 
dissolved and the right to strike was abolished.1265 Gradually, a civilian current emerges 
within the military dictatorship around the figure of António Salazar, who became the 
main political minister when was he heading the Finance Ministry and was able to make 
a swift transition to a new form of authoritarian rule, more ideological and more 
civilianized, namely the Estado Novo. 
 Initially there was a strong resistance to the imposition of the dictatorship by 
sectors of the union movement. On May 31, 1927 there was an appeal by the Anarchists 
for a general strike against the dictatorship, in February 1932 an attempt of general 
strike by the Communists, and a series of bombist actions in Coimbra, Barreiro, Setúbal, 
Lisboa, Almada, Silves, and Marinha Grande. On January 18, 1934 there was a large 
insurrection against the plans for state-corporatist legislation where the main left 
currents (Communists, Anarchists, and socialists) were able to achieve some 
coordination. Many associations, unions, and cooperatives were linked to the three left 
movements that participated in the insurrection (consumption cooperatives, mutualities, 
recreational, and cultural popular associations), much mobilized by the Socialists (the 
Voz do Operario in Lisbon, the Casa do Povo in Porto) as well as the Federação das 
Associações Operárias; the Anarchist CGT; and the newly formed and small Comissão 
Intersindical, connected to the recently formed Partido Comunista Português-PCP. But 
the revolt failed, only achieving the blocking of railroads in the north, and occupying 
the city of Marinha Grande for several hours. After violent fights, it was repressed by 
the military. 1266  In 1934, CGT was declared illegal, although a small group of 
Anarchists in 1937 made a failed assasination attempt against Salazar.1267 
 The new corporatist legislation put unions in a state controlled structure that 
made them organize in sindicatos de profissão (national craft unions). This contributed 
to the pulverization of unions, since they became regulated mainly at the district level, 
thus making it more difficult to cooperate between workers of different professions. In 
the same company, for instance, there could exist a diversity of unions, each with its 
different aims and legislative schemes. This is the contrary of what workers’ 
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organizations aimed during the republic, where unions after 1918 became sindicatos de 
industria and of a vertical nature. Moreover, new legislation prohibited federations and 
confederations of workers and stipulated that union directions needed to be authorized 
by the government.1268 
 In Spain the events between February and June of 1936 were the pretext for the 
right-wing military to intervene. On July 18, 1936 a military coup by right-wing officers 
put an end to the republic. This was the start of the civil war and a situation of territorial 
dual sovereignty with one part of the country controlled by the republic fighting the 
other part controlled by the coalition of right-wing forces and the army. In order to 
defend itself, the republican government looked for support in the peasant organizations 
and in the unions. It legalized the land occupations and recruited individuals in these 
areas and in the unions for the creation of a militia to fight the rebellious military.1269 In 
the republican zone the resistance of the government was based on the working class 
militia, a collection of ill-trained armed workers, recruited from the militant left and 
trade unions. The unions socialized production, controlled the factories, especially in 
Catalonia, where CNT was dominant, and established revolutionary committees that 
shared power with the remnants of the legitimate state.1270 Moreover, a social revolution 
began and it was directed against the traditional enemies: the church and the 
landowners. Committees of armed milicianos destroyed churches and killed bourgeois 
and priests, in spite of the efforts of some of the CNT leaders to avoid this. 
Collectivization of property was also instituted by the CNT and in some areas by the 
UGT in order to create a federation of free municipalities (municipios) and workers’ 
collectivities.1271 
 In the nationalistic zone the military Right had the support of bourgeois, 
landowners, and the Catholic church. Organizationally it included also the Fascists (who 
until then had been a minority and who now began to organize for mass mobilization 
through a militia), the militant carlists and their armed militia, the Requetes Navarros 
(which had 6,000 individuals in 1934),1272 the monarchists/traditionalists (the Bloque 
Nacionalista of Calvo Sotelo, an exile from France, who was influenced by Maurras, 
and who proposed a semi-Fascist monarchy), and the Acción Católica Nacional de 
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Propagandistas also supported the rebellious military. 1273  There was also the 
consolidation of a series of extreme-right associations in this period. There were the 
Fascists in the Falange. They were inspired by Mussolini’s ideas and oriented for the 
mobilization of the working classes under a nationalist ideal, and they were strong in 
university student’s towns (Sevilla, Madrid, and Valladolid). They were the result of the 
fusion of the JONS (Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista, formed in 1931), a youth 
revolutionary Fascist movement created by Onesimo Redondo and Ramiro Ledesma 
Ramos who had plans for organizing a Catholic counter-revolutionary force composed 
of peasants and farmers in Valladolid, with the Falange of José António Primo de 
Rivera, the son of the ex-dictator. Before 1936 it had never more than 2% of the 
national vote and fewer than 10,000 members. With the outbreak of the civil war, it 
grew to 25,000 members and in October provided 43,000 of the 65,000 volunteers for 
the militias of the nationalist cause.1274 The military Right was the more powerful group 
in the rightist coalition, and it was able to maintain control over it, especially because 
the Moroccan army of Franco was highly disciplined and cohesive. This enabled the 
Right to win over the republican side. First, it was not as divided as the republican side, 
with its intestine fights between left groups. Instead, it relied on a cohesive Catholic 
ideology somehow accepted by all parts of the coalition, at least provisionally, 
including the Fascists. Second, it was able to maintain a military unity and use a 
professional army, which the republican side lacked.1275 In the end the nationalist bloc 
won.1276 
 
12.3. Outcome: Disjointed Associational Life under Authoritarianism 
 
 In both societies, authoritarian regimes were established that ended almost any 
vestiges of autonomous associational life. Still, they were different regimes. The level 
of political and associational engagement in Spain was higher at least until the early 
1950s. This was the result of a higher level of ideological differentiation between the 
several families that composed the authorization right wing founding coalition. 1277  
Political families became clearer in the Spanish dictatorship (the Catholics, the 
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Falangists, the military, the Tradicionalistas-traditionalists, the monarchists, the 
integrists, and later the technocrats) whereas in Portugal they were more of a 
personalistic-clientelistic nature.1278 
 The Portuguese dictatorship was the oldest right-wing authoritarian political 
regime of the twentieth-century. Between 1933 and 1974 a single-party regime, based 
on a strong repressive apparatus, repressed severely the development of voluntary 
associations.1279  The existing Republican, Socialist, Anarchist associations from the 
republic were dissolved and their property confiscated by the state. For instance, in 
1926 the Masonry, the Grande Oriente Lusitano (Grand Lusitan Oriental) had 3,150 
members organized in 94 groups. In 1933, the first year of the dictatorship, there were 
only 1,500 members. The organization was persecuted by the dictatorship, closed in 
1930 by government decree, and its possessions were given to the Fascist semi-military 
organization Legião Portuguesa (Portuguese Legion). 1280  Most CGT leaders were 
deported or sent to prison.1281 
 In Portugal, authoritarian rule was reinforced by the abolition of all party 
pluralism and the creation of a single party representing the supporters of the new 
regime, the União Nacional. Contrary to the Spanish Falange, it was built from above 
and from the state to society, more as a device for the cooptation of local and regional 
elites and with the explicit aim to demobilize the citizenry.1282 It never achieved the 
levels of mobilization and links to associational life that its Spanish counterpart had. 
The party developed ancillary organizations, which were also weaker than their Spanish 
counterparts: the Legião Portuguesa (Portuguese Legion), monopolist student 
associations Mocidade Portuguesa (Portuguese Youth), and the Mocidade Portuguesa 
Feminina (Portuguese Feminin Youth).1283  
The major innovation of the regime was the creation of a monopolistic system of 
interest representation in industry and agriculture known as Estado Corporativo. The 
Portuguese state was considered a corporative republic, where the diverse interest 
groups from the past were replaced by monopolies of professional representation in so-
called corporatist organizations of employers and workers in several productive sectors. 
It was supposed to be an alternative to liberalism and socialism with their recognition of 
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class warfare and divisive competition between interest groups. The corporatist system 
was very complex and had class organizations and sectoral organizations, organizations 
where just one or more than one class was represented, mandatory and non-mandatory 
organizations. Contrary to Spain, where single organizations for workers and business 
were implemented in a more coherent fashion, the authoritarian vertical unions 
represented only workers, and business created their own Grémios Nacionais (national 
guilds). 
 Workers were reunited in single national unions authorized and licensed by the 
state and controlled by the government. The state retained the possibility of determining 
union leaderships, dismissing its directions at will, and through the Instituto Nacional 
do Trabalho e Previdência it regulated collective hiring.1284 Business was organized in 
Grémios based on products (wheat, cotton, olive oil, and so on) including all productive 
agents of the process (production, transformation, and commercialization). Legally, 
each Grémio regulated the economic activity of its field, and companies were not be 
allowed to develop outside the Grémios.1285 
 In agriculture, the corporative order included grémios of farmers, landowners, 
and animal breeders, who were organized at the concelho level (an intermediate 
administrative unit between the district and the single village or city) level. 
Subsequently, they would be aggregated in regional (e.g. the Federation of Wine 
Producers of the Center-South Region) grémios and finally in national confederations. 
They were about two hundred and thirty of these associations, almost all created 
between 1939 and 1943. They were managed at the concelho level by a general 
committee (conselho geral), run by twenty individuals chosen among the farmers of the 
region, and as only the founding members of the Grémio could be elected to its 
direction, this system tended to give almost absolute power to the more powerful 
farmers in the concelho.1286 The rural workers and the fishermen were organized in the 
Casas do Povo (People’s Houses) and Casas dos Pescadores (Fishermen’s Houses). In 
these organizations there was a distinction between effective members (the rural 
workers, who paid dues and benefited from the services of the association) and 
protective members (sócios protectores) who had mandatory membership and at the 
same time access to the ruling positions in the organization (usually the big 
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landowners). The sócios protectores were present in the assembly that elected a 
directive junta and its president, again usually a big landowner. Contrary to corporate 
representation in industry, there was no separate representation for unions of workers in 
the countryside, since the big landowners controlled the Casas do Povo.1287 This system 
was established in all rural parishes of Portugal, and it was highly paternalistic, being 
more a vehicle for control from above and paternalistic distribution of sickness benefits, 
old age pensions, and unemployment subsidies.1288 
 In April 1939, after the victory of General Franco and the right in the civil war, 
there was the creation of a new authoritarian order. After the defeat of the left, 
repression ensued in a very large scale. Authority by the military was provisionally 
institutionalized, and political and associational activities were forbidden. A declaration 
of the war was maintained and authority given to local military commanders.1289 
 The Spanish Franquist dictatorship (1936-1977) was also one the most long 
lived right-wing authoritarian regimes of the twentieth-century. It was based on a strong 
repressive apparatus, on the monopoly power by a single-party, and on laws that 
severely limited dissenting groups and the development of voluntary associations. It 
deliberately promoted widespread demobilization of the population, although in some 
contexts there were waves of mobilization and association building. 
 First, it simply attempted the total physical elimination of any opposition. More 
than 30,000 “reds” were killed between the end of the war and 1946.1290 There were no 
firm procedural guarantees, at least not until 1941. The government supervised traveling 
between provinces and kept the country in a state close to a state of war until 1947. 
270,000 people were held in prison in the 1936, 84,000 in 1940, and 35,000 in 1945.1291 
This strong repression was in the hands of the army, and military courts had competence 
over civilian matters.1292 
 Second, a set of laws prohibited any form of free associational life. A decree on 
September 13, 1936 by the National Defense Committee (Junta de Defesa Nacional) 
declared illegal all parties and associations that had integrated the republican Popular 
Front (Frente Popular) or that were in the opposition to the Fascist Movimiento 
Nacional (National Movement). Another decree, on September 25, 1936 prohibited the 
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political activity by unions or employers associations.1293 All political associations were 
dissolved and their property given to the single party (the Ley de Responsabilidades 
Políticas of February 1939). Strikes became illegal. In March 1940, a law was approved 
specifically for the repression of masonry.1294 
 On January 25, 1941 a decree regulated the right of association. Associations 
could not be constituted without the approval of the regime’s political coordination 
ministry, the Ministerio de la Gobernacion. The exceptions were associations with the 
sole objective of profit that were ruled by the dispositions of civil or mercantile law, 
Catholic associations that promoted exclusively religious ends, institutions or 
corporations that existed because of special laws, cooperatives registered in the Ministry 
of Work, and associations subject to the sindical legislation or to the single party of the 
regime, the FET de la JONS. 1295  The state recognized the right of Spaniards «to 
associate freely for licit purpose», but the limits of the law were so narrow that the 
creation of any association was very difficult. In 1941 a decree declared that projects of 
associations should be sent to the Gobernadores Civiles, civil governors or prefects, of 
their district which in turn sent them to the Ministry of Gobernación. Before deciding 
the minister would listen to the several state departments that had direct relations with 
the interests of the association. For instance, the Ministry of Education would be 
consulted about associations related to education, or the public health state department, 
the Direccion General de Salud, if it was an association of doctors, for instance. But 
many times these state organizations were rival and conflicting with these merging 
associational interests, and consequently they would veto their legalization. Although in 
some contexts associations collaborated with state agencies, this was an exceptional 
situation. The regime elites were very careful in selecting the type of associational life 
they wanted to foster. 
 In Spain between 1945 and the mid-1950s, associational life was constituted 
mainly by three arenas. First, there was the associational life connected to the single 
party. The FET de la JONS, the single political organization in Spain, was created in 
1937 and had the task of intermediation between the society and the state. The regime 
had banned political parties and instituted single-party rule.1296 Its principles of unity, 
totality, and hierarchy (unidad, totalidad y hierarquia) were extended to existing 
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associations like unions, employers’, sports, or youth associations. In the war years, its 
membership grew from 650,000 members in 1939 to one million in 1945. At this time, 
it had about 2,000 full time functionaries (and 10,000 in the syndical organization).1297 
Some associations were organizationally dependent of the single party, like the Youth 
Front (Frente de Juventudes).1298 Until 1965, for instance, all university students were 
required to belong to the Sindicato Español Universitario, a Falangist union founded in 
the 1930s. 
 There was also the a women's organization, the Sección Femenina (SF) of the 
Falange, which had been created during the war as a network of social welfare centers 
for the health and hunger relief of wounded combatants, women, and children in the 
Nationalist zone. From 1937 to 1939, it grew from 60,000 to 580,000 members.1299 
 Second, there was an attempt to corporatize society from above by direct state 
initiatives. The regime fostered the creation of new institutions and organizations. The 
work laws, called Fuero Del Trabajo, compelled workers to join vertical unions 
dominated by the Falange and controlled by the government.1300 The Ley de Unidad 
Sindical of 1940 instituted 28 multifunctional, vertical, and sectoral syndicates that were 
supposed to include all workers, technicians, and employers of each product cycle. The 
sectors were insurance, herding, entertainment, banking and stock exchange, chemicals, 
hostelries and tourist activities, water gas and electricity, glass and ceramics, 
transportation and communications, merchant marine, teaching, hides, olives, metals, 
sugar, cereals, combustibles, foodstuffs, wood and cork, alcoholic beverages, paper and 
graphic arts, fruits and horticulture, press radio television and publicity, and health.1301 
These unions served as communication chanels between workers, employers, and the 
state, and they had several welfare functions (collected and distributed retirement, 
sickness and other social insurance benefits, operated sports clubs, vacation resorts,  and 
entertainment facilities), trained labour, resolved plant-level grievances, set wages, and 
work conditions.1302 
 These authoritarian corporatist institutions were designed as a part of the broader 
project to control associational life in general and the labor class in particular. Unions 
and interest organizations were integrated into the regime through monopolistic forms 
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of representation. Membership was compulsory for employers and employees, while a 
vertical command structure controlled associations. Officials at national, provincial and 
local levels were nominated by the government, and they were to maintain discipline in 
the work force, and subordinated to the authoritarian single party, the Falange.1303 
 Agricultural organizations were also included in the corporatist system. The 
Hermandades Agrícolas were created in 1940 by the fusion of pre-existing laborers’ 
unions with employers’ organizations know as Camaras Agrarias (rural lodges), and 
they assumed the power that in a syndicate was exercised by the syndical centrals. 
These Hermandades had a history since the early twentieth century of fighting rural 
workers’ mobilization, and now they were given ultimate control over the rural 
proletariat’s life and work conditions by being integrated in the Falange and given 
monopolistic representation powers. According to Sevilla-Guzman, these Hermandades 
(1906) were created to neutralize workers’ and peasant movements of left orientation in 
the first half of the century, an early attempt of the big landowners to mobilize small 
peasants.1304 
 Nevertheless, the Hermandades were subordinate to the centrals at the provincial 
level and their workers’ and employers’ sections had the same appointed president, 
which made them in a way less representative than the syndicates at the provincial level 
and below. 1305  The main organizations were the Hermandades Sindicales and the 
Sindicatos de Rama, both organized within a given territory and connected vertically 
with the Organizacion Sindical; The Hermandades Sindicales Locales de Labradores y 
Ganaderos, with mandatory membership of several categories of the agrarian 
production (farmers, technicians and workers), and an internal structure very much 
controlled by the Movimiento; then would be aggregated at the provincial level with the 
COSAS (Cámaras Oficiales Sindicales Agrarias), federations with consultation 
functions; and then at national level there was the Hermandad Sindical Nacional de 
Labradores y Ganaderos with exclusive character for the representation of the interests 
of the countryside.1306 
 The corporatist structure managed to achieve some penetration of society. In the 
late 1950s, ten million workers were organized in twelve thousand and five hundred 
local syndicates and associations. By 1964, nine million workers and three million 
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employers were organized by the syndicate. Out of a labor force of thirteen million, 
ninety percent belonged to the syndicate. The corporatist structure provided also 
vacations, training centers, parks and sports facilities, medical centers, and social 
insurance schemes. In the 1960s, these activities absorbed forty percent of the syndicate 
budget and five percent of the state budget. The sindicatos had a mandatory quota, a tax 
on all wages and salaries, which gave it a solid financial basis. 1307  Finally, they 
managed to regulate with some stability employment hiring and conditions, imposing in 




 The common patterns of Spain and Portugal, of a political stabilization by the 
elimination of almost all autonomous voluntary associations can be traced to the factors 
I identified in the previous chapters: a weak pre-modern associational life tradition, low 
parliamentarization and democratization, and low state capacity. Still, there were 
differences between Portugal and Spain explained by variations in these three aspects. 
In fact, Spain in the interwar period, both during the Rivera’s dictatorship, the second 
Republic and the civil war, continued its history of a much denser associational life than 
Portugal. This is explained by the fact that associational life organizations in Spain 
maintained their partnerships with the state and strengthened their links with political 
parties. This also explains why the authoritarian regimes were different at this level: 
there was a much more mobilizing dictatorship through Fascist organizations in Spain, 
whereas in Portugal a more traditionalist and static regime fostered instead passivity and 
demobilization. 
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Chapter 13: Associational life in Iberia, 1940s-2000s 
 
 The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, I explain how the patterns of state-
voluntary associations relationships established in the 1930s-1940s to the 1970s 
constitute a legacy that still shapes associational life in contemporary Iberian 
democracies (after the 1980s). These patterns left an imprint that still determines the 
scope, density, and coordination levels of associational life in democratic Iberia, and 
that explains to a large extent why among Western European democracies, it is here that 
we find the weakest voluntary associations. Second, I also explain variations between 
the Iberian democracies. Spain and Portugal have significant differences in the density 
and composition of their associational structures that allow for a reflection that not all is 
determined by the weight of an authoritarian legacy. There are varying possibilities for 
change and for building an active citizenry and participatory democracy in post-
authoritarian democracies. 
 
13.1. Associational life during and after authoritarianism: problems and issues 
 
 As was discussed in previous chapters, the preceding regime’s levels of 
associability (the corporateness of polity), the nature of the state, and the level of 
democratization of the regime were the main factors shaping associational life in the 
twentieth century Western Europe. In the case of Iberian countries, a stable 
configuration of associational life developed between the late 1930s and the 1970s that 
was to become the weakest of Western Europe. This was the result of very early 
opposition to and elimination of corporate identities, low levels of state capacity, and 
low levels of democratization and parliamentarization of the polity. This very weakly 
dense and coordinated pattern of voluntary associations stabilized in the lifetime of the 
Iberian authoritarian regimes, between the 1930s and the 1970s, and it was still highly 
present when these societies faced pressures to end these regimes in the mid-1970s. In 
this sense, and according to my theoretical model, it is to be expected that when Iberian 
societies faced the process of transition from authoritarianism in the 1970s and the 
consolidation of democratic regimes in the early 1980s, their associational lifes would 
be heavily influenced and shaped by the characteristics and traits of voluntary 
associations that developed during authroritarianism as well as by the state and 
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institutional configurations inherited from this regime. In this section I examine this 
claim. 
 One factor recently stressed in the literature on voluntary associations in the 
third wave of democratization in shaping associational life is the nature of the 
antecedent regime. 1309  As Marc Howard has shown, the levels of associational 
membership for a series of countries in western and southern Europe, Latin America, 
and Eastern Europe are well explained by the nature of the antecedent political regime. 
As Howard has shown for the 1990s, established western European democracies, with a 
strong democratic tradition, have the highest average of associational membership with 
a mean of 2.39. Then, they are followed by democracies whose previous regime was 
authoritarian (e.g. Brazil, Spain, Portugal, and Argentina) with a mean of of 1.82 
associations per adult. Finally, in the last place come the post-totalitarian Eastern 
European democracies with a mean of 0.91.1310 
 Howard’s argument is similar to mine: the fact that new democracies of southern 
Europe consolidated after a period prolonged authoritarianism, in contrast to the rest of 
established western European democracies where authoritarianism never existed (e.g. 
Britain and Norway) or lasted only a few years (e.g. Germany andItaly), explains its 
weak dimension. In which way and through which mechanisms do the legacies of 
authoritarian dictatorships have an impact in associational life during the democratic 
consolidation period in Iberia (1980s-present)? Which characteristics of 
authoritarianism, both at the level of associational development and institutional traits, 
are important? 
 First, authoritarianism left a legacy of weak organizational development that 
after the more euphoric and mobilizing period of the transition from authoritarianism, 
still impacted associations by making them have a low capacity for resource extraction, 
mobilization, and influence over authorities. The fact that most associational ventures, 
in particular lower class/popular sector, were prohibited from forming confederations 
and they were coerced into state sponsored vertical corporatism, disorganized these 
groups and left them with a low capacity for self-organization at the moment of 
democratic consolidation. This was the result of high repression and direct exclusion of 
popular masses from policy-making networks. As Fishman argued for the Spanish 
working class during Francoism, there was a disconnection between «oppositional 
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activity and organization», meaning that opposition to the dictatorship could not take 
the form of organization-building.1311 
Moreover, the state sponsored corporatist institutions were built less for 
mobilization and indoctrination of the population and more for control and promotion of 
apathy.1312 Although working classes had no alternative but to affiliate with the official 
sindicatos, in the end even this was not possible, since corporatist organizations took a 
long time to be built and left popular classes’ relationships with the state mainly through 
direct clientelistic contacts with the administration and/or direct repression by the 
police. For instance, in Portugal many parishes did not have the corporatist institutions 
for the inclusion of rural workers, the Casas do Povo. Still in 1967, 70% of the nation’s 
parishes did not have these institutions.1313 In 1969, a government report showed that 
the primary sector was «almost untouched by collective bargaining» and that 90% of the 
Casas do Povo functioned only as charitable institutions. 1314  A 1969 survey of 
Portuguese industrial workers of OPorto and Lisbon found that only 39% were 
members of the official unions, and of the ones who were members only 50% knew the 
name of the union they belonged to. Even more, 76% had the opinion that the union 
«nunca serviu para nada». Finally, only 6% had the idea that unions were able to 
determine their level of salaries.1315 Another survey taken in 1973 showed that only 1% 
of the population thought that organizing a formal group was a worthwhile form to 
influence the government. Finally, in 1973 only 19.7% disapproved the government 
policy towards freedom of association, 25.8% approved, and 54.5% did not answer.1316 
 In fact, this meant that opposition to the regimes by popular sectors had to take 
the form of informal networks. For instance when the regimes implemented processes 
of labor cooptation and the liberalization of worklace relationships, this provided an 
opportunity not for association building but for the spread of informal networks of 
resistance and protest. In Spain in 1958, collective bargaining was introduced between 
the formal representatives of capital and labor within the vertical system in order to 
overcome the rigid central wage formation. The Ley de Convenios Colectivos of April 
24, 1958 gave more power to the jurados de empresa and the enlaces sindicales 
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(elections were allowed for the social sections of the different syndicates at plant level, 
for the post of shop steward - enlace sindical-, which would represent 25 workers, and 
the jurados de empresa, or factory committees, which meant to represent workers 
equally to the management, the state, and the syndicate), and determined that salaries 
and work conditions to be regulated by direct negotiation between representatives of 
workers and employers. In Portugal, Salazar’s successor, Marcelo Caetano also 
introduced changes in the corporatist system in order to make it more representative and 
to achieve real negotiation and bargaining between workers and employers. In 1969, the 
government published laws (decree-law 49058 June 14, 1969) which ended the need for 
government permission of the union leaders and on August 28, 1969 the decree-law 
49212 instituted mandatory negotiation and mechanisms of conflict resolution called 
conciliação arbitral in companies, namely in industry and services, as well as 
mandatory quotas and free union elections.1317 
 This led to the infiltration of official unions by opposition forces that could 
consequently reach workers. 1318  In Spain, official unions were penetrated by 
communists, left-Catholics (and to a much less extent by the socialists or anarchists). 
This promoted the development of clandestine trade unions, such as the communist-led 
Workers' Committees (Comisiones Obreras CC.OO, in 1964) and the progressive 
Catholic Workers' Union (Unión Sindical Obrera USO) to take part in the official 
syndical organizations. USO was created by members of the apostolic youth workers' 
organization Juventud Obrero Cristiana (JOC) in Guizpuzcoa in 1959. Comisiones 
Obreras emerged more spontaneously as an ad hoc organization of an unofficial strike 
movement in Asturias (1958), which insisted to negotiate on employment 
conditions.1319 The labor movement gained capacity for collective action since the mid-
1950s strikes started to be organized by informal coordination committees of workers, 
but never through organization building.1320 
 Also, in Portugal these changes allowed the opposition to penetrate more easily 
the unions, especially in the sectors of insurance, banking, metal industry, electricity, 
chemical industry, and commerce. Still, the unions controlled by the opposition were 
only one tenth of the total. After a national encounter of union directions, out of this 
liberalization of the corporatist system came out in October 1970 an informal 
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coordinative structure, of confederal nature and national in scope, called Intersindical 
Nacional. Its aim was to envisage a common union strategy towards the regime.1321 It 
grew from the «reuniões intersindicais», meetings of representatives of several unions 
(banking, commerce employees, and metalworkers), and it became institutionalized on 
September 1970. It spread quickly and in two months had 41 unions. Most of its 
founders were linked to the Partido Comunista Portguês (PCP orPortuguese Communist 
Party), but there were also many Catholics from the the JOC, JOCF and LOC, and 
LOCF.1322 In 1971, it included about 190,000 workers.1323 In 1973 in Lisbon and in 
Setúbal areas, there were 105 different labor unions with over 350,000 members and 
additional 350,000 associates. Moreover, this gave the unions the ability the organize 
strikes more effectively:they were able to mobilize more than 100,000 workers in 1973 
alone.1324 
 Second, the experience of authoritarianism created deep divisions in the 
workers’ movement that led especially to communist empowerment. The communists 
had been a weak and insignificant political organization in Iberia in the interwar years, 
where the Left was much more represented by mass movements of socialists and 
especially anarchists. The extreme harsh conditions that the dictatorships imposed on 
the popular sectors led to the disintegration of the anarchist and socialist movements, 
and instead it provided a more fertile groud for the survival of sect-like radical 
organizations, thus favouring the communist parties. Communists, Catholics, and to 
much less extent, socialists competed for the allegiance of the workers within the 
corporatist unions during the dictatorships, but these divisions became clearer in the last 
years of the dictatorships, and they were especially promoted by government action. In 
Portugal, the PCP was more cautious and pursued a strategy of recognition by the 
authorities, whereas the Catholic unionists had more the aim of creating a real 
confederation.1325 In Spain after Franco’s death in November 1975, there was a debate 
whether there should exist a single labour organization or a variety of unions. The 
policies of the authoritarian governments towards the unions made a single movement 
less possible. The UGT had been permitted to have a public meeting in April 1976 
(Arias Navarro was the PM), while the CCOO, which was the strongest movement in 
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Spain since the late 1960s, had to remain clandestine. As a result, an extreme 
competition between the two confederations emerged, especially in the first years of the 
transition, when CCOO was hegemonic and the UGT was fighting for its place.1326 
 This inhibited the creation of confederative structures during democracy, and in 
both countries it favoured the organizational fragmentation of the working class during 
the transition from authoritarianism and during democratic consolidation. In Portugal 
the main union confederation, the communist dominated CGTP, opposed integratation 
in the corporatist tripartite body, the Conselho Conselho Permanente da Concertação 
Social in 1984, and it was willing to enter only the unions affiliated with the socialist 
dominated UGT. CGTP entered the council in 1987 but never signed any agreement 
with the employers and the state, contrary to the UGT.1327 In Spain in the 1980s, the 
CC.OO had to compete with UGT (socialist), a small anarchist federation (CNT), 
basque (ELA/STV), and galician (INTG) labour organizations.1328 
 It was not only the legacies of associability during authoritarianism that shaped 
democratic associability in Iberia but also the continuation of state and regime 
institutional configurations of the dictatorship. First, political parties both on the Right 
and the Left had weak links with voluntary associations. This was the result of the fact 
that in the dictatorships parties were not important institutions in the regime, thus 
inhibiting the creation of links between the elites of the opposition and popular 
classes.1329 As Juan Linz has argued, political parties in authoritarian regimes are much 
less important than other institutions like the bureaucracy, the church, or the army. This 
makes the political elites of the regime to be recruited in institutions that are insulated 
from contacts with associational life, and for the small number of professional 
politicians. 1330  But it also affects elites in the opposition. Iberian dictatorships had 
created a high ambiguity between the government and the oppositions, with many 
individuals maintaining ambiguous positions towards the regime. It was possibly one 
way how to survive in an authoritarian environment, but a price to be paid was also the 
depoliticization of many opposition groups and the strengthening of a technocratic 
mode of thinking.1331 As Fishman has shown, a big part of anti-Franco union plant 
leaders in the vertical unions during Francoism that organized strikes and illegal 
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activities did not have any connections to the opposition during the authoritarian 
period.1332 
Moroever, due to the difficulty of creating mechanisms to legitimize political 
pluralism, authoritarian regimes are prone to experience factionalism. The various 
groups which support and oppose the regime tend to occupy simultaneously institutions 
and organizations such as the single party, the state bureaucracy, the press, public 
companies, or the armed forces. Thus, their competition for power tends to cut across 
several of the regime’s institutions. One example was the competition between the Opus 
Dei technocrats, placed in technocratic ministries dedicated to economic and social 
development reforms, and the single party, the Falange, during Franquismo. As a 
result, autocracies often do not have clearly demarcated borders between the 
government and the opposition, and this tends to engender political groupings which are 
simultaneously inside and outside the regime, and which occupy its institutions but 
display an attitude of semi-loyalty towards the current political order. Juan Linz labelled 
these sectors the ‘semi-opposition’. In its extreme form, the semi-opposition is made up 
of those groups which control or are present in some of the regime’s institutions, and 
which initially were supportive of the regime but with the purpose of attaining goals 
«not shared by their coalition partners».1333 In Portugal, during the Estado Novo, the 
democratic semi-opposition was embodied during the period from 1968 to 1974 by a 
group of representatives in the X legislature of the National Assembly (Assembleia 
Nacional) (1969-1973) who became known as the Ala Liberal (Liberal Wing), and who 
defended the project of a gradual and peaceable transformation of the Estado Novo 
regime into a democracy.1334 
 During democracy and after the euphory of the transition, these old patterns 
were re-established. As Gunther argues for Spain «the weakness of contemporary 
Spanish parties as interest-representation organizations would appear to parallel the 
irrelevance of the Movimiento Nacional in the former regime's policy processes».1335 
Iberian political parties were formed without strong links to associations of popular 
sectors, and thus more easily tensions and different aims arised between the party 
leadership and the union leadership.1336 From the point of view of elites, there was not a 
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presentation of clear ideologies and a direct mobilization strategy. Many sectors of the 
new elite, both on the Right and the Left, were state technocrats.1337 For instance, in 
Portugal in the Socialist Party the technocrats became ascendant in the mid-1980s and 
emphasized mainly economic development plans and economic liberalism that clashed 
with many unions’ claims for a higher state intervention in sponsoring welfare and 
consumption.1338 In Spain, the even more aggresive economic liberalization policy of 
the PSOE antagonized labor and failed to create a comprehensive welfare state.1339 This 
distanced socialists from the workers’ movement. In Portugal, unions were mainly 
connected to the communists produced extreme conflicts with the socialist party, and in 
Spain PSOE’s rule led to a clash with both communist and socialist unions.1340 
 On the Right, the same pattern occurred. In both countries there was an inability 
to build the classical mass mobilization strategy of Western European right-wing 
Christian-democracy. During the authoritarian regimes and the transition there were 
weak links between the elites and the Catholic masses. In Spain, the francoist moderate 
elites that directed the transition to democracy could not even form a mass party (the 
failed UCD), and they had very low connections with workers and peasants.1341  In 
Portugal, in the transition the Catholic Church did not mobilize its constituency through 
the building of new organizations and direct links to parties. After the coup in April 
1974, the Church was very cautious, refraining from any mobilization and defending 
instead the idea that Catholics should be mobilized by the existing political forces: the 
newly created center parties. Catholics, moreover, were present in a diversity of 
political associations, from the most right-wing to the extreme left-wing groups.1342 The 
groups that emerged claiming an explicit politico-Catholic identity were very small and 
soon disappeared (the PCSD or Partido Cristão Social Democrata, with some militants 
of the Catholic Action; Partido Democrático Popular Cristão or PDPC). The most 
nefarious was the rightist PDC (Partido da Democracia Cristã) that was illegalized on 
March 17, 1975 under the accusation of preparing a coup a few days earlier. The 
Portuguese constitutions of 1976 and 1982 in fact prohibited parties from using 
religious affiliations.1343 
                                                 
1337 Gunther, 1996, p. 15. 
1338 Bermeo, 1990, pp. 153-155. 
1339 Bermeo, García-Duran, 1994, p. 121-123. 
1340 Schmitter, 1999, p. 436. 
1341 Linz, 1981, p. 399; Pérez-Díaz, 1999, p. 33. 
1342 Santos, 2005, pp. 112, 114. 
1343 Stepan, 2001, p. 221. 
 356
 This is a very interesting finding, since organized Catholicism was allowed and 
even promoted during both dictatorships, as was explained in the previous chapters. The 
Catholic Church was part of the social pluralism that Linz argued was a main trait of 
authoritarian regimes.1344 In this sense, the Catholic field could have served as a base 
for conservative mobilization. But divisions within the Church after the second Vatican 
council in 1961-1963 inhibited Catholic allignment with a single political position.1345 
In the 1960s, many Catholics began to oppose the regime while others support it. This 
division affected both laymen and members of the hierarchy. In Spain, there emerged 
gradually a situation of stronger workers’ mobilization by other organizations, some of 
them new, in cooperation or in competition with the CCOO. The USO was formed by 
Catholic activists and independent socialists.1346 In the Catholic workers’ movement, 
the HOAC or Hermandad Obrera de Acción Católica, a legal organization, participated 
in the workers’ struggles and utilized churches and monasteries as shelters for meetings 
even to non-Catholic organizations like the CCOO. 1347  This contributed to the 
emergence of a cleavage within the Catholic associations between those discontent with 
the regime, which tended to come close to left-wing and even Marxist positions, and 
those still supporting it. For instance, many Catholic leaders of the dictatorship started 
to participate and lead secular and extreme left organizations.1348 
 In Portugal, the first sign of clash between the church and the regime was when 
the bishop of Porto declared to favor strikes in 1958 and he argued that the «Portuguese 
corporatism was in reality a means to deprive workers from the natural right of 
association».1349 In the aftermath, many reformist Catholic groups were created to fight 
for freedom of expression and democracy. They were founded in particular by people 
coming from the ranks of the Acção Católica and other lay movements: the Comissão 
Justiça e Paz (Porto, 1969), the Comissão Nacional de Socorro aos Presos Políticos 
(1969), the cooperatives PRAGMA (Lisbon 1964) and Confronto (Porto 1964). 
Moreover, some of these Catholics participated in the opposition’s electoral lists in the 
elections of 1961, 1965, and 1969, and in the military coup attempts of 1959 and 
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1962.1350 These internal contradictions of Portuguese Catholicism were reflected in the 
conflicts between laymen and the church hierarchy, and within the church hierarchy 
itself between progressive and conservative bishops and priests. More importantly, it led 
to an internal decomposition of the unity and identity of Acção Católica. The 
organization identified greatly with the existing political order, and gradually after the 
1960s it was unable to recruit members, its local implantation declined, and it was 
affected by a lack of financial resources. At the same time, there was growth in the 
opposition organizations, like the students, and some of its organizations like the JEC, 
JUC, JOC and LOC closely adopt a left wing posture and become controlled by leftist 
priests.1351 Between 1963 and 1969, the members of LOC decreased from 2,000 to 400, 
and in 1975 Acção Católica had only 7,891 members.1352 
 Second, in the democratic period one can see the creation of powerful executives, 
and the state administrations somehow continued the strong executives of the 
dictatorship. There was a tendency for weak parliamentary bodies and institutions of 
societal corporatist policy-making. Direct imposition from above (statism) was a form 
of policy-making and/or selective relationships between the state and chosen 
associations. 1353  There was a continuation of the technocratic policy-making and 
decision-making style of the dictatorship.1354 In Portugal during the autoritarian Estado 
Novo, for instance every economic sector was under the tutelage of an institution of 
sectorial economic coordination, nominated by the government and with almost 
absolute powers on the sectors, from fixating prices and the quality of products to 
imports of raw materials, work contracts and the supervision of exports.1355 
Moreover, although free popular class associability was not allowed, elites did 
have more open channels of influence and access to rulers. Business and professional 
interests were tolerated and even escaped the state corporatist structures.1356 In Portugal, 
capitalist associations like the Associação Industrial Portuguesa and the Associação 
Industrial Portuense1357 negotiated directly with the government.1358 Also in Spain, the 
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old liberal trade associations like the camaras de comercio, industria, and navegacion 
remained outside the official sindicatos.1359 Moreover, both in Portugal and in Spain, a 
few corporate groups dominated the economy under the protection of the state while 
relying mainly on direct and informal contacts with the political elite for the 
advancement of their interests.1360 
 In the democratic period, this pattern of statism and preferential relationships 
continued between the state and particular voluntary associations. In Spain, for instance 
policy-making during UCD and PSOE governments was similar to the patterns of the 
dictatorship. As Richard Gunther has observed, the Council of Ministers did not 
establish policy priorities to be resolved by consensus between the ministers as a 
collegial body, but it was the prime minister's intervention that resolved issues and 
made the decisions.1361 As a consequence, corporatist institutions played a minor role in 
economic and welfare policies. In Portugal, the Conselho Permanente da Concertação 
Social, created in 1984, was presided by the Prime Minister, and was composed of six 
members of the government, six representatives of employers designated by their 
confederations (Industry-CIP, Commerce-CCP and agriculture-CAP) and three 
representatives of workers from the socialist/social-democrat UGT and three from the 
mainly communist CGTP. But this body had very weak powers and most decision-
making was done by direct government regulation. The government attempted to 
directly impose decisions, like limits on salaries (tectos salariais) and many issues could 
not be debated in the council, like social security, duration of work, termination of work 
contracts, duration of work conventions.1362  establishment in 1991 of the Conselho 
Económico Social (CES), the main body for corporatist negotiation ever since. Did CES 
play in the 1990s a more relevant role than the Conselho Permanente da Concertação 
Social in the 1980s 
In Spain there has been also a weak institutional integration of unions in 
corporatist structures. The main body for corporatist negotiation, the Economic and 
Social Council (Consejo Económico y Social or CES) was created in 1992 for the 
cooperation between unions, business, and the government. But as scholars have 
observed, the CES cannot «take binding decisions and its discussions are fundamentally 
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different from the negotiation of the global pacts up to 1986».1363 Moreover, although 
Spain has become known for its transición pactada (the Pactos de la Moncloa, in 
October 1977), these pacts were mainly the work of political parties and of the UCD 
governments and were not institutionalized. For the most part, they were pacts between 
the UCD and the opposition parties to achieve democratic stabilization, not designed for 
deliberation and decision on economic policy issues. Although an income policy 
agreement was achieved, unions and employers’ organizations did not participate 
directly in the negotiations. The national leaders of the unions voted it in the parliament, 
as deputies (Nicolás Redondo, as head of the UGT, and Marcelino Camacho, head of 
CCOO).1364 
 This has affected associational life. For instance in Spain, agrarian interest 
organizations do not have institutionalized relationships with the parliament (where the 
agriculture commission has a difuse role), and they depend more on personal 
relationships with MPs and individual politicians.1365 There is also in this field a style of 
policy making characterized by a high degree of direct state intervention. 1366  The 
francoist Instituto de Estudios Agrosociales became the Instituto de Relaciones 
Agrarias (IRA), which continued to have powerful functions and financial control over 
agrarian associability, and to use its power for political purposes.1367 Employers act also 
less through business associations and more «by maintaining a ‘family relationship’ 
with the public sector» or by direct links with ministers.1368 Although in the field of 
third sector associations 85% report to have public funding, only 1% receives it through 
partnership contracts, and most receive it by direct funding or by subventions. 
Moreover, only 31% of these associations report a constant collaboration with the state, 
and two thirds think that the state and public authorities provide very weak support.1369  
Legislation inherited from Francoism reinforced this tendency. In fact in Spain, 
the 1964 law of associations was terminated only in 2002.1370 The 1978 Constitución 
eliminated the clauses prohibiting freedom of association and the requisite of 
administrative permission in the 1964 law, but it maintained the figure of declaracion 
de utilidade publica (public utility), which is granted through very discretionary 
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mechanisms. Its attribution depends on the council of ministers, and it is reserved only 
for associations with aims of welfare, education, culture, and sports. As a consequence, 
very few associations have had this statute in democratic Spain.1371 In 1987, there were 
20 associations, in 1988 23, and between 1993 and 1997 157 associations that received 
it.1372 
 Unions are usually not consulted and have no impact on policy decisions.1373 
This argument could be extended to most of the associational landscape of popular 
classes in the Iberian democracies. The data shows that the Portuguese and Spanish 
democracies’ levels associational life remained stable and at very low levels when 
compared other Western European democracies, stagnating around the 30% of the adult 
population affiliated in voluntary associations (Table 33). The periods of transition from 
authoritarianism involved high mobilization and organization building, but when 
democracy was consolidated, older patterns of state-society relationships surfaced 
again, thus contributing to weaker associational lives during democracy.1374 
 
Table 35: Membership in Voluntary Associations (% adult population affiliated) 
 1973 1977 1983 1990 1998 1999 2002 
Portugal  - - - 24 26 24 29 
Spain  37 36 31 27 28 31 36 
(Sources: 1973: Prados, 2005, p. 50; 1977-1998: Eurobarometer; 1999 and 2002: 
Ulzurrum, 2001, p. 425) 
 
As one can see, the Iberian democracies show very low levels of associational 
membership, both in political and social associations (Table 35). But of interest is also 
the level of membership in social associations. It is much higher than in political 
associations, with about 16% more for both countries. This is explained by the legacy of 
authoritarianism that depoliticized associability and channelled whatever associational 
ventures existed to social forms. In Portugal, a survey taken in 1969 found that 51% of 
the workers did not belong to any association, but that the preferred and allowed forms 
of associations were exclusively social: 15% were members of sports associations, 11% 
of recreational, 14% of social welfare associations (usually firefighters), and 2% of 
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cultural associations.1375  In Spain, it is mainly associations of social type that have 
public status. In 1997 only 0.54% of all associations had this status, and most of these 
were associations for the protection of the disabled and incapacitated (32% in 1989), 
followed by sports and recreational organizations (19%), philantropy (17%, usually 
related to helping drugaddicts and alcoholics), educational (9.5%), cultural and 
ideological (9%), old age and familial (9%), and finally economic and professional 
(5.5%).1376 
 
Table 36: Membership in Type of Association: Political and Social 
 1990 1998 
Country 
     
political 
     
social  
     
political 
    
social  
Port: 9 26 9 25 
Spain: 10 23 9 26 
(sources: Eurobarometer: 1990-nº34.0, 1998-nº50.1; social associations: groups that provide social 
welfare, personal health, education, art, music and culture, youth, sports, recreation and entertainment; 
political associations: unions, professional associations, local community groups, political parties, 
movements for human rights, peace, Third World development, resource conservation, environmental 
protection, gender equality) 
 
National surveys during the democratic period show a continuation of this 
pattern. The national Portuguese surveys are constant in showing very low levels of 
civic engagement. In 1978, a survey conducted by Thomas Bruneau and Mário 
Bacalhau asked the Portuguese population if it had cooperated in any socio-cultural 
organizations: only 11.1% responded in the affirmative. The same question was 
replicated in 1984, and the result was that only 14.9% had. IA 2000 survey asking what 
the Portuguese did in their free time found that activities in associations and 
collectivities (4.9%) and in political parties and unions (3.6%) were the lowest and least 
preferred in a list that included spending time with friends and family (79.3%), listening 
to music (63.7%), watching TV (59.9%), internet surfing (59.5%), or reading 
(52.5%).1377. 
Finally, there are very high social and economic inequalities in civic 
engagement. In Portugal there is a very strong social inequality in the levels of 
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membership. Studies have consistently found a strong class bias in levels of 
associational membership. In 1991, 34% of the upper and upper-middle classes were 
affiliated in associations, 22% of the middle class, 12,7% of the lower class, and 6,1% 
of the lowest classes.1378 In Spain in 2001, of the people who belonged to associations, 
28.3% belonged to the upper middle class, 24.2% to the middle and lower middle class, 
and 28.3% were workers. In terms of age, 26.1% were between 30-45 years old, 26.2% 
between 46-60 years men 24.4%. People who did not belong to associations were 
mainly women (80.4%), younger than 30 years (84.5%), with just the primary school or 
no schooling at all (81.5%), unemployed (84.3%), working class (83.4%), and 
abstentionists (88.9%).1379 
Looking at the the universe of associations themselves is also revealing. In Spain, 
69% of third sector associations declare that there is a low coordination between 
associations; only 31% associations say they have regular collaboration with other 
associations. This field is mainly occupied by a few very large and powerful entities 
(the 3 biggest associations have 50% of the paid and 64% of the volunteers of third 
sector associations), but half of these associations are very small and local.1380  
In Spain, the associations of local character dominate. 1381  Two out of three 
associations are local and one out of four is provincial. Regional organizations account 
for only some 9% of the total, while only 8% operate at the national level. Since 1983, 
more than half of the associations registered declared to work in the local sphere, with 
percentages of more than 70% in the period 1977-1979. Next are the associations of the 
provincial sphere, with 16% and 30% of all registered associations and a development 
with no variations since 1987. National associations, finally, account for 16% of all 
associations in 1967, 3% in 1978, and 12% in 1996. Regional associations have evolved 
from 3% in the 1970s to 20% in 1985, and to 26% in 1996.1382 
 
13.2. Variations of Associational Life in Portugal and Spain, 1940s-2000 
 
There are interesting variations of associational life between Portugal and Spain. 
Although Spain shows slightly higher levels of membership in associations, there are 
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studies that put Portugal ahead of Spain. In 2000, Manuel Villaverde Cabral found in a 
national survey that 32.1% of the adult Portuguese population was affiliated in 
voluntary associations.1383 Morales and Mota have found that Portugal had higher levels 
than Spain in 1999-2002: 43% and 42% respectively.1384 
Where we see stronger differences is in membership by type of association 
(Table 36). In the period of democratic consolidation (in Portugal after 1982 and in 
Spain after 1981), Portugal shows higher levels of membership in unions and 
professional associations. It also shows higher levels of membership in sport and 
religious associations (8% in Portugal during the period 1984-1999 vs 5.6% in Spain 
during the period 1989-2002) although with much smaller differences. Inversely, Spain 
has much higher levels than Portugal in New Social Movements type of associations 
and of neighbourhood and cultural local organizations.  
Also union density has been higher in Portugal. In 1989, Portugal had a union 
density of 28.6% of the workforce.1385  Between 1988 and 1990, about one million 
people were union affiliates. In 2000 union density was 25.6%.1386 In Spain, union 
density was 8% in 1980, 12% in 1990, and 17% in 1997. According to Perez-Diaz, 
union density declined sharply from 27.4% in 1977.1387 In 1978, both labor unions 
listed over 2 million members, over 70% labor force, although this data might be an 
exaggeration because Perez Diaz found in a survey of 1978 that only 56.3% of the 
workforce was enrolled in unions. Most accounts refer to a sharp decline in union 
membership after the extreme mobilization of the transition years, putting it around 
13% or lower.1388  There has been also a scarcity of union plant level leaders, and 
surveys found that the attitudes of the mass membership reveal apathy.1389  Finally, 
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Table 37: Types of associational membership in Spain (%), 1980-2002 
   1980 1985 1989 1994 1995 1996 1997 2000 2002
Sports 14 10 11         
Neighborhood 10.5 11 11.5         
Cultural 5 9 7 7 7       
Unions 9 6.5 7.5 5 7 6 6 7 5
Religious 3 7  5.5 4.5       
Professional 3.8 5 4  3.8 3.5     
Human rights 1 1.8 5 4        
Youth   2.5 3.8 3        
Environmental 1 1.8 1 1        
Women’s 1.8  2         
Consumers 1  1 0.8        
Parties 7 3 4 3 4 3 3 4  




















Table 38: Types of associational membership in Portugal (%), 1978-1999 
 1978 1984 1990 1993 1999 2000 
Sports/recreational 39.7 50.4 12.2 14 8.6  
Worker’s comissions 6.5 0.5     
Union 31.0 12.9 4.2 5 1.7 11 
Professional 10.2 6.2 3.7 4 1.1 7 
Religious 4.4 5.7 9.8 11 5.6  
Cultural 14.5 22.1 6.7 8 3.1  
Student 2.1 5.3     
Workers 3.6      
Humanitarian  7.9     
Parents  1.9     
Social welfare   4.4 5 2.0  
Political groups    5   
Work with youth   2.4 3 1.2  
Health support   2.8 3 2.2  
Third world/human rights   0.6 2 0.8  
Poverty/unemployment 
reduction 
   2   
Ecology/environmental   0.9 1 0.5  
Animal rights    1   
Peace   0.5 1 0.6  
Feminist/women’s   0.2 0 0  
Local/Communitary   1.6  1.0  
Parties and political associations    4.1 0.9 4 
Other 6.2 5.9 2.1 3 3.2  
N/A 0.9 1.8     
(1978: Bacalhau, Bruneau, 1978, questions for 1978 and 1984: which of the following associations you’re 
affiliated or frequently active in its activities?; 1984: Bruneau, T., McLeod, 1984; 1993: Membership in 
Types of associations by the Portuguese adult population (%), Santos and Dias, 1993, p. 59; 1990 and 
1999: membership and volunteering by type of associations, social services: for elderly and disabled; 
local communitary: combat poverty, employment, race equality and housing; Delicado, 2003, p. 235; 
2000: Villaverde Cabral, 2000, p. 136) 
 
What could explain these varying patterns of associational life, a stronger 
density of traditonal socioeconomic associations in Portugal (unions, professional 
associations) and a more localistic and neighborhood type of associational life in Spain? 
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I argue that this is explained by different modes of transformation of the authoritarian 
regimes into democracies, in particular the institutional and state transformations during 
the periods of authoritarian liberalization, transition, and democratic consolidation.1391 
In this section I analyse these historical phases and their impact on associational life. 
By liberalization of an authoritarian regime I mean those political processes of 
enlargement of the sphere of political and social rights that are available to the citizens 
as well as measures directed towards a greater acceptance of the opposition and 
stimulus towards organizational pluralism. This does not mean that the authoritarian 
leader wants to democratize the regime, but only that it allows for wider spaces of 
freedom within the dictatorship.1392 In the words of Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe 
Schmitter, the regime evolves in the direction of a softer form of rule, a 
Dictablanda. 1393  For instance, in Spain Carlos Arias Navarro ruled from December 
1973 to July 1976 and attempted to institutionalize a softer Franquism, a more liberal 
order, but pressures towards liberalization started in 1964 with a new wave of 
associa
idered Salazar to be the 
dictato
    
tions.1394 
A context that tends to spurt liberalization is leadership succession. The 
succession of an authoritarian leader is one of the major problems that an authoritarian 
regime faces, and ”the absence of mechanisms for self-renewal contributes significantly 
to the erosion of the legitimacy of those regimes”. A crisis of succession, which usually 
occurs after the death of a founding and charismatic leader, threatens seriously regime 
stability and tends to produce a dispersion of power and to accentuate the struggles 
amongst the regime’s factions. The issue here is to find out whether the stability of the 
regime itself is affected. As Sigmund Neumann has argued, autocracies tend to 
accentuate the personal aspects of leadership, and this seems to have been very strong in 
the Portuguese dictatorship. For instance, Neumann cons
r who most identified his persona with the regime.1395 
I argue that the processes of liberalization were different in both countries, and 
that in Portugal they tended to give more power to political and professional 
organizations, whereas in Spain they tended to promote more localistic organizations. In 
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Spain in 1964 the regime proceeded to changes in the law of associations.1396 The new 
1964 Law of Associations was more tolerant of new social associations and broke the 
monopoly enjoyed by the single party and the Church. It stimulated, for instance, the 
growth of some third sector associations.1397 A decree of May, 20 1965 declared that 
associations could apply for public status. If an association was considered to be 
dedicated to «welfare, educational, sportive or any other ends that tend to promote the 
common good» it could be exempted from the general legislation on associations, 
receive public subventions and technical help from the state, and to be consulted in 
affairs related with their activity. Still, associations could not question the public order, 
they were to maintain the regime informed of their activities and budget, and ask 
permission for their meetings.1398  Moreover, at the same time the Movimiento pushed 
further its own new internal associational project for the Associaciones de Cabezas de 
Familias (ACF), the first of which appeared in late 1963, in order to survive in a much 
more c
The neighborhood movement became publicly politicized when the 
                                                
ompetitive world. In fact, any new association could register either through the 
Ley de Asociaciones of 1964 or through the Movimiento.1399  
These changes enabled the regime to channel the development of voluntary 
associations but of a social, not political, nature. 1400  Still, in 1968 only 5,650 
associations were listed, and the number of organizations per 100,000 inhabitants was 
18.4.1401 The evolution of associations between 1968 and 1975 was slow and more 
stable, although many of them might not have been registered because they worked at 
the neighborhood level.1402 But in the early 1970s, although repression in fact grew, it 
was the time when associational ventures started to spread. Between 1973 and 1976, 
there were debates in order to legalize some form of “political associations”, but these 
were very ill-defined as a legal category, something between interest group and party. 
For political associability the legalization was very restricted and needed the approval of 
the National Movement. 1403  On the other hand, a very strong neighborhood 
associational movement emerged. In 1975 it coordinated several campaigns with wide 
popular support. 
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and developed links to the socialist opposition and even to the communist trade 
                                                
cial Federation demanded a democratic system and made an alliance with the 
trade unions.1404 
In Portugal, the liberalization phase started with the rule of Salazar’s successor, 
Marcelo Caetano. In the years of the so-called Marcelismo, there was more tolerance of 
associability. First, the 1969 elections were used by Caetano as plebiscites to his rule, 
which introduced a stronger mobilization by the single party. Together with softer rules 
for the opposition to participate in  elections, this fostered the emergence of new civic-
electoral organizations by the opposition. Caetano used the National Assembly to gain 
political legitimacy, both internally and externally. As Schmitter argues, the 1969 and 
1973 elections were above all exercises in political mobilisation in support of the new 
authoritarian project and leadership, which is a novelty when compared to the 
Salazarismo period.1405 In fact, Caetano had no choice but to use this institution as a 
source of power and legitimacy for his political projects, since he had not been chosen 
by Salazar as his successor. Hence, Caetano also appealed to electoral legitimacy. In the 
words of Manuel de Lucena, after Salazar any new leader «has much greater need for 
the regime’s legal and institutional crutches».1406 In 1969, after the Second Republican 
Congress, the opposition forces created together the Comissões Democráticas Eleitorais 
(Electoral Democratic Commissions, CDE). These were expanded to each district of the 
country, and in July 1969 approved a common political platform and a coordination 
commission in a national meeting. In the 1973 elections, though, the CDE suffered an 
internal cession, and the socialists opted to form the Comissão Eleitoral de Unid
rática, or CEUD (Electoral Democratic Union Commission). Moreover, these 
groups had links to both Catholic and communist unions and social movements.1407  
Caetano fostered deliberately more organizational political pluralism. There was 
the creation of the Sociedade para o Desenvolvimento Económico e Social (SEDES, 
Society for Economic and Social Development), an organization of Catholic technocrats 
and liberal-minded new generations of the regime’s elites that functioned as a kind of 
democratic semiopposition and that on occasions supported Caetano against the 
hardliners in the single party, but that also started becoming autonomous from Caetano 
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1404 Hipsher, 1996, pp. 289-290. 
1405 Schmitter, 1999c, pp. 81-82. 
1406 Lucena, 1976, p. 39. T
1407 Raby, 2000d, p. 552. 
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unions.1408 In fact, SEDES was the organizational prelude and basis from which the 
center-right political party of Portuguese democracy, the Partido Social Democrata 
(PSD),
he parliament even 
that he
                                                
 was created in 1974.1409 
Also in Portugal there was a stronger tradition of freedom of association during 
the dictatorship that could be used to foster reforms when the right moment arrived. 
Freedom of association was always in the 1933 constituion, although it never had been 
implemented. Scholars have classified the 1933 constitution as a dual text incorporating 
both liberal and state-corporatist principles.1410 A 1971 law allowed for more freedom 
of religion and permitted diverse religious groups to organize and create associations 
without administrative permission.1411 Also in Portugal, the legislation on cooperatives 
was more benign to freedom of association. This had in fact stimulated the development 
of a cooperative movement with political tonalities. The “commercial” cooperatives had 
been used by the opposition (socialists, communists, and Catholics) as a form to create 
free associability, since the law regulating cooperatives was not restrictive. 1412  
Moreover, this cooperative-political movement had always the support of the more 
liberal MPs of the dictatorship. For instance in December 1970, a group of these MPs 
reacted against the proposals of the government to curb the cooperative movement by a 
more repressive law. One of these MPs, Pinto Machado, referred in t
 represented UNICOOPE, a federation of 85 cooperatives.1413 
In Portugal there was a strong survival and continuity of institutions inherited 
from the pre-authoritarian past. Portugal had an experience of competitive politics after 
WWII. Its legislature continued to function, although without many powers (could not 
remove the government), but nonetheless it contributed to some form of political 
pluralism: republican/socialist, and sometimes even communist, electoral fronts were 
tolerated and some progressive MPs were elected to the parliament. Also for much of 
the time, the president was elected by popular suffrage.1414 In fact, in 1969 18% of the 
adult population was enfranchised, and 40% voted in the general elections.1415 In 1973 
34.4% were enfranchised.1416 The National Assembly was a window of opportunity for 
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certain sectors of the regime’s elites who sought to transform the regime in order to 
assert their position. During the Marcelismo, the National Assembly acquired higher 
public 
 who already held posts within the regime (union 
leaders
in Spain, the transition tended to be carried 
out by 
        
visibility and political autonomy.1417 
A comparison with the assembly under Franco reinforces this point. In 
authoritarian regimes, parliaments were distinguished by the degree of freedom and 
autonomy given to minority and semi-opposition groups. In its origin and function, the 
Spanish assembly (the Cortes) was markedly different from the Portuguese National 
Assembly. When it was created in 1942, it was merely a consulting organism, which 
assisted Franco in the legislative tasks. It did not approve laws, and elections were not 
held before 1967. The head of state, Francisco Franco, had full legislative power and 
nominated every member of the assembly. As an institution, the Spanish assembly was 
thus tightly bound to the authoritarian order. Initially, its members were appointed ex-
oficio, that is, they were persons
 and mayors, for instance). 
Consequently, the Spanish assembly was an institution with less autonomy and it 
was more dependent on the authoritarian leader than the Portuguese assembly. From 
1966, when the new Spanish constitution created 108 seats, two for each province, to be 
elected by the heads of family, the Spanish assembly became an institution where there 
was some pluralism. The government, however, only required its support for great 
constitutional changes, and it almost always controlled all the nominations. In Portugal, 
the government’s control over the chambers was much weaker. An example which is 
similar to the Portuguese is Pinochet’s Chile, where the continuation of the 
parliamentary assembly of the previous democratic regime contributed to making 
political positions more extreme, and, consequently, caused the opposition to play the 
decisive role in the transition. By contrast 
the democratic semi-opposition.1418 
The Spanish form of liberalization of the regime was different and tended to 
promote the spread of more local and social organzations. This is also related to the 
institutional configuration of the regime. As Linz has argued, in Spain there was a 
higher organizational competition between two factions of the coalition supporting the 
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regime, the single party (the Falange) and the Church.1419 In the 1960s, this competition 
became very intense, with elements of the Falangists deciding to make use of their 
control of parts of the welfare state apparatus to compete with other political families 
(modernizers, Catholics, etc.) and young Falangists who initiated dissident social 
movements. Hence the disposition within the Falange to tolerate some dissidence in the 
union domain and in spaces that emerged as a consequence of the extension of the 
welfare state: in public hospitals and, above all, in the higher education system. This led 
to the creation within the orbit movimineto of a new Delegación Nacional de 
Asociaciones (National Delegation of Associations) to mobilize wider sectors of the 
Spanish population, and for this a specific type of associations was created: local 
associations of cabezas de familia (family heads) and amas de casa (housewifes). In 
1976, there were more than 4,000 of these local family associations sponsored by the 
Movim
 Franco regime and competed with Movimiento 
organiz
                                                
iento.1420  
At the same time the Church supported associational building in response to this 
move from the Falange. The Accíon Católica expanded its organizations (442,000 
members in 1946, 600,000 in 1955, 53,300 in 1956, and in 1973 only 100,000 though): 
the Hermandades Obreras de Acción Católica, the Juventud Obrera Católica, and the 
Juventud de Estudiantes Católicos.1421 In rural areas like Castilla Vieja and Navarra 
Church organizations tried also to mobilize the conservative peasantry through 
associations like the Hijas de Maria or by giving stronger socialization functions to the 
parishes. 1422  Finally, a stronger role was given to family associations like the 
Confederación Católica de Padres de Família who in 1958 was composed of 74 
associations of provincial and diocese character, and 247 associations of colegios 
(private catholic schools) with a total of 143,000 heads of family in it. The Associacion 
de Padres de Familia had been founded in 1913 to mobilize against the liberal 
government’s anticlerical education legislation, and during the Republic they expanded 
from 34 to 154 local branches, and from 9,000 to 85,000 members. These associations 
continued to exist during the early
ations since the early 1960s.  
Localism was an outcome of these social movements because both the family 
associations and the neighborhood associations of the Movimiento and of the Church 
 
1419 Linz, 1975, pp. 292, 320. 
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relied on parish centers to be built. Church buildings and local infrastructures were 
essencial resources to spread these organizations, and in both local priests were the key 
actors.1423 Many local Spanish priests of the 1960s and 1970s were promoters of both 
family and neighborhood associations. Many of these associations evolved gradually 
towards to a left political position, becoming comunidades cristianas which discussed 
everyth
ifferent associational landscapes according 
to the t
e transformation but without 
resortin
                                                
ing from labor issues, human rights, and even the election of bishops.1424. 
These differences were strengthened when the two regimes began their transition 
from authoritarian rule. The period of transition from authoritarianism refers to the 
phase when there is no return to the previous authoritarian order but it is not yet known 
and certain which type of regime will replace it. Accordingly, this is a phase of extreme 
institutional innovation and political uncertainty. Moreover, different forms of transition 
have different effects in the quality and type of possible subsequent democratic regimes. 
Specifically, democracies will vary in their d
ypes of transition they emerged from. 
Terry Karl and Philippe Schmitter have defined four types of transition from 
authoritarian rule. They look at transitions according to two dimensions of variation. 
One dimension is the main actors that push for change of the authoritarian regime. 
These can be the elites or the popular sectors, the masses. The other dimension is the 
strategies of the main actors of the transtition. These range from the use of force to a 
wilingness to compromise and negotiate. Democracies can emerge from any of these 
modes of transition but the quality and type of democracy will vary nonetheless. Cross-
tabulating these dimensions, Karl and Schmitter arrive at four modes of transition. 
Imposition: when elites are predominant and use force to bring regime change (e.g. the 
foreign led transition to democracy of Germany in 1945-1947); Revolution: when the 
masses are the main actor and rise up in arms and defeat the authoritarian elites; Pact: 
elites are also the main actor behind the transition but negotiate the terms and rules of 
the new regime (e.g. Spain in 1977 or Venezuela in 1958); Reform: when the popular 
sectors or masses mobilize from below and impose a regim
g to widespread violence (e.g. Poland in 1989).1425 
According to Karl and Schmitter, revolution is the path of regime transformation 
less conducive to democracy, since usually revolutions result in extreme widespread use 
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of violence that only end by state centralizations fostered by single party hegemony. 
The other paths can lead to democracy, although to different types of democracy.1426 
Pact-led transitions and imposition paths are conducive to more restricted types of 
democracy. In the former, the outcome usually leads to an institutional design where 
competitiveness and accountability are restricted, and as a consequence they demobilize 
and even exclude popular classes. This is the case of Spain. In the later a big part of the 
former regime’s elite will not accept the new regime.1427 Reform seems to be the better 
option for the development of a wider and denser associational landscape, since from 
the beginning popular sector voluntary associations had a major role in bringing regime 
transformation and as a consequence, all other things being equal, the new regime 
institutional design will be more open to the demands of popular sectors. I argue this to 
be the 
, the Movimento Ecológico Português, was created by the journalist Afonso 
Cautela
                                                
case of Portugal.1428 
Portugal’s transition, between April 1974 until the end of 1975, was an extreme 
case of high participation and popular mobilization through a variety of forms. It was 
stimulated by the termination of the regime by a coup of left-wing, dissatisfied military 
officers, the MFA (Movimento das Forças Armadas-Armed Forces Movement). The 
Estado Novo regime was brought down by a military coup on April 25, 1974. The coup 
unleashed a wave of popular mobilization and associational building unprecedented in 
Portuguese history. The denominated revolutionary period, between April 1974 and 
April 1976 when the new democratic constitution was approved, saw an explosion of 
associative movements concerned with every aspect of social life, such as the 
improvement of housing conditions through resident associations (associações de 
moradores), the preservation of employment, improvement of working conditions, 
parent associations, and services to help children. 1429  The women’s movement, 
Movimento Pró-Divórcio, was created in 1974. In a rally in Lisbon, it brought together 
10,000 people and gathered 100,000 signatures all over country asking for the end a law 
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After the coup there was such an institutional opening in Portugal whereby 
popular associations were created and many of them also developed strong links with 
elites, institutions and the state apparatus. The MFA, but also civilian elites of new 
political parties, tried to sponsor and mobilize much of this popular sector. 1432 . In 
particular, the Portuguese transition involved high competition and mobilization by 
political parties. Unions established closer links to parties, much more than in Spain. 
The CGTP allied with the Communist party, and the PS (Partido Socialista) and the 
PSD (Partido Social Democrata) counter-reacted by mobilizing other sectors of the 
union 
uccessful after 1974 in penetrating the corporatist 
unions
established the preponderance of the PS which together with the PSD established limits 
                                                
movement that were later used to build a rival confederation, the UGT, in 
1978.1433  
The PCP just after the transition had a strategy of wait-and–see, and between 
April and the summer of 1974 it even condemned some wild strikes not organized by 
the CGTP. But as the national state decomposed and the military radicals and the 
extreme left mobilized, the PCP radicalized its action for a revolutionary takeover of 
power. The main controversy in this period was between the control of the labor 
movement and union federations in Portugal. The Intersindical had an unofficial link 
with the PCP, which proposed a unitary labor movement, and the center-left (PS) and 
the center-right (PSD) wanted instead multiple union federations as a way of fighting 
the PCP monopoly over the labor movement. The provisional government ruled in favor 
of a single union federation on January 22, 1975. It was seen as proof of the ascendancy 
of the Communist party in the provisional governments.1434 The labor movement (the 
CGTP mainly) reached its highest membership in 1975, about one million and a half 
unionized workers, and according to the CGTP two million (the active population was 
three million). The CGTP had been s
, and the fact that it was the single confederation and organized by a party with a 
mobilization strategy made it grow.  
Moreover, it could rely on state induced resources for that. The mandatory quota 
in Portuguese corporative legislation was instituted, which foresaw that all workers had 
to pay their unions quotas (unless they declared the contrary).1435 Socialists and Social 
Democrats reacted by counter-mobilizing. The first constitutional government in 1976 
 
1432 O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 54. 
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to a single confederate labor movement. It did this firstby establishing links with some 
unions in service sector1436 (whereas the CGTP had its strongholds in industry, public 
employees, and farm workers) and second, by creating another union confederation in 




                                                
uency in the service sector (banques, insurance, and office employees).1437 
Also rural associational life became linked to elites and the new political parties 
during the cycle of mobilization during the transition. In the north the farmers’ 
organizations were called the MOLA or Movimento de Lavradores (Farmer’s 
Movement). Itwas composed mainly of small farmers, and it was more heterogeneous 
ideologically, having in its first commission socialists, Catholics, liberals, and 
conservatives. Moreover, the MOLA wanted to mobilize small farmers, namely tenants, 
a group that did not exist in the more socially polarized south (where the opposition was 
mainly between big landowners and landless laborers).1438  In the summer of 1974, 
agricultural workers’ unions were founded. Their potential constituency was the 
510,000 individuals who classified themselves as wage and salary earning agricultural 
workers, composing one sixth of the active population of the country, but these 
associations became strong mainly in some parts of the southern latifundia region. 
Union penetration was stronger in the districts of Beja and Évora. In 1975, 62% of 
Beja’s workforce was unionized in comparison to 53% in Évora. In Portalegre it was 
less than 20% of all workers, in Santarém and Setúbal only 15%, in Faro and 
ss, and in Castelo Branco the union came into existence only in 1976.1439  
In the first months of 1975, a group of workers in the south started to occupy 
lands and establish collective farms. In the following twelve months, 23% of Portuguese 
farmland had changed hands and was now managed collectively. These changes 
occurred mainly in the south. 1440  These new institutions were called Unidades 
Colectivas de Produção or UCPs. They paid fixed salaries and they were run on a 
egalitarian and democratic basis. Each was a cooperative run by elected boards of 
directors, a fiscal council, and with a general assembly of all workers as the supreme 
decision-making body.1441 When the revolutionary process came to a halt in the summer 
of 1975, with the defeat of the coalition of PCP and left revolutionaries by the coalition 
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of the moderate parties and the less ideological military, the occupation of land ended 
also in the south. But this process had sparked a transformation in the farmer’s 
organizations in the south. Landowners created a confederation called CAP 
(Confederação da Agricultura Portuguesa orConfederation of the Portuguese 
Agriculture). It had a major mass organization, it was capable of public disruption, and 
it opposed any attempts of agrarian reform declaring a war «against the Marxists» and 
against the «Lisbon commune». 1442  It became strongly linked with the right-wing 
groups and supported on occasions the center-right of PSD and CDS, asking for the 
retribution of the lost, expropriated land. Reacting against this, some farmers in 
connection with the PCP and the PS formed the CAN (Confederação Nacional da 
Agricultura orNational Confederation of Agriculture) in 1978. It was an umbrella 
organization for 253 different associations and cooperatives, of small and middle 
property farmers that supported the revolution.1443 It pretended to represent small and 
medium farmers from the regions outside agrarian reform area and rivaled with CAP. 
Existing accounts attribute it a weak dimension: in the late 1980s it had only 6,000 
members.1444 In the north the MARN (Movimento de Agricultures e Rendeiros) was 
animated by the PCP and took the place of the MOLA. In the south, there were the 
Ligas, which became under PCP control in 1975, although they shared some socialist 
influen
on left the elites of the new Spanish democracy with much weaker links 
to the m
                                                
ce and creation of Sindicatos de Trabalhadores Agrícolas.1445  
Spain’s transition from authoritarianism was very different. It was mainly a 
negotiation between the moderates within the francoist elite (represented by Adolfo 
Suárez) and the elites of the opposition, the socialists and the communists. With the 
support of the new head of state, King Juan Carlos, who had replaced Franco, a series of 
negotiations in 1977 that terminated the dictatorship. But this highly secretive and elitist 
mode of transiti
asses.  
This was possible due to institutional origins and configuration of the Spanish 
regime, and how it resolved the problem of Franco’s succession. In Spain there was a 
simultaneous identification of the head of state and the head of government, both roles 
being played by Franco, which resulted in the Spanish authoritarian leader’s far greater 
power over the regime’s factions than what the Portuguese leader possessed.  Franco 
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held weekly cabinet meetings, and his government was the true center of power. This 
allowed him, in 1947, to overcome the regime’s factions and to push through the 
approval of a law regulating the succession of the head of state in which Spain is 
defined
in which the assembly dissolved itself, thus clearing the way for 
democ
UCD was just a collection of personalities, and it was unable to develop links to societal 
                                                
 as a monarchy and in which the successor is chosen by Franco.  
In Portugal, on the contrary, the council of ministers was very much centred on 
the figure of Salazar and not very well developed as an organ of power. From a legal 
and constitutional perspective, in the Estado Novo regime, the government was only 
made up of the president of the council and of the individual ministers, but the council 
of ministers was not regulated as an organ of power. It was only with Caetano in 1968 
that the council of ministers was finally institutionalized. This inhibited the 
development of other centers of power in Spain and allowed more easily for the head of 
government to be an agent of political change and reform. This was precisely what 
happened when Juan Carlos was crowned.  After a brief rule by Franco’s last prime 
minister, Carlos Arías Navarro, Juan Carlos nominated Adolfo Suarez as head of the 
government in July 1976, thus putting the democratic semi-opposition in power. 
Together with Suarez, he dismantled Franco’s single party, issued amnesties to political 
prisoners, and presided over the first free elections. Moreover, the fact that Juan Carlos 
had greater control over the assembly than any leader had in Portugal over the National 
Assembly allowed him to persuade them to approve the law of political reform in 
October 1976, 
racy.1446 
The party behind this transition was the UCD (Unión del Centro Democrático), 
created in 1977 under the leadership of Suarez, that included the reformist wings within 
Francoism and that was adept of a transition to democracy, as well as other groups like 
the Tacito group (advocates of a regime change since the early 1970s), liberals, 
Christian-democrats, and social democrats.1447 The UCD won the general elections in 
1977 and in 1979, but it was unable to develop a modern party with a unitary 
organization throughout the territory, and it disintegrated after factional struggles. The 
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organizations and interests, like the church and business interests. In 1982, the party 
splits with many joining the socialists and the more conservatives going to AP.1448  
Also the Spanish socialists, the PSOE, were unable to create links with the 
workers’ movement. This is even more paradoxical because historically the Spanish 
socialists had close links to the workers’ movement, in the UGT, as I explain in the 
previous chapters. Even in the first years of the transition, the party statutes required 
that PSOE members join the UGT. Still the party as an organization became weak. It 
did not have more than 200,000 members and within the party internal power struggles, 
party functionaries, and elected officials are predominat over union leaders. Members of 
the union’s national executive attended party congresses as guests and had no voting 
rights. 1449  Also the Communists had weaker links to unions than their Portuguese 
counterparts. The CC.OO maintained its autonomy from the PCE. «Thus, the union has 
not been “dominated” by the party».1450 
These weak linkages are quite evident in the agricultural associability. After 
1982, with the transition to democracy, the agrarian sector stabilized around four 
national agricultural associations: CNAG (National Confederation of Farmers and 
Breeders), COAG (Coordination of Farmers and Breeders Organizations), CNJA 
(National Central of Young Farmers), and UFADE (Union of Agrarian Federations of 
Spain). They had almost no connection to parties or other organizations, and their 
relations with governments were mainly consultative and informative meetings.1451 In 
the transition period, the COAG (Coordinadora de Organizaciones de Agricultores y 
Ganaderos del Estado Espanol) was mainly implanted in Catalonia, Pais Valenciano, 
Navarra, Rioja, Alava, Cuenca del Duero, and Valle del Ebro, although in Catalonia, 
Rioja, Navarra, and Leon it had many conflicts with regional organizations. In the south 
it was weak and dispersed. The COAG originated from the peasant protest movements 
of the 1970s, the UAGAs (Uniones de Agricultores y Ganaderos). After 1977, it 
achieved some institutionalization as a valid interlocutor with the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Still, it tended to have internal divisions and it strongly depended on its 
members for funding.1452 The FTT-UGT, Federación de Trabajadores de la Tierra and 
the SOAs (Sindicatos de Obreros Agricolas), the rural workers’ federation of the 1930s, 
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were revitalized by the PSOE in 1977. This led to some competition with the UAGAs, 
and the FTT had some success in the elections of 1978 for the camaras agrarias, 
especially in Andalusia, Extremadura, Pais Valenciano, and Castilla la Mancha, where 
there was a strong UGT tradition. But in spite of continuous support from PSOE’s 
organizational network and the obligatory membership for all socialist militant workers 
to be affiliated in the FTT (which itself is part UGT), it did not consolidate and expand 
as an organization. After 1982 the PSOE allowed for its militants to be affiliated with 
the UAGAS.1453 
Instead, it was local associability that developed during the Spanish transition. 
During the transition, the neighborhood and housewife associational movements 
became even more politically oriented. There were an approximate of fourty 
neighborhood associations at the end of 1975.1454 They appeared in every major city, 
calling for improvements in public services in working-class neighborhoods (cultural 
activities, health, education, and housing). In the early 1970s, they stood against the 
Greater Barcelona and the Comarcal (district) plans and several groups, within a strong 
cycle of protest, even presented a Memorandum of Citizen’s to the Mayor of the city. In 
one Madrid neighborhood, the local association grew from six families in 1970 to 1,400 
in 1977. In the mid-1977, there were 110 neighborhood associations in Madrid with 
60,000 members and 5,000 militants. In Alcala-de-Henares, a city close to Madrid, in 
1974 there were only 50 individuals in associations, whereas in 1977 there were four 
associations that coordinated over 600 individuals. In one neighborhood of Madrid, the 
local association grew sixfold from 1970 to 1977. On May 1976, sixty thousand 
individuals demonstrated against the high cost of living in Madrid; on June 22, fifty 
thousand against the high cost of living and called for the legalization of their 
associations; and through 1976 the demonstrations organized by these associations 
mobilized up to one hundred thousand people. 1455  Interestingly and contrary to 
Portugal, the neighborhood movement seemed to have maintained roots after 1982, 
when the transition to democracy was completed in Spain. Although there was a decline 
of the movement after 1979, in the 1980s the Asociaciones de Vecinos were still 
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articulating intense demands for participation and democratization at the municipal level 
in the big cities.1456  
                                                
In Portugal, a major social movement that rapidly expanded was the 
neighborhood commissions’ movement. During the final years of the authoritarian 
regime there had been community organizing of poor neighborhoods by church 
organizations and left-wing forces, and when the regime fell these organizations rapidly 
took over the control of authority in their residential areas. On May 8, 1974 in the poor 
Lisbon neighborhood of Chelas began the occupation of empty houses: in the next two 
weeks about 2,000 houses were occupied all over the country and on May 11 the first 
comissão de moradores is elected in Lisbon with the participation of 230 families. 
Gradually these comissões were taken over or mobilized by the military revolutionary 
left, the extreme left, like the MDP-CDE or the PCP. These groups competed strongly 
with each other, making the process of mobilization from below of poor neighborhoods 
very radicalized. At the beginning, the PCP opposed the wild occupations of houses 
which were fomented by the radical faction in the MFA that was structured on a Cuban 
socialist model (the faction around Major Otelo de Carvalho). These military between 
November 1974 and March 1975 organized “Poder Popular” campaigns all throughout 
the country, with the result that neighborhood commissions were established in many 
cities, like in Porto and Setúbal. In April 1975 in Lisbon, there were committees of 
occupation, 21 neighborhood commissions, and 54 freguesias were run by these 
committees. Moreover, the radicals in the army attempted an alliance between these 
commissions and the workers’ movement, and hence plans developed in November 
1974 document Aliança Povo-MFA (Alliance People-Armed Forces Movement). In the 
southern city of Setúbal this movement became very strong, and at the end of 1974 
almost two thirds of the population was covered by neighborhood commissions. The 
speed of house occupations became stronger between March 11 and November 25, 
1975, namely in Porto, Setúbal and Lisboa, involving now the occupation of private 
houses. National politics had radicalized to such an extent that a newly constituted and 
heavily armed revolutionary military unit, the COPCON, was organizing it and even 
clashing with the police.1457 
Also, some the poor neighborhoods’ associations of some Portuguese cities by 
lay people and priests, coming partially from the structures of the Catholic Action (the 
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JOC, JUC, LOC), founded associations like the Assembleias Livres de Cristãos (in 
Moscavide, Lisboa, and Porto), the meetings of Christians (Évora, Setúbal, Almada, 
Barreiro, Braga, and Algarve e Bragança), but they were never sponsored by the 
hierarchy.1458 The Catholic hierarchy rejected and criticized these organizations, also 
because some of them evolved to extreme left positions and connected with the radical 
factions in the military and extreme left groups like the LUAR, PRP, UDP, FUR, 
especially in the so-called hot summer of 1975 (the Acção Católica’s junta central was 
deactivated in December 1984).1459 The only mobilization strategy the church promoted 
was more defensive, against the campaigns of ideological mobilization in the northern 
countryside by leftist military and the PCP in 1975 and the attacks done by leftist forces 
on the Catholic Rádio Renascença in February 1975.1460 
Contrary to Spain, the neighborhood commissions that emerged in Portugal were 
unable to survive into the democratic consolidation period, and by the end of the 1970s 
they were already extinct. A survey in 1978 revealed that only 11.1% of the population 
had collaborated with these organizations during that year. Moreover, they were 
considered the least relevant institutions to make the country democratic (1.6%), when 
compared to other institutions like the presidency of the republic (27%), the political 
parties (7%) or even the armed forces (4%).1461 Braga da Cruz revelead in a study in 
1995 that the levels of identification with a city or a village were much higher in Spain 
than in Portugal (40% and 21,8% respectively).1462 
In the democratic period these differences were sustained by different patterns of 
state-voluntary associations relationships.1463 In Portugal, state transformations during 
the transition allowed for a higher control of the state apparatus by the CGTP. There 
was a strong presence of the CGTP unions in state employees and in banking, the 
sectors that were nationalized during the transition. There was also a high inequality in 
distribution of union density by sectors. It was very high in the primary sector and in the 
public services (where CGTP dominated), but in private industries and services it was 
below average. Union membership levels were strong in sectors like railways, banking, 
insurance, transport, and public companies, and weak in construction, commerce, 
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textiles, food industries, and ceramics.1464 Moreover, union membership was close to 
100% because in many of these sectors unions had a monopoly of health care provisions 
(e.g. banking, insurance, and telecommunications). For instance, banking unionism was 
around 90%, and its membership doubled since the revolution. Finally, the CGTP 
included 71% of all union members and the UGT less than 23%.1465 Union density was 
about 47.7% in companies with more than 160 workers (smaller union density in 
smaller companies, about 27.4%.1466  
In Spain, membership in unions was low in comparative terms although it rose 
since the mid-1980s until 1992, when major conflicts with the socialist governments led 
to cooperation between the two major unions for protest and membership mobilization. 
But most unions were unable to give their members such services like housing, pension, 
and strike funds in the democracy later on. 1467 Also labor laws in Spain made it easier 
to dismiss workers,1468 whereas in Portugal employment could only be terminated by 
mutual consent, when a contract ended or when there was a just reason (an existing 
legal precedent). Moreover, collective dismissals required the aproval of the ministry of 
labor and consultations with the workers’ union. Finally, in Spain there was a much 
wider variety of welfare funds (private, public, agricultural, self-employed, and other 
workers), whereas Portugal was less fragmented with some sectors like public 
employees, white collar workers and private wage earners in public and private 
companies received generous protection schemes.1469 
 Regime institutions were also different. In Portugal there was a higher 
parliamentarism. In Spain, the stability of governments was somehow an illusion, 
because it rested on the existence of a constitutional provision that to dismiss a 
government it required a constructive vote of no-confidence in the parliament, a censure 
act that could replace the Prime Minister with a new one. This required a large majority 
of the votes in the chamber involving much more than one single party usually, and 
these conditions are not always possible. Governments were usually single party and 
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needed only very few additional votes to legislate.1470 In Portugal, many reforms have 
reinforced the parliament’s role since 1985.1471 
This allowed for a higher pattern of coalitional politics. Although these have 
been rare, this has mainly led to the creation of stronger and more mobilizing parties 
that have thus hadan interest in reaching out to voluntary associations in Portugal. 
Levels of party membership as well as party identification1472and the links of interest 
groups towards parties have been higher in Portugal than in Spain. In Portugal 
negotiations with interest groups about laws and legislative measures and proposals are 
usually done with party leaderships.1473 
 
Table 38: party membership rates, 1970-1996 
 1975 1983 1990 1993 
Portugal 3.5 6.0 4.5  
Spain 1.7 1.9 2.0 1.7 
(Gunther and Montero, 2001, p. 94) 
  
Finally, because parties and unions are less important, socioeconomic cleavages 
are also less relevant for determining the type of Spanish civil society, which makes 
room for an easier formation of New Social Movement organizations. In Portugal, on 
the contrary, stronger organizations and competition between traditional socialist and 
communist parties occupies the political space, and it is more successful in mobilizing 
possible constituencies and groups that would support NSM organizations, like the 
youth. For instance, party youth movements are very important in Portugal. There is a 
tendency in Portugal for this type of organizations to prevail to other youth political 
movements. The existing organizations are the Juventude Comunista Portuguesa (JCP, 
Portuguese Communist Youth), Juventude Socialista (JS, Socialist Youth), the 
Juventude Social-Democrata (JSD, Social-Democratic Youth), related to the PSD and a 
center-right party, and the Juventude Centrista/Juventudes Populares (Centrist 
Youth/Popular Youth), related to the Centro Democrático e Social (CDS, Democratic 
and Social Center), a right wing party of Christian-democratic inspiration that in 1992 
changed its name to Partido Popular (PP, Popular Party).  
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All these organizations, with the exception of the JCP, were created after 1974 
by the leaderships of the respective political parties and closely depend on them in 
terms of financing, organization, and ideology. Their organizational structure tends to 
reproduce the party structure. Also, the youth organizations have representatives in the 
leadership organs of the party, and their functions are mainly of supplying workpeople 
for electoral campaigns, propaganda, militancy substitution for regions where the party 
is weakly implanted, and so on. At the same time they also work as one of the many 
pressure groups or factions within the parties.1474 In the early 1990s, the JS and JSD had 
both 30.000 members between sixteen and thirty years of age. The JSD existed in the 
majority of Portuguese districts with the exception of some areas of the south. The JCP 
is radicated mainly in Lisbon, Porto, and Setúbal. Fifty percent of their members are in 
secondary school. The JC had six thousand members in 1980 and in 1990 fifteen 
thousand, 70% of them students. The JS had 8,000 members in February 1975, 15,000 
in 1976, 16,600 in 1978, but in 1981 they had declined to 2,000 and in 1984 they were 
5,000. Forty percent of its youth is in secondary school.1475 Since the mid-1980s, with 
the exception of the JC, the membership of these organizations has declined. The 
leaders of these organizations have themselves a high level of membership in voluntary 
associations (85%), specially in the left-wing youth organizations’ elites (JCP, 93.5%, 
JS 86,5%, JC 84,8%, and JSD 81%). The types of associations preferred by these elites 
are sports association (22%), students’ association (13%), cultural (10%), and political 
non-party organizations (8%).1476 
In Spain, the non-socialist left, the communists, and ex-communists are less 
powerful and more adept of post-materialist values. In fact in Portugal, pre-materialist 
values are more widespread in the population than post-materialist values.1477 In Spain, 
the PCE is more fragmented than the PCP. It is still organized around the principles of 
democratic centralism and extreme loyalty to leaders, and not even allowing for 
organized factions. Since the transition, the PCE has been supportive of the milder 
version of Marxism and Eurocommunism, whereas the PCP has maintained its Stalinist 
ideology and practices. After some years, the PCE gave way to an electoral coalition 
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called Izquierda Unida, forging new links with social movements like feminists, 
pacifists, and ecologists, the so-called policy of “social and political convergence”.1478 
As a consequence, NSM organizations grew more in Spain. The feminist 
movement has been growing strongly also, and in fact it has been able to achieve even 
national coordination with the Coordinadora de Organizaciones Feministas del Estado 
Español to intervene in reproductive rights by presenting project-laws to the 
governments (divorce and abortion projects were presented in 1980 in order to change 
the penal code in the issue of abortion).1479 Environmental groups have also grown, 
having about 170,000 members in Spain (Greenpeace, CODA, AEDENAT, and 
Federacion de Amigos de la Tierra); about 348,000 people affiliate in associations for 
peace, international solidarity, human rights (Movimiento por la Paz, Desarmer y la 
Libertad, Paz Ahora, and Coordenadora Gesto por la Paz de Euskal Herria), and in 
ONGs (architects without borders, doctors without borders etc.). 1480  In fact the 
conscience of ecological problems by Spanish citizens is high, and much higher than the 
actual participation in ecological associations and ecological activities. Some 
researchers conclude that many of these associations, although their number has been 
growing, have a low participation of citizens. In fact, the surveys that have been 
analyzed do not seem to confirm this interpretation; the membership in voluntary 
associations has in fact grown. An important sub-sector of these associations is the 
Catalan environmental associations, which are able to mobilize the citizenry to a large 
extent. Some of these are associations for fire protection or the interesting Fundacio 
Territori I Paisatje which buys land in order to protect it, others specialize in recycling 
residues like the grupo CEPA in Barcelona or publish information about solid residues 
like the ecologist platform ERREKA in the Basque country.1481 
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Conclusion and Implications 
 
 This dissertation addressed the problem of the sources of associational life and 
civic engagement. What makes people form, affiliate, and engage in activities in 
voluntary associations? I developed a new theory of the origins of associational life by a 
comparative historical study of popular sector/lower class associations of urban and 
rural populations in a set of Western European countries during the period of the 1800s-
2000s. The countries under study were Sweden, Norway, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Britain, Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal. 
 Existing theories have not yet provided a full explanation of the causes of 
associational life and its variations in a diversity of settings. First, most studies, 
including the classics, have restricted the analysis to a small set of countries. 
Tocqueville wrote mainly on France and the United States, and Otto von Gierke on the 
German states. Putnam and Skocpol write especially about the United States. There are 
edited books on civil society in a diversity of Western European countries, but they 
restrict themselves to narrower time periods, namely the late-nineteenth century or the 
recent transformations since the 1980s. As a consequence, the theoretical scope of these 
studies was very restricted and their hypotheses applied only to a few cases. Second, 
students of associational life have been more interested in the effects of associations 
(e.g. to economic development or to democratic accountability) than with its origins and 
causes. Also, theories so far have mainly focused on single factors, taken in isolation, 
like the role of the state in shaping associational life (first recognized by the neo-
corporatist school in the 1970s), or on specific institutions, like federalism, levels of 
regime decentralization, or proportional electoral systems. 
 In order to go beyond these shortcomings, I proposed the following: 1) to 
maximize variation in the dependent variable by analyzing a bigger number of cases 
than previous theories. This meant looking at a larger number of countries than most 
studies. I also covered a broader time period. This time period is usually called the age 
of mass politics, and with respect to mass based voluntary associations it corresponds to 
the phases of their emergence (1800-1870s), struggle for inclusion (1870s-1920s), 
varying attempts of incorporation (1920s-1930s) and consolidation (from the 1930s-
1940s until the 1970s). The dependent variable was the associational life that developed 
in the period between the 1930s-1940s and the 1970s, when all countries in Europe 
experienced the stabilization of associational networks around patterns of strong 
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(Norway, Sweden), medium-strong (Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands), medium 
(Great Britain), medium-weak (Italy, France), and weak (Spain, Portugal) civil 
societies. 
 The bulk of the material of this thesis came from a variety of secondary sources, 
namely historical monographs that gathered data on voluntary associations for the 
period and countries considered. Such a comparative work usually rests on the re-
interpretation and analytical use of secondary sources. The explanatory strategy pursued 
was historical, as opposed to a more presentist approach. Many interesting political 
processes take long time periods to unfold, and many historical processes have 
consequences in the future that were not possible to predict.  
Within the field of associational life studies, this dissertation aimed to present a 
unified and multicausal theory of Western European civil societies. I also gave the due 
importance to rural associations and religious associability, like many studies have done 
for other themes. There has been an urban/industrial and secular bias in the analysis of 
the processes of political modernization. In fact, I argue that historically religious and 
agrarian associations have had a decisive role in the creation of conditions propitious to 
the development of strong civil societies in the twentieth century. It was only when rural 
lower class associations decided to ally with industrial workers that a hegemonic 
associational network emerged leading to the denser and more coordinated associational 
lives of Western European democracies, as in the cases of Norway and Sweden. This 
was the product of the non-existence of state-church conflicts. 
 I also showed a series of counter-intuitive mechanisms that sustain associational 
life. Civic participation will grow if associations have an encompassing and national 
scope (not small and local), usually through their insertion into confederative structures; 
it is also enhanced by strong states, especially when associations are embedded in state 
structures and used for the provision of services in the economy and in the welfare state 
system; and finally, civic engagement and associational life will grow when 
associations have opportunities to be connected to national level and parliamentary 
politics and to create links with parties and political elites. Arguments and theories that 
explain civic engagement by looking at socioeconomic structures and changes, social 
and political attitudes (e.g. trust and social capital theories), and religious values are 
insufficient in explaining long term patterns of associational development, as well as in 
their timing and shape, in the Western European context. 
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 Three political and institutional factors have shaped civil society: 1) Timing of 
state building and/or international status in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. 
The later the process of state building and/or the lower international status in the 
eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, the stronger will be voluntary associations in 
the twentieth century. In states that consolidated fully during the mid and late nineteenth 
century and/or had been secondary states in the international system in the eighteenth 
century (Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Italy, Sweden, Norway), as 
opposed to states that consolidated before the nineteenth century and/or had been major 
international players by the eighteenth century (Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal), 
the pre-modern corporatist structures (e.g. guilds, religious corporate bodies, rural 
fellowships) survived up to the early twentieth century, because the pressures for 
resource extraction from state-builders were weaker. This in turn promoted a stronger 
popular sector associational life in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries 
both in the form of voluntary associations and political parties. Early state builders 
abolished these structures much earlier (already by the early eighteenth century) in order 
to use their resources to finance war with other states.  
There were two mechanisms at work here. First, from the point of view of the 
communities and members of these groups, the stronger the tradition of corporatism 
inherited from feudal Europe, the higher was to be group consciousness and easier the 
collective action of urban workers and farmers in the late nineteenth century. Second, 
political elites and state-builders recognized corporate status groups as legitimate and 
integrated them, in the context of heightened international military and economic 
competition of the 1870s-1930s, in policy making networks for the dispensation of 
military, welfare and economic policies. This promoted the recognition of the self-
administration of voluntary associations. 
 2) State-capacity: the stronger the state capacity, the stronger were be voluntary 
associations. States with high capacity were able to implement policies and establish 
goals autonomously decided by rulers (e.g. Germany, Austria, Sweden and Great 
Britain, as opposed to the low capacity states of Italy, Spain, and Portugal; Belgium, the 
Netherlands and France are intermediate cases). In the late nineteenth-century, one of 
the main functions of the state became the promotion of economic development and 
nationalist mobilization. For this purpose states established partnerships with 
associations. This has empowered associations, through two mechanisms. First, 
associations have received resources, legitimacy and public status from the state, thus 
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being able to recruit more members through the distribution of selective benefits 
(welfare, pensions, health, education, and policy advise). Second, since high capacity 
states are more able to impose a uniform jurisdiction and control over a territory, this 
will make it easier for associations to expand through the whole national territory, to 
connect different geographical areas, and to develop more easily encompassing peak 
associations. Instead, low capacity states will produce small, weak, and local 
associations. 
 In the process of development of Western Europe two main factors have shaped 
state capacity. The first was international and geopolitical competition with other states. 
Processes of international competition which have led to war and made the state suffer 
collapse, defeat in invasion, politicization of the military, or military foreign occupation 
have promoted a weak state unable to control its territory.  
The second factor refers to state-church relations during the process of 
modernization. The more the church has put a territorial barrier to state expansion, the 
less likely it has been that the state will develop a strong capacity. If state and church 
elites are allies in the process of nation building, the easier it will be to achieve national 
territorial unification, because the state uses the church resources, personnel, and 
apparatus for the implementation of state policies, especially in welfare provision 
(pensions, old age care insurance, widower funds, credits for investment, and 
compulsory relief funds) and educational policies. 
 3) Democratization: the stronger the degree of democratization of the regime 
between the 1880s and the 1930s, the stronger the associational life. Democratization is 
measured by two dimensions: 3.1) the extension of rights of participation, debate, and 
assembly; 3.2) the degree of parliamentarization of the regime. This refers to the control 
by representative bodies of the formation, decisions, personnel, and policies of the 
executive (cases of high parliamentarism are Sweden, Norway, Great Britain, Belgium, 
the Netherlands; of low are Portugal, Spain and Italy; of medium are France, Germany 
and Austria). The stronger the parliament, the more associational leaders will seek to 
influence and establish links with MPs and political parties and to build their own 
agenda according to parliamentary cycles. Since strong parliaments represent the whole 
nation, associations will tend to become national in scope, and as such more coordinated 
through the territory, with associational leaders creating links and alliances that run 
through several regions and localities in the country. Moreover, in a strongly 
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parliamentarized system parties will be also more interested in creating permanent and 
not episodic links with associations in order to have a higher reach to the electorate. 
 The Scandinavian countries had the best conditions for the development of a 
fully developed and encompassing associational life. In Norway, Sweden, and Denmark 
traditions of estate and corporate organization survived until the late nineteenth century 
especially in the countryside, and a very efficient state that relied on partnerships with 
the Lutheran church for policy implementation. Also, the state was highly unified and 
had a high control of the territory. These two conditions promoted a strong capacity for 
collective action and organization building during the first two thirds of the nineteenth 
century, especially in the form of religious and agrarian reform movements. In the 
context of growing workers’ mobilization from the late nineteenth century to the 1930s, 
these movements were able to become receptive to workers’ demands and to build 
broad coalitions crossing class boundaries: farmers, workers, and sectors of the liberal 
elite (representing more progressive and open economic sectors). This was possible 
because strong parliaments and an open legal system created incentives for popular 
classes to address their claims to the parliament, and elites became more open to 
pressures from below since rival claims could be accommodated within the national 
parliament without the need to resort to repression and violence. Finally, this broad 
alliance conquered national government in the 1930s as the coalition promoting the 
transition to democracy. Because it was so hegemonic, it could use the traditions of 
state-church partnership to build an extrememly broad welfare state and corporatist 
partnerships in industrial policy that to this day sustains a highly participating citizenry. 
 The pattern of dominant associational life rested on a particular combination of 
variables. As in the pattern of hegemonic civil society, there was also the continuation 
of corporate forms of interest intermediation inherited from the pre-modern period that 
were modernized since the late nineteenth century to build modern societal corporatist 
states, but these were more denser in Germany (and Austria) than in Belgium and in the 
Netherlands. On the other hand, these two countries had a higher level of 
democratization, which allowed for popular classes to be represented in the polity and to 
form organizational links with elites, especially with the liberals. In Germany, however, 
parliaments were weaker, a point which made liberal elites immune to pressures from 
below. Additionally, in all these countries there were deep traditions of state-church 
partnership, but not as deep as in Scandinavia. In all of these cases, there were religious 
conflicts with state builders in some periods. Especially Catholics were antagonized by 
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rulers for long periods, which led to weaker patterns of incorporation of the church and 
as a consequence divided the popular classes, especially after the appearance of the 
workers’ movement at the end of the nineteenth century. Workers were mobilized either 
by religion, or by socialism, but it was never possible to form a broad coalition of 
religious reformists and dissenters with the workers and sections of the liberal elite as it 
happened in Scandinavia. After the transition to democracy in the 1930s and the 1940s, 
these societies built less comprehensive welfare systems and corporatist institutions for 
policy-making, thus not promoting civic engagement as the levels found in the pattern 
of hegemonic associational life. 
 Like the previous patterns of associational life in Europe, also England had some 
propitious conditions for the development of mass voluntary associations. England 
possessed an efficient and coherent state, which had been fostered by the incoporation 
of the Anglican Church and by severall anti-corruption acts, and since early on it was a 
highly parliamentarized polity. These traits fostered national level mass movements, 
especially of religious reform, but also of craft workers, because national integration 
made easier the conection and communication of associational leaders within the same 
social movement. Moreover, the centrality of parliament allowed claims to be debated, 
and it made viable the entry of the popular classes into organized politics by the creation 
of links between parties (both the liberals and the conservatives) and associations. At 
the same time, two other features inhibited the development of associational life in the 
levels found in the hegemonic and dominant patterns, and instead they pushed for a 
dualistic society. First, there was the religious issue over Ireland, which gave a fatal 
blow to an alliance of farmers (mainly Catholic and Irish) and workers (mainly English 
and Protestant/dissident). Second, the form of the British polity since the seventeenth 
century was essentially individualistic and corporate, as in the cases so far analysed. 
This made it impossible to create national level policy-making corporatist institutions as 
well as a developed welfare state in the 1930s and the 1940s that could have integrated 
voluntary associations in their social schemes. Instead, welfare and corporatist benefits 
were weak, dispensed from above by elites and not through organizations, thus 
promoting a dual and not coordinated associational life where social inequalities 
strongly determine the civic engagement of the citizenry. 
 In disjointed associational life, the conditions for development of associational 
life were weak. The traditions of corporate representation were extinguished early, 
parliaments historically had very low powers, and the state had a very low capacity 
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because of protracted territorial state-church conflicts, civil war leading to state 
collapse, and clientelism. Associational life became local and with weak links to 
political parties, thus facing high administrative barriers imposed by a distant and all-
powerful state. Partnerships with the state for the dispensation of welfare benefits and 
corporatist coordination never became the norm of policy-making. The combination of 
these three variables inhibited the development of a dense and coordinated associational 
life. 
 Still, there are differences between these societies that are worth exploring. 
Generally speaking, Italy (especially in the center and the northern regions) has had 
historically a denser associational life than France. Again, the same set of factors I have 
pointed out earlier explain the variations between the types of associational life and also 
distinguish these two cases. When compared to France, Italy has had higher levels of 
parliamentarism, thus allowing for politics to become more competitive and for parties 
to create interlocking links with associations. Italy inherited a higher legacy of pre-
modern associational life than France. Although corporate organizations were abolished 
earlier in many parts of Italy, in some regions, because of the fact they were peripheral 
regions which were not subject to extreme and harsh rule from state builders, it was 
easier to transform premodern guild associational life in modern voluntary associations. 
Also, part of the conditions for the promotion of a stronger civic life in Italy can be 
attributed to the Vatican state. In contrast to the French (or Spanish and Portuguese) 
churches, when it was incorporated in the new Italian nation in the late nineteenth 
century, there was a vast body of resources that could be used for collective action and 
for sponsoring Christian democracy. 
 Iberian societies faced the hardest conditions for the development of a dense 
associational field. First, since the eighteenth century there was a direct attack on any 
corporate autonomous body by state rulers, first by the absolute monarchy and later by 
both liberals and reactionaries that much took away resources for collective action and 
self-organization of communities both in cities and the countryside. Second, there was a 
pattern of an almost failure of state building that left many areas of the territory out of 
the control of the center and national rulers, thus promoting local and clientelistic 
associational ventures. Finally, a very weak parliament, where party competition was 
largely a sham, left power in the hands of the king and the military. In these conditions, 
repression over associations was much easier but at the same time promoted 
associational initiatives directed against the existence of the state itself. 
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 These conditions inhibited the development of associational venturesre 
continued during the period 1870s-1918, the so-called golden age of associability, 
where everywhere in the western world associations were being founded for many 
purposes. Iberian countries did not escape this trend, but a tradition of weak state 
strength became predominant with a system of façade parliamentarism that sustained 
itself mainly through corruption. When external conditions led to a confrontation with 
other states that had military overtones, this led to a crisis of legitimacy of these regimes 
that definitely put away popular classes from elites. 
 Still, it was also in this period that conditions in Spain lead to a denser civil 
society especially in some regions. At the regional level, in Catalonia and in the Basque 
country, there was a tradition of partnerships between the state, and corporate and 
church interests. Moreover, at the national level, the Spanish state showed a higher 
capacity both in the development of corporatist and welfare functions through 
partnerships with unions, like the UGT, and it showed higher levels of electoral 
competition and freedom of association than Portugal. Accordingly, civil society 
organizations were stronger in Spain. 
 The common patterns of Spain and Portugal, of a political stabilization by the 
elimination of almost all autonomous voluntary associations can be traced to the factors 
I identified in the previous chapters: a weak pre-modern associational life tradition, low 
parliamentarization and democratization, and low state capacity. Still, there were 
differences between Portugal and Spain explained by variations in these three aspects. 
In fact, Spain in the interwar period, both during the Rivera’s dictatorship, the second 
Republic and the civil war, continued its history of a much denser associational life than 
Portugal. This is explained by the fact that associational life organizations in Spain 
maintained their partnerships with the state and strengthened their links with political 
parties. This also explains why the authoritarian regimes were different at this level: 
there was a much more mobilizing dictatorship through Fascist organizations in Spain, 
whereas in Portugal a more traditionalist and static regime fostered instead passivity and 
demobilization. 
 In the end I discussed the implications of my findings for to the recent processes 
of democratization, namely in Portugal and Spain? How do patterns of state 
transformation, institutional configurations in these new democracies (e.g. the varying 
role of representative institutions like parliaments and presidencies), and varied legacies 
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of state-corporatism inherited from the previous non-democratic regimes influence third 
wave democratic associational structures?  
 In this vein I analysed post-authoritarian associational landscapes in Portugal 
and Spain (1980s-2000s) and found that my previous theory predicts associational 
dynamics in the contemporary new democracies. In spite of lower levels of 
socioeconomic development, institutional legacies and patterns of transformation from 
the dictatorships to democracies since the late 1960s led to a stronger civil society in 
Portugal because 1) associational life was stronger and political during the phase of 
authoritarian liberalization, 2) because of a mobilizational transition in Portugal, 
associations could develop links to parties and to a more open parliament than in Spain, 
3) links between the state and associations for the dispensation of welfare benefits were 
more solid in Portugal. 
Since civic engagement and a participatory public are the result of strong and 
centralized states and powerful representative institutions (the parliaments), to what 
extent are changes in public policies and the international context since the 1970s 
strengthening or undermining these bases for citizen participation in old democracies? 
Second, highly civic and participatory polities are sustained by state-voluntary 
associations’ partnerships in the arenas of welfare and economic policy-making. This 
finding calls for a broader theorization of the political economy of citizen participation 
and for linking the literatures of welfare state (e.g. Esping-Anderson) and production 
regimes (e. g. Peter Hall, David Soskice) with democratic theory. These tasks remain to 
be done. 
Although the thesis included only I only studied (Western) European cases, I 
would argue that the hypotheses are also valid to explain the character of (as pointed out 
by many scholars) the exceptional high associational life in the USA between the 
nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. First, democratization and 
parliamentarization, like in the European cases of strong civil society (e.g. Sweden), 
were also traits of the USA since early on in its history. This was very much an aspect 
singled out by Tocqueville already in the 1830s and confirmed by recent scholarship. 
Theda Skocpol for instance, argued against cultural interpretations that early and long 
lived democracy and competitive elections made parties compete for support in a 
national level and spurred the formation of waves of associations1482. 
                                                 
1482 Skocpol, 1999a, pp. 42-44. 
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Second, corporate forms of pre-industrial civil society were also present in the 
USA and served as a background to modern association building. Recent research has 
showed that early American associations were not separated from the state and regime 
institutions and had a corporate form. Since before the independence American states 
already possessed legislation regulating «the public constitution of corporate and 
associative bodies» 1483 . These had various forms– partnership, corporation, 
unincorporated association, charitable trust, mutual benefit society, labor union, and 
municipal corporations. Moreover, many voluntary associations «received the formal 
benefits of incorporation through an official charter» (e.g. associations for the «the 
advancement of religion, of learning, and of commerce») which gave them «privileges, 
immunities and the coercive power» to enforce their own laws and obligations1484. 
Moreover, the state was not weak in the USA during the nineteenth century. In 
terms of infrastructural power the American state was sometimes even stronger than 
many European cases. See for instance, the importance of the much stronger railway 
and postal system of the USA when compared to European countries. This, as well as a 
spreading federal State, served as an impetus and an «organizational model» for the 
rules, organization and expansion of associations1485. 
In this sense there was a strong state in the USA (as in the European cases where 
civil society was highly developed). However it was strong not so much in coercive 
power (although that is important too), but in the sense of being embedded in societal 
networks. States are strong insofar as they are able to coerce and impose policies and 
legislation. In particular, when they develop «ties that connect citizens and public 
officials across the public private divide», they promote individual initiative in the civic 
arena (associational formation), political participation and cooperation for joint 
ventures1486. 
Finally, the mechanisms that sustained civic engagement and associational 
development in the USA were similar to the ones I discovered for the Western European 
cases. Also, in the USA federative associational structures organized civil society and 
many of its most vibrant voluntary associations were local chapters of national 
federations1487. 
                                                 
1483 Novak, 2001, p. 173. 
1484 Novak, 2001, pp. 176, 180. 
1485 Skocpol, 1999a, p. 47. 
1486 Evans, pp. 179-189. 
1487 Crowley, Skocpol, 1999. 
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What is the connection between economic enterprises and voluntary 
associations? The question here is to understand the degree to which voluntary 
associations influence the functioning of markets and the economy, and specifically the 
emergence of a prosperous country, an insurmountable condition for civil society in the 
broad sense defined above.  
Markets are «processes of coordination among individual agents who are 
engaged in a variety of activities including investing in, producing, distributing, 
exchanging and consuming a large array of goods and services they produce for each 
other»1488. A market that fosters trust, progress and prosperity to all groups and classes 
within a society, does not automatically arise. Economic actors may ally with state 
rulers to exploit the public, and fraud and violence have long been traits of many 
capitalist ventures 1489 . As Culpepper argues, «the principal problem facing policy-
makers is not how to make actors improve economic performance, to cooperate with the 
government, but one of inducing economic actors to cooperate with each other»1490. 
One solution, proposed by Tocqueville, was that the size of the companies had to be 
small, in order to avoid extreme concentration of resources in new elites1491. Still, as 
realms of inter-organizational/company coordination, for the functioning of the market 
to lead to civil society it needs a particular legal and institutional framework in which to 
function. Regulation of work and contractual practices, of consumers’ rights and of 
work dynamics that lead to higher productivity can be achieved by improving the 
degree to which companies and the state establish joint ventures for policy-making1492. 
                                                
And this is best achieved when employers and capital associations are 
empowered by the state1493. Research has shown that this happens when the state grants 
public functions and selective benefits (e.g. the channeling of state subsidies to 
companies) to these associations. This empowers the associations, which are then able 
to attract more members (companies), which makes them have access to daily and 
contextual information that is passed on to state policy-makers. With this they have a 
much more accurate description of the economic actors’ aims, dilemmas, and resources. 
In this sense, public policy becomes more effective, since it has a more realistic and 
contextual knowledge of society. Moreover, associations’ with high membership 
 
1488 Pérez-Díaz, 2006, p. 18. 
1489 Pérez-Díaz, 2006, pp. 8, 18. 
1490 Hall, Soskice, 2001, pp. 45-46. 
1491 Swedberg, 2009, p. 33. 
1492 Hall, Soskice, 2001, p. 11-12. 
1493 Hall, Soskice, 2001, p. 11-12. 
 397
density and strong public incorporation are able to persuade (and sometimes force) more 
easily companies to engage in cooperation, exchange of information, have similar 
technical procedures, share technical expertise and manpower, thus setting in motion 
long term processes of trust between economic actors1494. 
Another question is the the degree to which «associational life is not just unions 
and business associations; the whole being bigger and more complex than, and different 
from, each of its components» (Víctor Péréz-Díaz). The point in debate here is the 
relationship between associational life (its density, quality, types of associations) and 
civil society in the broad sense, as a «liberal polity defined by the rule of law, limited, 
accountable government», a «public sphere» and a political culture of «justice, 
benevolence, and civic virtue»1495. Or, put in different way, the relationship between 
civil society and democracy. 
In my thesis we argued that this outcome is best achieved when 
subordinate/popular classes/groups (and these are varied historically) have a strong 
associational organization that gives them access to policy making and/or capacity to 
influence, veto and determine policy outcomes1496. When the poor, the excluded, the 
uneducated and the large anonymous majorities are somehow considered in the polity 
and their interests have a policy expression, the feeling of shared community and 
collective purpose is augmented as well as the overall feeling of political efficacy, 
interpersonal trust and regime legitimacy 1497 . This is the broader meaning of civil 
society. 
Still, this is not achieved simply by multiplying the sheer number of voluntary 
associations in a society, by considering that some classes are better suited to this task  
than others (the working class/unions, or the middle class/professional associations etc) 
or by favoring particular categories of associations (political or social). Density of 
associations per se does not necessarily promote democracy, since there have been 
periods where a high density of civil society, even popular class organizations, has 
paved the way for authoritarianism (e.g. Weimar Germany). As Tocqueville agued, 
«liberty of association is only a source of advantage and prosperity to some nations, it 
                                                 
1494 Culpepper, 2003, pp. 54-56. 
1495 Pérez-Díaz, 2006, pp. 2, 5. 
1496 Huber, 1995, p. 179. 
1497 Rueschemeyer, 1998, pp. 9-10. 
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may be perverted or carried to excess by others, and from an element of life may be 
changed into a cause of destruction»1498. 
I argue then that we must look not at the quantity but at the quality of civil 
society, namely of the ties between social groups and between groups and the 
government. What is important is the degree to which links are built between people 
across localities, social classes, workplaces, religions etc1499. Again, it was Tocqueville, 
thinking about political parties and mass political associations, who said that «it is 
solely in great associations that the general value of the principle of association is 
displayed (...) When the members of a community are allowed and accustomed to 
combine for all purposes, they will combine as readily for the lesser as for the more 
important ones; but if they are allowed to combine only for small affairs, they will be 
neither inclined nor able to effect it»»1500. If the scale of civil society is very limited and 
not connected to national politics and centers of decision making, it will have a limited 
effect. 
In the future I propose to analyse more deeply the impact of associational life on 
democratization and on the quality of democracy. We argue that two analytical 
dimensions should structure this project: (1) whether the association defends the 
interests of elites (e.g. professional, business groups) or the less advantaged (e.g. urban 
and rural unions, immigrants’ associations), with intermediate categories of associations 
of elites with public minded service (e.g. charities) and associations that are places of 
cross-class/group cooperation and/or public interest organizations (e.g. women’s, 
religious, advocacy groups); (2) whether the role of membership in the associations is 
high or low - meaning the degree of members’ participation and consultation in the 
activities and decisions of associations1501. In a second phase we deepen our analysis by 
studying a sample of associations that will be chosen according to their theoretical 
relevance to the process of democratization. In this respect, popular sector mass 
membership voluntary associations are particularly relevant. Core associations of our 
research could be public interest, cross-class and of the disadvantaged. In particular, 
these arenas of interest are important: parents associations, religious, immigrants, 
cooperatives, welfare and mutual aid (sickness, health, educational), political debating 
societies, women, veterans, farmers, consumers, neighbourhood, public service groups, 
                                                 
1498 Tocqueville, vol. I, 1994, p. 196. 
1499 Skocpol, 2003, p. 287. 
1500 Tocqueville, 1994, vol. II, pp. 116-117; Wolin, 2001, p. 344. 
1501 Skocpol, 2003;Wilson, 1973 
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and community services. We propose to build an in-depth qualitative and quantitative 
data set of their organizational characteristics: profile of founders, leaders and members, 
trends in membership, mobilization capacity, sources of funding, services provided to 
members and public in general, professionalisation of the activities, mechanisms of 
internal debate and selection of policy and leadership, members attitudes, leisure 
activities, networks with other associations and the degree to which they are inserted in 
federations1502. 
Finally, associational landscapes should be inserted within a general theory of 
socio-political coalitions in regime transitions and within democracy. Drawing on the 
idea of «sets of subpolitical families»1503 and in the work of Martin Shefter1504, I define 
a socio-political coalition as a relatively unified composite of social and political actors, 
namely organizational leaders and their followings, that engage in a certain moment 
under a common quest for power. Coalitions are not purely socio-economic, but involve 
institutional actors, like state bureaucrats or church officials. Rarely are also composed 
of only two groups. 
In the modern world we can identify three main types of political coalitions: a 
coalition for reform (oriented to gradual but sustained change of existing institutions in 
the direction of more democracy), a coalition for reaction (oriented to maintenance of 
existing status-quo, whatever it may be), a coalition for revolution (oriented to rapid and 
radical social and political change). Several actors may compose these coalitions: 
middle classes, intellectuals, bureaucrats, military, peasantry, landowners, etc. The 
important fact here is that the same actors may participate in different socio-political in 
different countries or periods. Also, the specific weight and political strength of these 
coalitions varies a lot between periods, between countries and within countries (this 
means that in a specific country a reformist coalition is dominant, but may also exist 
and operate a revolutionary coalition, with its specific clientele, institutional sites and so 
on). Note also that the same groups may have different political positions in different 
periods and countries. For instances, middle classes associational leaders may be pro-
democratic, but also against democracy. We should as well consider the probability of 
working classes within a reactionary coalition. Another element is that there exist 
several institutional sites for these coalitions. The first and most obvious of these sites in 
                                                 
1502 Collier, 2006; Wilson, 1973. 
1503 Schmitter, 1992, pp. 162-5. 
1504 Shefter, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c. 
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the modern age is the political party and the party system should be considered together 
and in articulation with the realm of associability, of voluntary associations, religious 
denominations, social movements, the media, courts etc. I would claim that to observe 
the causes of a positive relation between civil society and democracy we should look for 
the causes of the ascent to power of a socio-political coalition that structures political 
struggle by reform. Since a socio-political coalition is composed of elites based in 
diverse organizational and associational sites, the associations that favor democracy 
would be the ones that compose that coalition (they may, or may not be, be unions; they 
may, or may not be, be capital associations; they may, or may not be, professional 





APPENDIX: Research Design and Methods 
 
In order to test the theory developed in the previous chapters, I propose an 
approach that I call historically oriented comparative structural analysis. Let’s see what 
each these terms means and why I consider this to be the best approach to the study of 
associational life. 
 
1. A Historical-Structuralist Approach 
 
An historical approach, from the point of view of the dependent variable, or the 
outcomes to be explained, explicitly locates the phenomena to explain in time and 
space, in stretches of identifiable periods and concrete locations. The construction of the 
cases is the result of an attention to historical similarities and differences, which are 
considered empirical wholes. This means that the researcher first proceeds by induction, 
trying to observe similarities and differences between the societies he’s researching. 
From a disparate set of sources, both primary and secondary, there is an effort to arrive 
at descriptive generalizations or properties according to which the phenomena under 
interest can be classified. This process relies much in induction: looking for instances of 
a phenomena of interest and theorize about their properties. At the same time, there is 
also a deductive side since the diverse existing theories are put in contrast with the 
historical variation and serve as guidelines to better interpret and classify the data. In the 
process, the descriptive theory is also reformulated and a new definition of the 
phenomena is presented. 
This is a more fruitful approach to either purely interpretative historical analysis 
or pure deductive research 1505 . Historical analysis frequently arrives at conclusions 
about a case which, although frequently of interest and rich of intelligent suggestions, 
cannot really prove that the causes imputed to a phenomenon are not present in other 
settings. In this sense, historical analysis frequently assumes the uniqueness and 
incomparability of societies and is more interested in establishing the particularism of 
phenomena. But either in terms of the definition of the case and its imputed causes, 
there is no way to know their validity since there is no comparison with other cases. 
That would violate the axioms of many historians, because by assuming the need to 
                                                 
1505 In the field of studies of associational life, an example of the former is Hoffmann, 2006, and of the 
latter Putnam, 1993. 
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compare, one has to start thinking more about similarities between societies differently 
located in time and space, and hence going beyond simple description and thinking 
more on general criteria on what and how compare. Purely deductive approaches use 
frequently the historical cases to illustrate a theory, to prove that a theory is applicable 
to instances of reality, hence right, or to find deviations from the theory only. In this 
sense, is less attentive to the varying uniqueness of the cases and frequently looks more 
for instances of cases where the theory is “proven right”. A more inductive analysis is 
more case-oriented, looking for puzzles in the real world, theorizing about those 
puzzles, finding variation about them, and then start asking questions about their 
varying causes. On the other hand, deductive theories are indispensable, because one 
cannot think about the world without guidelines and principles of classification, causal 
interpretation and of facilitating conditions. But theories when used in a too deductive 
way can also block the advancement of new ideas, which only comes from noting 
empirical patterns not foreseen and explained by the existing theories. Moreover, 
historically oriented social science, while avoiding the errors of particularism and 
uniqueness of some historiographic schools, pay more attention to case definition than 
purely deductive approaches, especially theory driven macro-quantitative studies, where 
the cases are just points or indicators in a scale. Deductive statistical reasoning since 
relies mainly in canned quantitative data gives does not problematizes the comparability 
of cases. 
In this sense, a mixed inductive-deductive approach is the best antidote for these 
drawbacks. In particular, it is a privileged way to establish variation that allows for the 
testing of different hypothesis. As Ragin argues, once a phenomenon of interest is 
identified, it is necessary to identify sub-types of the phenomena/concept, that is, to 
historicize it1506. Having a scale of variation that is sensitive to both differences and 
similarities, allows the researcher more easily to go from the particular to the general, to 
identify specific and particular instances of a phenomenon. Moreover, this approach 
allows for the testing of the particular weight of each existing theory. Since we’re 
looking for multicausal processes, different cases should show variations the 
combinations and weight of the theorized causes. Each of this combination produces a 
distinct path to associational life, our theme under investigation. Finally, this is 
                                                 
1506 Ragin, 1989, p. 44. 
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approach is similar to what Charles Ragin has identified as QCA (Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis). 
Second, from the point of view of the explanatory strategy pursued, it has been 
given a primacy to a historical explanation, as opposed to a more presentist approach. 
Many processes take long time periods to unfold and many historical processes have 
consequences in the future that were not possible to have been predicted. Only 
perspectives attentive to historical processes over long periods of time capture this. 
Otherwise we’ll fall in the fallacy of presentism, where everything that happens in a 
certain moment is shaped by its immediate context. 
In the historical-comparative literature the terms now fashionable to define these 
historical processes are critical juncture and path dependency. Path dependency means 
that in certain historical contexts, self reinforcing processes are set in motion that have 
outcomes unfolding over time long after the historical-specific causes for it have 
disappeared1507. This is very important in the study of associational life because many 
have argued that voluntary associations usually survive for long their founding moment, 
much after the contextual conditions of their emergence have long disappeared. The 
second term is critical juncture, meaning that are historical contexts where 
organizational and institutional innovation and fluidity is very high, when several and 
alternative possibilities of evolution can develop1508. Other periods are more stable and 
predictable. This is also important when studying associational life, since many have 
also observed that associations tend to appear in waves, there are periods of immense 
foundation of associations, and others of much slower growth (e.g. the waves of 
fraternities founding in the USA)1509. 
Also, a short term temporal approach is less attentive to multiple and 
combinatorial causation, because when one tries to find long term processes unfolding 
over time, it is frequent to find not one but several independent processes that 
sometimes interact and as a consequence produce outcomes of interest. In this sense 
there are several processes unfolding over time, frequently intersecting, or not, and 
whose combinations will have different impacts. Many real world contemporary 
phenomena are unintended consequences of cross-cutting and convergent processes. As 
Katznelson argues, society is the «structured concatenation of processes» (e.g. state 
                                                 
1507 Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003, p. 11. 
1508 Mahoney, 2001, pp. 113-114. 
1509 Stinchcombe, 1986, p. 197; see also Wilson, 1973, p. 198. 
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building, market expansion etc) and while these do not determine behavior in a rigid 
way, they are conditioning strongly individuals’ actions and thinking1510. In this sense 
causality is combinatorial. Deductive-statistical method, on the contrary, is in a way 
more simplistic because each supposed cause in only seen in isolation. In this sense 
there is less attention to causal complexity, leaving many important questions without 
an answer. For instance, as we have argued, a very dense and coordinated associational 
life, what we’ve called the hegemonic pattern (of the Scandinavian countries, 
especially) is the result of three variables operating together, none of which alone would 
produce this outcome, but which are the result of autonomous historical processes (high 
state capacity, high parliamentarization and an unbroken continuity of premodern 
corporate forms of associational life). 
In fact, statistical investigations are good at presenting tests to see the degree to 
which certain phenomena are associated (positively, negatively or in null way), but less 
good at presenting causal factors. Correlation is not causation; it is just the measure of 
certain phenomena being associated with each other. Historical approaches are better 
suited to look for causes because since causes must temporally occur prior to effect, one 
tries to trace the genesis of the phenomena under investigation and the immediate and 
previous context of it, and then, looking for variation always, hypothesizes about its 
causes1511. 
Timing and sequence of historical processes are also important. Not only when 
things happen but the order of which they happen relative to other processes determines 
the outcomes being studied. If things happen before or after a certain event, their impact 
can vary. In Tilly’s words, «when things happen within a sequence affects how they 
happen»1512. In this line of reasoning, we have argued that countries that were early 
state builders were led to impose for much longer periods of time the extraction of 
resources on society (through taxes, confiscations etc) in order to wage war and as a 
consequence, eliminate the guilds much earlier, which proved to condition future 
associational life in the late nineteenth century. 
                                                
Thirdly, historical approach understood in these lines, leads one to a more 
structuralist line of explanation. If one is looking at the converging impact of different 
processes over longer periods of time, one more easily apprehends dynamics which 
 
1510 Katznelson, 1997, p. 83. 
1511 Ragin, 1989, pp. 34-35; Katzenstein, 1985, p. 21, 
1512 Pierson, 2000. 
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were not foreseen, especially unintended consequences of the sequence, timing and 
intersection of these processes. This is what we mean by structuralism, the idea that 
phenomena in society are not wholly determined by the intentions of actors but instead 
are consequences of the actions of many actors acting at the same time with different 
aims and objectives. In our opinion, these are very interesting phenomena. It is not that 
everything is fully determined and that action and possibilism are totally impossible. 
But in order to assess degrees of freedom, one first has to determine the unchosen and 
fixed contexts under which action takes place. This is what we mean by structuralism. 
To operationalize this structural approach, we’ve used John Stuart Mill’s 
methods of agreement and difference 1513 . Mill´s method is better for arriving at 
deterministic causations and parsimonious explanations, even considering that 
sometimes they may be too deterministic and rapid at eliminating factors that could be 
of interest. The method of agreement hypothesizes about the causes of a similar 
outcome by eliminating the different traits of the similar cases and considering only 
their common background traits. We have used this method mainly within each 
theorized case of pattern of associational life. We ask, for instance, what do cases of 
Hegemonic associational life have in common? All factors that are not common to all 
cases are not considered as potential explanation. Then we check these supposed factors 
to all the other cases outside the theorized type of associational life, that is, all other 
types of associational life. This is the method of difference. The identified factors, or 
combination of factors, within each type of associational life to be considered valid 
must be absent in other types. It compares cases differing in the dependent variable and 
eliminates the previous common traits arrived at by the method of agreement if they 
happen to exist in the negative cases. In the end of this process of a series of paired 
comparisons, the researcher should be able to discern patterns of multiple causation1514. 
Finally, the comparative logic is to western Europe tough and valid only to the 
period between the late nineteenth and the end of the twentieth century. We look for 
multiple causal paths 1515  within Europe, as della Porta says, we aim at «rich 
descriptions of a few instances of a certain phenomenon»1516. Moreover, our approach 
is a kind of soft QCA, not operationalized technically as Ragin defends, but using it 
suggestions as rationales for case description and evaluation. We have a medium 
                                                 
1513 Mahoney, 1999; Thelen, Steinmo, 1992, p. 13. 
1514 Ragin, 1989, pp. 34-35, 40. 
1515 On this notion see della Porta, 2008, pp. 213-214. 
1516 della Porta, 2008, p. 198. 
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number of cases, which allows for the growth of a multiplicity of causal conditions and 
combinations. Ragin’s inights were particularly useful in building up the truth tables 
where we tabulated the theorized outcomes with their possible causal conditions. 
Finally, our aim is to arrive at a middle level theory, true for a certain set of 
cases/societies in a certain time and period. As della Porta argues this is a weberian 
approach, that looks for causal to explain a certain variation and where generalization is 
limited and bounded spatially and temporaly1517. But we also argue that it might be 
possible to extend the causal factors identified as relevant and apply them to other areas 
and time periods. In this sense it is possible to go beyond the set of western European 
cases in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and see to which degree do conclusions 
that explain its variations can be reconceptualized and applied to other settings. To what 
extent does our theory travel to other times and places? It can serve as a model. If we 
say that the strongest associational life is the result of high a parliamentarization of the 
regime, a strong state and strong corporatist pre-modern tradition, this may be 
applicable to other areas world, like Eastern Europe in the same time period, including 
Russia, or Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and especially the USA. 
                                                
 
2. An Institutional and Organizational Focus 
 
 Finally, we propose an Institutional-Organizational focus. We have argued in the 
previous chapters that the causes of associational life lie in the interaction of 
associational legacies with patterns of institutional and state development. Our aim is to 
discern how legacies associational life from past periods (e.g. old regime guilds and 
corporations) are shaped and themselves shape the institutional and state processes that 
led to the emergence of patterns of associational life in the 1930s. How shall we go on 
to observe this in terms of an analysis? On the side of the dependent variable, we should 
focus in chosen sets of associations and see their organizational development and 
history in relation to the state, institutions and target groups through long stretches of 
time1518. We have argued that it necessary to go beyond survey and attitudinal data and 
to put associations themselves in the center of analysis, as actors of their own right1519. 
 
1517 della Porta, 2008, pp. 200, 203; see also Tilly, 1984, pp. 142-143. 
1518 Skocpol, 1999a, pp. 34-35. 
1519 For the notion of organizations as actors see Schmitter, 1983 and 1992. 
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 On the side of the independent variables we have argued that associational life 
will reflect the process of nation building and that the institutional constraints and 
opportunities of the polity shape associations. In this sense, our research tries to 
operationalize what Katznelson calls a polity-centered approach. Institutions are 
«middle level mediations between large scale processes and the micro dynamics of 
agency and action». They mediate between interest formation and aggregation and 
historical developments1520. This means that on the side of the independent variable we 
must look at processes of state building, legacies of institutions from previous eras (e.g. 
timing of state building) and the functioning of regime institutions, namely parliaments, 
governments, the bureaucracy, the army and the police. Their interaction with efforts of 
association building has produced the different patterns of associational life we 
hypothesized. 
 How do we put together these two aspects? By a causally informed historical 
narrative. We’ll tell a story that links the outcomes to be explained to the combinations 
of causal conditions. We’ll proceed through an analytical narrative. In the words of 
Philippe Schmitter, a narrative is «a plausible story that places the associations (the 
researchers) calculate and the inferences they draw in some chronological order. 
Narration can also serve to fill in the gaps between cause and effect by providing a 
verbal description of the mechanisms involved»1521. 
 Still, it is necessary to specify the components of that story. Since we’re 
interested in explaining variations in a certain phenomenon, we first must be sure that 
the cases are comparable. In this sense the cases are comparable when it should be 
expected that all these cases could have fell in any of the outcome categories. Cases 
must have had similar starting conditions, a similar starting point after which their 
differences accentuated through time. The push for the development of modern 
associational life was similar but ended having different evolutionary paths. This is 
what is made in the first chapter of the second part where we theorize on the issue of 
associational life in nineteenth-century Europe. We identify a common background to 
all the cases. Then, the following chapters of Part II and the whole of Part III make a 
causal narrative of each distinctive pattern of associational life. 
  
3. Data and Sources 
                                                 
1520 Katznelson, 1997, pp. 84, 91.  
1521 Schmitter, n. d., p. 21. 
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 In terms of data selection data, we first used standardized data on membership 
on voluntary associations and on federative structures of unions in western Europe, in 
order to have a reliable starting point to compare national level associational structures. 
This type of data is quite relevant for this task for two reasons. Theoretically we have 
argued that participation in voluntary associations is still today mainly through 
membership, that loose and non-organizational forms of participation, tough important, 
are rarer. So membership is still a very valid concept, as Ulzurrum, for instance, 
recently argued1522. Second, surveys provided reliable and standardized data since the 
questions to all countries analysed are very similar. In this sense surveys are still a vry 
good starting point for ranking and classifying cases 1523 . Also the other data on 
confederative structures of unions, mainly systematized by Colin Crouch, has the 
advantage of being standardized1524. But this was only the starting point, then it was 
necessary to focus the analyses in specific forms of association and on patterns of state-
association relationships. 
 We also try to go beyond surveys and data public opinion data and procede to an 
in-depth analysis of specific organizations, in particular mutual aid societies, religious, 
agriculture, and industry (unions). These associations are the main actors of our story. 
We were interested in collecting data on their number, memberships, time duration, the 
degree to which they became federated and non-federated groups, territorial scope, 
organizational structure, sources and quantities of funding, services provided to 
members, the meaning of participation for members, and data on their leaders (party 
affiliation etc)1525. 
 For the independent variables we looked for laws on freedom of association, on 
the right of demonstration, reunion, and strike; information on the effective practices of 
bureaucrats and state officials on the daily life of associations; legislative framework on 
the forms organizations are allowed to take; definitions of public-private status, fiscal 
treatment, responsibilities of policy implementation and their rules and practices, 
                                                 
1522 Ulzurrum, 2001, pp. 1-2. 
1523 Ulzurrum, 2002. 
1524 Howard, 2003, pp. 51-53. 
1525 Ekiert, Kubik, 1999, p. 107; Gamm and Putnam, 1999; Schmitter, 1971, pp. 137-150, 228; Skocpol, 
2003, pp. 21, 29; Skocpol, 2004, p. 36; Skocpol, Cobb, Klofstad, 2004, p. 11; Walliser, 2003, pp. 9-16. 
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incorporation in decision making bodies, labor codes. It was also important to know the 
associational affiliations of elites (deputies, ministers)1526. 
 Such a vast study relies mainly on secondary sources, complemented here and 
there by primary sources like associational reports. But the bulk of the material of this 
dissertation comes mainly from a vast number of monographs on the history of 
associational life for a period of a bit more of two hundred years. Through comparison 
and juxtaposition of these varied sources of information, it tries to achieve a unique and 
hopefully original interpretation of the whole process of associational life in Europe 
since the late 1700s. 
 
                                                 
1526 Schmitter, 1971, pp. 150-154; Schmitter, 1997, p. 249; see also on some of these aspects Bartolini, 
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